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ABSTRACT 
 
From the aftermath of Suez to the Kosovo campaign, Britain lost most of its colonies and 
ended up taking a moral interventionist stance on the world stage with the US its major 
ally.  Against that contextual background, this thesis considers the attitudes in Britain 
towards its Armed Forces and war from 1960 to 2000.  Using a range of lenses, the paper 
highlights the complexity of change.  Homosexuality was a scandalous issue for society 
in the 1960s, such that the 1967 Act which decriminalised it was not really widely 
accepted.  For the Armed Forces, searches for homosexuals increased on grounds of 
security.  The Act of Remembrance, as recorded in churches, shows the mixed approach 
of the clergy to war, particularly dependent on their own experience, and also the change 
in mood from a religious service to a secular one.  In the notable campaigns that did take 
place over the period, Borneo, the Falklands, Bosnia, Kosovo and the Gulf War, a 
methodical view is taken of opinion polls, press coverage, and letters pages to establish 
trends at the political, elite and public levels.  The media has been used as a reference 
throughout the thesis as a measure of opinion, but here is analysed for its own biases and 
approaches, since it has a clear effect on people’s opinions, both from fiction and fact.  
Overall, the thesis paints a complex web of declining interest in defence issues, greater 
self-interest amongst many, increasing secularisation, and greater tolerance, yet 
conversely, points to underlying themes of pride in individual servicemen and the 
institution of the Armed Forces.   
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 
 
The relationship between the British public and its Armed Forces is complex and has 
changed over time e.g. the period of National Service in the 1950s probably brought 
public and Armed Forces closer than at any time since.  The Clausewitzian trinity of 
government, armed forces and people achieves the most success when all three work as 
one; but as popular attitudes change, so the potential arises for the three elements to be 
disunited; the purpose of this thesis is to look at the attitudinal changes over this complex 
period1.  Most researchers focus on the political level or the commanders; few attempt to 
understand the people’s view, yet through their ability to vote and influence political 
decision-making they actually provide underpinning legitimacy for action and can shape 
the course of events2. 
 
Research Questions and Definitions  
 
The primary research questions addressed in this thesis are: to what extent have cultural 
changes affected British attitudes to warfare, and how has the way British forces (and  
their opponents) conducted themselves on a range of operations changed public opinion? 
Moreover, how has the Church influenced public opinion on warfare, and what has been 
the impact of the media on public opinion, in relation to warfare? 
 
                                                 
1 Clausewitz, K von, On War; Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds/trans)  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976, revised 1984).  
2 Personal military service from the Falklands, former Yugoslavia and Iraq has given the author a specialist 
interest over and above that of an historian. 
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Before considering the changes in British attitudes to war, it is necessary to define some 
key terms. The notion of ‘Britishness’ changed in the forty-year period under discussion, 
in part because of mass migration to the UK.3  It has been argued that ‘the idea of Britain 
as a nation or Britishness as an identity is a little out of date’4.  Richard Weight has 
argued that national identity is rather more than Benedict Anderson’s concept of 
‘imagined communities’5, but is concerned with how people define themselves in 
accordance with the nation (be that state or not) to which they feel they belong.  His 
central argument is that Britain, as an amalgam of ‘states’ has preserved national cultural 
differences.  He characterizes the growth of Britain as being marked by conceit of 
superiority in Empire, leading to racialism and bigotry, despite a perception of fairness 
and benevolence in running an Empire covering a quarter of the globe.  He suggests that 
it sought to create wealth, preserve class and promote the Protestant religion, but from 
1940 to 2000, the industrial and financial advantages that kept the Scots and the Welsh 
loyal to the Union started to weaken; secularization weakened religious links; migration 
and demographics changed the nature of the country; and that class divisions eroded. 
Above all else, the notion that being English was broadly synonymous with being British  
increasingly rankled with Scotland and Wales.  The advent of the European Union also 
brought into question what Britishness meant.  The end of the century saw the British 
                                                 
3 Emigration exceeded immigration in every year to 1985, and even then immigration was broadly in step 
with emigration until 1995 when immigration increased dramatically: Schenk, C R; in Carnevali F and 
Strange J-M, (eds.) 20th Century Britain; (Harlow: Pearson Educational 2007).  This thesis will not, for 
reasons of space, consider the different attitudes of minorities (e.g. Muslims) towards war and Britain’s 
armed forces.  But there is relevance here, to the debate in the Armed Forces over diversity, and the desire 
to gain increased numbers from ethnic minorities to better ‘reflect’ British society – a theme explore by 
Chris Dandeker and David Mason in ‘Diversifying the Uniform?  The Participation of Minority Ethnic 
Personnel in the British Armed Services’ Armed Forces and Society 2003; Vol 29; pp. 481-507  
4 Cosmo Landesman quoted in Peschiera, R, ‘After Hours’, Summer 2007 Institute of Directors.  For a 
summary of scholarly debates see Weight, Richard, Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1940-2000 
(London: Macmillan 2002) pp. 16-19. 
5 Anderson, B, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism  (London: 
1991 Verso) pp. 5-7 
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redefine themselves as Scots, Welsh, English and Northern Irish, who happened to live in 
Britain.6  
 
Thus ‘British attitudes’ are not monolithic. Moreover, cultural changes in this period have 
affected attitudes to warfare. Arguably views on risk-taking changed in the 1980s, as a 
desire for greater wealth and an apparent greater opportunity for success led people to be 
more adventurous. In the 1990s, changes in the international, technical and societal 
environment profoundly changed societies’ relationships with their armed forces across 
Europe in particular7.  Dandeker described these as the ‘New Times’, a period of radical 
change8.  However, in 2000, one scholar was still asserting that public opinion has acted a 
constraint on the extent to which Britain has been able to intervene in what he describes 
as ‘civil wars’9.  
 
The two definitions of ‘attitudes’ of most use are ‘the stance that individuals take on a 
subject that predisposes them to act and react in certain ways’10 and ‘a complex mental 
state involving beliefs and feelings and values and dispositions to act in certain ways’11.  
The element most worthy of note is taking of a particular position on a topic. However, 
many people do not routinely take a stance on defence issues, which thus requires some 
                                                 
6 Weight, Patriots,pp. 665-680 
7 Forster A, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2006) pp. 6-7 and 
Dandeker C, ‘On “The Need to be Different”: Recent Trends in Military Culture’ in Strachan H (ed) The 
British Army: Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century (London: Franck Cass 2000) p.173-187 
8 Dandeker, C ‘New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and 
Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies’ The British Journal of Sociology Vol 45 No 4 
(December 1994) pp637-654 
9 Dixon P, ‘Britain’s ‘Vietnam Syndrome’? Public Opinion and British military intervention from Palestine 
to Yugoslavia’ in Review of International Studies (2000) Vol 26 p. 99 British International Studies 
Association. 
10 wps.pearsoned.co.uk/wps/media/objects/1452/1487687/glossary/glossary.html 
11 wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn 
4  
testing (e.g. opinion polling) to determine what that might be.  Predisposition reflects a 
link to culture (and norms and mores), and hence why this requires further explanation.  
The latter definition reflects the idea of beliefs and feelings – things like patriotism – a 
hard concept to measure, yet a key feature in British history and psyche. 
 
War can be defined as ‘The most extreme manifestation of armed conflict, characterised 
by intense, extensive and sustained combat, usually between states’ 12.  British Defence 
Doctrine13 expands on this definition, making clear that war is the event; warfare its 
conduct; and acknowledges the cultural, societal and political elements which this thesis 
attempts to explore.  This implies that war and warfare cover the gamut of conflict, and 
will involve all kinds of people, and not just those in the armed forces.  This was 
recognised by General Rupert Smith: ‘the people in the streets and houses and fields – all 
the people anywhere – are the battlefield’14.  And although British doctrine15 suggests 
that irregular activity might not be described as ‘war’, for the purposes of this thesis it 
will be included, in line with General Smith’s comment and the perception in people’s 
minds that these are at least related.   
  
It is necessary to develop the issue of social and cultural change. There are a number of 
models of society, including the basic three layer convention of upper, middle and lower 
                                                 
12 JDP 0-01.1 (UK Glossary of Multinational Terms and Definitions) Ministry of Defence.  Taking this 
further, armed conflict is further defined as: ‘a situation in which violence or military force is threatened or 
used.  Generally it is a contest between two opposing sides, each seeking to impose its will on the other; 
however, intra-state conflict may involve several factions’. 
13 British Defence Doctrine, Ministry of Defence, Draft Version 
14 Smith, General Sir Rupert, ‘The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World’, (London: 
Penguin 2005) p. 3 
15 BDD 3rd Edn Op cit para 236 
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class; the 1921 Registrar-General’s five categories16 (I-V) based on work types (this has 
been developed over the years and is still in use, but the changes in groups make 
comparisons difficult over the 40-year period under discussion); and the division on 
socio-economic grounds of A-C used in marketing. 
 
Social scientists have regularly debated divisions along class lines for their relevance and 
usage: ‘Even within a society, different people or groups may have very different ideas 
about what makes one "higher" or "lower" in the social hierarchy’17. Sociologist Dennis 
Wrong defines class in two ways - realist and nominalist. The realist definition relies on 
clear class boundaries to which people adhere in order to create social groupings. They 
identify themselves with a particular class and interact mainly with people in this class. 
The nominalist definition of class focuses on the characteristics that people share in a 
given class - education, occupation, etc18. Class is therefore determined not by the group 
in which you place yourself or the people you interact with, but rather by these common 
characteristics.  One's class is thus determined conventionally by: occupation, education 
and qualifications, income, personal, household and per capita wealth or net worth, 
including the ownership of land, property, means of production, et cetera, family 
background and aspirations19. 
                                                 
16 See http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU9.html for more detail - Social Update 9 July 1995 accessed 3 March 
2010. 
17 Kerbo, Harold R. Social stratification and inequality: class conflict in historical and comparative 
perspective. (New York: McGraw-Hill 1996)  p.12 
18 There has been much debate over Marxist views on class – broadly that history is based around class 
struggles between the owners of wealth and the workers – but this is not the approach being used here.  See 
http://www.bolenderinitiatives.com/sociology/karl-marx-1818-1883/karl-marx-class-theory accessed 6 
October 2010 and Marwick, A, ‘Images of the working class since 1930’ in Winter, J, The working class in 
Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge Journals 2000) pp. 215-232 for more. 
19 Wrong, D, The oversocialised conception of man (New York: Transaction Publishers 1999) p. 3 and 
Readings in introductory sociology (London: Macmillan 1977) p. 1  
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If one cannot easily use a class-based structure to analyse British society, then the 
tendency is to lean towards a model of an elite20, comprising opinion-formers within 
academia, the defence industrial sector, informed non-military individuals and 
philosophers; a political group, based in UK around Whitehall and including Government 
and Opposition, with surrounding Government Departments and supporting staff; and the 
rest of society, broadly termed the ‘masses’21.  This is one of the conceptual frameworks 
to be used in this thesis and will be examined further shortly.   
  
If we accept, for the purposes of this work, that we can divide society into political, elite 
and mass groupings, we can then look at broad outlooks on Britain’s aims in a foreign 
and defence policy view from 1960.  Martin Ceadal’s conceptual model of theoretical 
attitudes to war and their relationship to Just War theory is helpful22: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Mermin believes that in the US, the group of most attentive and informed members of the population on 
domestic issues might be around 5%, and that on foreign policy it might much less than 5%.  It seems likely 
that the proportions in UK are not dissimilar.  Mermin also notes the revisionist debate, still in progress, 
that the traditional view that the masses are uninformed is overstated.  Mermin, J, Debating War and Peace 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999) p. 33 
21 Wright-Mills’ ‘power elite’, from which much of the media studies literature is based, includes corporate 
rich, political decision-makers, and military leaders; the latter dominant when he wrote his book The Power 
Elite (London: OUP 1956) p. 28 from the Second World War, and especially in the US.  See also Appendix 
1. 
22 Ceadal, M, Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987) pp. 4-5 
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Table 1.1  Ceadal’s theoretical attitudes to war 
 
Militarist Militarists are characterized as those who 
view society as inherently anarchic, that a 
nation’s role is therefore to fight and win, 
and that that is a perfectly legitimate state 
of affairs which requires large professional 
armies and largely martial values.  Its 
(limited number of) proponents would 
argue it is the only way a society develops.  
Crusading Crusaders share the perception that 
aggressive war is justifiable, but do not 
regard that as essential and are mostly 
inclined to peace.  They would argue that 
an aggressive act might be justifiable to 
either mend another nation’s ways or to 
impose a set of values upon them. 
Defencist Defencists differ from militarists in 
recognizing a form of peaceful society, but 
fear others might not share their views and 
might lean to war – hence if you want 
peace, prepare for war.  They therefore 
acknowledge the need for standing armies, 
8  
but do not believe in aggressive acts of 
force. 
Pacificist Pacificists believe that society is inherently 
bound to peace; that resolution can be 
found through a variety of means, but 
accept that armed force may be required to 
defend the political gains.  They therefore 
reject aggressive wars and most defensive 
ones 
Pacifist Pacifists totally reject war and support for 
war as permissible 
 
 In that context, it is pertinent to ask to what extent the British have moved from being 
largely ‘defencist’ (from the times of Cold War threat and superpower tensions of the 
early 1960s23) towards the ‘crusader’ model in the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in 
the 1990s. This question has to be considered at all levels in society, for it is one of 
perception.  Indeed, one may reasonably ask of each level whether people felt it mattered.  
In a similar vein, it is necessary to ask not only whether people felt it was right to enter 
into a conflict, whether that is a defencist or moral cause, but whether they were affected, 
or indeed cared, about the conduct of that conflict.  This gets to the heart of the practical 
application of Just War theory. 
 
                                                 
23 In the late 1950s one of the major engagements for British forces was in Cyprus, in which many of the 
features of modern conflict in a moral context were apparent.  This provides a sound lead in to this thesis. 
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The next question is: by looking at the conflicts Britain in which British forces have been 
engaged, how has their use and the way that they conducted themselves changed public 
opinion?  Here, public opinion represents a broad feeling expressed on a particular issue, 
as reflected in the media, political debate and measurable in opinion poll data.  In reality, 
this is a difficult issue to measure, since few issues galvanise overwhelming public 
reaction. This brings into question the determinants of right and wrong – such as being 
out of sight and therefore out of mind (as, arguably, in the case of the Northern Ireland 
conflict); what is regarded as of national importance; and the change in moral values over 
time and between elements of the population.  Why are Special Forces accorded a special 
place in public affection, and how far can their actions be taken and yet still be supported 
within the law and within public perception?  More broadly, does the conduct of British 
forces really matter, and if the answer to that is that historically it has varied in 
acceptability, what are the determinants of acceptability?  On specific operations, what 
made the Falklands War different from Bosnia/Kosovo or the First Gulf War? Included in 
this series of questions is that of the perceived acceptability of taking casualties, both 
prior to the operation and the actuality during the conflict itself.  
 
Also of interest is the way homosexuality has been regarded in the Armed Forces.  
Although homosexuality ceased to be a criminal offence in 1967 24 the forces were 
exempt from this legislation.  As public acceptance increased over the subsequent 
quarter-century, the Forces became more active in investigating and removing 
homosexuals. What this says about the relationship between the military and the public is 
                                                 
24 This was in the context of social liberalisation in the 1960s. However I have deliberately avoided the use 
of the term ‘permissive society’ as this appears to be a retrospective term and one which has its own 
symbolism, rather than a useful term for general trends. 
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the topic of a case study. By considering the changing nature of the Church’s relationship 
with society, particularly through the lens of Remembrance Sunday, one can discern a 
change in societal values, and growing secularization in memorialisation. By examining 
the media and popular culture, one can analyse the changes in type of content and 
evaluate its effects on attitudes more generally.  
 
In this thesis, it is argued that public opinion at all levels in society made the distinction 
between the ‘total’ conflicts such as the world wars; ‘limited’ wars such as the Falklands 
that were perceived as winnable; and nuclear war, and rationalised their attitudes to war 
along those lines.  The reality is, of course, that those boundaries were blurred. If, for 
instance, the public perception of the First World War is of the Western Front, then it 
would have affected, through the act of Remembrance, views of modern campaigns 
involving the use of non-regular volunteer forces.  
 
The Measures 
 
If those are the basic research questions, then what are the measures of public opinion?  
First, there is the media coverage in all its forms, though this has to be qualified by its 
relationship with public opinion.  Next are opinion polls, which are equally limited 
because they are wholly dependent on the sample size and the way questions are phrased.  
There are the comments of politicians and members of the elite, either in Hansard or in 
broadsheets, or equally in the more discursive pieces in documentaries. Cultural pieces, 
from popular TV programmes and films to art, are also of relevance. Particular insights 
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can be gleaned from looking at the act of Remembrance over the years, both in terms of 
the numbers of people taking part and the attitude of the Church towards an act 
traditionally bound in sacrifice for the national, rather than holy, good.  There are letters 
to newspapers from the informed and engaged members of the population25.  In sum, this 
is a mosaic of measures.  No single test can be said to be representative and all have their 
own limitations.  Only by aggregating the views can any sort of valid impression be 
gained of public views. 
 
The Frames of Reference 
 
There are three basic frames of reference in play against which to judge public attitudes.  
The first is the nature of the belief; the attitude towards Just War theory, and what is 
acceptable in order to go to war and then the conduct of the war itself; and finally, there is 
the division of views between the political, the elite and the masses. 
 
Ceadal, himself a pacificist, suggests that the typology has two dimensions: the attitude to 
force (which allows distinctions between socialists who are crusaders from those who are 
pacific-ists or pacifists) and that the categories are ‘ideal types’ (which means that they 
are theoretical positions as opposed to actually encountered ones). 
 
This thinking relies on the precepts of Just War thinking: jus ad bellum, which governs 
the ends of the war; and jus in bello, which considers the means by which wars are 
                                                 
25 Mermin suggests that one of the major failings in research is the concentration on opinion poll data, 
whilst not considering the views of the more attentive and informed members of the population, and hence 
that letters are worthy of review.  Mermin Op cit p. 81 
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conducted.  Ceadal suggests that the move from war being the ‘norm’ to being accepted 
as ‘abnormal’, with peace as the normal state, occurred during the First World War, but 
that international law did not formalize this position until the Charter of the United 
Nations was agreed in 1945.  Perhaps this is the first clue about why Britain is always 
keen to seek a UN mandate before proceeding in conflict.  The ‘ends’ part of the debate, 
however, tends to a distinction between realism and idealism as a rationalization of the 
positions.  Yet the reality is that there is blurring between the two, as Ceadal points out 
that a militarist can view his position as entirely realistic, whilst crusaders are generally 
viewed as idealists, and then pessimistic pacifists are viewed as realists26.   
 
The problem with Ceadal’s analysis is that a nation such as Britain does not have unified 
views throughout all its component parts, and does not act as a unified whole.  
Politicians, the Armed Forces, the Church, and the general public are all actors on this 
stage and each may adopt different roles as a conflict develops.  For example, it would be 
possible to portray Britain’s involvement in the Falklands campaign as defencist, if one 
believed in the sovereignty argument, which is precisely the same argument which would 
be put forward by the Argentineans for their invasion.  Such an argument would be 
rejected by pacificists, who would question the colonial link (as did many in UK), but 
others would present the same campaign as an example of crusading, potentially by both 
sides. 
 
The concept of the political, elite and masses lies in the model of society which says that 
each level interacts, and has the fourth dimension of the media as part-glue and part-
                                                 
26 Ceadal Op cit 
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counterpoint.  The model, largely unwritten but usually assumed in most texts, suggests 
that the political level both drives policy and is responsive to the other levels in forming 
it, since the other levels broadly form the electorate.  The elite represent the opinion-
formers, part-academic, part-influential business people and part-followers of the 
‘broadsheets’.  It is impossible to judge with precision the size of the elite; Sabin has 
suggested that this might be a couple of hundred people, others think a few thousand27.  
The masses represent the greater part of society, sometimes associated with the ‘tabloid’ 
media, likely to have opinions but unlikely to lead on debates.  The model suggests that 
the media will not raise issues if all three groups are perceived to be in concert on an 
issue, but are likely to exploit any schisms between groups, particularly between 
politicians and the elite, and just as much so within each group.  The topic of whether the 
media reflect public opinion, or lead it, or act in spite of opinion is an area to be explored 
later, together with the differences between media. 
 
The nature of the sources 
 
As a work of contemporary history, and as a consequence of the 30 Year Rule, this study 
is only partly based on archival sources. Instead, a more rounded approach has been used 
to derive material from other sources.  Opinion polls have been widely used, with their 
drawbacks heeded28. A range of newspapers have been used to derive editorial comment, 
letters from the public and to measure the extent of coverage (or lack of it).  Other media 
sources, such as television programmes, films, theatre, and cartoons have been used to 
                                                 
27 Interview Badsey 31 Mar 2009, Philo14 February 2008, Sabin 26 July 2007 
28 Opinion polls must be treated with caution because, for example, the way questions are asked and the 
nature of the sponsoring organisation may influence the results.  
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provide evidence of public tastes and changes in attitudes.  The aim has been to use a 
range of sources to triangulate changes in public opinion over the period. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Included in the range of sources above has been a review of current literature.  The nature 
of the period means that there are relatively few defining texts to use; much of the work 
to date has been to fix the historiography rather than to analyse changes in trends or make 
wider comparisons.  Nevertheless, authors such as Ceadal29 have attempted to establish 
models for considering attitudes to peace and war.  Kerbo30 and Wrong31, amongst others, 
have analysed society to propose models of class systems.  Sandbrook32 has emerged as 
one of the key reviewers of the 1960s to 1980s, together with work by Hennessy33 and 
Morgan34, whilst Rupert Smith35 has proposed a model of the ‘new’ way of war since the 
1990s. 
 
On homosexuality, the key texts are Gorer36, Seabrook37, Westwood38, Weeks39 and 
Halperin40.  Much of this work influenced or is influenced by the Wolfenden Report41.  
                                                 
29 Ceadal, M, Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987) 
30 Kerbo, Harold R, Social Stratification and Inequality: Class conflict in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective (New York: McGraw-Hill 1996) 
31 Wrong, D, The oversocialised conception of man (New York: Transaction Publishers 1999) and 
Readings in introductory sociology (London: Macmillan 1977) 
32 Sandbrook, D,.  White Heat.  (London, Little Brown 2006) 
33 Hennessy, P, Having it so Good  (London: Penguin 2007) 
34 Morgan, K O,  Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace.  (Oxford: OUP 1990 this edn 2001) 
35 Smith, General, Sir Rupert,  The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World  (London: 
Penguin 2005) 
36 Gorer, G, Sex and Marriage in England Today  (London: Nelson 1971) 
37 Seabrook, J, A Lasting Relationship.  (London: Penguin 1976) 
38 Westwood, G,  A Minority  (London: Longmans 1960) 
39 Weeks, J,  Sex, Politics and Society  (Essex: Longman 1989 orig 1981) 
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At the extreme end of the spectrum is Tatchell’s work as an activist42.  The feminist view 
comes from Enloe43 and others.  More of a debate is to be found over the decline of 
religion in the UK and its causes, led by Bruce44 and Brown45 predominantly but with 
much emerging work by Davie46.  On Remembrance and memorialisation, conventional 
thinking has been shaped by Todman47, Connelly48 and Gregory49.  The Church has 
undoubtedly been affected by John Robinson’s challenge in Honest to God and also The 
Church and the Bomb50.   
 
McKittrick51 and Miller52 articulate much of the historiography of the Northern Ireland 
campaign, and in particular the views from the Irish press.  Ingham53 offers a view from 
the political level, and Urban54 shows the role of special forces.  Bullock offers a key 
insight on Borneo as a former commander55.  Freedman’s history of the Falklands 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 Halperin, D,  One Hundred Years of Homosexuality  (New York: Routledge 1990) 
41 Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences 
and Prostitution. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1957 
42 Tatchell, P,  We Don’t Want to March Straight.  (London: Cassell 1995) 
43 Enloe, C,  The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War  (Berkeley: University of 
California Press 1993) and Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 2000) 
44 Bruce, S,  God is Dead: Secularisation in the West  (Oxford: Blackwell 2002) 
45 Brown, C G,  Religion and Society in Twentieth Century Britain.  (Harlow: Pearson Educational 2006) 
and The Death of Christian Britain.  (Abingdon: Routledge 2001) 
46 Davie, G,  Religion in Britain since 1945.  (Oxford: Blackwell 1994) 
47 Todman, D,  The Great War – Myth and Memory  (Cambridge: CUP 2005) 
48 Connelly, M,  The Great War, Memory and Ritual  (Boydell Press 2002) 
49 Gregory, A,  The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919-1946  (Oxford: Berg 1994) 
and  The Last Great War  (Cambridge: CUP 2008) 
50 Robinson, J Bishop.  Honest to God. (1963) and the Church of England Committee Report: The Church 
and the Bomb.  (London:  Hodder and Stoughton  1982) 
51 McKittrick, D, and McVea, D, Making Sense of the Troubles (London: Penguin 2001) 
52 Miller, D, Don’t mention the war (London: Pluto Press 1994) 
53 Ingham, B, Kill The Messenger…Again (London: Methuen 2003 (orig 1991)) and The Wages of Spin 
(London: John Murray 2003) 
54 Urban, M, Big Boys’ Rules: The SAS and the secret struggle against the IRA (London: Faber and Faber 
2001) 
55 Bullock, C, Journeys Hazardous (London: Square One 1994) 
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Campaign56 has a counterpoint in Barnett’s anti-war commentary57.  Cordingley58 and 
Schwarzkopf59  provide their personal commander’s view of the Gulf War, along with 
Pimlott60 and others.   
 
On the media, Knightley61 provides a good challenge on the topic of truth and its 
portrayal.  More in depth analyses are provided by Greg Philo and the Glasgow Media 
Group62.  Wright Mills63 established a view of the ‘power elite’ in his 1950s work on the 
media; Chomsky64 and others take this forward in a conspiracy theory over media 
dominance65.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 Freedman, L, Official History of the Falklands Campaign Vols 1 and 2 (Government Official History 
Series 2005 (Vol 2 hardback) and 2007 (Vol 1 paperback)) 
57 Barnett, A,  Iron Britannia.  (London: Allison and Busby 1982) 
58 Cordingley, Major-General P,  In the eye of the storm: commanding the Desert Rats in the Gulf War 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton 1996) 
59 Schwarzkopf, General H Norman, It doesn’t take a hero (London: BCA 1992) 
60 Pimlott, J, and Badsey, S, (ed) The Gulf War Assessed (London: Arms and Armour 1992) 
61 Knightley, P,  The First Casualty.  (London: John Hopkins University Press 2002 (original edn 1975)) 
62 Philo, G, and  Eldridge, J, (ed)  Getting the Message (London: Routledge 1993) and  Seeing is Believing: 
The Influence of Television  (London: Routledge 1990) and Bad News From Israel  (London: Pluto Press 
2004) and Message Received  (Harlow: Longman 1999) 
63 Wright-Mills, C, The Power Elite (Oxford: Oxford Press 1956) 
64 Chomsky, N,  Media Control.  (New York: Seven Stories 2002 2nd Edn) 
65 Interviews were conducted with key appointment holders from the period where available, political, 
military and civil servants.  In addition, interviews were also conducted with key academics who had 
researched in each area.  A full list is at p. 361. 
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CHAPTER 2.  FROM ‘NEVER HAD IT SO GOOD’ TO ‘THINGS CAN ONLY GET 
BETTER’ 
 
Views on warfare from 1960-2000 must be seen in the cultural context in which they 
were formed.  This chapter looks at three cross-cutting themes: societal and cultural 
changes; the status of the military in society; and homosexuality, as a measure of the 
changes in societal attitudes. It begins with an assessment of the military context1. 
 
Roles and Missions 
 
Following the 1957 Defence White Paper, the Armed Forces were reshaped in the early 
1960s. The effects included the abolition of National Service, resulting in professional 
force backed by reserves, designed for non-nuclear combat, matched by a nuclear 
deterrent force.  By 1965 the force size was reduced from 700,000 to around 400,000 
personnel and Defence spending was down to 7% of GNP2.  
 
Dean Acheson’s comment on 5 December 1962 made every newspaper in Britain and 
probably encapsulated the external view of British decline: ‘Great Britain has lost an 
empire and not yet found a role.3’ Such strong words irritated Macmillan and affected 
                                                 
1 Note that Peter Feaver opines that public attitudes were much refined in 2003 compared with twenty or 
thirty years before, but this is unsubstantiated by evidence.  Journal of Strategic Studies Vol 26 No 2 (June 
2003) pp. 1-5 
2 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965 (Cmnd 2592) (London: HMSO February 1965) 
3 The Times 6 December 1962 p. 12 
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British opinion4, which was being nurtured by Macmillan to believe that Britain was re-
establishing its global credentials post-Suez, exercising a role at the intersection of three 
circles: Europe, the United States and the Commonwealth.  Arguably, since 1962 Britain 
has fulfilled Acheson’s prediction.  
 
The perception, illusory or not, of Britain as a great power was maintained. In 1964 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson said ‘Our frontier is on the Himalayas’5.  For the people, 
raised in that colonial image, the concept of European engagement was alien, apparently 
aligning Britain to former enemies and defeated nations. A 1961 opinion poll showed 
48% thought the Commonwealth was most important to Britain, as opposed to 19% who 
opted for the US and 18% for Europe6.  But the withdrawal from Empire was rapid, as a 
series of colonies achieved independence.  By and large Britain extricated itself from 
Empire without bloodshed and pain.  Sandbrook7 argues that the British public saw this 
as a logical evolution continuing from the granting of Dominion status to the likes of 
Australia and Canada.  Whether the ordinary British people saw it in such a way is hard 
to say – there is no evidence to support it and no investigations seem to have explored 
this point. 
 
                                                 
4 Though in fairness, the Daily Telegraph letters column of 10 December 1962 only contains 3 letters on 
the Acheson speech, two of which consider him to have been correct in large part.  Daily Telegraph 10 
December 1962 p. 12 
5 Ziegler P (biographer of Harold Wilson) lecture Gresham College 21 February 2006 
6 Quoted in Sandbrook, Op cit p. 223 
7 Sandbrook,  Never Had it so Good Op cit pp. 277-289 
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In the period from 1958 to 1962, Britain became home to tens of thousands of immigrants 
from the Caribbean and Indian sub-continent8. Though the actual figures are relatively 
small in comparison to the overall population, and the likely reason that historians make 
so much of it is the colour of the immigrants’ skin, it does mark the beginning of a much 
more cosmopolitan society, with changing values and slightly different views on Britain 
and its place in the world, that has followed through over the next 40 years. 
 
In the 1960s war was a real issue. Many had lived through the Second World War and 
understood total war at first hand.  Arguably, the later 1960s and 70s were not periods 
where the public took a great deal of interest in the military, other than the lingering fears 
of nuclear Armageddon, although even that was a minor issue until the 1980s9.  It is easy 
to overestimate the change culture of the 1960s.  There was much continuity in common 
values.  The community was predominantly white Anglo-Saxon and substantially 
Protestant.  But attitudes were changing.  In art, design, fashion and music challenges 
were beginning to set in, partly as a result of the greater economic freedom at the 
individual level, and partly in reaction to post-war austerity.  Yet Britain did not see the 
extremes of elsewhere.  The student riots of 1968 in Europe and especially France were 
not replicated here in the same scale10.  And the effects of the Vietnam War, with all the 
implications of perceived failure for American forces, high casualty rates, mental issues 
                                                 
8 David A. Coleman, "UK Statistics on Immigration: Development and Limitations", International 
Migration Review, Vol. xxi, No. 4, Winter 1987, pp. 1138-1169 
9 This of course followed the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the emergence of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament. 
10 Though see the section on homosexuality in this chapter to see the links between Gay Liberation and the 
anti-war, anti-military and Troops Out (of Northern Ireland) marches of 1968 and 1971.  Also note that 
there were minor demonstrations at the LSE and elsewhere (which originated over the appointment of a 
new Director with Rhodesian connections believed to be associated with the apartheid regime – Bond, B, 
Op cit p. 53). 
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and drug abuse were seen but not replicated on the UK.  If the 1970s challenged the post-
war nirvana of a State-funded welfare state, so the Thatcherite 1980s placed more 
emphasis on the individual and personal wealth and choice.  If the Gulf War exorcised 
the ghosts of Vietnam for the US, then surely the Falklands (Chapter 6) did the same for 
the British and memories of Suez.  A stream of national self-confidence seemed to 
emerge, reinforced by the Gulf experience, which paved the way for the more moral, 
interventionist and reflective period under Blair. 
 
Economics 
 
Let’s be frank about it, most of our people have never had it so good.  Go around 
the country, go to the industrial towns, go to the farms, and you will see a state of 
prosperity as we have never had in my lifetime – not indeed ever in the history of 
this country.  What is beginning to worry some of us is, ‘Is it too good to be true?’ 
or perhaps I should say, “Is it too good to last?” 11  
 
 Macmillan’s often misquoted words hide the uncomfortable truth that the economic 
success of the country was built on borrowing; that the relative post-war improvement in 
Britain was far outstripped by its European neighbours. But with rationing only having 
ended in 1954, most people were aware of economic improvements, and also the safety 
net of the post-1945 welfare state.  One telling fact is that there was an increase in 
consumption of green vegetables from 1950-1960, but equally a massive increase in 
sugar consumption and in the intake of fats, particularly highly-saturated fats.12  This was 
not merely about greater availability of foodstuffs; it was a reaction against austerity, 
                                                 
11 Macmillan, H, Speech at Bedford Football Ground 20 July 1957  - 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_3728000/3728225.stm accessed 18 August 
2010. 
12 Driver, C, Britain at Table, 1940-1980 (London: Chatto and Windus 1983) pp. 14, 68 
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mainly amongst the women, which had helped the Conservatives to victory in the 1951 
and 1955 elections. With increases in real disposable income, this was the start of a more 
materialist society. 
 
There was a price to pay.  The economics of the situation simply did not stack up.  The 
early post-war years had Britain still in control of massive lands across the world, and the 
pound as the second world reserve currency.  Superficially, Britain should have been well 
ahead economically.  But the costs of the war on the nation, and the population in 
particular, had been great, taking nearly a third of total wealth13.  And the pressures on 
Defence spending in the early 1950s created by the Korean War had diverted a sizeable 
proportion of GDP (7.6%) which could otherwise have been used for investment.  The 
quiet acquisition of a nuclear capability by the Attlee government without reference to 
Parliament simply exacerbated the problem.  There was a price involved in maintaining a 
world power status in the 1950s through military capability.  Underpinning all this was a 
poor Balance of Payments situation, experienced since the temporary improvement after 
the 1949 devaluation, which persisted right through Macmillan’s notorious speech in 
Bedford.   
 
The average annual percentage growth rate per-capita GDP from 1950-1960 and 1960-
1970 were identical at 2.3%.  All the main European nations showed substantially higher 
increases than the UK for the same period14.  Yet Britain still took a substantial portion of 
GDP to fund public spending – the figure for 1948 was 35.2%, and by 1988 was 36.7% 
                                                 
13 Hennessy Op cit p. 27 
14 Hennessy, Op cit p. 42 
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with minor variation in between15.  The conclusion here is that, at least economically, 
there was no great change in trend from the 1950s through the period.   Defence spending 
to the mid-1960s was 7-10% of GNP, higher than anywhere except the US and USSR.  
Defence spending was £30 per head of population, and the nation was spending three 
times as much on defence as education16.  
 
Nuclear Weapons 
 
In 1952, 60% of the British public supported atomic bomb development and 58% for the 
H-bomb development in 1955.This was viewed as the price for a seat at the top table.17  
‘Bang goes ours!’ was the Daily Express headline the morning after the first Christmas 
Island test.18  After a succession of embarrassing failures in weapons acquisition, Britain 
allowed the US to use Holy Loch for its Polaris submarines and agreed to acquire Polaris 
from the US in 1962.  But this time, media coverage focused on the lack of independence 
from the US – ‘Britain has had very much the worst of the bargain at Nassau’ (Daily 
Telegraph),19 ‘The Sell-Out’ (Daily Express)20, ‘Macmillan’s nuclear folly’ (Daily 
Herald).21  This in itself is interesting, as both left- and right-wing newspapers were 
                                                 
15 Hennessy, Op cit p. 55 
16 Morgan, Op cit p. 218 
17 Sandbrook, Op cit p. 239 
18 Daily Express 16 May 1957 p. 1.  Erroneously mentioned in Sandbrook Op cit p. 242. 
19 Daily Telegraph 22 December 1962 p. 6 
20 Daily Express 22 December 1962 p. 1.  It went on to say that this was a ‘5-way loser’, and that ‘The offer 
is unacceptable.  Britain must insist on a nuclear deterrent of its’ own made with her own resources and 
dedicated to her own purposes.  The public will accept nothing less.’  Daily Express 22 December 1962 p. 
4. 
21 Daily Herald 22 December 1962 p. 1.  The following day’s front page went on to describe the deal as 
‘Macmillan’s Munich’ Daily Herald 23 December 1962 p. 1. 
23  
critical on this issue, suggesting an unusual confluence of opinion, perhaps linked to a 
view that Macmillan’s government had run its course. 
 
The rise of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) can be tracked to J. B. 
Priestley’s article in the New Statesman entitled ‘Britain and the Nuclear Bomb’ in 
November 1957.  In his appeal to fight back against the ‘nuclear madness’ overtaking the 
world, he struck a chord with many, which led to a substantial debate.  A gathering of 
luminaries such as Michael Foot and the Bishop of Chichester gathered in early 1958 to 
set up CND.22  Over the next year, 270 branches were established and marches organised, 
often exceeding expectations in their size.  The highlights were the annual Easter 
Aldermaston marches.  Attendance at the finale, which became a demonstration in 
Trafalgar Square, rose from 20 000 in 1959 to 75 000 in 1960 to 100 000 in 1961.23  The 
social make-up of the CND leadership was predominantly middle-class pseudo-
intellectuals, but as skiffle gave way to the folk music often associated with beatniks, 
CND supporters became identifiable as a distinct group, outside mainstream public 
opinion24.  The re-emergence of CND in the 1980s as a reaction to the deployment of 
Cruise missiles at Greenham Common, also saw a European dimension in the Appeal for 
                                                 
22 Morgan K O Britain since 1945: The People’s Peace (Oxford: OUP, 2001[1990]) p.181 
23 Sandbrook, Op cit p. 264.  Some minor marches were reported in The Times, but very little on the CND 
Easter March itself.  The only letter correspondence refers to the right to report the march (after a member 
of the House of Lords said he felt it was not worthwhile). 
24 MoD took the CND challenge very seriously by constructing a new section of the Defence Secretariat 
(DS19) to counter it.  Quinlan also felt that the anti-nuclear debate really died between 1963 and the advent 
of the ‘neutron bomb’ in 1978 and then the Trident debate.  Quinlan interview Op cit.  This is supported by 
Kenneth Morgan’s analysis in his book Britain since 1945 p. 454.  He goes on to argue that British support 
for the US attacks on Libya, which again inflamed elements of public opinion, also served to preserve the 
UK’s Trident capability (p. 486) 
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European Nuclear Disarmament25, drafted by E P Thompson and revised by Ken 
Coates26, Mary Kaldor, Robin Cook and others.   
 
Military Culture 
 
Simpson27 believes that the small size of the professional Army has contributed to its lack 
of public popularity of the three Services.  He suggests that the Royal Navy has always 
been very popular indeed, ‘not least because you didn’t see it’, and the RAF grew in 
popularity because of the Battle of Britain.  He also suggests that the Army’s lack of 
popularity historically may have been based on a perception that it was the most class-
based of the Services until the First World War28. 
 
All that said, there were strong links between the county-based Regiments, local 
Territorial units (and equivalents in the other Services), and the populace, reinforced by 
large numbers of ex-Servicemen post-Second World War and post-National Service in 
the community29.  The link extended to Parliament and all walks of life; many men at the 
start of the period of this thesis had had direct experience of the military from two world 
wars and National Service.  In addition, the aftermath of the First World War not only 
                                                 
25 http://www.aim25.ac.uk/cats/1/9560.htm accessed 24 December 2009. 89 boxes of END material are 
held in the British Library of Political and Economic Science. 
26 Of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. 
27 Interview with Keith Simpson MP 24 July 2007.  Simpson is an historian, as well as the then Shadow 
Foreign Minister and former Special Advisor in the MOD during the first Gulf War.  In contrast, Strachan 
states that the British Army was held in high regard on the eve of the Boer War as much as in 2000, despite 
equivalent difficulties in recruiting.  Strachan, H, (ed) The British Army – Manpower and Society into the 
Twenty First Century (Abingdon: Frank Cass 2000) p. xiv 
28 Ibid 
29 It is worth noting in passing that the amalgamation of Scottish regiments brought about the album,  
Farewell to the Greys, from which the version of ‘Amazing Grace’ topped the charts for five weeks in 1972 
– Turner, A W, Crisis, what crisis? Britain in the 1970s (London: Aurum 2008 and 2009) p. 17.   
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saw the start of the British Legion, but also other Service charities.  In a very tangible 
way, the populace was linked to the military through charities that still exist today.   
 
In 1947 Second World War conscription was replaced by peace-time National Service. 
Many of the conscripts were unenthusiastic recruits who viewed their compulsory time in 
the Forces as a sheer waste of time, resenting the interruption in their civilian studies or 
careers30. Finlay Clark recalls that ‘the various arms of His Majesty’s Services were 
therefore augmented, in the early fifties particularly, by thousands of callow, brash, 
anxious or rebellious young men with little or no money, and a simmering resentment, in 
many cases, that they had to be there at all.31’ Conscription was phased out from 1960 
and, by the time the last National Serviceman was demobilised in 1963, 2 301 000 
civilians had been called up, and saw active service in each of those eighteen years32.  
 
When British forces were deployed to Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya, including substantial 
numbers of National Servicemen, there was little public dissent.33 There is certainly little 
in the newspapers to reflect a public concern. This suggests that the public were either 
tolerant of colonial operations, or were not interested.  The lack of press coverage 
suggests they may not have been that aware.  Indeed, as demonstrated in the 1962-1966 
Borneo campaign (Chapter 6), there was little coverage at all in either local or national 
                                                 
30 Hew Strachan notes that conscription was against the norm for the UK compared with European powers 
who historically has fought more often, and thus the army had been less important in British political 
development than elsewhere.  ‘The British Way in Warfare Revisited’ The Historical Journal Vol 26, No 2 
(1983) p. 458 
31 Finlay Clark Op cit p21 
32 Hennessy, Op cit p. 80 
33 Sandbrook, Op cit p. 287; Darwin J The End of the British Empire (Oxford: Blackwell 1991) pp. 18, 21l 
Dixon P Op cit pp. 105-106. However, many National Servicemen were unhappy with their role in Malaya, 
and there were confused public views over Kenya, with collections for Mau Mau widows being taken in 
London and Liverpool:  See Hickman, Tom, The Call Up (London: Headline 2004) pp. 117, 125.  
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press, tending to confirm Sandbrook’s view.  However, recollections of National 
Servicemen, such John Peel34 and others, suggest there was disquiet at being used in 
colonial campaigns.    
 
The cultural implications of National Service cannot be underestimated.  Finlay Clark’s 
prologue highlights the fact that despite many years since National Service, and many 
jobs and educational achievements, his two years of service still remains significant and 
different from any other period of his life, and in this he was probably not atypical35.  
Whatever the man’s social origins, they went through a common equaliser of 12 weeks of 
basic recruit training, forming bonds rarely forgotten.  Officers were selected by the War 
Office Selection Board, using a range of techniques including self-nomination.  Although 
public and grammar schoolboys formed an obvious source, many declined to put 
themselves forward on principle.  The result was a continuation of social levelling in the 
Armed Forces36, despite some memories of a separate officer class defined by ‘double-
barrelled names’37. Interestingly, Thorne, who became a National Service officer, 
remembered his service number as a soldier, but not as an officer, showing the power of 
his initial training.38  Memories of National Service leaned towards satire – The Army 
Game39 was a late 1950s TV sitcom lampooning life as a National Serviceman, and 
                                                 
34 Peel, John (former DJ – and ex-radar technician) in his foreword to Royle, T, National Service: The Best 
Years of their Lives (London: Andre Deutsch 2002) p. 7 
35 Clark Op cit p. 13 
36 Interview Hennessy, P, 31 October 2007.  Hennessy talks of the effects of 90 days of social inclusion 
before the officers were ‘spun out’ – a great social leveler. 
37 Thorne Op cit p. 121.  Indeed, Finlay Clark also makes much of the ‘officer and a gentleman’, whether 
National Service officer or regular, as being distinct from the other ranks.  Finlay Clark Op cit p. 19 
38 Findlay Clark Op cit p. 143 
39 http://www.itv.com/ClassicTVshows/comedy/thearmygame/default.html accessed 29 December 2009 
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similarly Get Some In40 was a similar theme for the RAF in the 1970s.  Experiences and 
recollections certainly varied, but for all, the experience coloured future judgments on the 
military and meant that they had experience on which to draw. The post-war Army was 
highly respected in society as a place to carve out a career, with wartime leaders like 
Montgomery revered as folk heroes in the 1950s and 1960s, while the 1970s brought 
about a decline in public affection41.  National Service produced both an anti-authority 
feeling and a shared sense of humour that led to the satire of the 1960s42.  Charlie Chester 
had to amend his act at the London Palladium as military banter was replaced by more 
family-oriented jokes as time passed43. 
 
It is impossible to link crime rates to National Service with any certainty. Yet it is a fact 
that crime rates per million increased by 69.8% in 1960 compared with five years 
previously, and remained fairly constant at that higher growth rate through to 198544.  
Relevant to later consideration of the Church and society, Gorer’s review in 1971 showed 
a larger proportion of the young stating that they had ‘no religion’.  He ascribed that to 
the end of National Service in 1963, during which time a lot of men had filled in forms 
marking their religion as Church of England (CofE) as they were expected to put 
something down45.   
 
                                                 
40 http://www.televisionheaven.co.uk/getsomein.htm accessed 29 December 2009 
41 Finlay Clark Op cit pp. 153-4 
42 Hennessy interview Op cit 
43 Ibid 
44 Morris, T, Crime and Criminal Justice since 1945  (London: Blackwell 1989) p.57 
45 Gorer, G, Sex and Marriage in England today (London: Nelson 1971) p. 10 
28  
The post-National Service forces did not want to be seen as linked to a moral 
rearmament, or part of penal reform, or part of the welfare state.  In doing so, the Services 
removed themselves from wider involvement with communities and the identification of 
the public with the Forces took a different, and perhaps more traditional turn.  The 
recruiting slogan of 1976 was ‘Join the Professionals’46 – making more of the distinctive 
professional volunteer ethos in a similar way to the pre-First World War Army.   
 
National Service influenced a generation of political leaders and the elite who took part in 
it.  It coloured the views of conscripts not only on matters such as authority and self-
reliance, but also on the type of conflicts in which they were employed.  The influence of 
National Service is hard to measure but easy to underestimate47.  As we shall see later, 
many of the war cabinet of the Falklands had wartime or National Service experience that 
made it easier to understand and converse with soldiers of the day.  Thorne remarked on 
the ‘freemasonry’ that exists between those who served as National Servicemen – not 
literally perhaps, but noting the strong bond of service48.  Though some still believe 
National Service would be a sound option to resolve some of societies’ ills49, Woodrup50 
reminds us that ‘The majority of National Servicemen were not delinquents and they 
were serving King and country and later Queen and country, and many of them died 
defending the peace.  They served their country, not a custodial sentence.’51 
                                                 
46 National Army museum posters. 
47 A 1955 War Office survey showing that 80% of National Servicemen said they enjoyed it, and a 
Brassey’s Annual of the same year which quoted an Army survey, saying that 15% liked the life, 10% hated 
it and 75% do their best but long for the day when it will be over.  Hickman Op cit p. 275 
48 Thorne Op cit p. 245 
49 An opinion poll in 1970 suggested three in five adults would support the reintroduction of national 
service, including 52% of young men in the age group affected.  Hickman Op cit p. 299 
50 Len Woodrup was a former RAF National Serviceman. 
51 Woodrup, L, Training for War Games (Sussex: The Book Guild 1993) p. 9 
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Ministry of Defence 
 
One of the key events of the early-1960s was the formation of a unified Ministry of 
Defence from the previous separate Service Ministries. The Defence (Transfer of 
Functions) Bill received its Second Reading in the House of Lords on 4 February 196452, 
led, albeit reluctantly, by the final First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Jellicoe.  Key roles 
were given to a new Secretary of State for Defence, a single Permanent Under-Secretary, 
and a Chief of Defence Staff, given precedence over the single-Service chiefs.  Overall 
coordination and control was vested in the new Defence Council. The debate is worthy of 
note for the strong feelings expressed by ex-Servicemen and Parliamentarians.  Most of 
the criticisms were levelled at the powers of the new Secretary of State, the reduced 
powers of the single-Service Ministers, and the ability of the Chief of Defence Staff to 
cover all the interests.  Others questioned the accountability to Parliament and the role of 
the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee. Despite the parliamentary interest, there 
seems to have been little media interest from the broadsheets or tabloids that week53.   
 
In a similar way, Michael Heseltine’s54 announcement on centralizing the staff functions 
in the Ministry of Defence55 in July 1984, which produced the Vice Chief of Defence 
Staff and a Major-General for Reserve Forces and Cadets, as well as introducing 
Executive Responsibility Budgets, created considerable political comment from such 
                                                 
52 HL Deb 04 4 February 1964 vol 255 cc 9-69 
53 No comment in the Daily Telegraph, The Times, or the Daily Mail for that week. 
54 Then Secretary of State for Defence. 
55 Cmnd No 9315 and HC Deb 18 July 1984 vol 64 cc 321-30 
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worthies as Denzil Davies, Julian Amery and Dr David Owen, but made little apparent 
public impact in the press56. Both announcements, in spite of their significance, did not 
seem to excite much attention, illustrating the limited nature of public engagement with at 
least this type of defence issue. 
  
Women and the Military 
 
Space does not permit a full review of female attitudes to the military57, but the depth of 
social change during the period, whether it be in the increasing importance of women 
with careers in their own right, or in becoming senior figures in combat arms in the 
military in their own right58, is worthy of comment59.    
 
A feminist view of the military can be seen from work such as Enloe’s60.  An analysis of 
her book by Michael Lind61 distinguishes between feminist empiricism (unconscious 
masculine bias in academic disciplines can be corrected by female scholars); female 
standpoint theorists (theories need to be rethought from the perspective of women); and 
                                                 
56 No comment in the Daily Telegraph, The Times, or the Daily Mail for that week 
57 This is discussed by Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Stephen Welch in ‘Women in the Military: Future 
Prospects and Ways Ahead’ in Alexandrou, A, Bartle, R, and Holmes, R, New People Strategies for the 
British Armed Forces (Abingdon: Frank Cass 2004) pp. 49-67.  The first footnote provides a useful 
summary of the strands of the feminist debate, from those who seek equality of the sexes in the military, to 
those who opine that feminism naturally inclines to pacifism and is therefore anti-militarist in nature. 
58 A question which Chris Dandeker considered (along with much work on homosexuality in the Armed 
Forces) in his article in the RUSI journal: Dandeker, C (2001) ‘On the need to be different: Military 
Uniqueness and civil-military relations in modern society’, The RUSI Journal, Vol 146: No 3,pp. 4-9 
59 See Natyio G, ‘Infantrywomen – An Ethical Dilemma’ in McConville T and Holmes R (ed) Defence 
Management in Uncertain Times (Abingdon: Frank Cass 2003) pp. 188-213 for further debate 
60 Enloe C The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley: University of 
California Press 1993) 
61 http://feminism.eserver.org/of-arms-and-the-woman.txt accessed 24 December 2009.  Editor of The 
National Interest 
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female post-modernists (argue that there is no single standpoint of women, and where one 
is put forward, it generally represents that of affluent white women).  He stresses the 
feminist perspectives of nurturing and cooperation, as opposed to artificial concepts of 
sovereignty, patriarchy and militarism, and the feminist alternative to military security 
being natural justice.  Enloe’s previous work62 touched on the ‘Mrs Thatcher’ factor – 
Lind argues that Enloe was implying63 that Mrs Thatcher was a pawn of the patriarchal-
militarist structure.  Enloe moved on in her work to consider homosexuality and the 
exploitation of prostitutes by US forces overseas. 
 
Lucinda Peach took a feminist approach to Just War theory in her analysis after the first 
Gulf War64.  She noted the traditional concept of associating women with peace and 
pacifism, and the actual practice of more women than men being involved in peace 
movements.  She also cites work by Gallagher, and Branscombe and Owen65, which 
showed an average 15-20% gender gap between women and man on the issue of military 
involvement and use of force.  But she also recognises that many women, including 
political scientists and pacifists, may acknowledge the need for force in certain 
circumstances, and uses this idea to develop the thought of a feminist approach to Just 
War theory. 
 
For those serving in the military, this period was a time of change, particularly for 
combining male and female training, and to expand the roles available to females.  In July 
                                                 
62 Enloe, Cynthia  Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 2000) 
63 If not actually stated 
64 Peach Lucinda J, ‘An alternative to pacifism?  Feminism and Just War Theory’ Hypatia Vol 9 1994 
65 Ibid p153 
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1960, WRAF recruit training moved to Spitalgate in Lincolnshire where, for the first 
time, females lived in barrack blocks painted in lilac and pink with flowered curtains.  
This developed still further when the females moved to Hereford in 1974, where the 
barrack blocks had televisions and washing machines.  Combined training at Swinderby 
started in 1982, reflecting a major change in Service attitudes towards bringing the sexes 
together.  Officers of both sexes had been trained together since 1961 at the Officer and 
Cadet Training Unit at Jurby, presumably reflecting the idea that officers were in some 
way more responsible than airmen and airwomen, and possibly a concept around class as 
well.  It took the British Army some 25 years longer to bring WRAC and male officer 
training together.  In terms of available opportunities for females, in 1946, airwomen 
were only allowed to be in 31 of the 79 trades; by 1984, 75 of the 100 trades were open to 
females.  In 1963, the first WRAF air traffic controllers went into training.  In 1973, the 
first female airloadmistress was commissioned.  In the 1990s, the first female combat 
pilots joined the front-line66. 
 
From a different perspective again, Laura Connelly returned to the UK from Australia, 
where the War Widow’s pension is tax-free, refused to pay tax in UK and found herself 
in dispute with the Inland Revenue.  The fourteen women who supported her stand 
formed the War Widows’ Association67 in 1971.  The original aim was to remove the 
burden of tax, which was partially achieved in 197668 and the remainder removed in 
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1979.  The Association became a registered charity in 1991, and the website quotes 
membership in 2009 of 4000.  Interestingly, noting the discussion elsewhere of white 
poppies as tributes, the founders decided to have their own floral tribute made of white 
chrysanthemums with a sprig of rosemary in the shape of a cross. 
 
In summary, the female view takes two sides.  In the first, there is a desire for equality of 
opportunity, for women to take on all military roles.  In the second, the feminist view is 
that women are inherently more inclined to pacifism and thus would be against war in 
any way. 
34 
CHAPTER 3. HOMOSEXUALITY 
 
As a case study in societal and attitudinal change, homosexuality in the British Armed 
Forces is useful.  It demonstrates liberalization within British society at the political level 
(within some groups at least), whilst the populace was perhaps more wary of acceptance, 
and the Armed Forces retained their opposition to recruiting and retaining homosexuals 
until the end of the period on the supposed grounds of operational effectiveness.  In the 
1970s, Seabrook argued the stereotype of the homosexual was usually ‘effeminate, 
mannered, emotionally volatile, unstable, predatory and promiscuous’, but that stereotype 
was largely irrelevant and what was viewed as ‘undesirable aberrancy’ was a reflection of 
‘straight’ society.1  The author’s experience of Service life since 1979 suggests that many 
in the military used the term ‘homosexual’ to mean something weak or inferior.  
Homosexuality is a condition, it was argued in 1965, which, of itself, has little effect on 
the development of the individual; the attitude of others towards that condition that 
creates stress.2.  As far back as 1960 it was argued that there was a difference between 
official morality, generally theoretical and usually conservative, and the morality of the 
private individual, where people are more tolerant and make individual judgments on 
cases.3  In the 1950s, post-war rationing, lack of consumer choice in the early part of the 
decade, and a model in society of success through citizen producers being heterosexual 
contributed to a puritanical approach at political and elite levels, not really replaced until 
the consumerism of the 1960s4.  But as society became arguably more permissive in the 
                                                 
1 Seabrook, J, A lasting relationship (London: Penguin 1976) p. 9 
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1970s and 1980s, the Armed Forces became more active in tracking down and removing 
known and suspected homosexuals, using the claim that such people were more likely to 
be susceptible to blackmail and therefore a threat to security or to military ethos and 
cohesion.  One of the difficulties throughout the history of homosexual studies has been 
agreed definitions.  Historian David Halperin used homosexual, queer and gay 
interchangeably, but this lacks rigour; other authors have described some 41 categories of 
homosexual5.  So for this work, each term will be qualified as necessary. 
 
Homosexuality is a debate with three underpinning concepts: sex (male or female), 
gender (masculine or feminine) and sexuality (heterosexual or homosexual).  As sexuality 
increasingly defined gender during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so 
gay men were forced out of the masculine camp as viewed by ‘straight’ men.  The 
significance of this lies in the perception of the military as being strongly masculine, such 
that the extreme nature of combat is assessed to require the peak of masculinity to 
achieve success.  This was the ideology underpinning the national objection to 
homosexuals serving in the military in western countries, and expressed itself in military 
law and in the recruitment process and then throughout Service life.  Homosexuality was 
viewed as demeaning, something to be used to belittle others – and the image of an 
officer on the USS Enterprise next to a bomb destined for the Taliban with the inscription 
‘High Jack this Fags’ in 2001 suggests this thinking is still present.6  As discussed later, 
many authors over the period noted considerable repugnance and revulsion by non-
homosexuals at homosexual activities.  Potential rational explanations underpinning this 
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view include a high incidence of VD amongst homosexuals (and latterly AIDS), and a 
perception of high promiscuity, which can be supported by evidence of a large number of 
active partners in some cases, particularly those convicted on homosexual grounds prior 
to 1967. 
 
 It is important to differentiate between homosexuality as a preference and sexual acts7 – 
sodomy having been made illegal for men in UK by an Act in 15338; the death penalty 
only having been removed in 1861 in England and Ireland9.  In the 1800s, the law was 
applied particularly firmly in the Armed Forces: in 1816, four members of the crew of the 
Africaine were hanged for buggery10.  Though the distinction became a point of debate 
during the Clinton trend towards ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ in the 1990s11, it is useful to 
separate the two, as the law on sodomy was equally applicable to heterosexuals as well as 
homosexuals, and military law specifically targeted sexual acts as grounds for court 
martial and imprisonment.  Few records exist of legal action against servicewomen in the 
period, possibly because, if pursued and found at all, they were dealt with by 
administrative discharge rather than a legal process.  Some regard homosexuality as an 
illness, while others view it as a rational choice12.   
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There is no doubt that homosexuality was present, and tolerated, throughout the Armed 
Forces of the Second World War despite legal obstructions13.  Indeed the 1957 
Wolfenden Committee14 considered that one of the origins of homosexuality had been 
American servicemen and British servicemen serving overseas; Lord Hailsham opining 
that British servicemen had brought it back from the Middle East15.  Jackson’s review16 
of the Canadian forces demonstrates that there was a blind eye turned to recruiting 
avowed homosexuals when the need was critical for numbers to fight, and also that 
homosexuals fought with honour and distinction in all Services.  There is evidence to 
demonstrate that many Canadian and allied serving officers and men were more than 
aware of the homosexual nature of some of their comrades and were much more tolerant, 
to the point of being defensive, of them17.  Schofield found considerable evidence of 
convicted homosexuals in the 1960s having had homosexual experiences in schools 
(mainly boarding schools) and so it is likely that servicemen with that background would 
also be aware too18.  Westwood, similarly, found 73% of the group he looked at reported 
occasional to very frequent homosexual acts in schools19.  There is every reason to 
suppose that the same atmosphere pervaded in British armed forces; indeed Jackson 
points both to liaisons between Canadian and US and British servicemen but also 
extensive liaison with British civilians while Canadian servicemen were based in the UK.  
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‘It was definitely joining the Army that woke me up….I liked to watch them.’20  Bill 
Wexford’s testimony to Jeremy Seabrook is one of many accounts of homosexuality in 
British forces in the war. 28% of Westwood’s subjects reported that their first adult 
homosexual partner had been in the Armed Forces21.  A 32 year-old Army officer without 
any heterosexual experience also commented on his sympathy for homosexuals, although 
he had ‘ignored it’ in himself22.   Indeed, Hirshfeld suggested that a category of pseudo-
homosexuals would include those working in abnormal circumstances, such as the Armed 
Forces, implying a greater likelihood of homosexuality in that group23.  A number of 
studies mention the number of soldiers and sailors involved in male prostitution, not 
necessarily as homosexuals, but simply avoiding the costs of a room and alcohol in 
London for the night24.    
 
PC Butcher’s evidence to the Wolfenden Committee noted the number of servicemen 
present in the Fitzroy public house off Tottenham Court Road, known ‘worldwide’ as a 
place for homosexuals25.  The end of the Second World War brought ‘a time of increased 
conservatism on many fronts, although there is no consensus about why this was so’26. 
One facet of the change was the increases in prosecutions for homosexuality, amongst 
other forms of deviance in part due to a particularly strong Director of Public 
Prosecutions27 who pursued homosexuals more vigorously28.  The homosexual sub-
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culture where freedoms were available was a feature of the upper, richer classes, but for 
the majority of homosexuals, the atmosphere was one of repression reinforced by the 
law29.  The 1957 Wolfenden report (commissioned in 1954) had recommended 
decriminalization of homosexual acts in private30, but it was to take another ten years 
before this was enacted.  It is worth noting that the origins of Wolfenden’s commission 
lay in a 1953 desire to reduce female prostitution on the streets of London; homosexuality 
was not the initiator31. The Home Secretary proposed a Royal Commission, but had to 
settle for a Home Office report because Cabinet members were concerned that this was 
an issue where relaxation of the laws might not bring credit (votes) on the Government32, 
reflecting the political disinclination, in an almost puritan way33, to tackle the issues that 
had been fairly constant since the Second World War.   
 
Evidence from the Services was key in two respects: a link to national security and the 
debate on the age of consent.  On the former, the RAF34 said: ‘the removal of 
homosexuals is of vital importance in an armed force.  The homosexual cannot exist in 
isolation; he must have an accomplice, usually several, and in seeking to extend his 
corrupting influence he is no respecter of rank or person.  Homosexual practices bring 
together men [note that women not mentioned] of widely different ranks and position to 
the prejudice of discipline.  There is also a security risk since the man compromised by 
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homosexual conduct may yield to pressure for the disclosure of secret information’35.  On 
the age of consent, the Committee was most concerned about evidence of homosexuality 
amongst young servicemen, particularly National Servicemen (although Hickman says 
that this was actually quite rare, mostly exhibited by the regulars, and tolerated where 
found by most)36.  The DPP talked of the ‘susceptible ages’ between 19 and 22 or 23, and 
his concern over young guardsmen, and the Chief Constable of Liverpool gave his views 
on the ‘corruption’ of young men created by conscription37.  Higgins suggests that one of 
the worst aspects of National Service was low pay, which meant that troops stayed 
together rather more and were more inclined to look for ways of increasing their income, 
including homosexual acts38.  Higgins says that the protection of National Servicemen 
was the critical factor in Wolfenden’s decision (against the majority on his committee) to 
press for a minimum legal age of 21 rather than 1839, coupled with strong advice from 
Lord Chief Justice Goddard.40  
 
Media reaction to the report was strong but mixed. The Beaverbrook papers, the Daily 
Telegraph41, and the Daily Mail42, together with most of the provincial press were hostile, 
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while other London papers were in favour of the recommendations on homosexuality43.  
There was general consensus on measures on prostitution – which gave the Government 
the freedom to put that element into law, whilst delaying decisions on decriminalising 
homosexual acts.  One of the consequences was the formation of the Homosexual Law 
Reform Society44, with many of the same membership as other liberalising organisations 
such as anti-nuclear weapons and cessation of hanging – which inevitably brought the 
groups together to campaign on a liberal agenda. 
 
Analysis by sociologists such as Schofield45 looked at groups of homosexuals in prison, 
paedophiles, and homosexuals receiving treatment against control groups outside.  Whilst 
this replicated much of the earlier work such as Kinsey (1948) and others, it carried a 
subliminal message of a linkage between homosexuality and illegal acts (not all related to 
homosexuality), and between homosexuality and paedophilia.  Indeed, Higgins notes that 
the business of the Wolfenden Committee was conducted on the basis that no-one had 
ever met a homosexual other than in a court of law, a police station, a prison, a hospital or 
a clinic46.  In fact, Schofield was able to demonstrate that homosexuals are very different 
from paedophiles, and that although many imprisoned homosexuals guilty of other 
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offences had a stereotypical lack of a father-figure in the family, and a strong attachment 
to the mother, broken homes were closely linked to all crime, and not purely 
homosexuality. Schofield found that prison staff were more inclined to regard 
homosexuals as ‘degraded, corrupt or degenerate’ rather than the homosexuals’ own 
views as unnatural or perverted47.  Westwood looked at 127 homosexuals across the 
range of professional levels48, though most were relatively uneducated49.  His research 
suggested that, although some homosexual acts and attitudes were ‘undesirable’, social 
and legal methods of dealing with the condition were ‘irrational’ and tended to cause 
more problems than they solved50.  He also found less of a link between homosexuality 
and crime than others were saying publicly at the time51. 
 
The most dramatic liberal agenda pursued by a Home Secretary was that of Roy Jenkins 
in the 1960s.  More than 1000 people attended the 1960 inaugural meeting of the 
Homosexual Law Reform Society, but a Private Member’s Bill to reform the law on 
homosexuality that year was defeated 2:1.  An influential film, Victim, was screened the 
following year, showing Dirk Bogarde as a gay barrister, blackmailed over his sexuality.  
The following year, the Secret Intelligence Service used a ‘gay honey trap’ to catch John 
Vassall attempting to sell state secrets to the Russians52.  In 1963, the Sunday Mirror 
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carried an article headed ‘How to Spot a Homo’53 – ‘They are everywhere, they can be 
anybody’ in which they offered eight possible ‘signs’, and made the link to the spy 
Vassall, who had apparently not shown any outward signs, other than being known as 
Vera.  In 1964, the North West Homosexual Law Reform Committee was established, 
later to become the Campaign for Homosexual Equality, with a Lesbian group Kenric 
formed the following year.  In 1966, the first gay contact advertisements were published 
in the International Times, for which it was prosecuted.  Leo Abse MP54 led on the 
Sexual Offences Bill of 1967 which legalized gay sex in private for consenting adults 
over the age of 21 (reflecting a general view that the law up till then was unenforceable 
and in danger of being brought into disrepute)55.  Even Labour ministers of the day were 
concerned about the bill:  
Frankly it’s an unpleasant bill and I myself don’t like it.  It may well be twenty 
years ahead of public opinion; certainly working class people in the north jeer at 
their Members at the weekend and ask them why we’re looking after the buggers 
at Westminster instead of looking after the unemployed at home.  It has gone 
down very badly that the Labour Party should be associated with such a bill56.   
 
This Act did not extend to members of the Armed Forces; indeed, Mr Abse indicated 
explicitly that he had no intention of changing the position obtaining in the Armed Forces 
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in this respect57.  ‘The security implications of the Sexual Offences Act were considered 
by the inter-departmental Official Committee on Security in March 1968.  The 
Committee considered that despite changes in the law which made homosexual acts 
between consenting adults in private no longer a criminal offence, the risk of blackmail or 
pressure in homosexual cases would remain substantial.  They decided that there should 
be no change in the general policy but that Departments should be advised that, because 
of the lessened threat of exposure to the police in the United Kingdom, they might find it 
possible to come down in favour of the individual when previously they would not have 
done so’.58   Schofield’s view in 1965 was that a change in the law would remove the 
possibility of blackmail; all that would be required for the Armed Forces was to ensure 
some protection for junior servicemen from senior ranks imposing on them for 
homosexual relationships, but that that protection was already available under existing 
Service discipline acts under ‘Conduct unbecoming to good order and discipline’59.  
Actual evidence to prove a link between homosexuality and effective blackmail is hard to 
come by, as Higgins recognises60.  Finally, that decade brought the formation of 
Stonewall in 1969, following the New York riots of the same name when, on 27 June 
1969, the New York Police Department raided the Stonewall Inn gay bar – not in itself an 
unusual act, but on this occasion the drag queens, butch lesbians and queers of all 
varieties fought back in a riot which lasted all that weekend.61 
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The reality of the 1960s is, though, that although some notorious homosexuals made the 
headlines, such as controversial playwright Joe Orton (killed in 1967 by his jealous male 
lover Kenneth Halliwell), and Andy Warhol, whose attempted shooting by Valerie 
Solanas, playwright and author of the SCUM Manifesto (Society for Cutting Up Men) in 
1963 was captured in the film I Shot Andy Warhol, for most homosexuals, the Sixties 
were a period of isolation, fear and repression.  Many met in ‘gay bars’ or clubs, 
particularly in London, Brighton and Blackpool62.  81% of homosexual activities took 
place in private63, despite the media attraction to more public activities.  The most 
widespread outlet for queers was the so-called ‘pulp fiction’ which allowed allusion and 
suggestion to let a variety of expression through, despite legal constraints.  Patricia 
Juliana Smith makes much of ‘false gods’64 to describe the idolatry present in society 
when homosexuality was repressed; examples might be Dusty Springfield in the 1960s – 
described as ‘”becoming” a gay man in drag’65 for her fans, before ‘coming out’ in 1970 
– and John Lennon, whose much-discussed relationship with the openly gay Brian 
Epstein, the Beatles’ manager, provided much of the queer ‘encoding’ in their films and 
songs.  Schofield notes the high level of repugnance over homosexuality amongst a 
control group of non-homosexuals, some to the point of potentially resorting to physical 
violence.  Some 20% of the control group in 1965 were opposed to relaxing laws on 
homosexuality, but 70% thought it should be decriminalised66.  That same repugnance 
was found by Westwood in his research which led to a number of sponsoring 
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organisations to withdraw their support67.  Even in 1971, Gorer found that 23% of men 
and 25% of women felt revulsion for same sex love68, but a further 5% of men and 4% of 
women felt it morally wrong; indeed only a third of the sample were tolerant of 
homosexuality with the rest hostile or neutral69.  Tolerance seemed to increase with youth 
and class.  ‘Camp’ figures such as Julian and Sandy in Round the Horne (1964-69) were 
figures of fun in society and only contested by activist groups70.  Weeks notes the lack of 
‘adequate’ sex education found by Schofield in his 1973 work on young adults: 1 in 10 
boys in his sample and 1 in 5 of girls were found to have had ‘adequate’ sex education71, 
which reflects the general lack of informed views of the period72.   
 
Case Study 1.  Homosexuality in the Royal Navy in the 1960s 
 
Despite the growing pressure on legalization up to 1967, the Armed Forces went in the 
opposite direction.  In 1968, forty Royal Navy men were discharged for homosexuality, 
many linked to events on HMS Eagle on its return from the Far East73.  This reflected an 
increase in the number of security cases which averaged one per month in 1967 to 
                                                 
67 Westwood Op cit p. ix 
68 Gorer Op cit p. 190 
69 Gorer Op cit p. 191 
70 Baker, P, and Stanley, J, Hello Sailor! The Hidden History of Gay Life at Sea (London: Pearson 
Educational 2003) p. 34.  Also goes on to a tradition marked by Mr Humphries in Are you being served? 
(1972-84), Larry Grayson in a series of shows from his arrival on television in 1972 (see Turner Op cit 
p243) and Dick Emery as Honky Tonk in his show which ran from 1963-81. 
71 Weeks Op cit p. 256 
72 Gorer points out that, even by 1971, 46% of men and 88% of women reached betrothal as virgins, 27% 
of men and 49% of women considered men should inexperienced before marriage, and 43% of men and 
68% of women considered women should be inexperienced before marriage, suggesting that despite the 
portrayal of a ‘permissive society’, actually England (and by extension, the rest of the UK as well) was a 
very chaste society.  His research showed that most of that inexperience lay in the working classes (the DE 
group under the Registrar General’s bands). 
73 There were no reports on the arrests in the Daily Mirror, The Times or the Daily Telegraph for 3-5 
October 1968.  HMS Eagle returned to Plymouth on 3 October 1968. 
47  
thirteen per month by 196974.  The Second Sea Lord maintained a list of ‘suspected 
persons’ which, in 1963 stood at 281 ratings and 13 officers, but by May 1968, had 
reached 375 ratings and 9 officers75.  The extent to which this reflected better detection or 
an increase in homosexual activity is unclear.  The Navy Board instigated work to review 
policy: ‘The Board is concerned at the amount of homosexuality becoming apparent, as 
the result of chain reactions to investigations into individual events’76.   In Bermuda, a 
local man was found to be running a brothel frequented by sailors where they took part in 
‘grossly indecent acts and [posed] for sexually perverted photographs’77.  In the ensuing 
investigation78 by retired Captain (RN) Donald MacIntyre79, a potential health disaster 
was found in Singapore, where sailors who had caught diseases from local prostitutes 
‘were afraid to reveal the sources of their infections’80.  Admiral Sir John Fitzroy 
Duyland Bush, commanding Western Fleet wrote: 
There is, regrettably, ample evidence that homosexual practices are rife in the 
Fleet; for a variety of reasons, disciplinary action can only be taken in a small 
minority of the known cases.  It can be assumed that the cases that come to 
official notice are but a small proportion of those who indulge in these practices.  
I have a strong feeling that many of the men are not perverts but basically normal 
men whose attitudes to this sort of activity is indifferent and whose standards of 
behaviour are thoroughly lax81.  
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Admiral Sir Frank Roddam Twiss, Second Sea Lord, warned commanders to be on the 
lookout for ‘unnatural vice’ attributable to changing moral attitudes in civilian life: ‘The 
time has come to take a less permissive attitude in the Fleet82.’   
 
Medical and legal advice was less inclined towards drastic action, and provides the only 
evidence of comparisons with life outside the Armed Forces.  On the Singapore male 
prostitutes, the Medical Director-General minuted: ‘Some of these “girls” are very 
beautiful.  They dress well and smell delicious.  They perfect the female walk, stance and 
mannerisms and some even undergo surgery to complete the illusion’83.  After debate 
with colleagues, he went on to say that  
 
The panel are generally agreed that the vast majority of these chaps are not 
homosexuals and it is doubtful whether they should be dealt with strictly 
according to the DCI referred to84.   
 
He had already opined in January 1969 that ‘It is considered impossible to detect 
“genuine” homosexuals at entry85.’ The Head of Naval Law Division had said  
 
If the number of men with some homosexual experience is as great as we think, 
we cannot afford to throw them all out as the Navy would not then be adequately 
manned.  On the other hand, “homosexuality” is declared a “character defect” by 
HMG and it undoubtedly does give rise to the possibility of blackmail.  It is also a 
threat to discipline86. 
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83 M8 from MDG(N) dated 28 April 1969 in ADM 105/104 National Archives 
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This is consistent with his line in May, where he had responded to the Second Sea Lord 
that:  
 
I do feel we should take into account the possibility that the current astonishingly 
rapid changes in the sexual morality of the whole western world may lead to a 
situation, well within our life time, when this [the ban] will be seriously 
questioned.  Indeed, I find my own civilian acquaintance – not, I hasten to add, 
unusually vicious – already asking why homosexuality is punishable in the Armed 
Forces when it is pretty well free in civilian life87.  
 
In actual fact, the Commander-in-Chief Western Fleet did not feel that blackmail was the 
problem:  
 
My own view is that the degree to which ratings get involved in these activities 
only exceptionally renders them liable to blackmail in this permissive society, and 
that the principal risk is not so much to security as society88.   
 
The quotation suggests that the Commander-in-Chief was more concerned about 
standards in wider society than the security threat from blackmail. 
 
 A Royal Navy Defence Council Instruction was issued in May 1969 on homosexuality, 
and is strident in its denunciation, making no allowance for the views of the Medical 
Director-General or the Head of Naval Law:  
 
Their [i.e. homosexual] acts, often committed with little or no sense of guilt, 
flourish with a permissiveness which is much too widespread.  The haunts of 
civilian homosexuals ashore are well-known and too large a proportion of ratings 
                                                 
87 Head of Naval Law Division to 2SL 22 May 1968 in ADM 105/104 National Archives 
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regard the seeking of their company as quite normal, when they are short of 
money, for the free drinks they provide89.   
 
An education programme was put in place by 1969 to warn of the ‘evils’ of 
homosexuality, particularly offering opportunities for blackmail.  The lecture notes were 
aimed at Divisional Petty Officers and Leading Hands of the Mess – felt most able to 
‘help in exposing and stamping out homosexuality in ships’90.  This may explain why the 
senior ratings mess room was subsequently in 2000 the most resistant in any Service at 
any level to change.  The notes were unambiguous:  
 
Homosexuality, in the security sense, includes any disgusting, infamous or 
immoral act between two persons of the same sex ranging, in men, from mutual 
masturbation to sodomy.  In other words, it is any such act about which one or 
both participants are ashamed, and wants to keep hidden from either a person near 
or dear to him, or his employer, colleagues (superiors, equals or juniors) etc, i.e. 
an act about which he could be blackmailed91.   
 
To prove that nothing is new, the collected papers from 1968 also include the Admiralty 
guidance from 1913, which said:  
 
My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are still much concerned at the large 
number of cases of immorality which come to their notice, and which do not 
appear to be confined to those who might have been led astray by youth or 
ignorance or to those of notoriously bad character92.   
 
In this case, the Admiralty required medical checks on all those indulging, to check for 
things such as ‘general paralysis of the insane’, which reflected the high levels of syphilis 
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and venereal disease present at the time (equally a major issue for the heterosexual 
population). 
 
From this case study several things can be inferred, partly by their omission.  First, the 
reaction to the 1967 Sexual Offences Act was not merely to conserve the military 
position, but to increase the pressure on removal of homosexuals, which from the 
numbers of suspected persons and discharge rates had been an issue for several years 
before.  Though it is unclear from the archives, it may be that this was a reaction to the 
clear Parliamentary signal that the Armed Forces were different from the rest of society 
in this respect, and that this difference needed to be enforced.  Second, despite the legal 
and medical reservations on implementation of anti-homosexual policies and the wider 
view, the narrower perspective of the Naval executive branch prevailed.  This may have 
been due to the restricted background from which many of the Naval executive had been 
drawn. Third, the imputation of the education programme is that homosexual acts would 
disgust servicemen, despite being legalized in society at large.  The level of repugnance 
found in society, as described elsewhere in this chapter, suggests this might just as well 
have been found in the wider public community.  Fourth, despite the Commander-in-
Chief’s view, the primary reason for security concerns appears to be potential for 
blackmail.  Fifth, there is no significant mention of women and lesbians at all; passing 
reference can be found in the archives but only to say that the regulations apply equally to 
women.  Finally, none of the papers, even Ministerial submissions or the record of inter-
Departmental discussions show any consideration of public opinion or still less media 
handling.  It appears that this was viewed as a very particular military issue where outside 
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opinion was not wanted.  There is no evidence of any leaks to the press or any discussion 
in newspapers of the issues. 
 
The Homosexual Movement 
 
The homosexual movement changed dramatically between the days of Stonewall and the 
1990s. In Britain, the 1993 Lesbian and Gay Pride March in London included uniformed 
veterans, including Americans who had served in Vietnam as well as British ex-
Servicemen who had served in Northern Ireland.  Newspaper comment at the time is 
broadly factual without comment.  It is worth noting that the press coverage of the Royal 
Navy’s formal participation in the ‘Gay Pride’ march of 2006 is far more positive, even 
celebratory, in tone93. 
 
Peter Tatchell94 is amongst those who are critical of what he perceives as a short-term 
approach for gays to appear as good as heterosexuals.  He quotes from the Gay Liberation 
Front Manifesto of 1971:  
 
In our mistaken, placating efforts to be accepted and tolerated, we’ve often 
submitted to the pressures to conform to the strait-jacket of society’s rules…It’s 
especially important for gay people to stop copying straights95.   
 
                                                 
93 Guardian ’Hello sailor: Royal Navy finally takes part in gay pride’ 1 July 2006 
94 Australian-born British human rights activist, well-known for his attempt to arrest Robert Mugabe in 
1999 and 2001 for torture.  Failed Labour candidate for Bermondsey in 1981.  Leading Gay Liberation 
activist and author, who co-founded Outrage! 
95 Tatchell, Op cit p. 4 
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He views the quest for gay liberation as part of a wider campaign for human freedom, 
with values of egalitarianism, solidarity, democracy, individuality and liberation being 
coincident with anti-militarist views, which allowed the Gay Liberation Front to shout in 
their 1971 march not only for police to stay out of gay bars, but also for British troops to 
pull out of Northern Ireland96.  There is some consistency here with the evidence from 
Gorer’s research of greater tolerance in 1971 by the younger element of the population, 
particularly those viewing heterosexual sex as fun, rather than a sacred duty, who might 
also take liberal views on other issues97.  Tatchell states that the Armed Forces 
‘manipulate, intensify and marshal the brutishness of heterosexual masculinity to create 
an institution dedicated to cold-blooded and systematic killing98’, whereas he believes 
that most queer men are: ‘unaggressive, tender and empathetic99’.   
 
He also suggests that the military training system’s tendency to ‘break’ people to form 
them into a cohesive body with shared ethos is totally dissimilar to the individuality of 
the homosexual100.  He goes onto say that the main reason homosexuals should refuse to 
serve is the Armed Forces’ ‘obsessive’ homophobia.  
 
Tatchell highlights the US experience of those Arab linguists actively removed from 
service in the 1980s for being gay, being brought back to service for the Gulf War in 
                                                 
96 The strong linkage between the Gay Liberation Front and other organisations shows in their participation 
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1991 because of a lack of expertise101.  He also mentions the case of Julian Corlett, a 
medical reservist called up for duty in the Gulf War despite his role as the Chair of the 
Scunthorpe Gay Men and Women’s Group, although he acknowledges that in the end, an 
illness prevented him from being used on active service102.  The clear suggestion is that 
the military can be exploitative if the situation requires expediency. 
 
In 1992, Rank Outsiders103 was formed by Robert Ely104 as a support group for lesbians 
and gay men in the Armed Forces and those who were sacked for their orientation105.  
The organisation worked with Stonewall to provide evidence to the House of Commons 
Select Committee on the Armed Forces, which led the Conservative Government to 
promise to stop the criminal prosecution of gay servicemen and women. 
 
In the UK in 1994, section 146 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act repealed 
those sections of the 1967 Act which related to members of the Armed Forces and the 
Merchant Navy.  Whilst this meant that homosexual acts were not offences under the Act, 
they could still be grounds for dismissal and could still be offences under the single 
Service Discipline Acts.  Service personnel who committed an act or expressed a 
homosexual orientation were administratively discharged from the Services. Challenges 
to the military ban persisted, but the judiciary were reluctant to challenge the primacy of 
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parliament who set the Services Discipline Acts.  In 1995, the Labour Party said that, 
when in power, they would establish a commission to examine the question of 
homosexuality in the Armed Forces; in power they generally opposed homosexuals in the 
Armed Forces, but George Robertson, Defence Secretary, agreed to review it during the 
Strategic Defence Review on 1997/8106, consistent with New Labour’s agenda of 
inclusiveness. 
 
Writing in 1976, Seabrook suggested that public attitudes had moved from horror and 
revulsion, through acceptance, to a view of homosexuality by the young as an exciting 
proposition, much as Satanism or necromancy107.  But this is not supported by later 
evidence from the polls.  Public attitudes towards homosexuality were measured in the 
British Social Attitudes surveys from 1983 to 1993.  The percentage agreeing with the 
statement ‘sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are always wrong’ started 
and ended at 50%, but peaked at 64% in 1987, possibly because of the start of the AIDS 
epidemic108.  Stephen Pattison notes that in 1987, some churchmen publicly stated that 
AIDS was a direct punishment for homosexual behaviour109.  This suggests that the 
Jenkins reform of 1967 was ahead of public opinion, and perhaps demonstrates why the 
Armed Forces were more in line with public opinion in pursuing homosexuals in the 
1980s and 1990s.  Wing Commander Phil Sagar, commanding the MOD Equality and 
Diversity Unit in 2007, recalled being required to be present in a search by four senior 
non-commissioned officers from the RAF’s Provost Branch of a young airman’s room, 
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including forcing open a padlocked cupboard and searching all his personal items, which 
Sagar regarded at the time to be quite normal and acceptable110, merely on suspicion of 
being a homosexual.  A female former Army unit commander recalled how lesbianism 
could ‘insidiously destroy the atmosphere of the accommodation block’, and of her 
concerns for the welfare of young servicewomen, made harder and more lonely for her as 
a commander if she felt her boss was also gay111.  A BBC Radio 4 programme estimated 
that 100-200 personnel were removed each year from the Armed Forces for 
homosexuality and lesbianism112.  A MORI poll in 1995113 showed that 40% of 
respondents thought homosexual sex was wrong, suggesting the downward trend was 
continuing.  In July1997, NOP114 carried out a survey on homosexuality, which showed 
that 71% believed attitudes were more tolerant than five years previously, and 19% the 
same.  When asked about their personal tolerance to homosexuality, 65% felt they were 
the same as five years before, and 23% more tolerant.  Those most tolerant were under 
the age of 34.  It was still not evident that the populace was tolerant of homosexuality in 
1994 during the days of ‘sleaze’ amongst the Major government.  The press revealed 
details of a Tory MP who had shared a bed with another man on a trip to France and a 
second MP was ‘outed’ by the News of the World writing of his ‘three-in-a-bed romp’ 
with two other men, suggesting that the public did not find this acceptable115.  Even in 
1998, when four Cabinet Ministers were found to be homosexuals, the Sun ran a headline 
of ‘Tell us the truth Tony: Are we being run a gay mafia?’116. 
                                                 
110 BBC Radio 4 ‘Cleaning out the camp’ Op cit 
111 Email Lamonte/Hine 10 May 2009 1251. 
112 BBC Radio 4 ‘Cleaning out the camp’ Op cit 
113 British Public Opinion January-February 1996, MORI 
114 Quoted in House of Commons paper 98/68 Op cit 
115 Greenslade Press Gang  Op cit p618 
116 Sun 9 November 1998 
57  
 
Case Study 2.  The reaction to the Lustig-Prean case. 
 
The most prominent case to change the law on homosexuals in the Armed Forces was 
that of Lieutenant-Commander Duncan Lustig-Prean117.  Few primary sources exist on 
this period as official records have yet to be released into the public domain.  He was 
born in 1959 and was discharged from the Royal Navy in 1994 on the grounds of his 
homosexuality, after he reported a blackmail attempt over his orientation118.   
 
Admitting I was gay was not enough for them.  I had committed no offences and 
had never been involved with a serviceman but they asked the most intimate 
questions.  They didn’t just want to ask if I had oral sex, but to describe exactly 
what I did.  They [Royal Navy Special Investigations Branch] left me feeling I 
had been raped by the MOD119. 
 
 His Commanding Officer had described him, at the end of 1993, as:  
 
A most able, conscientious and industrious officer.  His engaging and warm 
personality allows him to communicate effectively at all levels.  This is the 
cornerstone of his success; he is dynamic and extrovert, yet his magnanimous and 
conciliatory nature fosters genuine trust and support.  Resourceful, versatile and 
perceptive, he is a most effective manager and organizer.  He is a balanced 
enlightened and knowledgeable man who enjoys my complete trust in all matters.  
Lustig-Prean has great all-round potential.  He is an outstanding prospect for early 
promotion to Commander120.  
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Jeanette Smith, one of his later co-appellants, had her case considered by the Queen’s 
Bench Division on 7 June 1995, where Mr Pannick, counsel for the applicant, said:  
 
I regard the progressive development and refinement of public and professional 
opinion at home and abroad, here very briefly described, as an important feature 
of this case.  A belief which represented unquestioned orthodoxy in year X may 
have become questionable in year Y and unsustainable by year Z121.   
 
Lustig-Prean and three others went on to appeal to the Court of Appeal in 1995 to 
overturn the decision, but were refused.  However, in the summing up of the case, which 
set the course for an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, Lord Justice Brown 
said: 
  
…the tide of history is against the Defence Ministry.  Prejudices are breaking 
down; old barriers are being removed.  It seems to me improbable, whatever this 
court may say, that the existing policy can survive much longer122.   
 
The issue was brought to the House of Commons by Harry Cohen, MP for Leyton, but 
does not seem to have been taken up more widely123.  The Daily Mirror gave it a very 
small report124, but the Daily Mail gave it two pages125, with an editorial126 which made it 
clear this was not an issue for the European Courts, but a national issue.  The Daily Mail 
did not print any letters on the topic in the following two days.  The Daily Telegraph 
covered the case extensively127, considering the position in each Service and in other 
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countries under a by-line of ‘MOD has won a battle but is resigned to losing the war’128.  
John Keegan’s article argued that ‘homosexuality can undermine the vital authority that 
the Armed Forces must demand in war129’.  
 
The following day, the newspaper published five letters on the subject (dominating the 
letters column), four of which were from ex-servicemen, including Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Michael Armitage130, all of which were in opposition to homosexuals in the Armed 
Forces on grounds of ‘the moral decay of the nation’, ‘homosexuals create covens of 
corruption’, ‘unwanted attentions of homosexuals [towards a tank crew in the desert]’ and 
a ship’s captain having to assemble his crew to berate them over some of the behaviour 
on board, which led to one person being swiftly removed131.  The only letter in favour of 
removing the ban came from a civilian (no title provided) who noted American research 
by Shilts that homosexuals had proved just as effective in combat as heterosexuals. 
 
The whole issue of homosexuals serving in the Armed Forces was considered in a 
Timewatch programme in 1998132, which noted that homosexuals were still banned in UK 
forces, reflecting Homosexuals Assessment Study conducted in 1996 which had 
suggested that over 90% of servicemen would prefer not to serve with homosexuals133.  
Though there is no research to substantiate a difference between the results of a poll and 
the reality of those actually serving with homosexuals, personal experience of a 
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homosexual ‘outing’ himself in the 1980s at RAF Lyneham led, after initial ‘titillation’ at 
a ‘scandal’, to him being ostracized in the Officers’ Mess and a generally uncomfortable 
feeling amongst Mess members134.  The programme recorded the discrimination of the 
1970s against homosexuals and lesbians on the grounds of unit cohesion and morale.  
Lieutenant-Commander Duncan Lustig-Prean was interviewed and said that he was not 
asked his orientation on joining.  Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage, during his 
interview as a senior representative commander, said that including homosexuals would 
destroy unit cohesion and morale in a fighting force.  To the BBC, he added that: ‘The 
fact is that homosexuality is inconsistent with the special nature of service life135.’  
 
The television programme attracted no comment in the Daily Telegraph136 or the Daily 
Mirror137, and no letters to either paper.  The Daily Mail selected the programme as their 
Pick of the Day138 and The Times as their Choice139, but neither received letters in 
subsequent days.  In The Times television review by Joe Joseph140, he highlighted the 
irony (as did the programme) between the desire of homosexuals to serve in the British 
Armed Forces during the Second World War to defend against Nazi condemnation of 
people for who they were rather than what they had done, and the strident tones of 
Armitage’s objections to homosexuals in the modern Armed Forces.  Ahead of the 
European Court of Human Rights hearing, an MOD spokesman defended the ban, saying: 
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‘It is based on a practical assessment of the impact of homosexuals on military life141.’ 
The evidence offered to the court by the MOD said that military service is special 
because units have to withstand ‘close physical and shared living conditions together with 
external pressures such as grave danger and war142.’ 
 
On 27 September 1999, the European Court of Human Rights ruled against the UK 
government in the cases of Lustig-Prean and Beckett (ex-naval lieutenant-commander 
and rating respectively), and Smith and Grady (ex-RAF administrator and nurse 
respectively)as being illegal under Article 8 of the Convention.  The Court found that the 
interviews of Lustig-Prean and the other applicants had been ‘exceptionally intrusive’ and 
‘constituted exceptionally grave interferences with their private lives.’  It dismissed the 
Government’s evidence of the Report of the Homosexual Policy Assessment Team 
published in February 1996 as being based largely on the negative attitudes of 
heterosexual personnel towards those of homosexual orientation.  It also: 
 
noted that the Ministry of Defence policy was not based on a particular moral 
standpoint and the physical capability, courage, dependability and skills of 
homosexual personnel were not in question143.  
 
Accordingly, the court found that the interferences were no more justifiable than any 
other negative attitudes based on race, origin or colour.  The court also said that the 
Government’s evidence on the anticipated damage to morale and operational 
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effectiveness was not concrete, and noted changes in other European states, which needs 
to be seen in the context of more liberal attitudes (e.g. drugs and prostitution in Holland) 
in Europe than the UK.  Seventy cases of homosexuality being investigated in the MOD 
were stopped144. 
 
The Daily Mirror’s coverage145 warned of the potential for compensation claims by gays 
dismissed from the forces, and carried the views of ex-Flight Lieutenant John Nichol 
(pro) and ex-Colonel Bob Stewart (anti), and two letters from the public146, one for and 
one against.  The Daily Mail gave a much larger coverage to the outcome, including a 
very strong editorial against the decision147, largely on the grounds that it was decided in 
Europe (reflecting the paper’s anti-Europe bias), and containing a similar warning over 
potential compensation.  Major-General Julian Thompson’s article on the topic148 was 
against removing the ban, despite having served with two gay officers in the Falklands 
whose attitudes were well known.  A further two pages were devoted to the case itself149, 
but none of this resulted in any letters to the newspaper (at least, none were published) in 
subsequent days, suggesting this was not an issue that people felt strongly about.  The 
Daily Telegraph provided coverage150 on the first two pages of the newspaper, with 
further detail on page 14, an article by John Keegan on page 22, and a letter on page 23.  
The difference in line to the previous coverage in 1995 is considerable.  John Keegan’s 
line has changed to view this judgment as ‘probably sensible’, and the only letter, again 
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from Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage, which claimed that 95% of servicemen 
were opposed to changes in the policy on homosexuals (though there is no evidence to 
support this figure) looks quite remote in its extreme tone.  The Times provided both 
factual coverage of the decision151, and an article in favour of the judgment written by a 
representative of Liberty, albeit this was written ahead of the judgment being delivered152.  
Again, no letters resulted from the coverage. 
 
Whilst Menzies Campbell, then Liberal Defence spokesman described the decision as a 
triumph for civil liberty, General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley153 described the decision as 
ridiculous, saying ‘it is striking at the root of discipline and morale to have a policy 
whereby you knowingly enlist people who are homosexual’154.  He also said that: 
‘Wellington’s remarks about some of his soldiers may have a new application: “I don’t 
know whether they will scare the enemy, but they certainly frighten me”155.’ 
 
As a result of the decision, the MOD’s ban on homosexuality was removed and replaced 
with a code of conduct, launched by Secretary of State Geoff Hoon in January 2000.  
Angela Mason, executive director of Stonewall, said ‘It is a good day for us and a good 
day for society’156 and quoted an NOP poll saying that 68% of the population thought the 
ban should be lifted157. The decision was also welcomed by the Gay and Lesbian 
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Humanist Association158.  Conservatives claimed the lifting of the ban could undermine 
the effectiveness of the military and suggested that it would be opposed by many in the 
Services, Ian Duncan-Smith159 saying that ‘we should follow the advice of the armed 
forces which has always been that lifting the ban would adversely affect operational 
effectiveness160.’  Lustig-Prean’s reaction was ‘There are people in the Armed Forces 
who will be able to sleep a little bit better tonight knowing that there won’t be a knock on 
the door.  This is a new beginning161.’   
 
Press coverage was generally factual, without comment, although some, as the Observer 
noted162, remarked on the unique nature of European legislation dictating changes in 
national policies.  This change became enshrined in law under the Armed Forces Bill of 
2001. 
 
Even after the ban had been lifted, some did not accept the decision.  The Christian 
Institute163 makes the case that the European Court did not actually require the ban to be 
lifted completely, but argues that under the grounds of privacy and decency for the 
extreme conditions under which troops operate, the need to avoid homosexual temptation, 
and the risk of undermining cohesion and unity, homosexuals should not be in the Armed 
Forces164.  This must be viewed as a minority opinion; as the Observer reported: 
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159 Note that Duncan-Smith had served in the Scots Guards, and so his opinion was predictable. 
160 Ibid 
161 Ibid 
162 Observer 14 November 1999 
163 A small Christian right wing advocacy group with very traditional values, believing in the absolute truth 
of the Bible.  http://www.christian.org.uk/whoweare/index.htm accessed 1 June 2009 
164 http://www.christian.org.uk/briefingpapers/homosexualsinthearmedforces.htm ‘Homosexuals in the 
Armed Forces’ accessed 13 October 2008 
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the revised policy on homosexuality had no discernable impact, either positive or 
negative on recruitment.  There is widespread acceptance of the new policy.  It 
has not been an issue of great debate.  In fact, there has been a marked lack of 
reaction165. 
 
Following up on the review after the first six months of the new code of conduct in 
operation which gave rise to the comment in the Observer above, a further study was 
conducted by the Directorate of Service Personnel Policy, MOD in 2002 and published 
under Freedom of Information rules in 2007166.  It showed that the overall reaction of the 
Services was muted, that few homosexuals chose to ‘come out’, and equally most agreed 
it was a ‘non-issue’167.  In general, young officers and young servicemen and women 
were the most accepting, particularly those who had been to university and those with 
homosexual friends.  Senior non-commissioned officers were the most dubious 
(reflecting their age and traditional value set), but even there, most were accepting.  The 
only issue of concern was for accommodation, particularly in the Army, where people did 
not want to share facilities with homosexuals, but this was a relatively minor issue.  
Following removal of the ban, few homosexuals had sought re-enlistment, but some had 
enquired about loss of earnings claims (the Daily Telegraph suggested seven hundred 
people could re-apply or receive millions of pounds in compensation168).  The 
overwhelming view seems to be that this was a complete non-event for the Armed 
Forces, perhaps demonstrated by the fact that of the 2952 enquiries dealt with by the 
                                                 
165 Observer 19 November 2000 
166 SPB 12/02 Tri Service Review of the Armed Forces Policy on Homosexuality and Code of Social 
Conduct; a paper by D SP Pol SC.  Released under cover of FOI Request 20-03-2007-073852-002 dated 18 
May 2007. 
167 Ibid para 5a 
168 Daily Telegraph 13 January 2000 
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Naval Support Line (a confidential telephone service for the Royal Navy) since its 
inception in May 1999, only 14 related to gender issues169. 
 
The ‘Military Pride’ exhibition at the Imperial War Museum North looked at the 
experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people in military service, and 
recorded testimony from ex-servicemen.  Alan Edwards served in the Royal Navy from 
1948 until 1964, and then as a Reservist until 1972, and had represented the Navy in 
sport.  He noted that he had never had cause to complain of anyone being homophobic 
towards him during his service, but had seen it more recently in ex-Servicemen’s clubs170.  
Keith Best was in the Royal Navy from 1967 to 1982, reaching the rank of Petty Officer.  
He said ‘You still felt like people were looking at you as if there were something 
different, there was something strange about you.  But there wasn’t171.’   
 
Stewart Taylor was in the Army from 1975 to 1988, leaving as a corporal.  He said: 
 
I knew I was gay before I joined the Army.  But I thought, I’ll just put it to the 
back of my head, just get on with it.  And that’s what I did throughout my whole 
career172. 
 
Ben Amponsah served between 1992 and 1998, and was the first black officer in the 
Royal Armoured Corps.  He said ‘I didn’t feel I could raise my head above the parapet, 
because people would ask ‘Why are you defending gay people?173.’   
                                                 
169 Ibid para 44a 
170 http://www.bbc.co.uk/manchester/content/articles/2008/07/10/120708_military _pride_features.stm 
accessed 18 November 2008 
171 Ibid 
172 Ibid 
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It is quite evident from these and other accounts that, despite the more public debate 
created by Lustig-Prean and others, many homosexuals were serving through the period 
in the Services, and from their ranks, this was no bar to promotion or operational service.  
It is equally clear that many of those lived in fear of being ‘outed’ and preferred to 
conceal their orientation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There was a marked shift in attitudes between the homosexuals of the 1960s struggling 
for acceptance within society, with gay liberation activists (if not the rest of the 
homosexual and lesbian population) joining a liberal movement against nuclear weapons 
and war in general, and the 1980s and 1990s homosexuals struggling for acceptance 
within the military and desperately keen and proud to serve.  In both instances, the 
military reaction was to oppose any change and to be fearful of the consequences for unit 
cohesion and morale – often throwing in several other specious arguments.  The political 
level was mostly opposed to change in both main parties, with particular individuals 
standing out in favour of reform.  Arguably, the Jenkins-inspired Act of 1967 was ahead 
of its time in terms of acceptance in wider society, and the military were closer to societal 
views.  Little can really be said on public views on homosexuality and the Armed Forces.  
The lack of letters does not help in confirming any deep view, and so one has to rely on 
opinion polls.  There does not appear to have been a majority in favour of homosexual 
practices in the 1980s, but by the time the European Court forced change on the UK, two 
                                                                                                                                                 
173 Ibid 
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thirds of people seemed to have favoured a change174.  The fact is there was an absolute 
lack of any obvious impact on the UK forces after the change, and it went peacefully 
across political, military, press and other circles.
                                                 
174 It is worth noting in passing that, even in 2007, Pattison suggests that twenty years of activity by the 
Gay and Lesbian Christian Association had not convinced British Christians that same sex sexual 
relationships were acceptable, though he produces no facts to support this assertion.  Pattison Op cit p. 156 
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CHAPTER 4.  THE CHURCH AND SOCIETY 
 
This chapter addresses the relationship between the Church1 and society, with reference 
to the military.  This is addressed in three ways: first, a look at Church membership and 
attendance tends to suggest an increasing secularization of British society2; second, the 
nature of the act of Remembrance is considered as it has changed over the years; and 
finally, three case studies are used to demonstrate the real changes in Remembrance.  
 
Membership of the Church. 
 
In the 2001 Census, 72% of the population said they were Christian3.  The underlying 
evidence shows a rather different story.  A 2006 review4 showed that 66% of people in 
UK have no connection with any religion or church5.  In a MORI poll6, 18% of the 
British public said they were a practicing member of an organised religion and 25% that 
they were members of a world religion.  Taking these together with the results of a survey 
of British Social Attitudes by the National Centre for Social Research, which showed: 
 
                                                 
1 Broadly defined as the established churches. 
2 Diffusive Christianity (as an alternative to secularization) is a term often used to describe religion in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century which suggests, in a non-doctrinal way that God exists; Christ 
was a good man and set an example for others to follow; people who live on good terms with their 
neighbours will go to Heaven when they die.  See Wolffe J, God and greater Britain: religion and national 
life in Britain and Ireland 1843-1945 (London: Routledge 1994) p. 92 
3 Crabtree, V, Religion in the United Kingdom Diversity, Trends and Decline from 
http://www.vexen.co.uk/UK/religion.html accessed 13 October 2008 p. 1 
4 Ibid – quotes Tearfund research, Churchgoing in the UK, 3 April 2007 p. 3 
5 The Cremation Society figures for 2000 showed that 71.5% of those dying that year were cremated, which 
presumably still has, for many, a religious element (the presence of a priest for example).  Hence 
Tearfund’s findings must be caveated as referring to regular contact with a religion or church.  Davie, too, 
highlights that few funerals over the period do not involve the presence of some member of the church, to a 
much greater extent than people having been baptized.  See Davie Op cit p. 81 
6 www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/2003/bbc-heavenandearth-top.shtml accessed 19 October 2008 
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Table.4.1 Religious activity 
% who: 1964 1970 1983 1992 2005 
Belong to a 
religion7 and 
attend 
services 
74 71 55 37 31 
Do not 
belong 
3 5 26 31 38 
 
we can see that the numbers of active church-goers have dramatically reduced over 40 
years and that the traditional Christian (often referred to as Trinitarian) churches are 
reducing in comparison to other beliefs.  One sociologist finds nothing unusual in this:  
 
Sociologists know that if they count heads and ask about beliefs, more people say 
they belong to a religion, and say they have the beliefs of a particular religion, 
than actually do.  People over-state their religiosity; that’s why statistics from 
polls will often give higher percentages of ‘believers’ than will head-counting and 
deeper investigations8. 
 
The Church of England (CofE) has been viewed as the predominant (and State) church in 
the UK and represents the main view.  This view has been challenged: 
 
In the twenty years between 1980 and 2000 the CofE suffered a 27% decline in 
church membership.  The Roman Catholic Church suffered a similar decline in 
the same period in mass attendance.  The only institutional church which has 
continued to grow has been the Orthodox church – Greek and Russian – where 
                                                 
7 Includes Christians and non-Christians. 
8 Crabtree Op cit  p. 3 
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demand for churches exceeds supply, mainly because of immigration from 
Orthodox countries9. 
 
This challenge is supported by a report from the Office of National Statistics on social 
trends10, which shows: 
 
Table 4.2 Active Church Membership 1970-1990 
Active membership 
000s 
1970 1980 1990 
Roman Catholic 2746 2455 2198 
Anglican 2987 2180 1728 
Presbyterian 1751 1437 1214 
Other free churches 843 678 776 
Methodist 673 540 478 
Orthodox 191 203 266 
Baptist 272 239 230 
All non Trinitarian 
churches e.g. 
Jehovah’s witnesses 
138 154 182 
All other religions 
e.g. Sikh, Muslim 
451 740 1073 
 
                                                 
9 Furlong, M, The CofE: The State It’s In (London: Stoughton, 2000) p. 216 
10 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/xsdataset.asp?More=Y accessed 13 October 2008 
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In 1970, 9.3 million people were active members of a Trinitarian church, but this had 
reduced to 6.6 million by 1990 – a reduction of nearly one-third.  It is possible that 
Eastern European immigration will result in Roman Catholicism overtaking Anglicanism 
as the dominant denomination11.   
 
The Tearfund research suggested that 10% of the UK adult population go to church at 
least weekly; 15% attend monthly; 26% attend at least yearly; and 59% never or 
practically never go to church.  Evidence from Tearfund and the English Church Census 
of 200412 suggests that in fact self-disclosure polls of church attendance are generally 
twice as high as reality, a view shared by Furlong13.  Nevertheless, it is worth considering 
the religious adherents as they changed over the period14: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article1386939.ece dated 15 February 2007 accessed 13 October 
2008.  
12 Crabtree Op cit p. 8 
13 Furlong Op cit p. 216 
14 Crabtree Op cit p. 19 
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Table 4.3 Religious Adherence 1975-1995 
Millions 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Roman 
Catholic 
5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 
Anglican 27.2 27.1 27.0 26.9 26.7 
Presbyterian 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 
Other free 
churches 
     
Methodist 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Orthodox 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Baptist 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Total non 
Trinitarian 
churches  
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.7 
 
This shows the decline in those claiming to be Anglican, but highlights the dramatic 
difference between those active in the churches and those claiming membership.  Wilson 
demonstrated that the decline shown here had an actually been a continuing trend from a 
peak in 193015.  Despite low active membership, the CofE continued to predominate, as 
shown by the 2001 Census (Appendix 2). 
 
                                                 
15 Wilson, B, Religion in Secular Society, (London: Penguin:1966) p. 32 
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The CofE is demonstrably the primary church.  This view is supported by the strong 
linkages between CofE and State: the Lords Spiritual in the House of Lords16, the role of 
the monarch as Defender of the Faith and Head of the CofE, and the Prime Minister’s 
role in the appointment of senior clerics.  As informed journalist Jeremy Paxman puts it: 
‘[it] is not that it represents some profound spirituality in the people, but that it suits 
mutually convenient purposes for state and Church17.’ He also highlights the historical 
link of people to church:  
 
[the English] were not in any meaningful sense religious, the CofE being a 
political invention which had elevated “being a good chap” to something akin to 
canonization.  On the occasions when bureaucracy demanded they admit an 
allegiance, they could write “CofE” in the box and know that they wouldn’t be 
bothered by demands that they attend church18. 
 
This latter view is supported by the experience of many National Servicemen when 
completing forms as Finlay Clark describes it as ‘repetitious thoughtlessness of the 
uncritical believer19.’ 
 
There is significant debate on the causes of the decline in the church, broadly between 
those who see it as the culmination of a long period of decline from the Renaissance and 
Reformation (e.g. Gilbert) (although others like Bruce question whether Britain was ever 
quite as religious in the past anyway)20 and those who see gender as playing a lead role in 
                                                 
16 Davie Op cit p. 141 
17 Paxman, J, The English (London: Penguin 1999 – original edition 1998) p. 6 
18 Paxman Op cit p. 6 
19 Finlay Clark Op cit p. 36 
20 Bruce S God is Dead: Secularisation in the West (Oxford: Blackwell 2002) p. 46 
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more modern secularization (e.g. Brown21).  The latter looks to a change in the role of 
women in transmitting religion to the young, and rejecting religion themselves22.  Some 
see a particular high point in the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1952 – a joining of 
church, state and nation – after which decline can be demonstrated23.  Brown is amongst 
those seeing a turning point in Bishop John Robinson’s Honest to God which challenged 
church norms of belief in 1962-324.  The change can be shown by the rise of evangelists 
like Billy Graham from his work in Los Angeles in 194925, propelled by television to 
huge stardom. His later public meetings included him being jeered and heckled in Soho in 
196626. Similarly, McLeod highlights the drop in baptisms and Sunday school attendance 
from the 1960s onwards27.  Nevertheless, there is a view that many who do not take part 
in church activities still believe in God, as evidenced by opinion polls and census data – 
the phenomenon of ‘believing without belonging’ – Grace Davie28, and simply put as a 
decline of conventional beliefs by others29.  This can be shown from the 1988 IBA 
Research monograph which showed that in the month surveyed, 62% of adults had seen 
at least one religious programme on the main channels30 at a time when one study 
estimated that 88% of people claimed to belong to one denomination or another, though 
                                                 
21 Brown C G Religion and Society in Twentieth Century Britain  (Harlow: Pearson Educational 2006) p.  
13 and The Death of Christian Britain (Abingdon: Routledge 2001).  See also McLeod H The Religious 
Crisis of the 1960s (Oxford: OUP 2007 and 2008) pp8-9 for example. 
22 Ibid p. 13 
23 Davie G Religion in Britain since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell 1994) p. 31 
24 Brown Op cit Religion and Society in Twentieth Century Britain p. 224 
25 Davie Op cit p. 35 
26 Brown Op cit Religion and Society in Twentieth Century Britain p. 230 
27 Davie Op cit pp. 202-203 
28 The subtitle of her book, Religion in Britain since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell 1994).  See also Brown 
Religion and Society in Twentieth Century Britain Op cit p. 7 
29 Bruce Op cit p. 60 
30 Gunter B and Viney R Seeing is Believing: Religion and Television in the 1990s (London: John Libbey 
1994) p. 2.  Brown quotes an article by Bruce in the Journal of Contemporary Religion which suggested 
that 40% of people had watched a religious programme in 1968, but only 7% by 1987, showing the dangers 
in using statistics and the way definitions of religious programmes may vary.  Brown Op cit p. 281 
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another a year later showed that only 17% attended church regularly31.  Gunter and 
Viney’s work in 1993 showed that 56% believed that Britain was not a Christian 
country32. 
 
Remembrance Sunday 
 
A measure of cultural shift over the period, which also relates to attitudes to war can be 
shown by the progressive change in support for Remembrance Day33. Scholars see the 
forms of Remembrance that emerged at the end of the First World War in terms of a 
secular religion34.  The scale of military losses, 1,104,890 Empire dead, was 
unprecedented in the British experience.  The Prime Minister expressed the views of 
many when, in announcing the Armistice of 11 November 1918, he hoped ‘that thus, this 
fateful morning, came the end to all wars’35. 
 
  The key elements of commemoration were in place by 1920: the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier in Westminster Abbey; the memorial at the Cenotaph (literally, an empty tomb); 
and the two minutes silence at 11 o’clock on 11 November.  Early tendencies to celebrate 
became less common as it was felt that they ‘rob[bed] the day of its true significance’36.  
                                                 
31 Ibid p. 11 
32 Gunter and Viney Op cit p. 13 
33 As measured by attendance figures and television viewing figures for the Festival of Remembrance. 
34 Gregory, A, The silence of memory: Armistice Day, 1919-1946, (Oxford: Berg, 1994) pp. 51-86. See also  
Winter, J M, Sites of memory, sites of mourning, (Cambridge: CUP 1995); King,  A Memorials of the Great 
War in Britain (Oxford: Berg 1998); Gregory, A  The Last Great War (Cambridge: CUP,  2008). 
35 Hansard, 11 November 1918, Column 2463 
36 Stratford Express, 14 November 1925 
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By 1923, the numbers attending the Remembrance services were markedly reduced, 
suggesting that the public grief had formally ended37.   
 
In the 1920s, gestures of reconciliation or regret were unusual, reflecting both sides’ 
views of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘duty’ to justify their reasons for fighting the war.  That decade 
saw recollection in private; public discussion was limited as few wanted to question the 
virtue behind the actions of lost sons to grieving parents.  Discussion did not really start 
until 1929 and, amongst a boom in First World War books, Erich Maria Remarque’s All 
Quiet on the Western Front became a successful book and subsequent film.  But the 
message that that film sent, of a futile, bloody slaughter whose only heroes were the 
ordinary soldiers, coloured the judgment of opinion-formers who may not have been old 
enough to be part of the war itself.  In fact, the thinking that emerged at that time, based 
on a particular interpretation of the conditions of the First World War38, created a view of 
warfare based on a fear of technology (the effects of aerial warfare) and the concept that 
sacrifice was only worthwhile if it prevented a repeat of the war.  The same thinking was 
to re-emerge in the 1960s with a fear of technology (thermo-nuclear war) and a similar 
concern over the effectiveness of civil defence against a possible attack. 
 
Todman39 suggests that the 1930s were marked by a transition to a younger generation 
who, although still fascinated by the First World War, had little knowledge of the 
sacrifice and effect on communities.  He posits that new themes entered Armistice Day – 
                                                 
37 Todman Op cit p.57  although this is not a view shared by Gregory (who Todman quotes elsewhere) see 
The silence of memory Op cit p.188 
38 See also Bob Bushaway’s ‘Name upon Name: The Great War and Remembrance’ in Roy Porter (ed), 
Myths of the English (Cambridge: Polity 1992) pp. 136-167. 
39 Todman, D, The Great War – Myth and Memory (Cambridge: CUP 2005) pp. 58-59. 
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a sense of disillusionment, mistrust of politicians and fear of another European war.  All 
these were to have their echoes in the attitudes towards Remembrance in the Cold War 
era of the 1960s. 
 
In the Second World War, Britain suffered fewer losses: 250 000 in the Armed Forces, 
30,000 merchant seamen, 60,000 civilians.  The war was generally perceived, and still is, 
as a ‘good’ ‘People’s War’, which defeated a monstrous evil and from which a better 
British society emerged40.  The Second World War had a practical impact on 
Remembrance in that it was not sensible to have large gatherings, although there were 
some small ceremonies conducted privately.  After the war, it was decided by the 
Government to merge the act of Remembrance for both wars, which enabled 
communities to add the names of the fallen in the Second World War to those of the First 
on memorials and focused efforts for disabled ex-Servicemen41, and to place 
Remembrance Day on a Sunday to avoid losing time for work in the week.  
 
Case Study.  ‘Bomber’ Harris 
 
By 1945, the Bomber Command’s offensive against German cities, which contributed to 
some 780,000 German civilian deaths42, was deeply controversial in Britain. Despite the 
heavy aircrew losses no memorial to Bomber Command was erected43.  The bombing of 
                                                 
40 Calder A, Disasters and Heroes – on war, memory and representation (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press 2004)  p. 61. For the rare view the First World War was also an idealistic, moral war, see John Grigg 
cited in Bond,  Op cit pp. 56-57 
41 Gregory A The Silence of Memory Op cit pp. 215-6 
42 http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/frame5.html accessed 16 August 2010 
43 Harris’ statue was covered in graffiti in 1992.  See Socialist Worker 13 August 2005 pp. 8-9 on Kuhn and 
Gill’s book on statues in London. 
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Dresden in February 1945 caused concern in particular, with Churchill saying:‘The 
destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing44.’  
 
Harris had to wait until 1953 for a fairly lowly honour, a baronetcy, unlike many fellow 
senior officers who received their honours at the end of the war.  He moved to South 
Africa in 1948, partly as a result of the criticisms of the British public for the way he had 
conducted the bombing campaign45.  Feeling that Harris had not received sufficient 
public recognition, later the Bomber Command Association raised money to erect a statue 
to him which they wanted placed close to Dowding’s46 in the Strand.  The deputy mayor 
of Dresden opposed this move, claiming it was ‘the wrong signal at the wrong time47.’ 
 
The Queen Mother unveiled the statue in May 1992, and was evidently startled by the 
heckling from some protestors48.  Protestors carried placards saying ‘We’re sorry 
Cologne’ and the Queen Mother was jeered49.  An interview on television drew some 
contemporary parallels:  
 
Where is our moral standing now if today we say Serbia should not bomb 
maternity hospitals, and force out the maternity hospitals in Dresden and 
Hamburg and so on50?’ 
                                                 
44 Quoted in Kezwer G, in Peace Magazine, May-June 1992 p. 15.  See also Addison, P, and Crang, J A, 
(eds) Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden 1945 (London: Pimlico 2006) for a recent account of the impact 
of the raid. 
45 http://ww2db.com/person.bio.php?person_id=408 accessed 28 May 2009.  See also Probert, H, Bomber 
Harris: His Life and Times (London: Pen and Sword Books 2003) for a more detailed portrait of the man. 
46 Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, Commander in Chief Fighter Command during the Battle of 
Britain 
47 Kezwer Op cit.  
48 NBC Today programme, 31 May 1992.  Clip length 1 min 31 secs. 
49 http://www.londonrevolution.net/blog/london-history-information/arthur-bomber-harris-and-bomber-
command.html#more-53 accessed 28 May 2009 
50 Ibid 
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 NBC reported the view of a Dresden survivor:‘After so many years, to bring that man in 
a statue in the front of the man part of London, I think it is absolutely obscene51.’   
 
Coverage of the incident spread all over the world.  The Washington Post thought it 
reflected Europe’s bloodstained past colliding with its uncertain future, as ageing RAF 
veterans gathered to honour a leader ‘they revere as a hero but others call a war 
criminal52.’On the night of the unveiling, the statue was covered in red paint, and has 
been attacked several times since then53.  
 
The controversy continued after 1992.  In 1994, the Independent carried an article by 
Geoffrey Wheatcroft which said ‘we still can’t make up our minds about Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris’.54  The article discussed a Canadian drama-
documentary, Death by Moonlight55, regarding the Canadian contribution to Bomber 
Command (the Canadians lost some 10000 aircrew).  The programme had attracted 
vehement criticism in Canada.  The nub of Wheatcroft’s argument is that Harris was 
wrong. The 55,573 losses in Bomber Command were not worth it, still less the mass 
casualties of German civilians.  The proposition was that the bombing was 
indiscriminate, and therefore illegal and contrary to what the people in Britain had been 
told about the purposes of the raids. 
                                                 
51 Ibid.  
52 Washington Post 1 June 1992. 
53 See Socialist Worker 13 August 2005 pp. 8-9. 
54 Independent 7 August 1994  http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/firestorms-darken-our-past-those-
who-defend-bomber-harriss-destruction-of-german-cities-are-wrong-geoffrey-wheatcroft-argues-
1382000.html accessed 28 May 2009. Wheatcroft was born in 1945 and married Frank Muir’s daughter 
(Frank was ex-RAF in the Second World War). 
55 Which was shown on Channel 4 on 7 August 1994 
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The bombing of Germany is one of a few issues where long-standing views were 
expressed conveying unease about British conduct in war56.  Nearly fifty years after the 
events, the bombing of German cities had the power to influence not only the survivors 
and the aircrews in different ways, but also younger people like Wheatcroft, who drew 
their knowledge (as he admitted) from the film The Dambusters, not from personal 
experience.  Others, such as the philosopher A.C. Grayling, still say that whether the 
Allied bombing was wholly or in part morally wrong, it in no way equates in moral 
atrocity to the Holocaust57, going on to say that the bombings enjoyed support of the 
people in the US and the UK58 - the key point being that Grayling’s work still caused a 
reaction 65 years after the event. 
 
The start of Remembrance 
 
The first post-war Remembrance Service, when the new dates had been inscribed on the 
Cenotaph in 1946, occasioned The Times to observe:  
 
some…may have felt the sounds to be wholly irrelevant.  So also the new 
inscription…may have turned some minds to ponder the similarities and 
differences between the moods of this Remembrance Day and the Armistice Day 
on which, in his [the King’s] father’s presence, the Cenotaph was dedicated59.   
 
The report went on to say:  
                                                 
56 For wartime opposition to bombing, see Grayling A C, Among the Dead Cities (London: Bloomsbury, 
2006) p. 179. 
57 Ibid p. 5 
58 Ibid p. 8 
59 The Times, 11 November 1946 
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Looking back to 1919, it was surely still possible then to feel with something like 
certainty, however mistakenly, that the world must and could determine that the 
catastrophe should never recur.  But today?  There seemed plenty of time in the 
Silence for such not very satisfactory thoughts, mixed with private memories that 
rustled with the last leaves on the Whitehall plane trees60.   
 
But the memories seem to have been blurred over time, and focused on the First World 
War rather than the Second. 
 
The act of Remembrance was dying in the 1960s, as measured by attendance figures at 
services, and again in the 1980s and 1990s, but was reinvigorated each time.  In the 
1960s, a number of events conspired to re-awaken interest in the First World War e.g. 
war poetry was introduced as a part of the school curriculum.  The message of the poems 
chosen, particularly by Sassoon and Owen, was interpreted as anti-war; arguably, they 
exerted more influence in the 1960s than ever61.  This ascendency has not gone 
unchallenged, with some scholars arguing that Sassoon et al were unrepresentative of 
British soldiers in the First World War62.   
 
The rise of CND brought attention not only to the anti-nuclear debate, but also a 
previously apparently futile war – the themes come together in Joan Littlewood’s play 
Oh! What a Lovely War63.  The new Remembrance Service launched in 1968 after debate 
between Church and the British Legion, was described as ‘uninspiring and lacking in 
                                                 
60 Ibid 
61 Bond, B, Op cit p. 28 
62 Teaching WW1 Literature – event at Oxford University Computing Services 12 November 2007.  See 
also Sheffield, G, Forgotten Victory: The First World War, Myths and Realities  (London: Headline 2001) 
63 Ibid p. 51 see also Sheffield, G, Forgotten Victory Op cit  
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corporate dignity64.’ A senior civil servant said in 1975 that: ‘as wars become 
increasingly distant, it might now be time to abolish the Remembrance Day ceremony at 
the Cenotaph65.’   
 
Brenda Howarth66 recalled that there were many complaints from staff about the choice 
of set poems.  When GCSEs came in, the choice was much freer and left to schools.  She 
describes the poetry as having enough for highly academic classes, but also short poems 
for lower ability groups, retaining a powerful message.  In her view, the best poems 
‘tend[ed] to be fiercely and passionately against the war67.’  She recalls a poem 
describing breakfast in the trench, where the soldiers discuss football; one gets so excited 
he jumps up and gets shot68 – ‘it’s easy to imagine’.  The view offered to young opinion-
formers from poetry had a major impact on their views69. 
 
In 1988, the Conservative Government wanted to focus their national curriculum on all 
that was best in Britain – the First World War formed part of that heritage.  But the 
message that war was ‘futile’ was ingrained in teaching methods 70.  BBC2 released its 
landmark series The Great War in 1964 but this, often unwittingly, reinforced the 
message of futility and helped establish a particular perception of the war among younger 
                                                 
64 Daily Telegraph 3 October 1968 p. 26 
65 Sir Arthur Peterson, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office, quoted in Turner Op cit p. 155 
66 Head of English at Southgate School, London from the 1970s to 2000 
67 Letter Howarth/Lamonte dated 22 July 2007 
68 ‘Breakfast’ by Wilfred Wilson Gibson 2 October 1878-26 May 1962.  
www.theotherpages.org/poems/gibson02.html accessed 18 May 2009. 
69 Though some argue that teachers from the 1960s had undergone a broadly left-wing (to the point of being 
Marxist) post-graduate education, Hennessy believes this to be over-stated, and that the effect of television 
programmes was far more influential on social trends.  Hennessy interview Op cit. 
70 Hatch, R; ‘Teaching the Great War’; Journal of the Centre for First World War Studies, Vol 1, No 1 July 
2004. 
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people.  This reinforced the anti-war feeling emanating from the anti-war lobby in the US 
over Vietnam, although it was never as powerful a movement in the UK as the US71.   
 
 The Church, having considered the relevance of the Remembrance Service somewhat out 
of date since the 1950s, conducted reviews to look at what the best form of service might 
be.  IPC chairman Cecil King responded to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Secretary72 
that the younger generation considered that previous wars were simply the mistakes of 
their forebears and that they were more worried about nuclear war73.  By contrast, the 
BBC reported that the coverage of the Remembrance Service in the Albert Hall in 1967 
reached 25% of the population, although people under 30 were not in the least interested 
in the Cenotaph service or commemoration of the war dead of the two wars74.  The Times 
took on the lead for this, supported by the CofE, looking at attitudes amongst 9-30 year-
olds75.  Fewer than half thought the Remembrance service worthwhile, yet on specifics, 
many had greater knowledge of people and events in the First World War than the 
Second.  In the event, faced with inertia from the Home Office and Buckingham Palace, 
only minor changes were made to the Cenotaph Service, with latitude given to local 
parishes on the conduct of their own services.  For the 1960s clergy, war had a particular 
                                                 
71 Todman Op cit p. 143 
72 It is worth recalling that George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, strongly opposed the bombing campaign 
over Germany during the Second World War, which probably cost him a chance to replace William Temple 
as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1944 on the death of the latter.  See Grayling pp. 179-82.  This controversy 
will not have been lost on the following generation of clergy, particularly in the Church of England. 
73 Todman Op cit p. 140 
74 Todman Op cit p. 140 
75 The Times 13 November 1967 p. 8.  250 young people were interviewed from Birmingham and Solihull 
between 9 and 30.  Less than half found the Remembrance service worthwhile.  Arnhem meant nothing to 
80% of them.  75% had never heard of Mons.  By and large, males knew more about events and people 
than females, particularly on individuals like the Red Baron.  
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connotation quite different to previous generations, as many had served with the Forces, 
and their experiences changed their perceptions of the realities of war. 
 
In the 1980s, again attendance was declining, and yet the act of Remembrance was 
revitalized.  Here, one of the key events was the Falklands War, and the media hype 
around the heroism of individuals such as Colonel ‘H’ Jones VC76, and the attention paid 
to those suffering terrible injury like Simon Weston. The First World War theme returned 
in Blackadder Goes Forth in 1989 as described in Chapter 7. 
 
The scope of the National Ceremony was widened in 1980, reflecting a resolution of the 
Anglican Church Assembly in 1967 to embrace ‘all who had died in the service of their 
country’ and in all conflicts since77.  Representation from all Christian religions was 
achieved, coupled in 2000 by the inclusion of representatives of Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Islam and Sikhism.  For Professor Oliver O’Donovan, who preached and lectured in this 
period:  
 
the topic of war is unpopular because people do not know how to speak with 
conviction of…the just ends for which wars were entered…’ and ‘they do not 
know how to speak of these things without offence to their former enemies who 
tend to be our present allies. 
 
 Thus for him, ‘if anything keeps us going it is a sort of respect for the elderly78.’ 
 
                                                 
76 Daily Express, 31 May 1982 
77 Quinlan Op cit p. 35 
78 Interview Professor Oliver O’Donovan, Professor of Theology, University of Edinburgh, 26 September 
2007. 
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Yet even in the 1980s, the institution of Remembrance brought strong views.  When 
Michael Foot appeared at the National Ceremony in what was unfairly described as a 
donkey-jacket, the newspapers accused him of disrespect for the Nation’s war dead79.  
Despite his claims that this was a perfectly respectable coat, and he was simply keeping 
himself warm, the press and public continued to pour scorn on him and this may have 
contributed to his lack of success in the 1983 election.  The Ulster Nationalist politician 
Lord (Gerry) Fitt feared the consequences within his own community of wearing a 
poppy. His Irish Guardsman brother was killed in the Normandy campaign, and he 
himself had served as a merchant seaman80. 
 
The Church again reviewed the Service of Remembrance in 1984, against the backdrop 
of The Church and the Bomb, a report into the Church’s attitudes to thermo-nuclear 
weapons81.  This made hard reading for clergy and parishioners alike.  Many clergy found 
it hard to engage with a service glorifying those who had died for their sacrifice and 
dedication to a higher cause, against the backdrop of thermo-nuclear warfare and all that 
entailed82.  For many, Remembrance became a difficult area for them and some 
dissociated themselves from supporting, as they saw it, a pro-war stance. 
 
In the 1990s, once again, support for Remembrance was on the wane.  The 1990s were 
marked by complaints from veterans over the state of war graves in the UK to the 
                                                 
79  See for example Daily Mail 9 November 1981, which reported that Walter Johnson MP for Derby South 
has accused Foot of looking like a navvy.  The paper noted that it had received ‘dozens’ of telephone calls 
from readers, all ‘appalled’ at Foot’s standard of dress.  See also Morgan K O, Michael Foot: A Life 
(London: Harper Perennial 2008) p. 390 for more press quotes. 
80 Sunday Times, 10 November 2002 
81 The Church and the Bomb, (London:  Hodder and Stoughton  1982) 
82 Including, anecdotally, my own great-uncle, Peter Munday, vicar of Richmond in the 1970s. 
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Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Unequal parallels were drawn with the 
positive state of war graves maintained by the Commission overseas.  By 2001, the 
Commission estimated that 1000 of the sites it maintained in the UK were of an 
unacceptable standard83.   In 1995, the Royal British Legion fought a major campaign to 
revitalize Remembrance, aided by the Spice Girls to give it some meaning for the young.  
With Government support, who at the time wanted to re-establish core moral values, they 
reinstated the two minute silence on 11 November, rather than just the formal service on 
the Sunday closest to the 11th.  On 11 November 1999, 84% of schools and colleges 
observed the silence or marked Remembrance in some other meaningful way84.   
 
1995 also marked the 50th anniversary of VE Day and VJ day.  For whatever reason, the 
Government chose to celebrate them as one event85.  Sir Martin Gilbert, biographer of Sir 
Winston Churchill, remarked that he received considerable adverse mail from veterans, 
suggesting that this was an inappropriate action and the two should be separated86.  At the 
end of the decade, revisionist views extended to establishing pinewood stakes and a 
commemorative statue in the National Memorial Arboretum in Lichfield to 
commemorate 307 British soldiers who were shot for military offences87.  In fact, this 
was nothing new – Ewan Tavendale was shot for desertion in the First World War, but is 
recorded on the memorial at Kinraddie88 and Bert McCubbin was included in the Book of 
Remembrance at the Scottish National Memorial at Castle Rock.   It is not clear whether 
                                                 
83 Quinlan Op cit p. 153 
84 Royal British Legion information leaflet 2006  - see Royal British Legion website for details. 
85 Morgan, Op cit p. 578 notes that this event was a closing point to ‘post war’ Britain.   
86 Conversation with Sir Martin Gilbert, June 2007. 
87 Kidd, W, and Murdoch, B, Memory and Memorials (Ashgate 2004) 
88 Calder Op cit p. 9 
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this was in the mind of Dr John Reid89 in 1998 when he recommended that those 
executed should be recorded on memorials, though he stopped short of moving for a 
pardon90.  Less controversial, but similarly revising the criteria for remembrance  by 
including those who died in accidents as well as those on active service, was the addition 
to a Scottish war memorial of a soldier who died in a rail accident on his return to his unit 
in Germany prior to demobilization91.  Similarly, it was not until 1994 that a plaque 
carrying the name of Ernst Stadler, a German poet, was added to the monument to the 
war dead at Magdalen College, Oxford92. 
 
1996 saw the start of the British Legion’s schools programme to educate younger 
generations about the significance of Remembrance Day.  The programme started slowly 
but built over the next 10 years to distributing 43,000 packs to schools explaining the 
poppy and the two minute silence.  Whilst the work of the war poets was covered, with 
all the limitations of the images they present, modern day conflicts were also covered for 
balance.  A network of veterans from the Legion also visited schools.  The message 
however, was summarized in the words of Helen Hill, Schools Adviser:  
 
We show them the horrors of war and the sacrifices that were made.  And we 
show them that war is still going on.  Hopefully it makes them realize the futility 
of it all93.   
                                                 
89 Minister of State for the Armed Forces 
90 Some 20 000 soldiers were found guilty of military crimes for which the death penalty could be passed, 
of which some 3000 were actually sentenced to death.  Some 90% of those had their sentences commuted 
by their Commanders in Chief.  Bond notes the comments of Dr Reid in the 1998 Commons debate, that ‘In 
a sense those who were executed were as much victims of the war’ and that ‘The conditions and nature of 
the First World War distinguished it from all others’.  Bond, B, Op cit pp. 82-3 
91 Kidd et al, Op cit p. 4 
92 Kidd et al, Op cit p. 5 
93 10th Anniversary described in BBC TV News 12 November 2006  
BBC News report Op cit 
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This message of futility, right or wrong, is bound to affect the judgment of future 
opinion-formers and decision-makers. 
 
A 2002 article summed up the challenge of the previous few years:  
 
To wear the poppy is to make a moral choice, to stand up and be counted, to invite 
comment or even hostility……It also requires the humility to acknowledge 
openly that there are and have been people who were your betters, people who 
were tested as you have not been and probably never will be, thanks to them. 
 
Remembrance had previously been  ‘an inescapable obligation…an imperative, vital to 
our cultural identity…94’ 
 
The curious question, other than the particular perception of the conduct of the First War, 
is why was there the focus on that war, rather than the more recent Second World War? 
Sheer ignorance may be part of the answer. A 2001 survey revealed that half of young 
people questioned did not know that the Battle of Britain took place in the Second World 
War95.  The very act of homage, using the words from ‘The Fallen’ by Laurence Binyon, 
does pose the question – who are we remembering?  And what exactly are the images we 
are reflecting upon?  It would be easy to say that the scale of the British deaths – some 
half as many in the Second World War as the First – was the cause.  O’Donovan suggests 
Remembrance was a ceremony about burying of Empire at the end of the First World 
                                                 
94 Nick Thomas, ‘Comment’, The Times, 4 November 2002 
95 Furedi et al, The corruption of the curriculum, (London: Civitas 2007) p. 75 Civitas is an independent 
think-tank. 
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War – for both German and British Empires96.  Or that the more even spread in the 
Second War losses across ages and between civilians and military made it easier to cope 
with.  Or perhaps that the heavy civilian casualties in the Second World War, and the 
clear fight against Hitler’s Nazi regime, made it a much more popular war, indeed a 
‘people’s war’.  But there seems to be something about images of war from the First 
World War that find resonance with generations through the 1960s to 2000, and that 
subconscious image affects attitudes towards contemporary warfare. 
 
Heenan’s letter to The Times contained the radical suggestion considers that so many 
conflicts have occurred since the two World Wars that there might be a case for change. 
He distinguished between the two World Wars, when many of the dead were civilians 
participating in total war, with more recent conflicts, with different aims and objectives, 
fought largely by professional forces. His argument was that Remembrance should be 
demilitarised and to remember the dead of all wars, and all sides97.  In a sense, the 
Church’s progressive amendments to the Remembrance Service had tried to achieve that 
aim, but the popular trend since 1995 towards emphasizing Armistice Day suggests that 
the public still concentrated on the First World War. 
 
Calder argued that by extension, the British dead in Korea, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, the 
Falklands and Bosnia join the dead of the World Wars in Remembrance as young men 
who sacrificed their lives for their countrymen, in some sense of pro patria mori, in 
defence of the motherland and its overseas territories.    But he went on to question 
                                                 
96 O’Donovan interview Op cit 
97 Duncan Heenan, letter in The Times 12 November 2003 There is no evidence that he had a particular 
affiliation in this debate. 
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whether that model continued on operations like the Balkans, where the British were 
notionally involved in ‘peace-keeping’ and ‘humanitarian’ operations.  No longer could it 
be argued that this was sacrifice in defence of the motherland; deaths to be honoured 
certainly, but not perhaps to be viewed in the same light 98. 
 
Memory is a curious thing.  A British journalist was shocked when an aid worker in 
Kosovo remarked that she was reminded of Schindler’s List; not the Holocaust, or the 
ethnic cleansing in Europe during the Second World War, but of the Spielberg film99.  In 
truth, few remember the Second World War, and still less the First – ‘truth’ for most is 
what appears in films and news articles 100.  So preconception, and what might be called 
the Blackadder effect, colour our judgments of Remembrance and what it means to us.  
For the longer term, images of the First World War must fade over time, and the act of 
Remembrance will be questioned.  But the resurgences of the service over the period to 
2000 demonstrate that the core elements of national solidarity, service to the country and 
sacrifice in war are all relevant to generations of all ages. 
 
Remembrance Case Studies 
 
Having considered Remembrance at the national level, an evaluation of church 
attendance at Remembrance services was undertaken at varying levels in the CofE as the 
dominant Church according to Census data.  The CofE has a number of levels; at its 
                                                 
98 Calder Disasters and Heroes – on War, Memory and Representation.  (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press 2004) p. 25   
99 Calder Op cit p. 23 
100 Connelly Op cit p. 8 
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lowest level is the parish, here represented by Bathford.  Parishes are grouped into 
deaneries (each deanery administered by a rural dean, who is one of the local vicars), 
deaneries into archdeaconries (each administered by an archdeacon, representing the 
Bishop; three archdeaconries in the diocese of Bath and Wells: Bath, Wells and Taunton), 
archdeaconries into diocese, administered by the diocesan Bishop. Most dioceses have 
assistant Bishops, known as suffragen Bishops, to assist the diocesan Bishop (one in the 
Bath and Wells diocese: the Bishop of Taunton). The Cathedral at Wells is administered 
by the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral, not the bishop, although the bishop's palace is 
next door. Bath Abbey is a parish church, but has civic functions as well.  At the 
Cathedral level, this study has used St Phillip’s Cathedral, Birmingham.  Service 
attendance figures were drawn from the service registers for the Remembrance services 
for each year and, as a control, figures were derived from the week before.  Figures were 
also taken for the electoral roll for the church, to give an indication of how the 
Remembrance attendees matched those formally enrolled in the CofE.  These figures 
were taken from the annual Diocesan Directories, but were drawn from the annual returns 
by parishes.  Finally, numbers of communicants were recorded where relevant.  In some 
cases this had to act as a proxy for attendance, as figures were unavailable. 
 
Shortcomings in data rapidly became apparent.  Service registers were at best incomplete.  
On many occasions attendance was not noted – particularly for Remembrance Services 
where large numbers were involved.  In the Diocesan Directories, population figures 
were evidently copied from year to year, and reflected the assiduousness (or not) of 
churchwardens in collecting data.  Often the population figure may have reflected the 
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geographical boundary, rather than the ecclesiastical parish boundary.  And the electoral 
roll figures may be in doubt as in the early part of the period these figures were linked to 
pay for clergy, and throughout for contributions to diocesan funds – the ‘parish share’; 
this may have encouraged parishes to be more conservative in their estimates than might 
otherwise have been the case. 
 
Case Study 1 – Bathford 
 
Of all the parishes surrounding Bath, Bathford is the third largest with around 1800 acres 
and a population of some 2000-2200.  The village has been predominantly agricultural 
but stone quarrying has existed in Bathford since Roman times; the quarry tunnels of 
neighbouring Monkton Farleigh were used for wartime weapons storage with a rail spur 
from the London to Bristol line at Shockerwick, passing under the hill at Bathford.  From 
this emerged a strong link to the military within the community.   
 
The church of St Swithun’s from which the data is drawn dates back before the Norman 
Conquest, but was rebuilt in the 1870s.  The war memorial outside the church records 23 
war dead from the First World War which, although less than 3% of the population of the 
time, must have represented a major loss of manpower in the community.  The Second 
World War losses were only 7, but reflect a greater balance between the Services; the 
First World War losses being almost all Army.   
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What distinguishes Bathford from most of the neighbouring parishes, and one of the 
reasons for selecting it, is that it has always had a strong Royal British Legion branch 
which has greatly influenced the relationship between the local community and the 
church. 
 
What the figures show is a gentle decline in the electoral roll, despite a fairly substantial 
increase in the population101.  We know that the population figures do not tie in well with 
the census information, and this is probably due to churchwardens compiling data 
through best endeavours; certainly the constant population figures in the 1960s look like 
copying from one year to the next.  Fire destroyed service registers held in the vestry 
before 1969, so we have no records of attendance prior to that year.  A significant drop in 
the electoral roll occurred from 1972 onwards, and seems to be reflected in attendance at 
Church services, and can be linked to the local vicar102, a married man, and his 
relationship with a widow some 13 years junior to him.  He was removed from office in 
1979, under the 1977 Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure; a case that made 
some notoriety in the local community and was a reflection of the strong moral code still 
prevalent in the 1970s103.  The village split into two, with half wanting to retain someone 
they felt was a sound parish priest, and the rest who were horrified at his behaviour.  This 
demonstrates the disproportionate effect that one individual can have on things such as 
church attendance, a factor which will also be seen in successive case studies.  Numbers 
                                                 
101 Service Registers 1969-2000 
102 Name omitted for privacy reasons 
103 Article in The Church Times, 27 April 1979.  A local resident (name omitted for privacy reasons) 
recalled that her father, a strong supporter of the Church though not particularly religious, used to entertain 
the vicar in one room of his house and talk about the other lady, whilst his wife talked to the vicar’s wife in 
another room, usually accompanied by a gin bottle.  She also recalled that stone walls were refashioned 
with stiles to allow the vicar to go quietly to see his mistress.  Interview conducted 24 March 2009. 
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recovered with a new vicar in the 1980s.  In general, however, the electoral roll figures do 
not support the decline in numbers seen at the national level.  The figures for 1979 to 
1984 are the only ones where we have records of the major evening service held with the 
British Legion, for which there is a two-fold increase over the numbers normally 
attending church.  Most notable are the increases in 1982 and 1983, which may be related 
to the Falklands campaign.  The remaining figures generally show about the same 
numbers attending the morning service of Remembrance attendance as the week before, 
with the exception of the first half of the 1990s, where Remembrance seems to have 
dropped.  Interestingly, this was at the time of the Gulf War and the involvement in 
Bosnia.  It may be that churchgoers went to other churches, or attended the main British 
Legion service, or it is equally possible that people had lost interest. 
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Case 2.  Bath Abbey. 
 
The next case study considers the Abbey (which has church status) in Bath.  It provides a 
focus for the town of some 80 000 people, and also for the many tourists who visit the 
town daily.  It is particularly worthy of note as the centre for the religious element for 
Bath’s Remembrance commemoration. 
 
Bath Abbey is largely surrounded by shops and offices, so the parish, which is itself very 
small, is predominantly non-residential.  The electoral roll is therefore extremely small 
despite the large size of the Abbey.  The Abbey also conducts five services every Sunday, 
with a particular focus on the choral matins which is generally the best attended104.  The 
comparative figures for the week before Remembrance were therefore taken from this 
service. 
 
The annual Remembrance service was traditionally conducted in two parts: a two minute 
silence was observed at the 11am service, which started a few minutes early to ensure 
that the silence could be observed, and then a larger parade of military, civil and cadet 
organizations assembled for a Service in the afternoon.  The morning service was 
paralleled by a Service of Remembrance held in Royal Victoria Park at the War 
Memorial which many of the military and civil organisations attended before going onto 
the Abbey parade in the afternoon.  Where figures were available, it is the latter service 
that was used.  There may well be an element of duplication in numbers between 
Bathford and Bath Abbey; many people will have attended both services.   
                                                 
104 Bath Abbey Service Registers 1960-2000 – all years show the same pattern. 
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What the figures show is a very clear long term reduction in the electoral roll.  John 
Burgess suggested that this merely reflected national trends105.  He was also not aware of 
any pacifist preacher being appointed in the diocese which might have affected any of the 
data for Bath Abbey or Bathford.  The erratic figures for the quoted parish population 
reflect the inaccuracies in recording, and persistent copying of previous year’s data, 
which often only changed when they had to be reviewed on a 5-yearly basis.  Attendance 
figures are very sparse; during Rev Geoffrey Lester’s tenure106, no figures were recorded, 
save for some communicants.  It is really only of value to look at the figures post-1990 
for a real comparison between the Remembrance Service, held in the afternoon of 
Remembrance Sunday when all the military and civil dignitaries joined the British 
Legion from across the area, and a normal Sunday service.  Based on that evidence, the 
increase in attendance over the previous week was a factor of 4 or 5.  Nevertheless, after 
a peak in 1992-3 perhaps linked to the Gulf War of 1990/91, attendance gradually 
reduced over the following years, whereas the attendance the previous week at Choral 
Matins seems to have remained broadly constant. Hence despite the national surge led by 
the British Legion in 1995, attendance in this religious portion of the commemoration in 
Bath declined. 
 
                                                 
105 Telephone call Burgess/Lamonte 9 October 2008.  John Burgess was Archdeacon for the diocese 1975-
1995. 
106 He was employed as Vicar for 28 years 
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What Bath Abbey does offer is a complete record of the comments in the Bath Abbey 
News and Comment, published on a monthly basis throughout the period.  The advance 
notices in the November issues and the comments from the December issues are quite 
instructive.  In 1960, the Abbey News carried a note on the forthcoming Remembrance 
Service which mentions the Rev Vaughan-Jones, Assistant Chaplain-General Southern 
Command as the visiting preacher107.  The next few years regularly mention a military-
related presence: either a naval or Army officer to take the parade, or a military chaplain.   
After 1965 this stopped, and no military person was mentioned108.  In 1968109, the 
problems of Vietnam, West Africa and Czechoslovakia were mentioned by Rev Lester 
with considerable concern, but by 1969, Remembrance Service did not even feature as a 
                                                 
107 News and Comment November 1960 
108 News and Comment 1966 onwards 
109 News and Comment December 1968 
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major service110.  From 1969, all the references to future Remembrance Services talked of 
the visiting preachers, and seem to show an inclination towards senior church leaders: the 
Bishop of Bath and Wells and the Dean and Archdeacon appeared.  The Bishop of Bath 
and Wells’ fiery sermon of 1977111 asked the congregation to  ‘wage war on the anti-
Christ’, and sought the end for Idi Amin’s regime, as well as Russia, Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam – he also saw the anti-Christ in the ‘flood of pornography’ prevalent in Bath.  
 
1981112 saw Rev John Campbell, Chaplain to the Royal British Legion, ask ‘Is it better to 
be red than dead?’ as his sermon discussed a split between pacifists and Christians, which 
he saw as entirely different, and highlighted the real threat from nuclear weapons.  
Although the Remembrance Service for 1982 did not get a mention in the November 
News113, Rev Lester’s sermon was in the December issue114 where he gave thanks for the 
Falklands outcome, and went on to controversially discuss pacifism in the church.  His 
own perception was that the extant Articles of Religion included ‘It is lawful for 
Christian men…to wear weapons and to serve in Wars.’   
 
Perhaps his upbringing through the Second World War made Lester more at home with 
this conservative concept; certainly he seems to have felt that the pacifism of some parts 
of the CofE was inappropriate.  Again, the Remembrance Service did not get a mention in 
1983115 or in 1984116, perhaps surprisingly so soon after the Falklands war.  The 1983 
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111 News and Comment December 1977 
112 News and Comment December 1981 
113 News and Comment November 1982 
114 News and Comment December 1982 
115 News and Comment November 1983 
116 News and Comment November 1984 
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sermon117 did however hark back to Rupert Brooke’s sonnets, not least because Brooke’s 
grandfather was Rector of Bath Abbey from 1875-98.   
 
The most controversial part of the Bath Abbey story occurred in 1994/5.  The 1994 
News118 recalled the RAF’s raid on Braunschweig at 2 am on 15 October 1944, where, 
according to the article, in 40 minutes half the city was destroyed and 3000 killed of 
whom half were foreign workers.  Braunschweig and Bath have close modern links as 
University towns.  The relevance came in 1995 when Rev Joachim Hempel, preacher at 
the Cathedral in Braunschweig was invited to take services to celebrate the anniversary of 
VE day.  Despite intense local discontent (Bath having been heavily attacked in 1942) 
Hempel’s sermons were received well, largely though his contritional style.  At his 0915 
service, he said: ‘guilt of my people is large’; ‘war, hate and crime was started by the 
Germans’; and ‘I am saying this with sorrow and being ashamed’. At 1100 he said ‘To 
admit guilt and accept responsibility for it, is also not easy in our personal life!’ going on 
to remind us that ‘Victories are celebrated, defeats less’119. Curiously for that year of 
anniversaries, Remembrance Service was again not mentioned in the November News120. 
 
A further change in style emerged in the late 1990s, with Rev Askew as the enthusiastic 
and dynamic parish vicar.  His 1998 sermon for Remembrance said it gave ‘an awful 
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118 News and Comment December 1994 
119 News and Comment June 1995 
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warning of what can happen when great and Christian nations fall prey to a satanic 
ideology121.’   
 
The following year’s November issue122 brought an article from foreign correspondent 
James Pettigrew, who questioned whether the Kosovo campaign had been legitimate and 
a Just War.  This is one of the few tangible pieces of evidence of consideration of Just 
War theory outside the elite circles of academia and politics.  His conclusion was that it 
was both just and legitimate; indeed, he highlighted that the RAF had only dropped two 
bombs in the first six days of the campaign, and that the threat of ground troops 
(presumably cognizant of all that would have entailed) should have been made much 
earlier.  The final article from November 2000123 mentioned Remembrance as a time for 
looking back and looking forwards.  It is, said Askew, about ‘the sacrifice of others and 
not glorying in war, but gratitude for liberty’. 
 
Testing this evidence against that in the Bath Evening Chronicle124 shows both 
similarities and unusual contradictions.  The consistent message from the newspaper’s 
coverage of the 1960s is one of the Abbey being filled to capacity – around one thousand 
people.  In most years, the newspaper  sought comment from the British Legion, which 
almost every year suggested that the numbers were higher than the previous years – in 
fact, the evidence (however subjective) from the newspaper reports shows this not to 
have been the case.  For example, five bands played in 1964’s parade, but later in 1973 
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123 News and Comment November 2000 
124 Which became the Bath Chronicle in 1994. 
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lack of military bands caused the parade to be led by the Salvation Army; and the 
numbers of onlookers reduced from thousands in 1966 to hundreds by 1973, and ‘large 
crowds’125 in 1985.  By 1986, the hundreds of ex-Servicemen at the War memorial had 
become seventy126, and the twenty standards of the 1960s down to fourteen by 1992.127.  
 
The constant theme seemed to be the threat of nuclear war, as the Rector of Devizes said 
in 1961:  
 
If the explosion of gigantic nuclear weapons was an example of the type of 
freedom for which men and women had given their lives in the two Great Wars, 
we as a nation should be thoroughly ashamed128. 
 
Similarly, in 1963:  
 
In the Abbey churchyard at noon, a ceremony of a rather different kind took place 
without incident.  While a packed Abbey congregation sang “Now thank we all 
our God” a score of young CND members paid respects in their own way to the 
war dead.  They laid a poppy wreath on the new Garden of Remembrance 
accompanied by anti-war poetry by Stephen Spender and Rupert Brooke read by 
chest physician Dr Robert Oswald and 26 year-old John Mills. “We didn’t find 
anyone opposed to what we did” said Barbara Rebbick, “We got our wreath from 
the British Legion129.”   
 
The issue returned in 1983 when the editorial said ‘Britain has to be in NATO and be 
defended by nuclear weapons. CND….distracts attention from the real issue [of 
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managing with fewer weapons]130. The next year Rt Rev Wilson in his Abbey sermon 
said ‘In 1918 we spoke of the war to end all wars, and now our nightmare is the thought 
of a war that would end life131.’ 
 
The newspaper mentioned thoughts of dropping the act of Remembrance in 1968.  In an 
article marking fifty years since the end of the First World War, a comparison was drawn 
between the sober acts of Remembrance and the party atmosphere in Bath when the 
Armistice was signed, with flag-waving and cheering132.  But the Rt Rev Francis West in 
his Bath Abbey Sermon that year said:  
 
Those whose affections and sentiments are linked with either the First or Second 
World Wars must not expect others, in particular the younger generation, to 
regard Remembrance Day with the same attitude,  
 
going on to say that the ‘First World War seemed as remote as Waterloo’ and that ‘today 
we think less of national sovereignty than we did and much more of world problems133.’  
 
The anti-war elements were limited in sermons, but emerged in the Archdeacon of Wells, 
Venerable John Lance’s words of 1972 when he talked of ‘the dunghill of war’ and the 
dangers in letting Remembrance become a sentimental strutting vanity’134  It re-emerged 
as an issue in 1986 when the Bishop of Taunton was quoted as saying:   
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133 Bath Evening Chronicle 11 November 1968 p8 
134 Bath Evening Chronicle 13 November 1972 p5 
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There are a number of people today who attack our remembrance service and the 
obvious military presence it has on the grounds it glorifies war.  These are often 
the same people who sadly seem to have hijacked the word peace…135 
 
A particular issue that raised local debate was that of the war memorial, described in 
1972 as ‘badly-kept, wrongly-sited and incomplete136’ by the Royal British Legion.  In 
1974 the Dean of Wells talked of the Second World War names not always being placed 
on war memorials, saying: ‘Does it mean people in the Second World War were more 
disillusioned, cynical or just realistic?137’.   
 
It was not until 1995 that 600 new names were added to the war memorial from the 
Second World War after a campaign by the Royal British Legion, the Bath Chronicle and 
local people138.  One particular addition to the Frome memorial in 1983, that of Corporal 
Keith McCarthy who died in the Falklands Campaign, merited an article in the 
Chronicle139. 
 
Perhaps that feeling of change starts to show itself in the coverage of Remembrance Day 
in the newspaper, because the 1969 coverage was much less than previous years.  In 
1970, the coverage of Bath services was melded with that in other towns and villages in a 
single article140, yet the following year showed that the Abbey remained full. The 
newspaper gradually placed the articles further back into the paper – typically from pages 
5 and 6 to page 13 or 14. The turning point in coverage seemed to be 1987, when the 
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narrative became very short and the focus more on pictures of individuals.  In 1988, the 
focus was on Jack Hills, a 91 year-old ex-RFC observer.  Editorial comment was rare, 
save for a comment in 1986 to highlight wearing a red poppy with pride, and 
consideration of the plight of war widows in 1989.  In 1991 though, the editor recognized 
the new poignancy and swelling of numbers from the Gulf War.  Yet from that year on, 
no mention was made of the content of the church sermons, marking a possible 
secularization of the event.  In the coverage of 1993, it explicitly said that the purpose of 
Remembrance was ‘remembering the dead of two world wars’141, and this reflected the 
general tenor of the events with only minor exceptions. 
 
The move to revive Armistice Day in 1995 marked another change in newspaper 
coverage.  No mention was made of the Abbey service at all in the 1995 Bath Chronicle, 
or indeed for the following two years.  The Abbey service was mentioned again in 1998 
and 2000 but there was a distinct shift towards Armistice Day and away from 
Remembrance Sunday, with the implication that thought was more of the First World 
War, as demonstrated by Reverend Jonathan Lloyd’s article on Armistice in 2000142. 
 
The power of individuals stands out in the historiography; the Rev W D C Williams, 
Rector of Devizes was regularly quoted, notably in 1967 for his assertion that ‘History 
will also prove America is right now [in Vietnam]143’. His background as Assistant 
Chaplain-General to the Forces gave him more of a fiery and militarist flavour to his 
sermons.  In 1971, he was the only Rector noted in the press to highlight the conflict in 
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Ulster, together with the war dead of Korea, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden144; most 
others stick to the two World Wars.  Prebendary Geoffrey Lester at Bath Abbey was 
similarly strong in his views: 
 
The association of Christianity with pacifism is absolute rubbish’ he said in 1982; 
‘Is it peace at any price, would they really rather be red than dead?145 
 
which echoed the sentiment of the previous year’s sermon as mentioned above in the 
Abbey notes. 
 
Not everyone was engaged in the services: the two minutes silence at St Saviour’s, 
Larkhall, Bath was interrupted in 1961 by the ‘revving of car engines and the noisy 
footsteps of passers-by’146.  Similarly two men were each fined ₤30 each after shouting 
abuse and waving at Servicemen on the 1982 parade having mistaken it for a Falklands 
victory parade; a conflict with which they disagreed147. 
 
Despite the coverage of the Remembrance parades and services, little opinion emerges 
from the letters to the editor.  The first reference appeared in 1968 when a letter called for 
thought on Czechoslovakia during Remembrance that year. Two letters in 1968 and 1969 
simply thanked the efforts of poppy sellers.  Two other issues raised comment over the 
years: local correspondent Mark Alexander’s article and that of white poppies.  Mark 
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Alexander wrote a piece in 1974 looking ahead to the weekend’s Remembrance 
activities:  
 
‘I can see nothing festive about remembrance of two of the greatest criminal acts 
against the dignity of man in the history of the world...the irrelevance and 
stupidity of it all is inescapable…We should swap all the militaristic nonsense and 
quietly reflect on what actually happened…All the names on the war memorials 
were not heroes.  They were real people we sent to be killed…148’.   
 
In response to this strong article, two letters published on 11 November 1974 were 
equally strong in their condemnation of the text.  Although CND brought out the white 
poppies particularly in 1986 (though not in Bath)149, which brought one letter of defence 
for the white poppy, the first recorded wreath of white poppies locally was in Trowbridge 
in 1981150.  The final letter on remembrance was in 1993 against the white poppies.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the vandalism of the wreath laid by two representatives of the Bath 
Campaign for Homosexual Equality at the Bath War Memorial in 1981 received no 
comment, either for or against.  One can only conclude that Remembrance as an issue 
was not something the local public felt strongly enough to write about. 
 
Although the white poppies issue was a relatively small one at the local level, it was 
much more significant nationally.  The origins date back to the No More War Movement, 
which suggested in 1926 that the British Legion imprint ‘No More War’ in the centre of 
red poppies instead of ‘Haig Fund’151.  The first white poppies were introduced by the 
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Women’s Co-operative Guild152 (and made by workers from the Co-operative Wholesale 
Society) in 1933 as a demonstration against war and for non-violence153, who were joined 
by the Peace Pledge Union in 1934 who assisted them in distribution. The Peace Pledge 
Union took up the white poppy in 1936 as a symbol that war should not be allowed to 
happen again, and participated in alternative remembrance events in 1938, when 85 000 
white poppies were sold, often being worn with red poppies, as Neil Kinnock later did in 
the 1980s as Labour Leader.  In 1980, on the afternoon of Remembrance Sunday, a silent 
march was made to the Cenotaph, and a wreath of white poppies laid, with the inscription 
‘For all those who have died or are dying in wars; For all those who will die until we 
learn to live in peace; When will we ever learn?154’  
 
The silent march became an annual event and sales of white poppies grew.  When raised 
in Parliament, the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher expressed her ‘deep distaste’155 for them, 
which created a national debate.  Only in 2005 was the Royal British Legion, who had 
been very opposed to the white poppy, to try and reach an accommodation with the 
Movement for the Abolition of War (who took on the white poppy symbol) by removing 
‘there will always be wars’ from their website, and to introduce the Movement for the 
Abolition of War in their schools information packs156. 
 
Case Study 3.  Cathedral Church of St Phillip, Birmingham 
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Birmingham Cathedral represents a rather different city community.  The community has 
long been a multi-cultural one, with a high level of immigrants; indeed, the Church 
records from 1962157 mentioned services held in Urdu.  Losses from both World Wars 
were higher than in Bath, and the civilian community had felt far greater effects from 
German bombing.  Birmingham traditionally had a large open air service to 
commemorate Remembrance, either in the Bull Ring or the Hall of Memory.  The 
Cathedral church, chosen for its extensive records held in the Birmingham Central 
Library, always held a Remembrance service, usually coincident with the service of 
Matins.   
 
The data, taken from the Service Registers158 and the Diocesan Directory159 for 
Birmingham, are shown below: 
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What the figures demonstrate is the same arbitrary nature of estimating the population for 
the parish, which can then extend for some years before another individual took a 
different view.  In this case it is feasible that the parish population was much larger 
before the 1970s, when substantial redevelopment of the city centre took place, but this is 
not easy to prove definitively.  Nevertheless, the core numbers on the electoral roll shows 
considerable consistency with peaks in 1970 and 1984/5.  There is no major fall-away in 
numbers as the national trend would suggest.  With some exceptions, the numbers of 
communicants at the Remembrance Day service (which has to be used as a proxy for 
attendance for which no figures are recorded except for 1960) were some 5-10% higher 
than those of the previous week.  From 1991 onwards the numbers generally exceeded 
the electoral roll – which suggests both that visitor numbers increased for that particular 
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service, and that the attendance was not affected by the very large open-air Service held 
close by. 
 
Perhaps more instructive are the comments in the Service Registers.  In 1965, the 
morning service is noted as being for the Christian Nuclear Disarmament group, rather 
than simply as a Remembrance Service160.  Similarly, the following year’s service is 
noted a being for CND161.  There are no records of attendance at either service.  An 
increase in the electoral roll of over 25% by 1968162 may indicate the effect of a new 
rector or change in direction in style of service.  More significant are the annotations for 
the services.  In both other case studies, and seemingly more widely, the nature of each 
service was recorded for that Sunday, such as the 5th Sunday before Trinity etc.  
Typically, the fact that it is the Remembrance Service is also recorded.  But on eight 
occasions over the forty-year period of this review163 (1972, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1983-4, 
1999-2000) this was not recorded.  One might suspect that one omission might be a 
clerical error, but the fact that there were so many may indicate the level of importance 
given to this Service in the Cathedral, particularly from the 1970s onwards.  Also of 
significance is the fact that it was recorded in the year of the Falklands Campaign164, but 
not for the following two years165, and similarly not in the year of the Kosovo 
campaign166. 
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Correlating the Cathedral data with the Birmingham Post records shows both differences 
and similarities.  The connection with CND was clear in 1964 when members of 
Birmingham CND kept a ‘vigil’ at the Town Hall on Remembrance Sunday167.  Britain’s 
place in the world was brought into question in the 1966 editorial:  
 
Britain wins the war and loses the peace – and it is just as true of Britain as an 
economic entity as in its military capacity, though we do not recognize it so 
readily168.  
 
That same year, people were clearly questioning the Remembrance Service, as the 
Assistant Bishop of Worcester Cathedral, Rt Rev P Wheeldon suggested in his sermon at 
Worcester Cathedral:  
 
Thousands of people would be deeply hurt if Remembrance Sunday did not 
continue in some form…People have asked why should they go on keeping 
Remembrance Sunday when no-one under 60 can remember the Great War, and 
when the last war is receding into history169.   
 
And yet the paper records that more than five thousand people attended the Birmingham 
Hall of Memory service.  The debate over whether to continue with the service continued 
in 1967; Canon D A Hodges described the suggestion of an end to Remembrance Day as 
a ‘disaster to the cause of peace’ whilst agreeing that ‘after 50 years of paying tribute to 
the dead of the First World War’ the emphasis should change to thanksgiving for acts of 
self-sacrifice in every sphere of life170.  The editorial picked up the theme, noting that the 
Bishop of Birmingham was amongst those wanting a review of the purposes of 
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Remembrance Sunday, and noting the pressure from those who thought it ‘seemingly 
irrelevant to young people’ and a ‘glorification of war’, yet it remained ‘intensely 
pertinent to the mood and aspirations of a generation of young people that has shown 
itself passionately interested in peace171.’  From the fact that there are no letters in 
response to this debate, one can suggest that this was being held at a higher (elite) level, 
but that the general populace, still turning out for services in and out of churches in large 
numbers, did not share the concerns. 
 
In Birmingham at least, there seems to be a change starting in 1968.  Although the 
numbers of attendees seemed to be reducing (‘hundreds took part’ at Colmore Circus172), 
the biggest difference in press coverage was the lack of mention of church services, 
suggesting that the more secular event at the open air ceremony now had greater 
precedence.  Subsequent years show a similar trend, but 1969 showed a slight resurgence 
to two thousand people at the Town Hall in Birmingham, marking the 25th anniversary of 
the D-Day landings173.  The next change was the smaller local disputes that occur which 
make press coverage: the Shirley ceremony dispute over whether the Sea Cadet Band or 
the Salvation Army band should lead; the Staffordshire British Legion complaining that 
three schools (one grammar, one comprehensive and one secondary) had refused to sell 
poppies174.  Although trivial in nature, these events tend to distract from a much more 
formal report of what the church leaders said in previous years, and hence shows a 
cultural shift. 
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CND remains a feature of Birmingham services in 1970; the front page recording that:  
 
Spectators remonstrated with CND supporters during yesterday’s Remembrance 
Day march past along Colmore Row, Birmingham, after young people unveiled a 
banner which read “In Memory – and against a Third World War”175.  
 
 The students went on to place a wreath at the Hall of Memory, but none of this raised a 
comment in the editorial or letters to the paper. 
 
By 1971, the decline in the significance of Remembrance Sunday can be seen from the 
fact that coverage was confined to the back page of the paper, with just a picture of the 
Birmingham ceremony176.  The following year, coverage focused not on the ceremony, 
but on two veterans, aged 78 and 66, suggesting both that the really important element 
was the individual soldier, and that the key wars were the First and Second World Wars 
where those two had served, rather than any more recent conflicts177. Similarly, the 1973 
coverage178, whilst on the first page, was of Miss Emily Duckett, who made an annual 
pilgrimage from Weston-super-Mare to Birmingham where she had served in the Second 
World War.  The decline had gone still further in 1974, where there was no coverage of 
the Birmingham events at all, and only a picture of one of the Old Contemptibles in 
Staffordshire.  Interestingly, the quote from the British Legion in 1975 to accompany the 
single picture on the back page, said ‘the success of Dad’s Army on television had 
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brought in many young sellers and made this year’s Poppy Day collections a success179.’ 
This reinforces the idea that people’s ideas on war were drawn from the Second World 
War, and heavily influenced by fictional, and in this case humorous, accounts, rather than 
modern-day facts.  The ceremony was relegated to a small column in 1976, though 
numbers are quoted as being 5000 at the Hall of Memory. 
 
In 1977, numbers apparently declined once more (‘nearly two thousand turned out in 
Birmingham’180) but it is hard to know whether this is more about reporting accuracy 
than actual numbers – nevertheless, a significant difference to the previous year for no 
apparent reason.  A comment that ‘A mixed unit from the Regiment of Signals shows 
how the women keep in step with the men in yesterday’s Birmingham remembrance 
service181’ says more about the attitude to women at the time than anything else.  But this 
seems to reflect some of the attitudes at the time, for in the following year:  
 
Hundreds of ex-Servicemen, scouts and some councillors boycotted the 
Remembrance Day ceremony at Wolverhampton yesterday in protest over the 
participation of the Campaign for Homosexual Equality182.   
 
In the event, the campaigners laid a wreath, despite there being no standards present or 
ex-Servicemen.  Elsewhere, ‘Civic leaders marched to church to tunes such as the Yellow 
Rose of Texas, Little Drummer Boy and Hawaii Five-O183’ because the scout band 
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couldn’t play marches.  Beneath this humorous tale lies a change in society, where the 
military, previously providing bands and support, were starting to be rather more remote. 
 
By 1979184, the pictures had returned to the front page, and the complaint, both in the 
columns and in one letter, was of jet noise during the two minutes silence, the only letter 
relating to Remembrance for many years.  That this event was significant was shown 
again the following year when two amateur football teams complained to the league that 
their match (Canley Utd v Coventry Evening Telegraph) was not stopped at 11am to 
observe the silence185.  That year also saw the effect of a vicar perceived not to provide 
the sermon required:  
 
A vicar’s sermon yesterday halted the Remembrance Day service at a 
Birmingham church, because the congregation objected to it….The Rev John 
Duncan (from All Saints, King’s Heath) spoke of the peace movement and 
nuclear armament….When he asked if Russia really was “bent on world 
conquest” several people rose to argue and at least one person is reported to have 
walked out186. 
 
The editorial described this message as ‘inappropriate’ and that it ‘demonstrated an 
unfortunate lack of sensitivity’187, yet we also know that anti-nuclear campaigners were 
among those laying wreaths at services188, and that that occasioned no comment in the 
papers at all.  Equally strong was the message at Birmingham Cathedral in 1981, which 
made the front page:  
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Britain should abandon a nuclear arms race which seems destined to bring about 
its destruction, the Rector of Birmingham, Canon Peter Hall, said in his 
Remembrance Day service yesterday189.  
 
In fact, some of this may be temporal – it is feasible that people could be anti-nuclear 
weapons, yet see themselves as in favour of Remembrance for the dead of a war before 
nuclear weapons, and to still see themselves as entirely patriotic.  Yet despite the 
increasing rhetoric over nuclear issues, the paper also reports that there were hundreds at 
the Hall of Memory – suggesting a further decline in the significance of the service. 
 
Ahead of the 1982 service, which also marked the return of the Falklands veterans, came 
a surprising letter from a veteran of the Second World War, Don Lawson:  
 
Poppies, which are the emblem of a charity which has always received its fair 
share of charity, are as out of date as Armistice Day….. I am uncomfortably 
aware that the subtle influences tending to glorification of war are still with us.  
Such remarks would have been considered heretical in my father’s day – but that 
was 60 years ago – when “other ranks” knew their place190.   
 
The response from the British Legion, on 15 November191, said that it was all to do with 
remembering sacrifice, and nothing to do with glorification.  There was now other debate 
over the issues in the paper, and so it might be an isolated expression of views, but it is 
consistent with some church views and perhaps presaged the debate over white poppies.  
Much as the previous year, the ceremony returned to the front page, with pictures of the 
crew of HMS Birmingham who joined the service.192  In 1983, the debate over 
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Remembrance continued with an article by columnist Peter Rhodes who said that the ‘Act 
of Remembrance [was] forgotten in Britain’ as the band of Great War veterans dwindled, 
and that we should take ‘our Remembrance more seriously193.’   
 
Implicit in his comment was an assumption that Remembrance was predominantly about 
the First World War, with all the imagery that brings.    That was reinforced on the 
following day’s (Saturday) coverage of the letters of Lieutenant Clive Taylor, 17th 
Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, City of London Regiment, who was injured on the Somme on 
15 November 1916 and died later in February 1917194.  Coverage of Remembrance 
Sunday itself that year195 focused on the Archbishop of Canterbury’s comments on the 
‘madness’ of the arms race, in his sermon at Dresden Cathedral, and the peace protestors 
at the Cenotaph in London who dropped to the floor during the two minutes silence.  
Actual local coverage was confined to pictures and no mention of church services. 
 
Difficulties with the church were not confined to sermons.  Both in 1984 and 1992, vicars 
objected to the use of the British Legion’s favoured hymn, ‘O valiant hearts’.  In 1984, 
the Webheath British Legion had to use a retired vicar as the local man thought the hymn 
un-Christian196, and in 1992, the vicar of Glascote thought it too warlike197.  Despite the 
proximity to the Falklands War, where coverage of Remembrance appeared on the front 
page, by 1985, it had been consigned to page 11.  1986 was marked by the arrival in 
London of white poppies, including a wreath laid by the Peace Pledge Union who said 
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that they had sold 22 000 white poppies, twice as many as the previous year198.  
Unusually for the Birmingham Post, this issue drew some comment in their editorial 
under the title ‘Poppycock’; ‘What annoys most people is the belief of those wearing 
white poppies that they are somehow more in favour of peace than the rest199.’   
 
Perhaps this inspired the full-page coverage of Birmingham events, which mentioned the 
two thousand people in Birmingham, the longer march requested by the British Legion 
which lasted twice as long as the previous year, and for the first time included reference 
to the fallen of the Falklands (though curiously not Northern Ireland)200.  Viewed against 
the much larger population nationally wearing red poppies, the white poppy saga seems a 
minor irrelevance and the Post’s editorial to be representative of the mainstream public 
view. 
 
Another step change occurred in coverage of the 1987 Remembrance Day, which was 
coloured totally by the bombing of the Enniskillen service by the IRA201.  The editorial 
focused on this as a turning point for peace202.  By attacking members of the public 
attending a Remembrance service, the IRA inadvertently brought a much greater focus on 
the act of Remembrance itself, and all it meant for peace.  That year also marked the 
change in venue from the Hall of Memory to St Phillips Cathedral for the main 
Birmingham service, and the coverage203 mentions now four wars: the two World Wars, 
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the Falklands and Korea.  For the first time a wreath was laid by the Bishop of 
Birmingham and ambulance workers – reflecting the wider involvement of the 
community in war.  Yet there were no letters on this published at all.  The Cathedral was 
quoted as being packed for subsequent years, with the slightly optimistic message from 
the Lord Mayor of Birmingham in the 1989 service that ‘Remembrance parades 
yesterday were ushering in a decade of peace204’, perhaps reflecting, as did the 
editorial205, on the linkages with the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 
1990 saw a thousand people on the Cathedral Green, clearly less than previous years.  
And mindful of events in the Gulf, the Very Rev Kieran Conry, Administrator of St 
Chad’s Cathedral, warned the congregation ‘The celebration could easily become an 
outlet of unjustified patriotic pride which could blind us to the sins of our past206.’  
This seems to demonstrate once more the tension between church and veterans over 
Remembrance and a lack of linkage with current operations.  This view was reinforced by 
the lack of any mention of the Gulf War in the 1991 Remembrance services, which saw 
the ceremony go back from the Cathedral to the Hall of Memory.  If that seemed like 
swift loss of memory, then the coverage in 1992 returns to the back page of the 
Birmingham Post207, though reported numbers of attendees in Birmingham remained 
estimated at one thousand.  The decline continued into 1994, where ‘hundreds’ 
                                                 
204 Birmingham Post, 13 November 1989, p. 4 
205 Ibid p. 6 
206 Birmingham Post, 12 November 1990, p. 4 
207 Birmingham Post, 9 November 1992, p. 16 
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attended208, and the ‘I was there’ 1914-18 veterans banquet at the Council House was 
expected to be the last – suggesting once again a greater focus on the First World War. 
 
The next step change was in 1995, where the British Legion nationally and locally made 
a big effort to commemorate the 50th anniversaries of VE and VJ days.  In response to 
their efforts to reinstate Armistice Day as a point for two minutes silence at 11am, much 
of the news coverage was of the major stores in Birmingham agreeing not to open until 
after the silence, and the ‘Last Post’ being sounded in Broad Street.  The only letters in 
1995 drew attention to the VE/VJ day anniversaries, and one which condemned current 
soldiers ‘trying to milk the state’ over Gulf War syndrome209.  The Post covered the 
resurgence in numbers at the services, given the added publicity, and placed it on the 
front page210, but by the following year, this was confined once again to the back page211.  
In every subsequent year, roughly equal coverage was given to Armistice Day and to 
Remembrance Day (where they differ in date).  1998, as the anniversary of the ending of 
the First World War, merited considerable attention in the Post, from articles on the 
inclusion of the relatives of those shot for cowardice or desertion, to one on the re-writing 
of history to discredit Haig (which it opposed) and to the companies supporting Armistice 
Day.  Over the period 7-12 November 1998, several pages were devoted to covering the 
First World War and the Remembrance acts212.  The only two relevant letters, however, 
were published on 12 November; one bemoaned the fact that commemorative stamps 
                                                 
208 Birmingham Post, 14 November 1994, p. 3 
209 Birmingham Post, 11 November 1995, p. 5 
210 Birmingham Post, 13 November 1995, p. 1 
211 Birmingham Post, 11 November 1996, p. 12 
212 Birmingham Post, 7 November 1998 p. 7, p. 51; 9 November 1998 p. 1, p. 5; 12 November 1998 p. 1, p. 
8, p. 12 
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were not issued; and the other that Haig’s statue213 should be painted red to remember the 
slaughter that ‘he’ caused214.  At a national level, under the headline ‘Why do we let this 
man cast a shadow over our war dead?’, the Express’s front page215 debated whether Haig 
should symbolize the losses of the First World War, taking Alan Clark’s line that Haig 
had a blinkered view of strategy and tactics, causing the needless deaths of thousands 
(lions led by donkeys), the then Dr Niall Ferguson’s view that the First World War was 
an avoidable tragedy for the British and that building a statue for Haig was wrong216, and 
Labour MPs David Winnick and Dr Lynne Jones that the statue of Haig was 
inappropriate and should be moved217.  The article inside the newspaper218 by Patrick 
O’Flynn and Tom Rawstorne mentioned the book by historian Julian Putkowski, British 
Army mutineers 1914-18, to reference the ceremony at the Cenotaph for those who were 
executed for military offences. 
 
Both 1999 and 2000 showed considerable coverage of both Remembrance and Armistice 
Days.  In 1999, attendance was quoted as being in the thousands at the Hall of Memory, 
mentioning the poetry of Wilfred Owen219.  In 2000220, a First World War VC recipient’s 
grave was formally marked with a headstone.  Two pages were devoted to the career of 
Jeeves221 a promising local cricketer who died in July 1917.  Another three-quarters of a 
                                                 
213 Even the statue by A F Hardman in 1937 was controversial, criticised by cavalrymen at the time as Haig 
was not wearing a hat and for the inaccurate depiction of the horse’s legs.  Express 6 November 1998 p. 5 
214 Birmingham Post 12 November 1998, p. 12 
215 Express 6 November 1998 p. 1 
216 Clark and Ferguson’s opinions caused a fierce debate amongst military historians; Sheffield, Bond and 
Holmes in particular taking a different more positive view of Haig. 
217 See also Bond B for other similar views from Hastings and others Op cit p. 85 
218 http://www.aftermathww1.com/statue.asp accessed 18 May 2009. 
219 Birmingham Post, 15 November 1999, pp. 1,5 
220 Birmingham Post, 11 November 2000, pp. 1, 4, 34-35, 43-44 
221 Percy Jeeves played 50 matches for Warwickshire and died in July 1917. 
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page was devoted to VC heroes, predominantly First World War.  And another full page 
was given over to a local man who tended a war memorial for 50 years.  All this suggests 
a resurgence of interest and support for the Remembrance event in Birmingham, even if 
numbers were much lower than in the early part of the period.  The focus was quite 
clearly on the First World War rather than any more recent conflicts.  Supporting this 
assertion was the formation of the WFA222 in 1980 by military historian John Giles, 
which had some 6000 members worldwide by 2006, and received strong support from the 
University of Birmingham; Dr John Bourne, previously Director, Centre for First World 
War Studies, being one of the Honorary Vice-Presidents223.  The fact that this was only 
started some sixty-two years after the end of the War, with hardly any members who 
served in that War, and its continued success worldwide, suggests an on-going 
fascination with the First World War on a scale not seen for more recent conflicts224. Yet 
the telling piece is in the article in the Birmingham Post on 13 November, quoting a 
survey of children.  It said that a quarter of children had no idea what Remembrance is 
about, and half did not know the relevance of the date of 11 November as being 
Armistice Day, with growing numbers of the 6648 questioned failing to understand why 
Remembrance Day was being held so close to 11 November225. 
 
Drawing the threads of the press coverage together, it is clear that the Birmingham Post at 
least, noted a change in the relationship between church and Remembrance from 1968 
onwards.  The only exceptions to that were where churchmen have made controversial 
                                                 
222 http://westernfrontassociation.com/news/latest/1-welcome-to-wfa.html 12 October 2006 accessed 18 
May 2009 
223 http://westernfrontassociation.com/history-wfa.html 15 May 2008 accessed 18 May 2009 
224 See also Bond, B, Op cit p. 90 
225 Birmingham Post, 13 November 2000, p. 3 
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statements or decisions which have either occasioned editorial comment or letters.  The 
reports highlighted the difficulties for many churchmen in rationalizing the 
Remembrance message with Christian beliefs. But the actual number of letters over the 
years relating to Remembrance or the Armistice Day was very small, and even less if one 
discounts the letters from the British Legion.  From 1995, the trend was towards a 
bilateral approach to Armistice and Remembrance, with equal support in Birmingham 
given to both.  But the thread apparent throughout was to hark back almost exclusively to 
the First and Second World Wars, and predominantly the First.  Almost perversely, 
interest in the First World War was greatest in the last couple of years of the period under 
review, when virtually all local First World War veterans would have died.  The nuclear 
debate seems to have been important in the 1960s and 1980s, yet was almost an 
aberration locally, in comparison with local attendance at ceremonies.   Secularisation of 
the event seems an on-going, if unstated, trend.  And finally, as for attendance, it is very 
hard to be sure what precise figures attended the Hall of Memory services, but the overall 
trend appears, with some fluctuations, to be downwards over the period.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the paucity of data, it is possible to discern some general trends.  Church support, 
as a percentage of the population seems to have been in general decline in Bath, yet not in 
Birmingham (in Bathford the roll remained constant despite an increase in population; in 
Bath Abbey the roll decreased at a higher rate than the apparent (if suspect) decline in the 
parish population).  After an increase in attendance in Remembrance after the Falklands 
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war, at least in Bathford (though Bath Abbey actually declined), and the Gulf War, there 
was no such increase coinciding with Bosnia or Kosovo (perhaps because of negligible 
casualties). For Birmingham, there was no obvious link between attendance and conflicts. 
But what Bath Abbey and Birmingham Cathedral showed clearly was that Remembrance 
services were attended by those not usually associated with the church.  One is struck by 
the power of individual clergymen to affect opinion – the Flenley incident in Bathford, 
the vicars with concerns over hymns in Birmingham or Askew’s enthusiasm in Bath.  The 
press coverage reveals a much greater concern with nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 
early 1980s, and the dedication of services in Birmingham towards CND suggests a far 
more radical urban view than in Bath.  The lack of letters in any paper does suggest a lack 
of interest by the public, but the sheer numbers reported for public open air services and 
parades, despite a gradual reduction over time, does seem to show a solid groundswell of 
support for Remembrance as an act of commemoration, but (as indicated by the change in 
nature of press coverage) a de-linking of Remembrance from the religious service – 
perhaps a reflection of the wider national trend away from churches yet notionally 
retaining the title of Christian.  The other theme that comes though is the continued 
reference to the commemoration of the two World Wars; other conflicts were generally 
mentioned by exception.  Thus the contention has to be that the generally silent populace 
were still conditioned by the thoughts of war from those two conflicts rather than any 
others, whilst the elite level (represented by the Church and news editors) were keener to 
debate the need for a Remembrance Service, the nuclear threat and, in the case of the 
press, to gently drop references to the church. 
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Despite a general decline in the active membership of the churches in UK, with one or 
two notable but small exceptions, most people in the UK, even at the end of the period, 
regarded themselves as Christian.  Within that number, the vast majority reported 
themselves as being CofE, so for the purposes of this work, it is appropriate to consider 
the CofE as the representative Church in the UK. 
 
Remembrance Day changed perceptibly over the period under review.  Gone was the 
almost party-like atmosphere of the 11 November 1918, and even the subsequent 
remembrance of the fallen by immediate families in the inter-war years.  Since the 
Second World War the act became rather more sombre and complicated, and perhaps 
based as much on myth and selective memory rather than on a complete factual account 
of previous conflicts.  There is little doubt that the main focus was on the two World 
Wars, and perhaps this was inevitable given the scale of the dead from those conflicts.  
Yet the evidence from admittedly only three locations is that other conflicts got only a 
passing mention, and they were relatively quickly forgotten as memories return to the 
World Wars.  All this was becoming rather odd as the veterans of both wars died away, 
and what was replaced was the created image of poetry, television programmes 
(sometimes factual but often humorous), and individual’s memories. 
 
When contemporary themes arose, they caused problems for this almost ritual act.  
Churchmen with military backgrounds or wartime experience had little difficulty in 
rationalizing this act of Remembrance, whereas others found some real challenges in 
meeting the demands of the local populace with their own conscience.  The threat of 
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nuclear war seems to have coloured the judgment of many in the 1960s and 1980s, yet 
this too seems to have been a passing fear. 
 
What the detailed examples show is that the general flavour of the Remembrance Service 
was towards a reduction in the size of those attending, and a split between the Church as 
the important focus and the more secular approach to commemoration (most clearly 
shown in the press coverage).  And since 1995, Armistice Day assumed a much greater 
importance in people’s minds, with almost equal importance to Remembrance Sunday.  
Quite clearly, this act of Remembrance created an image of war in people’s minds and 
reflected their attitude to conflict.  For an event so long ago, with very few living 
veterans, this was quite a feat, perhaps also part of a more moral agenda in society, 
coincident with the interventionist stance in Bosnia and Kosovo of the same era – a sense 
that this was ‘the right thing to do’. 
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CHAPTER 5.  NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Of all the campaigns in which British forces were engaged during the period, Northern 
Ireland deserves especial mention for several reasons.  It is part of the United Kingdom, 
and therefore saw Servicemen engaged on home soil.  Being so close to the mainland, 
operations were conducted under the glare of the media. It was a unique operation for the 
British, moving from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism, and the lines between 
support to the civil power and support for a partisan position became blurred.  Military 
tactics became controversial, not least the use of Special Forces. The Troubles prompted 
terrorist attacks against the mainland and British military targets in Europe. 
 
It is fair to say that, for the majority of the mainland British population, Northern Ireland 
seemed remote, and the causes of conflict less than clear.  A journalist wrote: 
 
All of us who went to Northern Ireland for the first time in the early seventies 
were absolutely shattered by what we saw.  We were shocked by the housing, we 
were shocked by the poverty, and we were shocked that this was part of Britain 
that appeared to be 50 years behind what we had grown up amongst1. 
 
McKittrick describes the troubles as being a ‘continuum of division’2, reflecting 
unresolved issues of nationality, religion, power and territorial rivalry.  In the 1960s, the 
Province had its’ own Parliament, own police force in the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 
backed by an armed paramilitary group of volunteers known as the ‘B’ Specials, and a 
                                                 
1 Jon Snow, Pack up the Troubles, Critical Eye, Channel 4, 24 October 1991 
2 McKittrick D and McVea D Making Sense of the Troubles (London: Penguin 2001) 
p. 1 
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resident British Army garrison known to its occupants as ‘Sleepy Hollow’ – a place for 
hunting, shooting and fishing3.   
 
For most, the view of the Troubles can be summarized in the word terrorism.  Most 
writers agree that terrorism involves systematic use of murder or other physical violence 
for political ends4.  And there is wide agreement that this is usually indiscriminately 
applied against a civilian population5.  But if that were applied to Northern Ireland from 
1969-89, 37.4% of IRA victims were civilian, yet 54.4% of security force victims were 
civilian6.  But it is convenient for the Government to use the pejorative term terrorism to 
reinforce its legitimacy – hence the Prevention of Terrorism Act.  The significance here 
lies in the legitimacy of the conflict, and the idea it conveys to the population on the 
mainland – for few would argue that terrorism should not be stopped.  The relevance of 
this argument becomes clearer when one looks at the 14 deaths in Derry in 1972 on 
Bloody Sunday, and again the three shootings in Gibraltar in 1998.  The issue can be 
clearly seen in the guidance provided in the BBC: 
 
Members of illegal organizations who bomb and shoot civilians are 
unquestionably terrorists – they use terror to achieve their objectives.  If there are 
occasions when the term is not appropriate there are always other words available 
– IRA men, UVF men, killers, murderers, bombers, gunmen7. 
                                                 
3 Taylor, P, Brits: The war against the IRA (London: Bloomsbury 2001) p. 9 
4 Alonso, Rogelio, The IRA and Armed Struggle (Abingdon: Routledge 2003) p. 1 
5 See Gearty, C, Terror (London: Faber 1991), Thackrah,  J R, ‘Terrorism: A definitional problem’ in 
Contemporary Research on Terrorism Wilkinson, R, and Stewart, A M, (eds) (Aberdeen 1987), Wilkinson, 
P, ‘Terrorism and the Media’ Journalism Studies Review June 1978, Wilkinson, Paul 'Terrorism and 
Propaganda' in Y. Alexander R. and Latter (eds) Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, 
Journalists and the Public, (Washington: Brassey's 1990), Wright, J, Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army 
and the Provisional IRA, 1968-86 (London: Macmillan 1991), Miller, D, Don’t mention the war (London: 
Pluto Press 1994) 
6 Miller Op cit p. 4 
7 BBC Style Guide for News and Current Affairs Programmes London 1993 p 15 
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The start of mainland public awareness can really be traced to 5 October 1968, when TV 
coverage of a civil right’s march in Derry showed, at least on the surface, police charging 
demonstrators and using batons indiscriminately.  In particular, the image of a senior 
police officer using a long blackthorn stick, his symbol of authority, to lay into protestors 
and then to look wild-eyed into the camera, was shown repeatedly worldwide8.  Comment 
in the British press was overwhelmingly critical9.   
 
For the British Army, the start was August 1969 with the deployment of troops from 
Belfast to Derry in support of a police force exhausted and unable to cope with the rising 
protests.  When 1 Battalion, Prince of Wales’ Own Regiment, marched into Derry, they 
were greeted with cheers, ‘presumably from the Protestants10, who thought we [the 
Army] were going to sort out the Catholics11.’ A Support Company Lance Corporal wrote  
 
We didn’t know what to expect.  We were clapped and cheered.  We looked down 
and people were waving at us and being very friendly towards us.  They were 
even wolf-whistling.  They were shouting “We’re glad to see you.  Thanks for 
coming.  Thanks for saving us”…..Then they started to shout up the walls, “Are 
you hungry?” “Yes” So we sent down a rope and they tied baskets onto it and put 
fish and chips and flasks of coffee in them12.   
 
Callaghan, as Home Secretary, said:  
 
                                                 
8 McKittrick Op cit p41 
9 McKittrick Op cit p42 
10 Though the troops were initially welcomed by the Catholics too. 
11 Major David, Company Commander, C Coy, 1 Bn in Taylor Op cit p24 
12 Lance Corporal Brian, Support Coy in Taylor Op cit p25 
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I never do believe, frankly, that anybody from this side of the water understands 
Ireland and I’ve never flattered myself that I understand the situation fully.  I 
think very few people do.  Certainly we didn’t have enough understanding of it at 
the time13. 
 
Nevertheless, the British Government agreed to send troops, the first deployment from 
the mainland.  The Army was as unprepared as the politicians, buying maps of Belfast 
from a filling station on their way from the airport.  Major Keith14 said:  
 
...when you crossed the divide, the Catholics did think you’d come to finish them 
off.  It took us a long time to persuade them that we were actually there to stop the 
fighting.  When they realized it was true, they actually got down on their knees 
and prayed….They were convinced that if we hadn’t gone in that night, a huge 
number of them would have been burned out and probably killed by the next 
morning15.   
 
For many, the welcome continued over the next year, soldiers shopping in corner shops, 
using local pubs and marrying local Catholic girls16.  Some troops were more welcome 
than others; the Scottish regiments were seen as particularly inflammatory because of the 
historic links of the Protestant communities to Scottish forebears17.  The IRA was 
depicted on walls in Belfast as IRA – I Ran Away.  Up until then it had really not existed, 
after a flurry of activity in the late 1950s to 1962.  There was little support for the IRA on 
any side, even the south18.   
 
                                                 
13 Quoted in Taylor Op cit p 29 
14 A serving British Army officer – regiment unknown. 
15 Taylor, Op cit, p. 30 
16 Taylor Op cit p. 37 
17 The National Army Museum of Scotland does not have any exhibits on Northern Ireland for 
religious/political reasons.  Conversation with the curator, March 2009. 
18 Coogan, Op cit p. 65 
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Case Study.  Bloody Sunday.  On Sunday 30 January 1972, in the nationalist Bogside 
area of Derry, a team from the Parachute Regiment opened fire during a march and killed 
thirteen unarmed Catholics (and one further person died later)  – known thereafter as 
‘Bloody Sunday’.  On the surface, this was an appalling act, and it brought the name of 
The Parachute Regiment into disrepute for years afterwards.  The stage had been set by a 
ban on marches since the summer of 1971, yet a simmering campaign against internment 
had continued.  Taylor quotes the memo from Major-General Ford, Commander Land 
Forces to Lieutenant-General Harry Tuzo of 7 January 1972 in which he said:  
 
I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a 
restoration of law and order is to shoot selected ring leaders amongst the Derry 
Young Hooligans, after clear warnings have been issued19. 
 
Although we know this went to Brigade Commanders, and to 1 PARA, its influence is 
unclear on subsequent events.  What is fact is that 1 PARA were involved in the beach 
battle of 22 January 1972, in which paratroopers fired rubber bullets into the crowd and 
wielded batons to prevent protestors getting to the Magellan internment camp.  The TV 
image for the public was self-evident: peaceful protestors were clubbed by brutal 
paratroopers.  Nigel Wade of the Daily Telegraph was one of the press contingent, and 
Coogan says that he was one of the group assuming that ‘our boys would not do 
something like that’20.  Coogan goes on to report that the paratroopers were only brought 
under control when batons were used on them by their own NCOs21.  For the march the 
following week in Derry, 1 PARA had a specific role.  The operation Order for Op 
                                                 
19 Ford’s note, quoted in Taylor Op cit p. 88 
20 Coogan, Tim Pat, The Troubles (London: Arrow 1996) p. 158 
21 Coogan Op cit p. 158 
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FORECAST, issued by 8 Brigade, tasked 1 PARA to ‘scoop up’ as many hooligans and 
rioters as possible22.  For 1 PARA, drawn from Belfast to meet this problem in Derry, this 
was a welcome task23.  But these were elite troops ‘trained to…move forward, seek out 
the enemy and engage them’24.  Wade was again watching, and was (Coogan says) 
appalled as he watched troops open fire.  He met Brigadier Thompson, military 
correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, who had missed the event itself, on his way to the 
City Hotel, who was allegedly grinning, and reportedly said ‘Our boys shot well, didn’t 
they25?’  
 
Cashinella of The Times said that the paratroopers seemed to  
 
relish their work, and their eagerness manifested itself, to me, mainly in their 
shouting, cursing and ribald language.  Most of them seemed to regard the 
Bogsiders and people who took part in the parade as legitimate targets26.   
 
In a later report on the province, Martin Woollacott of the Guardian quoted a paratrooper 
as saying  
 
Although you moan about Ireland, you know at least you are going to have a 
chance to shoot some bastard through the head…you are walking around with live 
rounds, you are there to kill people and see guys get killed, and you are going to 
get the shit scared out of you.27. 
 
                                                 
22 Taylor Op cit p. 92 
23 Field Marshal Lord Bramall’s view was that it was ‘probably unnecessary and those who carried it out 
weren’t the right people.  I mean the first paratrooper attachment didn’t know the area, they shouldn’t have 
been brought in and three or four individuals went wrong.’  Lord Bramall interview 24 July 2007. 
24 Lieutenant Colonel Wilford, CO 1 Para  quoted in Taylor  Op cit p. 93 
25 Coogan Op cit p. 159 
26 The Times 1 February 1972 
27 Guardian, 13 July 1973 
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Lord Widgery’s report, published some three months after the event, was largely seen by 
nationalists as a whitewash.  Although he viewed some soldiers firing ‘bordered on the 
reckless’, his overall view was pro-Army:  
 
Civilian, as well as army, evidence made it clear that there was a substantial 
number of civilians in the area who were armed with firearms.  I would not be 
surprised if in the relevant half hour as many rounds were fired at the troops as 
were fired by them.  The soldiers escaped injury by reason of their fieldcraft and 
training… in general the accounts given by the soldiers of the circumstances in 
which  they were fired and the reasons they did so were, in my opinion, truthful28.   
 
The Daily Express said ‘Widgery blames IRA and clears Army’29.  The Daily Mail 
summarized the British media reaction in its leader:  
 
Against cynical propaganda the British Government replies with judicial truth.  It 
is like trying to exterminate a nest of vipers with Queensbury rules.  Even so, over 
the past 2 ½ years of mounting terrorism, the record shows – and it is a record 
which now includes Lord Widgery’s report – that our troops are doing an 
impossible job impossibly well30. 
 
For the public in UK, British soldiers were seen as having acted at best recklessly.  For 
many in the elite, this confirmed many of the fears of using forces in support of the 
police.  The widest effect was in the Province, for it led directly to the establishment of 
direct rule from Westminster.  It led to a massive rise in IRA recruiting, and a revenge 
attack by the IRA on the Parachute Regiment HQ Mess at Aldershot, killing five kitchen 
workers, a gardener and a Catholic padre.  More significantly, it was the first mainland 
attack by the IRA since the 1940s. Twenty-eight years later, at the instigation of Tony 
                                                 
28 Taylor Op cit p. 103 
29 Daily Express 19 April 1972 
30 Daily Mail 20 April 1972 
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Blair and largely as a result of the evidence of a Private 027, who was identified in the 
Press after voicing doubts and having kept a contemporaneous record, an inquiry was 
started under Lord Savile to establish the facts31.  In reality, the damage had been done.   
The accountability of soldiers was a real issue – by 1976 no British soldier or member of 
the RUC had spent one day in jail for killing or ill treating people in Northern Ireland.  
Prosecutions tended to be for murder rather than manslaughter, allowing acquittals on the 
grounds of lack of intent.  Even the first soldier to be found guilty of murder while on 
duty in the Province, Private Ian Thain, was released to rejoin his regiment on 23 
February 1988, having only served 26 months of a life sentence32. 
 
One slant on this was taken by Peter Taylor and the ITV This Week team, who decided to 
take someone there from the mainland to try and understand the nature of the problem.  In 
a programme entitled ‘Busman’s Holiday’, they picked Tom, a bus driver, and his wife 
Doris from Hull.  Tom’s initial reaction at his Hull home was that the troops should be 
brought home and to ‘let the buggers sort it out33.’ When taken to Belfast, on seeing a 
soldier, Doris said, amazed, ‘Look Tom, there’s a soldier – and he’s got a gun!34’.   
 
Their amazement went on when they visited the city centre and saw Boots and Marks and 
Spencer’s – this was just like Hull.  Except it wasn’t, for a small bomb destroyed a shop-
front – Tom’s reaction was that if it had happened in Hull, the Hull Daily Mail would be 
running the story for weeks.  At the end of the visit, Tom’s reaction was ‘We can’t just 
                                                 
31 The Saville Report was published on 15 June 2010.  See http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/ 
accessed 27 August 2010.  
32 Coogan Op cit p180 
33 Taylor Op cit p11 
34 Ibid 
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abandon them; we’ve got to stick it out’.  In this short film, the level of the lack of 
understanding of the Province on the mainland was amply demonstrated, and a 
considered view, after some reflection, that there was a duty for the military to support 
the process of maintaining law and order. 
 
In stark contrast, 1982 saw the bombings of 20 July, which killed 11 soldiers and injured 
51 people in two bombs at Knightsbridge Barracks and Regent’s Park bandstand.  But for 
the British public, the worst aspect was the death of a number of horses of the Household 
Cavalry, almost to the extent of overshadowing the human casualties.  Sefton, one horse 
who survived despite serious injuries, became symbolic of the British fight against the 
IRA and almost a national hero35. 
 
The Savile Report’s conclusion, published in 2010, was that ‘there was a serious and 
widespread loss of fire discipline among the soldiers of Support Company.36’  Their 
conclusion was that the Support Company should not have been deployed into the 
Bogside, and that their actions had been unjustifiable, increasing hostility towards the 
Army, strengthening the IRA and prolonging the conflict37.   
 
Case Study.  The Brighton Bomb and Mrs Thatcher.  The real test for Thatcher 
personally, and in the view of the public, was the bombing of the Grand Hotel Brighton at 
the Conservative Party Conference at 2.45am on 16 November 1984.  A 20lb bomb 
placed behind a bath panel in Room 629, and detonated by a sophisticated timing device, 
                                                 
35 McKittrick, Op cit, p. 150 
36 Savile Report Op cit, para 5.4 Vol 1 
37 Ibid para 5.5 Vol 1 
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exploded and collapsed four floors of the building, killing five members of the 
Conservative Party and injuring thirty others, many seriously38.  This event set in play a 
reappraisal of British policy on Northern Ireland, and involved the Prime Minister 
personally in giving a clear statement on John Hume’s New Ireland Forum proposals for 
a unitary state, a federal/confederal system or joint authority from London and Dublin – 
her response of ‘out, out and out’ at a press conference set a clear tone for several years, 
starting with the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement.  Although Ian Paisley of the DUP gave 
vent to his feelings much as expected, telling his church congregation that Thatcher was a 
‘Jezebel’39, British press reaction was more positive.  The Sunday Telegraph rejected 
Unionist claims of betrayal, and the Mail on Sunday said that:  
 
 Mrs Thatcher was a real champion of the people of Ulster…it would have been 
easier to let the matter rest and watch the Province slowly bleed to death40.   
 
On TV, Mrs Thatcher used the Weekend World programme to say that the Agreement  
 
was to mobilize everyone against the men of violence, because violence and 
democracy could not exist together41 
  
Global support suggested this was a ‘worthwhile gamble for peace42’.  The effect of the 
public, the media and the elite in unison had been to alienate the extremists at both ends 
of the spectrum, illustrating the key relationship between each group.  Extremists still 
expressed their views in ever stronger language, e.g. James Molyneaux’s comment that: 
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 in 40 years in public life I have never known what I can only describe as a 
universal cold fury, which some of us have thus far managed to contain…43  
 
and the former Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Lord Moyola: 
 
 the people of the Province were facing a desperately serious situation which I 
believe could produce a holocaust44.   
 
But as The Economist noted, it united: 
 
not just Mrs Thatcher and her entire Front Bench, but also rallies Mr Heath, Neil 
Kinnock, David Steel and Dr David Owen in her support45.   
 
The degree of consensus can be measured in the ensuing Parliamentary vote: 473 in 
favour and 47 against – the largest majority on any topic in the Thatcher era.  Despite the 
fury of the extremists, the fact is that terrorist shootings and explosions in 1985 dropped 
by 30%, with ten fewer deaths than in 1984.  But despite the reduction in the violence, 
attitudes hardened in the Province, more people volunteered to join the UDA and the 
organization, arguably for the first time, pitched itself against the RUC – the first real 
split between the Protestant community and the security forces. 
 
The BBC2 programme, Brass Tacks, conducted a poll of 1060 people in UK, which 
showed 42% approval for the Anglo-Irish agreement, with 32% against – significantly the 
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remainder was undecided or indifferent46.  What was more significant was the reaction of 
UK public when asked on the future for the province: 26% felt it should be part of the 
UK, 24% part of the Irish Republic and 35% felt it should be independent; in many 
senses, a view of despair with the province. 
 
The public’s lack of interest was reinforced in a poll supporting the ‘troops-out’ 
campaign: 
 
Table 5.1 Daily Express/MORI Poll 198747 
 % 
In favour of troop withdrawal 61 
In favour of Northern Ireland remaining in 
UK 
29 
In favour of Northern Ireland independence 29 
In favour of a united Ireland 21 
No preference 15 
Those who thought Northern Ireland the 
most important question facing Britain 
<0.5 
   
The Guardian’s leader reflected  
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that this means most of us simply don’t care…you have a British electorate which 
is happy to leave matters to the Northern Ireland people themselves…but it wants 
rid of the costs and dangers of Northern Ireland48. 
 
Case Study.  Shoot to Kill.  On 24 November 1982, the RUC shot and killed Michael 
Tighe and wounded his friend Martin McAuley. The RUC story was that police had seen 
an armed man entering a barn, they had heard a weapon being cocked, and the two 
victims emerged pointing weapons.  In fact, there was no armed man; the barn had been 
under observation for some time.  The weapons were pre-war Mauser rifles, unloaded 
with no ammunition in the vicinity. These shootings led to the ‘shoot-to-kill’ inquiry led 
by John Stalker49. It became clear that the barn had been bugged for months, allegedly by 
the Security Service. Taylor50 suggests there were 42 tapes, and that the last might have 
offered a clue as to whether a warning was given.  Despite trying to obtain it, it was never 
forthcoming.  Allegedly a copy was produced by one of the soldiers at the incident, only 
to be destroyed by the Security Service.  A transcript offered to Stalker was inconclusive.  
The Chief Constable’s inaction in sitting on Stalker’s recommendations for four months 
before passing them to the Director of Public Prosecutions only fuelled the public 
perception of a cover-up, giving the shoot-to-kill policy more credence, made worse by 
the decision to remove Stalker in May 1986 because of a link to a Manchester 
businessman, Kevin Taylor, who had been involved in irregular dealings.  The public 
perception was clearly one of conspiracy theory. 
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When the Attorney-General, Sir Patrick Mayhew announced in January 198851 that no 
RUC officers would be prosecuted as a result of the Stalker enquiry (subsequently taken 
on by Colin Sampson), the media let fly:   
 
Policemen have killed and lied about it.  Ministers find it inexpedient to prosecute 
them52’; ‘the Attorney-General’s statement will have done nothing to dispel the 
stink of corruption which hangs over the affair..’53; ‘there is now an overriding 
obligation of the British Government to show that even if criminal prosecutions 
are not to be brought, it will not allow the security forces to take the law into their 
own hands…there must be expulsions and names must be named.54   
 
The Independent considered the matter in a number of articles, looking at a ‘liberal state 
menaced by an illiberal attacker…how far should it employ illiberal methods such as 
imprisonment without trial, torture and murder, in its own defence?’55  The Guardian 
concluded that: 
 
the cold-blooded killing of a young boy, followed by a conspiracy to conceal the 
truth, amounted to the action of a Central American assassination force56.   
 
And in this latter comment lies a real issue.  For does it make a difference how far away 
from home the action takes place?  For the British Army in Kenya treated prisoners 
appallingly in the Mau Mau rebellion, but distance and lack of media coverage kept this 
from the public gaze.  A soldier from the Gloucesters said of Aden: ‘We weren’t 
governed by the same rules that we were in Ireland.  The lads over there could be a lot 
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rougher, a lot harder because we never had the newspapers there and we never had the 
Press or anyone else who could actually see what we were doing.  It made a lot of 
difference because you were given a freer hand right across the board, from commanding 
officers right down to corporals in charge of men on the ground.  You could just be a lot 
harder, a lot tougher and a lot more ruthless57.’ And it was Denis Healey who recognized 
years later, that the actions of troops in Borneo in the 1960s could not have been done in 
a more public view58. So this episode tells us that, at least at the elite level, there was a 
genuine concern about the methods employed by security forces in a conflict against 
terrorists, and that the conduct of conflict did matter.  Stalker was later to recall that  
 
the feeling was OK, dead or alive we’ll be protected to some extent.  We’re 
soldiers really, in police uniforms, and we can probably justify deaths afterwards 
because we’re in a war59. 
 
Case Study. Death on the Rock.  At 1541hrs on 6 March 1988, Mairead Farrell, Dan 
McCann and Sean Savage, all IRA members, were shot by security forces on Gibraltar.  
This single incident, perhaps along with Bloody Sunday, raised fundamental questions 
about the conduct of British forces on operations.  Initial reports were of a massive car 
bomb attempt being foiled by Gibraltar police who shot dead three IRA terrorists. Later 
that evening, the MOD acknowledged that military personnel had been involved in the 
shootings.  But the story really took off when the Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, 
made a parliamentary statement the following day to say that a ‘dreadful terrorist act has 
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been prevented’ by ‘military personnel’, but he went on to say that no bomb had been 
found, and that the terrorists were unarmed: 
 
When challenged they made movements which led the military personnel, 
operating in support of the Gibraltar police, to conclude that their own lives and 
the lives of others were under threat.  In the light of this response, they were shot.  
Those killed were subsequently found not to have been carrying arms60. 
 
Sixty Labour MPs signed a statement condemning the shootings as ‘capital punishment 
without trial61.’  What was interesting in all this was that, despite the change in official 
stance, the media did not challenge the Government on what had gone wrong, but stuck 
with the initial line that there had been a bomb, or at least a plot.  The Independent 
claimed that ‘bomb disposal experts defused 440lbs of explosives in a Spanish-registered 
car62.’ Both the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph referred to a 500lb bomb in the car.   
Despite the inevitable Dublin Irish Press headline of ‘Fury as no bomb found’, the 
mainland press focused on the hunt for the alleged fourth member of the IRA team:  
‘Fourth IRA bomber on the run’ (Guardian), ‘Hunt for Fourth IRA Terrorist’ (The 
Times), ‘Fourth Terrorist still at Large’ (Daily Telegraph), ‘Search Continues in Gibraltar 
for Car Bomb and IRA Terrorist’ (Financial Times), ‘Hunt for IRA Evelyn’ (Sun), and 
‘Find Evil Evelyn’ (Daily Mirror).  The latter reports reflect the international hunt for 
Evelyn Glenholmes, named as part of the Gibraltar ‘Bomb Plot’63.  Even after the event, 
the tone of the Sun was supportive of the shootings:  
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The moral for the IRA is a simple one.  If they do not want to be killed, they 
should not try to kill others.  Three criminals are dead.  Our troops and the forces 
on the side of law and order are safe.  For us that is a happy ending64. 
 
It was left to the broadsheets to raise a question mark, notably the Guardian, the 
Independent, the Observer and the Daily Telegraph.  From the latter: 
 
Few British people will mourn the death of members of the IRA. But it is an 
essential aspect of an anti-terrorist policy to maintain the principles of civilized 
restraint which obtain in a democratic society.  A failure to do so argues that 
terrorism is succeeding in one of its critical aims, the brutalization of the society 
under attack65. 
 
At the funeral for the IRA dead from Gibraltar in the cemetery at Milltown, Michael 
Stone, a loyalist paramilitary launched a gun and grenade attack on the mourners, killing 
three dead and wounding a further fifty people.  Following that, at the funeral of one of 
the Milltown dead, a car drove at speed towards the cortege.  The car was surrounded by 
the crowd; the occupants were dragged out, beaten, taken away and executed by the IRA.  
The occupants were British Army soldiers, both armed and one actually fired a shot; no-
one really knows why they were in that vicinity.  But the effect on the British public on 
seeing papers filled with pictures of stripped, battered and bruised bodies was one of 
revulsion.  What followed was a request from the RUC Chief Constable, for release of 
untransmitted film of the attack.  The BBC, ITV and RTE refused without a court order.  
On 22 March 1988, the Prime Minister set the position out quite clearly:  
 
I believe that everyone, the media included, has a bounden duty to do everything 
that the can to see that those who perpetrated the terrible crimes, which we saw on 
                                                 
64 Sun 8 March 1988 
65 Daily Telegraph, 8 March 1988 
145  
television, which disgusted the whole world, are brought to justice.  Either one is 
on the side of justice in these matters, or one is on the side of terrorism66. 
 
Though broadcasters reflected the cry of staff safety to avoid release of the material, the 
strength of public and newspaper opinion, demanding to know why the TV stations were 
not assisting the police, led to the final agreement to hand material over to the RUC on 
the following day.  The Sunday Times commented ‘it was the television coverage of the 
attack that fuelled much of the outrage at the killings67.’ 
 
  The press reflected public revulsion:‘the daylight nightmare of the lynch mob set new 
levels even for two decades of criminal violence and terrorism in Northern Ireland68’ 
while the Sun called them ‘Scum of the Earth69’, and the Daily Mirror called for British 
troops to be brought home. 
 
Death on the Rock was a very controversial episode of Thames Television’s current 
affairs programme This Week.  It was screened on ITV on 28 April 198870, and 
subsequently went on to win a British Academy of Film and Television Award.  The 
documentary investigated Operation FLAVIUS, the SAS mission in Gibraltar in response 
to intelligence of an IRA unit being on the peninsula.  The SAS claimed authorisation to 
use deadly force  
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if those using them had reasonable grounds for believing an attack was being 
committed, or about to be committed, which would endanger life or lives and if 
there was no other way of preventing that, other than the use of firearms71.  
 
The programme considered the extent to which this had been an ‘execution’ with no 
intent to arrest the IRA members.  The SAS said that McCann had made an ‘aggressive 
move’ towards a bag he was carrying, which the SAS believed indicated intent to 
detonate a car bomb using a remote control device.  When Farrell went for the bag after 
McCann was shot, she was killed on the same grounds.  Both died.  Savage allegedly 
moved his hand to his pocket, and was shot on the basis he could have been moving for a 
weapon.  He died.  McCann was shot five times, Farrell eight times and Savage between 
sixteen and eighteen times.  No weapons were found on the bodies afterwards, but 
ingredients for a bomb were later found in a car in Spain. 
 
The programme produced witnesses to discredit suggestions that a warning had been 
given, and to question the ability of the IRA to use a remote control detonator (including 
from an Army Bomb Disposal expert72).  In particular, Carmen Proetta, a local witness, 
was quoted as saying: 
 
They [the security forces] didn’t do anything…they just went and shot these 
people.  That’s all.  They didn’t say anything, they didn’t scream, they didn’t 
shout, they didn’t do anything.  These people were turning their heads back to see 
what was happening and when they saw these men had guns in their hands they 
put their hands up.  It looked like the man was protecting the girl because he stood 
in front of her, but there was no chance.  I mean, they went to the floor 
immediately, they dropped73. 
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In subsequent days, her testimony was posited as suspect because she was alleged to be a 
prostitute, though this was later found to be false.  
 
Lord Bramall took the view that:  
 
it was just a question of whether they should have been apprehended rather than 
shot and I think the argument then was that they might have had a device in their 
hand, and electronic device or a mobile telephone on which they could have 
dialled a number and an explosion would have gone off.  So they weren’t taking 
any risks.74’ 
 
The Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, attempted to block transmission of the 
programme by writing to the Independent Broadcasting Authority Chairman, Lord 
Thomson75, on the grounds that it would prejudice the official inquiry into the event.  But 
the Independent Broadcasting Authority refused on grounds of free speech in a 
democracy76 – much to the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s irritation77.  In the 
ensuing reaction to the programme, Andrew Neill, editor of the Sunday Times, ensured 
the paper attacked Thames Television for their coverage.  This was presumably because 
Rupert Murdoch, the owner, and very much a favourite of the Conservative 
administration, wanted to support the Government’s line.  The Sun was also critical – its 
headline was ‘Storm at SAS TV Trial’.  Both newspapers attacked the programmes 
procedures of enquiry and challenged the character of the witnesses – particularly and 
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quite erroneously, Carmen Proetta78.  Murdoch would have presumably viewed Thames 
as a competitor to his own satellite television company.  Neill was given a vote of no 
confidence by the Wapping Branch of the National Union of Journalists79; he was 
subsequently given Sky TV to launch by Murdoch80.  In fairness, both the Daily Mail and 
the Daily Star were equally critical, with headlines of ‘Fury over SAS Trial by TV’ and 
‘TV Slur on the SAS’ respectively81.  The Prime Minister seemed to be in tune with the 
popular view when she said  
 
the place to have trials is in a court of law.  Trial by television, or guilt by 
association, is the day that freedom dies82. 
 
Although the enquiry led by Lord Windlesham and Richard Rampton QC83 into the 
programme did find errors, it largely cleared it of any impropriety.  It went deeply into 
programme construction, the processes for research including finding witnesses, and the 
means of presentation between interviews, presenter commentary and use of location 
material.  For politicians (and particularly Conservative Government members), the 
report raised the issue of the point at which it is appropriate for investigative journalism 
to go, and where limits should be placed in the so-called national interest. From the 
public’s perspective, the bombing attacks by the IRA not only in Northern Ireland but 
also on the UK mainland gave the Gibraltar incident the feel of an appropriate and 
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unquestioned response, as might have been felt in wartime (e.g. bombing of German 
cities – see Chapter 4).   
 
Case Study.  Special Forces.  The role of Special Forces seems to be part of national 
pride, a sense of tradition in elite forces, perhaps dating from the 1979 Iran Embassy 
siege. Badsey highlights the debate over whether it was the Iran Embassy siege, the 
Falklands War, or the efforts of the SAS over a number of events that made the British 
public ‘proud of their Armed Forces’84.  In reality, there is little evidence to show that the 
public ever thought ill of individual soldiers, but it is certainly true that a lot of books 
have been sold on the SAS (fictional and factual), and that a ‘feel-good’ factor emerged 
after the Falklands War, reflected in opinion poll evidence of support for the Prime 
Minister.  But the extended use of soldiers in undercover operations did raise questions at 
the elite level.   
 
The SAS shot dead three IRA men on the Omagh–Carrickmore road in September 1988.  
The papers reflected the continuing support for the SAS, and a feeling that the IRA got 
what they deserved: ‘SAS rub out IRA rats’ (Star); ‘Serves them right’ (Evening 
Standard); and ‘Justice has been done for our boys’ (Daily Mail)85, which showed the 
affection of the public for ‘heroic’ special forces. 
 
However, the role of Special Forces and undercover operatives was brought into question 
in a number of TV documentaries.  One such was Channel 4’s Diverse Reports 
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programme86 of 2 May 1984 looking at the work of Captain Frank Holroyd, an 
Intelligence captain working for the RUC Special Branch in Portadown in 1974/5.  He 
allegedly worked for MI6 through their enclave at HQ Lisburn87.  His allegations were:  
 
that Loyalist killers were deliberately allowed to go unpunished; that British 
forces carried out kidnappings, snatching wanted men from the Republic; that 
sometimes the security forces deliberately allowed operations which they had 
foreknowledge of to go ahead to discredit the IRA, thereby putting civilian lives 
at risk; that similarly, instead of capturing weaponry and explosives found in IRA 
dumps, they would sabotage the material so that it would booby trap its owners; 
that the security forces carried out acts of intimidation, such as sending 
threatening letters containing bullets to civil rights activists; and that they carried 
out bank raids and conducted illegal break-ins88. 
 
 All this raised doubts on the ethics of the Armed Forces in prosecuting operations in 
Northern Ireland. 
 
Case Study.  Bombing on the Mainland.  The day after John Major’s surprise re-election 
in 1992, the IRA launched an attack on the Baltic Exchange.  Three people were killed in 
the blast, including fifteen year-old Danielle Carter.  The bomb caused £800million of 
damage; more than the entire cost of the damage in the Province since 1969 to that point 
and more damage than the entire 10 000 bombs detonated in the Province89.  The 
message was driven home very clearly to the Major government that the IRA were a 
force to be reckoned with, that the intelligence services were not as taut in London as in 
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the Province, and for the IRA, that massive effect could be had on the city in a 
financially-disproportionate way90. 
 
If the large-scale bombings in London had little effect on people, albeit at great financial 
cost in infrastructure damage, then the emotional effects were felt profoundly by the 
British people at events like the Warrington bombing of March 1993, where two bombs 
were placed in litter bins, killing three year-old Jonathan Ball, out to buy a Mother’s Day 
present, and twelve year-old Tim Parry, who had been running away from one bomb only 
to get caught in the other.  The emotion can be seen in the opening lines of The Times 
report of 21 March:  
 
He was a little boy with blond hair.  “He looked angelic, “said an eyewitness who 
saw him lying on the ground afterwards next to an empty flowerbed. “But he was 
obviously dead.” 91 ‘It’s just senseless, what the bombers have done.  These 
people were out shopping for Mother’s Day presents.  I counted at least 10 lying 
about, one definitely dead, his face blown off completely.’92 ‘Mike Rondo, who 
was walking towards the shops when the first bomb went off said, “the earth 
moved literally beneath my feet.  Hundreds of people came running towards me.  
Everyone was shouting and screaming and calling the IRA bastards.  The people 
who have done this are sub-human.  They are worse than animals.  They can have 
no humanity to plant a bomb in a shopping centre that is packed with women and 
children like this.” 93‘Thousands of letters from the public were sent to console 
the parents.  A peace vigil, organized by a group of mothers, was attended by 
2000 people a week after the event94.  The Church joined the outcry against the 
bombers “Dr George Carey…said people should “rise up in horror” against the 
bombers….”I do not have enough words to summon up my disgust at the evil 
perpetrated on these innocent people.95’  “The Rt Rev Michael Henshall, the 
Bishop of Warrington, last night called on the world to witness “the barbarity” of 
the IRA bombers.  He said” The world needs to know we are dealing with people 
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who have lost any sense of civilization.  It is barbaric, it is callous, it is cruel and 
it is inhuman”96.’ 
 
A Timothy Parry Trust Fund was set up to establish greater understanding between Great 
Britain and the two halves of Ireland.   
 
There was a strong sense in the media of a traditional bulldog spirit, and an indomitable 
response from those bombed on the mainland:  
 
Only one comment is worth making on the London station bombs yesterday.  It 
came from a commuter: “This is never going to put people like me off 
travelling”…Two responses to this are appropriate.  First, by no extent of 
tolerable administration can such outrages be avoided or even marginalized.  But 
speed of police reaction and swiftness in the subsequent return to normality are 
vital….The second response…is not to allow the perpetrators of terror to dictate 
the political agenda….To go normally about one’s business is the only victory 
every citizen can score against terrorism97.   
 
In that same paper, Brian Hilliard, editor of Police Review, highlighted the need for the 
public to take a role:  
 
The message, after yesterday’s bombs in Victoria and Paddington stations, is that 
the public must look after itself98. 
 
Calling for a public reaction in the same way as in the Second World war was consistent 
with what the IRA leaders described as ‘creating a war situation in Britain’99, in this case 
by ‘disrupting the journeys of 500 000 commuters in London100.’ 
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Simon Jenkins, writing in The Times, took stock after the Bishopsgate bombing of April 
1993.  He referred to the effectiveness of terrorism lying in the reaction, not in the act, 
quoting, not for the first time in The Times, Conrad’s secret agent ‘frail, insignificant, 
shabby, a pest in a street full of men101’, who would understand that ‘He could sow 
violence, but he needed publicity and the public to reap the harvest of terror.’  The 
Bishopsgate bombing made the headlines for several consecutive days, moving Russia, 
Britain’s economic recovery and Bosnia off the front pages.  Jenkins wryly remarked 
that:  
 
The metropolitan media conformed to its old rule-of-thumb, that a London 
atrocity is worth five Manchester atrocities, ten Belfast ones, 20 in Europe and 
100 in China102.  
 
He reported that newspapers called financiers all around the world to ask if they were 
frightened of London, trying to induce the very economic sanction the bombers intended.  
But he moved on to put this in perspective; that:  
 
London is one of Europe’s safest cities, and that to do much more would be to let 
the terrorists win and make people live in a state of fear.  And therein lies the 
conundrum.  How much should be spent so that people feel safe, whilst avoiding 
the charge that the mainland has been bombed into producing the very reaction 
intended. 
 
Jenkins’ conclusion was that ‘meanwhile the IRA will go on bombing London for as long 
as it hurts us103.’ 
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For the Daily Telegraph, quotes from the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development’s annual conference served to show that London would continue as a major 
financial centre:  
 
Deutsche Bank’s presence in the City will continue.  London is one of the most 
important financial centres.Chase Manhattan’s commitment [is] 
unchanged…London is a very important financial centre and this [bomb] will not 
deter foreign banks [said Credit Lyonnais]104’ 
 
At the individual level, the piece ends with a quote from Donald Swerk, working for US 
Development Alternatives Inc: ‘I was in the City when the bomb went off.  The building 
shook and I had a moment of fear.  But you ask: “will I come back?” The answer is yes, 
but it doesn’t mean everyone will.’105  John Major, addressing the EBRD conference was 
unequivocal: ‘They have won no sympathy for their cause and nothing but contempt for 
their campaign’106.   
 
The Church’s view, in language consistent with that from Warrington, came from 
Cardinal Hume, Archbishop of Westminster, who  
 
condemned the “barbaric behaviour” of the perpetrators and accused them of 
sinning grievously.  Their actions were “against everything that is right humanly 
and from a Christian point of view”107.   
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In a retrospective look, following the events of 7 July 1995, Michael Snyder, a partner in 
the accountants Kingston Smith, recalled  
 
Staff at Kingston Smith turned up for business in jeans on the next working day to 
help with the cleaning.  Many of them brought their own rubber gloves and 
dustpans and brushes from home.  By the end of that day, word processors and 
calculators were clicking away and by the following day we were advising clients 
and charging fees again.  Nobody wanted to stay at home.  Nobody wanted to let 
bombers and murderers keep us away from our business of earning a living in the 
world’s leading business and financial district108. 
 
In a sense we should not be surprised at the lack of reaction from those on the mainland 
suffering both the bombings and the restrictions on personal liberty.  Professor Simon 
Wesselly’s lecture to Gresham College in 2007109 looked from the Blitz to Bin Laden, but 
the parallels are the same for the intervening years of the IRA mainland bombings.  The 
conventional wisdom was, as expressed in Richard Titmuss’ Problems of Social Policy 
(1950) 110, that  
 
morale had been maintained during the War because of the equitable sharing of 
risk and danger and the rise of an egalitarian collectivism, of an informed 
citizenry standing together against the horrors of war.   
 
Despite that model, there are those such as Angus Calder who point out the flaws, for 
example in the Blitz, looting occurred; delinquency rates increased; strikes carried on, 
occasionally impeding the war effort; and despite rationing, there was a clear black 
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109 Gresham lecture by Simon Wesselly, 9 June 2007  - from Gresham website 
110 Cited by Wesselly  Op cit 
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market in operation111.  But Wesselly found in the declassified files of the Home 
Intelligence Division evidence of observation of the public that by and large supported 
the conventional viewpoint; that law and order was maintained, and that morale did not 
fail, and finally that there was not the surge in psychiatric casualties that had been 
predicted.  Hence the Official Historian was indeed able to write in 1955112 that ‘London 
can take it 113’. 
 
Wesselly then took that forward to the events of 7 July 2006 and the London bombings 
by Al Qaeda.  In essence, after the bombs went gone off, places filled with smoke, the 
emergency services took thirty minutes to arrive and so it was left to the people who were 
there to carry out initial rescuing and lifesaving.  Wesselly described the research of Chris 
Cokin, who took narrative reports from those involved in the incident.  After the packed 
carriage filled with smoke, people panicked, but that only lasted a couple of minutes and 
people calmed down.  A feeling of unity came through – people who were total strangers 
as fellow passengers suddenly become uniquely close.  People started to help each other 
to see who was hurt and who needed help.  Seven days after the bombing, Wesselly 
joined the Health Protection Agency in studying around 1000 people drawn at random in 
London.  Some 25% reported feeling upset, and others noted poor memory, sleep, 
concentration and so on.  There was anxiety about travelling on the Underground.  
Muslims felt even more anxious.  These questions were chosen because they were 
                                                 
111 Calder, A, Disasters and Heroes – on War, Memory and Representation.  (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press 2004) – presumed Wesselly is referring to Chapter 2 here. 
112 Quoted by Wesselly but believed to be Crew, F AE, Vol  2 Medical History of the Army Medical 
Services (HMSO 1956) 
113 Reflecting a common theme from newspapers such as the Reading Eagle 10 November 1940. Grayling 
notes that morale in Berlin when subjected to area attacks in the Second World War rose, not fell.  See 
Grayling, Op cit p. 38 
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precisely the same ones asked in New York following the 9 November 2001 disaster, and 
the responses were virtually the same.  Following up with 700 of the target group some 
six months later, whereas 30% initially said they were not bothered by the events in July, 
that figure had doubled six months later. 
 
So how can we compare this with the IRA bombings?  It is clear that some people had a 
serious reaction to the events, but many didn’t, and the effects were relatively quickly 
over.  People’s reactions were to pull together.  What came through from the reports of 
the mainland bombings of the IRA yet not in Wesselly’s work was a feeling of extreme 
anger – one person from Warrington mentioned that he could never face the bombers; 
even with a six-inch steel wall he’d try to get at them.  But the sense of community and 
pulling together was also clear.  Unifying shock, a sense of common purpose, and a sense 
of defiance against aggression were elements common to the Second World War, 7/7, 
9/11 and the IRA bombings.   In summary, people tended to have an initial shock, got 
over it, wanted to live normal lives and it left the consciousness soon afterwards.  
Business tended to look at the damage, worked on the elements of risk and how to 
manage them, and then saw how best to operate – even in alternate locations.  The report 
of the Guardian Royal Exchange annual accounts noted the costs of the Arndale Centre 
bomb in Manchester of £5million, and a 29% fall in pre-tax profits, but this was confined 
to one line amidst otherwise normal business 114. 
 
                                                 
114 The Times 1 August 1996 p. 1 
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What lessons can be drawn from the Second World War experience?  Wesselly made the 
point that by 1944, 80% of the civilian population was actively engaged in the war effort 
in one way or another.   
 
They knew why they were there, they knew what they were doing, they knew why 
they had been asked to accept the risk and adversity and hardship that they were, 
and not only did they know why and what the purpose was, but they were also 
playing, in a small way, a part in overcoming that115.   
 
So in a society where the majority of people were not involved in the Province, and by 
and large appear to have been indifferent to both the way the campaign was conducted 
and the future of the Province, it is harder to establish that shared purpose to deal with the 
IRA bombings.  Yet it does seem to have happened, with a sense of resignation, defiance 
and abhorrence.  It is hard to see how the IRA ever thought they could influence public 
opinion through having a campaign against non-military targets on the mainland to make 
an economic case for withdrawal from the Province. 
 
 
                                                 
115 Gresham lecture Op cit 
159 
CHAPTER 6.  BORNEO TO KOSOVO 
 
This chapter addresses public perceptions of war from the campaigns in which British 
forces actually took part in the period from 1960 to 2000.  There is a wide choice of 
operations, but five campaigns have been chosen as case studies: Borneo (a neo-colonial 
conflict); the Falklands (an invasion of British sovereign territory by another state, with a 
classical force-on-force nature, with little civilian involvement); the first Gulf War 
(Operation GRANBY, a combined campaign with the mandate of a UN Security Council 
Resolution); Bosnia and Kosovo, two liberal interventionist operations in former 
Yugoslavia involving peace support and enforcement.  The latter campaigns also show 
that the UK and the US made choices when and where to intervene to support people 
exerting their right to self-determination, along the lines of the Atlantic Charter1.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which public attitudes have changed to 
British actions over the period. 
 
The methodology is to consider the political, elite and populace levels2, and analyse 
perceptions of war as reflected in reactions to these campaigns. Cross-cutting themes are 
considered where information makes this possible, including the attitudes of the Churches 
(predominantly CofE, the Roman Catholic Church and the Free Churches); attitudes to 
taking casualties; and the differences between press and public perception. Evidence is 
primarily drawn from three different source types: opinion polls; newspaper comment 
                                                 
1 Gaddis, John Lewis, We now know (Oxford: OUP 1997) p. 12 
2 Political level being based around the parliamentary system; the elite level including relevant academia, 
defence industries, the broadsheets and other informed commentators; the populace representing the 
remainder of British society – expanded upon in more depth in Chapter 2.   
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and letters; and individual memories, drawn from oral history or memoirs.  In this way it 
is hoped to draw together a picture of the public views of the time.  
 
As mentioned previously, opinion polls can be misleading if used in isolation.  An 
example would be the MORI survey on the Falklands War conducted for the Daily Star 
on 26 April 19823 which asked ‘Was the government right to resort to military force to 
regain the Falkland Islands, or not?’.  One might argue that the use of the word ‘resort’ 
carries an implication about other alternatives to military action.  This is a particular 
concern, when the final question of the three in that survey asks ‘Should British armed 
forces attempt to restore British sovereignty by invading the Falkland Islands?’.  The use 
of the word ‘invade’ is interesting, since Britain supposedly had sovereignty anyway, and 
so could not truly invade islands they already ‘owned’.  Whilst this choice of words could 
be unintentional, it is more likely that experienced pollsters use the questions to shape the 
response.  Survey size is a similar issue, and there are therefore potential pitfalls in 
scaling the result to be a national perception.  Similarly the age group, level of experience 
in a particular issue and geographic spread may all make the data less representative.  
Nevertheless, opinion poll data does give both a quantifiable measure of perception and a 
relative measure as polls are taken over the duration of each conflict. 
 
Newspaper coverage has its own difficulties.  The relationship between newspaper 
comment and public opinion will be discussed in Chapter 7, but the nature of the 
relationship on whether it leads, reflects or runs counter to public opinion is key in this 
respect.  So the way it has been used in this chapter is to look particularly at the editorials 
                                                 
3 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/trends/falklands_dailystar.shtml accessed 29 April 2007. 
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of the newspapers, which give a reflection of the views of both the popular press and the 
more considered opinions of the broadsheets, and then at the letters pages where 
available, to see how editorial and responses join.  Again, both have difficulties.  The 
editorials often reflect the views of owners, which again is part of the discussion on 
media.  Letters reflect to a certain extent not the views of the respondents, but the editor’s 
selection of which letters to print and the proportion of letters both for and against a point 
of view may represent the same proportion as received by the newspaper or a national 
view. 
 
Memoirs and oral histories give a good view, if occasionally dimmed by the passage of 
time, of perceptions at the time.  For the purposes of this study, however, they are limited 
as they reflect more closely the events of the day, rather than the populace’s perceptions 
of them, and so must be used with care.   
 
There is no single definitive model or measure of public perception on each campaign 
that can be used with certainty.  Nor are the measures used here exhaustive in themselves.  
The best that can reasonably be achieved is to build a consistent pattern of approaches 
across each conflict to offer some views of perceptions at the various levels in society. 
 
Case Study 1.  Borneo 
 
A combined force from UK, Australia and New Zealand took up positions in 1962 in an 
undeclared jungle war against Indonesia that lasted for four years and was known as the 
162  
‘Confrontation’.  The plan for the defence of Borneo4 against overt attack was known as 
SPILLIKIN, whilst a contingency plan was formed for the destruction of Indonesia’s 
offensive capability - ALTHORPE5.  Evidence from the draft minute from the Chief of 
Defence Staff6 to Ministers on the minimum force size needed to prevent intervention in 
Borneo by Indonesian forces in 1963 shows no anticipation of the length and depth of the 
campaign7.  What is clear from the note is the support the Indonesian forces received 
from the Russians (which presumably underscored the British intervention), although 
there was no suggestion at the time that they would fight in Borneo.8  The early publicity 
was targeted at Indonesian incursions, but the Government stopped short of issuing a 
White Paper on Borneo9; as the Confrontation developed, publicity was not raised again 
but clouded in tight security.  The 1965 Statement on the Defence Estimates10 simply said 
that the Army had ‘substantial forces engaged in the Borneo operations’ – which not only 
omitted the contribution of the other two Services but grossly understated the nature of 
the campaign11. 
 
                                                 
4 Under the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Agreement, Borneo was split between Dutch and British spheres of 
influence, but was occupied by the Japanese during the Second World War. 
5 Brief to Secretary of State for Defence 6 July 1963 DEFE 11/593.  Other plans existed for various other 
contingencies and gradations of effort, but these are not germane to this discussion. 
6 Admiral Lord Mountbatten 
7 DEF 157/200/01, CO 968/873 from CDS to Ministers dated 29 January 1963.  Although the Treasury 
clearly were worried about the costs, and anticipated involvement to 1965 (reacting to a note of 29 May 
1965 from the MOD).  Note to Mr Mark from P H F Dodd dated 28 March 1963.  T225/2554 
8 JP 12/63 25 January 1963  CO 968/873  
9 DH/1061/84(J) dated 27 August 1963 from J E Cable at the FCO.  FO/371/169901 
10 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965 para 60 p. 16 CAB 129/120 
11 Smith suggests that, by early 1965, some 15 000 Commonwealth troops were engaged in Malaysia.  
Smith R Op cit p. 207 
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Bullock described the area as heavily-jungled, with an unmarked frontier; ethnic 
constituents covered both sides of the border and moved between sides at will12.  The 
only efforts to mark the border with signs were subsequently used by the Iban people as 
frying pans13. The Indonesians were, in Bullock’s view, doing most of the attacking 
(much against the views of the indigenous peoples who viewed them as being as alien as 
the British)14.  The reaction of British forces was sound when they caught the 
Indonesians, but they were always forced to be reactive15.  As a result, the Director of 
Borneo Operations, Major-General Walker 16, concluded by early-196417 that permission 
was required from London to mount operations against military targets inside Indonesia, 
which Bullock describes as being ‘politically-deniable’18.  These were known as ‘Claret’ 
operations19.  This case study considers how operations were conducted, and the lack of 
media coverage. 
 
                                                 
12 Bullock interview 8 June 2009.  Bullock was a Company Commander with 2nd Battalion 2nd KEO Gurkha 
Rifles in Borneo in 1965. He also noted that the only map they had at the start of operations was a Dutch 
map from 1936 with little detail. 
13 Bullock interview Op cit 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 Walker was Director of Borneo Operations, Commander Land Forces in Borneo and senior Gurkha 
commander, commanding 17 Gurkha Light Infantry Division.  He was replaced by Major General P M 
Hunt in his role with the Brigade of Gurkhas on 1 April 1964, and by Major General Lee as Commander 
Land Forces when the roles were split in theatre.  Walker noted the end of his period in command in The 
Kukri (Regimental magazine – No 16 August 1964) by saying the Gurkhas had been ‘fully extended in the 
Borneo territories’.  Walker was later to become a full General and knighted; he later became a right –wing 
advocate with connections to Taiwan  and Pakistan.  See his book Fighting On by General Sir Walter 
Walker.  Bullock, writing the history of the Gurkhas, said his later efforts were viewed as ‘slightly 
embarrassing’ and that he was ‘a bit of a menace’.  Walker was alleged to have been involved in the 
proposed military coup during Wilson’s government in the 1970s. 
17 Noted in CDS’ note to Secretary of State COS.27th Meeting/64 7 April 1964 DEFE 11/551.  Walker’s 
assessment, endorsed by Admiral Begg as CinC FE, is in CBB 19 dated 27 March 1964 and covered by 
CINCFE.1684/1298/1 dated 3 April 1964 (despite the fact it says March!).  DEFE 11/487 
18 Bullock Op cit p Introduction (unnumbered).   
19 Smith R Op cit p. 208 
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The first ‘Claret’ operations took place in May 196420.  Each operation had to be 
approved by the MOD and, as a result, some were delayed21.  The most successful 
operations were to attack the Indonesians when they conducted battalion movements by 
boat.  Using the asymmetric advantage of helicopters for rapid access, the British were 
able to attack these in ambushes.  Later ‘Claret’ operations in 1965 targeted enemy 
bases22.  Each operation had a number of rules23: there was no casualty evacuation by 
helicopter24; incursions were not sanctioned further than 10000yards25 into Kalimantan 
(the effective range of the 105mm howitzer); operations were to be totally deniable26; 
every scrap of evidence had to be recovered; and artillery use was minimized for the 
operation27.   
 
                                                 
20 Bullock interview Op cit 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
24 To prevent the Indonesians downing a British helicopter and gaining a public relations victory at the UN, 
although the records show that clearance for ‘hot pursuit’ of Indonesian aircraft was considered up to fifty 
miles into Indonesian airspace.  COS 2068/21/7/65 dated 21 July 1965 DEFE 11/593 
25 Confirmed in signal from CinC Far East (Admiral V C  Begg) to CDS 300420Z July 1965 which 
requested authority for three deep raids without further clearance but held to the rule of ten thousand yard 
incursion.  DEFE 11/593 
26 The public relations strategy surrounding cross border operations was to be limited to dissemination of 
Indonesian incursions to try and persuade the public of the need for strong counter-measures.  COS.124/64 
dated 10 April 1964.  DEFE 11/551.  Deniable was defined by CDS as ‘one in which the Indonesians 
cannot prove that the border has been crossed’.  Signal CDS to CinC FE 011935Z I July 1964.  DEFE 
13/385 
27 The initial approval by Ministers in April 1964 (Signal MOD to CinCFE 232805Z 23 April 1964 DEFE 
11/551) was for ‘limited and deniable reliatory cross-border operations: artillery/mortar fire in self defence; 
deniable hot pursuit to 3 000 yards; deniable offensive patrols to 3000 yards (July 1964)’.  Deniability was 
confirmed in a letter of 17 April 1964 from the Foreign Office to MOD, which notes that there would be no 
publicity initiated by us (the British) (DEFE 11/551) E1981.  The cross border approval was extended to 
offensive patrols to 10 000 yards; sea patrols up to a 3 mile limit; and planning for graduated operations in 
Kalimantan in December 1964 to reflect a build up of Indonesian forces in Kalimantan (Signal CDS to 
CinC FE 151100Z January 1965 notifies the change. DEFE 11/621).  Brief for Secretary of State for 
Defence 6 July 1965.  DEFE 11/593 
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These operations were kept extremely secret28.  Bullock recalled29 a visit from a Medical 
Corps Major-General, concerned over outbreaks of scrub typhus.  The visitor produced a 
sack of sticks which he suggested could be used to mark areas where the typhus was 
prevalent; clearly, he was unaware that British forces were operating over the border and 
so couldn’t leave such evidence.  Press were not allowed into theatre.  Even the SECRET 
situation reports excluded reference to border crossing30.  The Regimental magazines of 
the period contained no references to border crossing31.  The SAS reports (with whom the 
Gurkhas were working closely) were limited in distribution32.  The Gurkhas achieved 
many honours on operations; all citations used a form of words to circumvent saying the 
operation was across the border.  An example would be the Military Medal awarded to 
Rifleman Ramprasad Pun33:  
 
On 2 September 1965, Rifleman Ramprasad Pun took part in an operation the aim 
of which was to ambush a stream bed in the border area of the Lundu District of 
                                                 
28 Even the quarterly report to Chief of Defence Staff by the Commander in Chief Far East for September 
1964 to March 1965 makes no reference to the cross border operations.  CINCFE.54/65 dated 26 May 
1965.  DEFE 11/593 
29 Bullock interview Op cit 
30 Undated Sitrep from Bullock papers viewed 8 June 2009.  Also Joint Sitrep No 41 (2 Div) from 122045H 
to 141900H in a signal from 2/2 GR to West Brigade, presumed to be July 1965.  Bullock papers. 
31 The Kukri Nos 16, 17 and 18 dated August 1964, July 1965 and July 1966 respectively.  No 16 refers to 
the extension in the operational tour of duty from 3 to 6 months, and the casualties for that year of 2 British 
officers, 1 Gurkha officer and 14 other ranks killed, and 1 British officer, 4 Gurkha officers and 23 other 
ranks wounded in the report to the King of Nepal p5.  No 17 has a similar report to the King, listing the 
casualties as 1 British officer and 20 Gurkha other ranks killed and 1 Gurkha officer and 35 other ranks 
wounded p5.  The same edition contains a ‘typical’ patrol report, but uses the term ‘Indonesian border 
village’ to obscure the cross border operation p145.  Casualties were only taken to Singapore at best, but 
not UK, so news of their wounds was confined (note that the Daily Mail 12 June 1964 complained that 
details of casualties were being withheld – see Signal CinC FE to Secretary of State 091045Z July 1964 
DEFE 13/385.  See for example 2/2 GR Battalion newsletter No 22 dated 31 December 1965 for the death 
from his wounds of 21151635 Balbahadur Thapa of C Company in Kuching General Hospital.  Bullock 
papers. 
32 Confined to the Director Borneo Operations, Commander Land Borneo, HQ SAS, West Brigade and the 
Gurkha battalion.  See for example, Operation JACK SPRAT 25 August – 2 September 1965 OPS/90/99 
dated 12 September 1965 signed by Major Peter de la Billiere MC commanding the SAS in Borneo.  WO 
305/4294 
33 21150344 Rifleman Ramprasad Pun 2nd King Edward VIIs Own Gurkha Rifles 
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Sarawak which it was believed Indonesian infiltration parties used as a route into 
Sarawak34. 
 
 This conveniently omitted the fact that the operation took place across the border, as we 
know from Bullock’s evidence that he led it with the Support Company.  Even the award 
of a Victoria Cross to Lance Corporal Rambahadur Limbu in July 1966 omitted to say it 
was across the border, simply that he ‘discovered and attacked a strong enemy force 
located in the border area35.’    
 
Finally, the monthly battalion newsletters made no mention of cross-border activity.  
Some are quite short on detail; e.g. the September 1965 newsletter36 described a major 
operation by Support Company, without making reference in the story to the cross-border 
action, and the important role played by SSM Lawrence Smith37, 22 SAS, who 
subsequently received a Military Cross38. 
 
The conduct of the ‘Claret’ operations was described by Bullock as ‘pushing the 
boundaries a lot’39 yet he pointed out that such operations were only conducted in 
response to Indonesian attacks or carefully-planned intelligence-led ambushes.  He felt 
that the Indonesians were strangling the local trade and sometimes cleared villages of 
their populace, who gave them no support40. ‘Claret’ operations were designed to take 
                                                 
34 The London Gazette 24 May 1966 
35 The Kukri No 18 July 1966 p. 1 
36 Battalion newsletter 2/2 GR dated 30 September 1965.  Bullock papers. 
37 Letter Smith to Bullock dated 27 June 1966 in response to a congratulatory letter from Bullock on his 
MC says ‘I have honestly never felt prouder serving with any other soldiers outside my own Regiment.’  
Bullock papers. 
38 The London Gazette 20 May 1966 
39 Bullock interview Op cit 
40 Ibid 
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place when the maximum numbers of enemy soldiers were present; every weapon 
available was then employed from rocket launchers to machine-guns.  The only operation 
Bullock recalled41 as being ‘iffy’ was conducted using a medium machine-gun of 1940s 
vintage but with long-range and effective firepower.  A village was judged to be empty of 
civilians and only enemy soldiers were in place.  The village was machine-gunned for ten 
minutes before British troops entered the village. 
 
The Durham Light Infantry (DLI) deployed from Hong Kong to Borneo in October 1965.  
The only public record lies in an undated article entitled ‘North Country Notes’, which 
noted that the DLI would undertake jungle training before deploying to Borneo42.  An 
article from Kuching (Sarawak) from Easter 196643 reported an incursion by Indonesian 
soldiers into Sarawak at Balai Ringin, but made no comments on cross-border British 
operations.   
 
  An undated cartoon by Jak, presumably from a UK newspaper, depicted a Guards NCO 
in dress uniform with bearskin, talking to troops coming out of the jungle with shredded 
clothes and long beards looking very bedraggled saying: ‘Come on, come on, 
confrontation’s over – you’re back in the Army now!44.’  The DLI returned to Colchester 
in 1966; an article, presumably from a local Durham newspaper45, had one mention of 
Borneo (and that referred to a comment from one soldier who said that his barracks were 
                                                 
41 Ibid 
42 D/DLI/2/1/287(256) in Durham Record Office. 
43 D/DLI/2/1/287(358) in Durham Record Office. 
44 Cartoon by Jak entitled ‘The Borneo Swamp Rat’, undated but estimated 1965, D/DLI/2/1/287(376) in 
Durham Record Office. 
45 D/DLI/2/1/287(388) in Durham Record Office. 
168  
better than conditions in Borneo) in its 2/3 page coverage of their return. In short, there is 
no recognition of the nature of the Borneo conflict. 
 
Internally, the Standard Operating Procedures for 1st Battalion DLI46,  made no reference 
to ‘Claret’ operations or cross-border operations, but simply to ‘seek out and destroy 
terrorists or criminals who attempt to operate from, or take refuge in, the jungle’ and to 
‘patrol the frontier and large tracts of sparsely-occupied country47.’  In echoes of more 
recent conflicts, much of the internal correspondence was to do with shortcomings in 
equipment (e.g. webbing, boots, and mortar aids)48.  The DLI Regimental Journal for 
June 1966 talked about the deployment to Borneo and the takeover from 3rd Green 
Jackets, but made no reference to ‘Claret’ operations and just talked of border patrols49.  
The same edition noted the loss of Private Griffiths (see below) but only talked of an 
engagement with Indonesian troops, making no mention of the location50.  The following 
edition in October 1966, following the Battalion’s return to Colchester, again made no 
mention of cross-border activity, concentrating on the handover to 1st Battalion Royal 
New Zealand Regiment instead51.   
 
                                                 
46 D/DLI/2/1/146in Durham Record Office. SOP for 1st Bn DLI dated 18 October 1965.  The Jungle 
Warfare School instructions do not mention the cross border operations in Borneo, but do contain a rather 
confused definition of both guerrilla and insurgent, the main difference appearing to lie in their 
arrangements for pay and daily work.  D/DLI/2/1/154 pp1-2.  Durham Record Office. 
47 Ibid p. 10 
48 191/Q dated 31 December 1965 3rd Green Jackets to HQ West Brigade.  D/DLI/2/1/146(152) in Durham 
Record Office. 
49 DLI Regimental Journal June 1966 pp. 122-3.  D/DLI/2/1/178 Durham Record Office 
50 Ibid p125 
51 DLI Regimental Journal October 1966 pp. 10-11. D/DLI/2/1/179 Durham Record Office 
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Operation BLAYDON RACES was a ‘Claret’ operation against an Indonesian base at 
Lubok Sabok.  The Operation Order52 (reconstructed in 1981 and therefore liable to 
minor error) demonstrates that the base was within range of the 105mm gun detachment 
at Bunan Gega (also known as Gunan Gajak), thus meeting one of Bullock’s criteria for a 
‘Claret’ operation.  The Order shows the approach to have been through steep secondary 
jungle, and to have been carefully reconnoitred previously.  The plan called for a track 
ambush and the destruction of bashas53.  The subsequent patrol report54 showed that three 
bashas were burnt using lavatory paper and matches due to damp phosphorous grenade 
fuses, and a few civilians walked through the ambush position and were given tea and 
chocolate whilst held.  Simulated firefights failed to initiate enemy activity at first, but 
after four hours, Indonesians set off claymore mines and were engaged. The final count 
showed eleven Indonesians killed and one British soldier killed55.  The Operation led to a 
Military Cross for the Company Commander Major J A G Arnot, and two Mentions-in-
Despatches56. Again, this ‘Claret’ operation was not publicised and no mention of the 
cross-border action was present in the citations.  Even in a series of lectures given by 
Colonel Michael McBain57 in the 1990s, much of the detail of the ‘Claret’ operations was 
omitted, showing the continued secrecy over these operations58.  Similarly, an article for 
the friends of the DLI, the Durham Bugle, published in 200259 mentioned the operations 
                                                 
52 D/DLI/2/1/160(1) Durham Record Office. 
53 Small native huts – probably ought to have been termed longhouses 
54 D/DLI/2/1/161 Durham Record Office. 
55 23972763 Private Thomas Griffiths 
56 The London Gazette 13 December 1966. 
57 Mike McBain had been Company Commander, C Company 1 DLI in 1965/6. 
58 D/DLI/2/1/165 Durham Record Office.  See numerous inclusions of ‘BLANK’ in text. 
59 Colonel R W H Crawford commanded B Company 1 DLI in 1965/6.  His article appears in the Durham 
Bugle of Autumn 2002 pp. 8-9 
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by A and C Companies in passing, yet these were the principal operations of that 
deployment.  Most of the article focused on the Indonesian incursions into Sarawak. 
 
For the Gurkhas, the 1965 operations were viewed as very successful60, if not 
publicised61.  There was no press coverage in The Times of the ‘Claret’ operations in 
1965/66 affecting the Gurkhas or the Durham Light Infantry; indeed, the only reference 
to Borneo in that period was to a Malaysian investigation of British police in Sarawak 
alleged to have acting as ‘big bosses and colonial masters’62.  Looking at the Auckland 
Chronicle, which covered Durham, there was no mention of the Borneo operation for any 
of the period the Regiment was deployed in 196663.  Similarly, the Hampshire Chronicle 
as the home newspaper for the Gurkha Regiments made no reference to their activities in 
Borneo64. 
 
What the Borneo case study clearly demonstrates is that great efforts were made to keep 
the nature of operations secret.  This policy was extremely successful, as the lack of 
                                                 
60 See signal DOBOS (Director of Borneo Operations) to 2/2 GR dated 210455Z (presumably at the end of 
their 1965 operational deployment): ‘Personal for CO.  You have had a long though supremely rewarding 
haul and the laurels are yours.  As you know only too well, the enemy has not mustered the courage to 
cross the frontier to do battle with you since Jul of last year.  Such has been the measure of his respect for 
you although Nelson’s Eye [the name for an OP at GR575932 and a previous Claret operation] and like 
escapades must also have had something to do with it (Claret operations).  Also to your credit is the very 
high morale of the local people upon whose continuing support so much hangs.  Well done Second Second 
for a job expertly executed.  You have earned a respite.’  Bullock papers.   
61 See also the Battalion Orders for 21 December 1965 from Lieutenant Colonel D F Neill OBE MC on 
leaving the Regiment: ‘For the second time now you have returned from Borneo with an unsurpassed 
record.  Never in one operational tour has any other Battalion killed over one hundred Indonesian soldiers.  
No battalion in the whole of the British Army has killed as many enemy in Borneo as you.’  Bullock 
papers. 
62 The Times 29 March 1966 p. 9 
63 Auckland Chronicle 24 February 1966 to 2 June 1966. 
64 RTT 7017/241922Z March 1966 COSSEA 23 – referred to in a note from the Chief of the Defence Staff 
in his note to Secretary of State of 4 May 1966 and the subsequent signal from MOD to the CinC FE (ACM 
John Grandy) the following day.  DEFE 11/623 
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public reaction shows.  Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, was later said to 
have argued that this operation would have been impossible to run under the media 
spotlight65. 
 
Case Study 2.  The Falklands War. 
 
Although the Falklands crisis had been building since the 1960s over sovereignty, the 
period of this review focuses from the Argentine landings on 2 April 1982 to the 
surrender of Argentine forces in Port Stanley on 14 June 1982.  The reaction to the 
invasion can be typified by Roy Greenslade’s recollection66 that he had no idea where the 
Falklands were, let alone their history, having merely collected their stamps as a boy.  He 
recalls that many seemed bemused at the idea of sailing 8000 miles to retake islands 
occupied by 1800 people, but that that was held to be a very unpopular idea by many, not 
least in the Sun office where he worked.  Badsey characterizes the British response as 
emotional and patriotic, and largely incomprehensible to intellectuals67. 
 
MORI conducted several surveys for various newspapers and TV programmes over the 
period, but the most consistent set of results68 was conducted for the 
Economist/Panorama, drawing on a baseline of 1018 adults aged 18 and over, from 53 
sampling points across the UK.  The data was then weighted to reflect the make-up of the 
                                                 
65 Discussion with Prof Gary Sheffield, University of Birmingham 23 February 2010. 
66 Greenslade R, Press Gang (London: Pan 2004) pp. 441-442. 
67 Badsey interview Op cit. 
68 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/trends/falklands_panel.shtml accessed 29 April 2007. 
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national population.  The initial poll was conducted on 14 April 1982 and the subsequent 
polls all used virtually the same questions, thus allowing a true comparison. 
 
At the political level, there is no doubt that the Conservative Government was unpopular 
before the Falklands War.  This can be demonstrated by the Gallup poll of January 1980 
which showed the largest reduction in optimism over the economy (-48%) since 197469 
and a series of monthly polls which showed that the public perception was that strikes 
were the main problem facing the country (53% of people thought this the major 
problem), which was only superseded by the cost of living as the major issue from June 
197970 (45% of people thought this the major problem)71.  This was reflected in the 
Labour lead in the 14 April poll of 1% over the Conservatives (34 to 33) and 58% being 
dissatisfied with the way the Government was running the country.  Over the seven polls 
up to 21-23 June 1982, Tory support increased from 33% initially to 51% by the end.   
This was borne out by success in the May local elections and in by-elections at 
Beaconsfield and Mitcham and Morden.  Despite press and public condemnation of the 
Labour Party’s approach to the conflict, support for the Party remained at 33-34% from 
14 April to 16 May, and only reduced to 24-25% from the end of May into June, once the 
landings at San Carlos were completed and the victories towards Stanley were achieved.  
Much of the criticism was levelled at Labour Party leader Michael Foot personally, 
though he was to sack three Labour rebels, Tam Dalyell72, Andrew Faulds and John 
Tilley from their positions as Opposition spokesmen because of their action in voting 
                                                 
69 British Political Opinion Op cit p. 314. 
70 Ibid p. 267 
71 Noting that the Conservatives came to power on 4 May 1979. 
72 Commissioned in the Scots Greys – the regiment his nine times great grandfather had raised in 1679 in 
Scotland – see Hickman Op cit p. 55 
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against the Government on 20 May73.  Tony Benn’s opposition too, was seen as a major 
negative influence on the by-elections74; Dr Owen attacked Benn as an ‘inconsistent 
purveyor of platitudes’, recalling his lack of objection when in the Cabinet in 1977 to 
send a submarine and frigates to the Islands when previously threatened by Argentina75. 
 
Michael Foot deserves an especial mention for his unique position in British politics.  In 
the generally sympathetic biography by Kenneth Morgan76, a left-wing Labour Party peer 
and academic, Foot’s upbringing as a Liberal, with a very political family is described.  
Probably best noted in his early days as a member of the ‘awkward squad’ for his adopted 
Labour Party, his followership of Bevan (up to his speech of 1957 on nuclear weapons), 
his career as a journalist and editor of the London Standard and then Tribune, his 
adoption as a Trades Unionist supporter, and his founding membership of CND from 
1958 marked his stance on issues from the closed shop to unilateralism.  Given that 
background it was slightly unusual77 for him to be brought into the Wilson Government 
as Secretary of State for Employment in 1974, and latterly as Deputy Leader to 
Callaghan, though even then, he was known to the press as ‘Worzel Gummidge’ for his 
dress sense78.  Foot was an unlikely choice to become Labour leader in 1980, but was 
elected in the face of a perception that Healey was too far to the right of the party and 
would lead to disunity79.  At 67, he was inexperienced at ministerial level, yet recognised 
                                                 
73 Daily Telegraph 22 May 1982 p. 7 
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75 Ibid 
76 Morgan K O, Michael Foot: A Life (London: Harper Perennial 2007, this edn 2008) 
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78 Ibid p284.  Exacerbated by his accident in 1963 which left him with a limp for which he used a stick 
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as one of parliament’s best orators.  His support for the Falklands campaign seems to 
have stemmed from his background as a strong supporter of the navy as MP for 
Plymouth-Devonport80. Equally, his subsequent derision from the media over his donkey-
jacket at Remembrance Day in London should have held no surprises; the later picture of 
him on a hillside painted by Graham Jones in 1998 wearing said jacket testament to his 
sense of humour81. 
 
Voting patterns do not seem to have mattered in support for the Government’s handling 
of the crisis, which started at 60% on 14 April 1982 and increased steadily to 84% by 21-
23 June.  Anthony Barnett, in his book on the war which was an attempt to argue that the 
British opposition to the war had been ignored and that policy alternatives to military 
action had not been pursued, claimed that  
 
twenty percent of the population expressed opposition to the war… Even after a 
brilliantly executed and cleverly publicized military victory82.  
 
The footnote refers to the Economist of 22 June 1982  
 
which reported that 22% of its poll sample was against the victorious war “given 
the cost in lives and money”83.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1983 General Election.  See Philo G, Seeing is Believing: The Influence of Television (London: Routledge 
1990) p198 
80 Foot would have been present at the notorious Oxford debate of February 1933 “That this House would 
not fight for King and Country’.  Ibid p31 
81 Ibid  facing p 427 
82 Barnett, A, Iron Britannia, (London: Allison and Busby 1982) p. 88. 
83 Ibid p. 158 
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This is impossible to reconcile with the poll for that date conducted by MORI for the 
Economist which clearly shows a figure for those dissatisfied with the Government’s 
handling of 13%.  The satisfaction rate of 84% is the highest for the campaign and the 
highest for any of the campaigns considered here.  The actual question to which Barnett 
refers was ‘250 British servicemen have lost their lives recapturing the Falklands, and the 
operation is estimated to have cost £1Bn.  Given the cost in lives and money, do you 
think Britain should have sent the task force or not?’.  To say, as Barnett does, that this 
meant that 20% of Britons opposed the war stretches the point.  Certainly, it was not 
supported by the poll undertaken by MORI for BBC1 which showed that only 14% of 
people believed the decision to invade was wrong84.  Perhaps in consequence, Barnett’s 
book is largely overlooked in more recent texts on the conflict, although he was quoted in 
Freedman’s official history of the Falklands Campaign85.  
 
The percentage of people in favour of military action, despite American pressure over the 
first three weeks of the campaign, never dropped below 66%.  From 67%-89% were in 
favour of landing troops on the islands.  That this was in the same poll as Barnett’s claim 
that 20% opposed the war is inconsistent.  And from an initial 52% to a final 79% were in 
favour of sinking Argentine shipping86.  By comparison, Gallup’s polls (which 
unfortunately are not broken down by age or socio-economic group) showed an initial 
figure of 61% in favour of sinking Argentine shipping at the start of the conflict87.  But 
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people did show an aversion to widening the campaign to the Argentine mainland, thus 
showing a moral measure around proportionality: over 57% consistently opposed 
bombing the mainland; 93% opposed using nuclear weapons against Argentina.  At the 
wider level of society, measures of casualty-aversion gave clues to people’s attitudes.  
From an initial 49% opposed to the loss of British Servicemen’s lives, the number 
steadily reduced to 34% by 25 May88.  The Sunday Times conducted a poll on 2 May 
which said that 60% would not be prepared to lose one Serviceman’s life89.  The same 
poll, conducted by MORI, showed that only one in seven would be prepared to lose over 
100 Servicemen’s lives. 
 
Polls overall demonstrated a much-increased support for the Government90, and in 
particular Mrs Thatcher’s leadership91, with increasing support for military action over 
time, with only slight wavering when maritime losses were high in the early stages.  As 
the landings proved successful, confidence seems to have increased with a recognition 
that losses were not just inevitable but justifiable to secure the objective. 
 
The initial political news coverage supported the poll data.  Usefully, broadsheets of the 
day contained a greater verbatim coverage of the Parliamentary debates, which is 
therefore easier to track and more likely that more of the population will have seen.  The 
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Daily Telegraph of 3 April 1982 captured the political mood in its headline of ‘Fury in 
House over Falklands Humiliation’.  The editorial said:  
 
By landing troops on the Falkland Islands, Argentina has committed an act of war 
against British territory….But diplomatic efforts should be backed up by 
immediate military preparations by Britain to prepare for action to remove the 
invaders by force if all other measures fail...The difficulties of mounting military 
action to evict the Argentineans would be formidable, but not insuperable…92 
 
 The immediate shock of invasion was replaced by a desire in Parliament to see who was 
to blame and to remove Ministers; in the event The Times of 6 April made much of the 
honour of Lord Carrington in resigning93.  At this early stage, public support for the 
deployment of the task force seems to have surprised the Royal Navy as:  
 
Half the crew of 1000 lined the flight deck of the anti-submarine carrier on a 
sunny, spring day to acknowledge the noisy farewell from ships and well-wishers, 
crowded onto docks, jetties, beaches, ports and even rooftops to wave their Union 
Jacks and cheer94.  
 
 Yet amidst the evident public show of support, the letters page showed that of the total of 
sixteen letters to The Times (which can broadly be used to represent the Establishment 
view in a newspaper of record), seven related to the Falklands and three of those opposed 
the war95. 
 
Analysing the letters columns as the campaign develops demonstrates a number of points 
on the type of people writing letters, the themes for their letters, and the editorial policy 
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93 The Times, 6 April 1982 p. 13. 
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178  
of newspapers on letters received.  The Times of 7 April96 had an editorial which 
considered the long term future of the Falklands, yet the six letters on the campaign 
covered issues from naval force cuts, to parallels with Cyprus, to an ironical view of the 
Argentine national anthem.  The authors were drawn often from academia or retired 
officers e.g. General Sir Robert Ford’s letter that day on government failings.  In the 
same newspaper on 27 April97 only three of the sixteen letters referred to the Falklands. 
The other theme that started to emerge, particularly from legal authors, was a need for a 
legal judgment on sovereignty.  Again, The Times of 29 April had sixteen letters, seven of 
which related to the campaign.  One related to the laws of war, one to the need for a legal 
judgment, one to previous negotiations on sovereignty, one on ‘jingoism’ ( a recurrent 
theme), one to the need for mediation, one on naval cuts and one on historic claims to the 
islands.  Again, using The Times of 4 May, five of the fourteen letters that day were based 
on the Falklands campaign; one on the role of the International Court at the Hague from a 
QC; one on democracy in South America; Dr Paton from Hertford College wrote on truth 
in war; one asked how many islanders were required to justify the conflict; and one from 
the Director of The Coalition for Peace through Security argued for strong defences.  
What seems clear is that the volume of letters relative to other issues did not seem to be 
in proportion to the coverage of the topic in the rest of the news; this indicates a 
considerable degree of editorial control of the letters published.  Indeed, this was exposed 
in the editorial note in the letters section of the Guardian on 8 May 1982, which said  
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We try, in our selection of letters, broadly to reflect the weight of opinion in our 
post bag.  On the subject of the Falklands crisis, we have received only a handful 
of letters supporting military action, and many hundreds opposing it – Ed98. 
 
  The Guardian represents a useful counterpoint to other broadsheets, being broadly left 
of centre in political line, but having an influential readership drawn from, inter alia, 
academia and education.  Its natural tendency was to oppose conflict, but here it had to 
tread a careful line not to antagonize readers by opposing British troops and being seen to 
be unpatriotic.  A similar note appeared in the Daily Telegraph (a right-wing broadsheet) 
of 21 May 1982, saying that they received many hundreds of letters but couldn’t print 
them all99.  This then raises questions when later in the conflict, there were days with no 
letters in some broadsheets relating to the campaign – had people’s opinions changed, or 
was it deemed inappropriate to publish them?  It seems unlikely we will ever know for 
sure.  The authors of the letters were regularly drawn from Parliament, academia or 
professional institutions (e.g. lawyers), and thus the broadsheet letters columns were 
demonstrably a reflection of the ‘elite’ level and can be analysed as such.  And the tenor 
and subjects of the letters were not consistent with either the editorial lines or the public 
poll data, implying that the elite level (to the extent one can take a small sample of letters 
pages) had a differing view of the conflict. 
 
The Guardian showed itself to have a different approach to the conflict through its 
editorials to The Times and the Daily Telegraph.  An example was the editorial of 27 
April100 which said:  
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Mrs Thatcher may, briefly, have rejoiced in the evening of South Georgia 
conquest: but Westminster declined to rejoice as openly yesterday afternoon.  
Polite and warm tributes to professional soldiering were dutifully offered.  
 
This more cautious line, with a less positive view of the military, continued throughout 
the Guardian’s coverage of the campaign.  Indeed, the newspapers lined up essentially as 
the pro-lobby of the Sun101, the Star, the Daily Express, the Daily Mail and the Daily 
Telegraph, with a combined circulation of around 11 million; whereas the more cautious 
group of the Mirror, Guardian, The Times and Financial Times had a combined 
circulation of 4 ½ million - hence despite the greater national reliance on television 
coverage, the pro-lobby had the majority of the newspaper circulation in any event. 
 
The Guardian was clearly stung by some of the criticism of its coverage; the proof lies in 
the editorial of 13 May:  
 
“standing up for our task force, our boys, our people, and the cause of 
democracy”.  The boys Mrs Thatcher habitually refers to with fierce, almost 
maternal affection are of course the British men and women with the task force.  
And her phrase, by some curious process beyond strict logic, has come to be taken 
as one litmus test of patriotism…..Barely a British word in print or over the 
airways through the last forty days has questioned that situation or seemed less 
than supportive….Every section of the Parliamentary spectrum has hoped – and 
continues to hope – that the troops in the South Atlantic fulfil their instructions 
(whatever they be) with professional brilliance, success and the minimum of 
casualties.  They are not under scrutiny or question.  They rightly receive every 
backing….102 
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  This shows how the press divorced politics from military endeavour, remaining 
questioning, if not critical, of the political masters, but being seen never to criticize the 
military, especially in battle.  This presumably reflected a concern that the readership 
would leave103 if they did not feel the newspaper supported national troops who might 
have died on operations and a general desire to support the national position (i.e. be 
patriotic) during conflict (whilst challenging the political level in the event of perceived 
splits in elite and political views). 
 
The Sunday Times reflected its daily partner in a very cautious approach.  The editorial of 
9 May 1982 was particularly strong:  
 
the task of recapturing the islands is too difficult and likely to be too costly in 
human life.  Last week’s casualties on both sides have come as a rude awakening 
to the reality of war.  We should therefore desist from further active operations, 
other than those of maintaining the extended blockade, and wait for the impact of 
international sanctions against Argentina to make itself felt104.’  
 
And of the four letters in that edition, only two related to the campaign, one pro from an 
ex-RAF officer, the other bemoaning jingoism.  But later, the comments seemed to show 
a greater support for the military, whatever the view of the politicians:  
 
For the moment, and whatever the apprehensions about the future, what matters 
over the Falklands is that British forces are fully committed and must be 
supported105. 
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The paper also recognizes the personal and unusual bond between a strong Prime 
Minister and the military:  
 
No British Prime Minister now living could have taken on the role [of war leader] 
with half the aplomb that she [Mrs Thatcher] has shown….The military like her 
and respect her.  She has the military virtue of clarity106. 
 
Reinforcing both the point of splitting support for the military from considering the 
political position, and the change in attitudes once the landings had taken place, can be 
seen from the considered editorial of the Daily Telegraph of 22 May 1982:  
 
They [our troops] have the complete confidence of the nation, eight thousand 
miles away.  That and our prayers…..Every Briton will now hope that the action 
is swiftly consolidated and casualties as light as may be.  If such is the outcome, 
criticism will wither away….the argument about how to resolve the Falklands 
conflict has reflected a very deep ideological division in our culture.  Ironically, 
the spokesmen for appeasement (and they travel by many names and speak from 
many pulpits) have also been constrained by virtue of their intellectual ancestry to 
rage against Argentine oppression and colonialism.  But this is a hollow anger.  
The logic of their argument may be that the cost of individual human life must be 
considered too great for us ever to defend ourselves against aggressors…  The 
British landings on the Falklands, however, have shown what the past few weeks 
did not always make clear, namely that a British Government is, after all, 
prepared to bear all the costs of defending its people….This operation represents 
in a reassuring way the victory of nationhood107. 
 
  The choice of the word ‘pulpits’ may be significant in considering the mixed messages 
emerging from the Churches.  Appeasement is a theme harking back to national guilt over 
Chamberlain’s Munich agreement of 1938, and was commonly used by the press 
whenever there was a feeling that the government might not have been standing up to 
perceived aggression – not just here but also in the first Gulf War.  And the underlying 
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message, that the loss of British servicemen is acceptable, seemed to coincide with the 
opinion poll evidence of a greater public acceptance of losses, particularly once the 
landings were proving successful. 
 
Worthy of note was the editorial of the Economist, partly because it covered the militarily 
critical week of 1-7 May, and partly because it employed the MORI opinion poll data 
referred to earlier.  Under a headline of ‘Voting for a spectator’s war’ the editorial said  
 
Support for Mrs Thatcher’s handling of the aggression increased steadily after the 
invasion by Argentina on April 2nd to reach 76% this week.  British public 
opinion, in other words, appears to be taking the government’s leadership on trust 
and doing what most responsible politicians have asked of it: rally to the flag.  
Last weekend when our sample was last questioned, with nothing but British 
success to report and no serious casualties, voters found the Falklands crisis 
politically absorbing, militarily exhilarating and a welcome outlet from chauvinist 
self righteousness.  There is little trace of populist warmongering.  On whether it 
is really worth going to war to regain the Falklands if substantial loss of life is 
involved, the response is evenly divided.  A rising proportion accepts that there 
may have to be a loss of British service lives, but even that figure is only 58%, 
and no more than that would agree to sinking Argentine ships.  This appears to 
reflect a nation eager - as many of Britain’s allies are – for a ‘spectator’s war’, in 
which clear principles must be upheld, but not if it means anyone getting hurt108.  
 
This analysis of the raw data from opinion polls which, from the numbers, must have 
been based on the data from 22-23 April, demonstrates the dangers in using limited 
information sets at a time of rapid change.  Some of the narrative is also hard to reconcile 
with the opinion poll output, although it is possible that the writer might have had access 
to unpublished poll data or comments. 
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The tabloids showed a greater focus on individuals, such as the Sun’s headline of ‘My 
Son’109 on 6 May, referring to the loss of Lieutenant Nick Taylor in a Sea Harrier, and on 
31 May, the Daily Express’s headline of ‘H My Hero’110, referring to the death of 
Lieutenant Colonel ‘H’ Jones, commanding 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment.  The 
latter captured much of the coverage of the time, in a way that Sergeant McKay, the other 
Victoria Cross winner of the campaign, never did.  The opinion column of the Daily 
Express said:  
 
We can now celebrate a brilliant exercise of arms and military craft [referring to 
the battle for Goose Green]…Herbert Jones – H to his men – will be proudly 
remembered111.   
 
The latter gained praise in many papers quoting tributes from Mrs Thatcher, Major Chris 
Keeble, his second-in-command, and Brigadier Julian Thompson.  This raises interesting 
questions about the particular level of praise for officers rather than men, and the need for 
heroes and the cult of heroes – but this is more than this piece can consider in depth. 
 
The Sun managed to irritate the rest of the press in its strident editorial of 7 May, saying 
‘There are traitors in our midst’,  referring to radio and TV commentators, particularly 
Peter Snow for the Panorama programme that week (discussed below) and the Guardian, 
with its ‘pigmy circulation and absurd posturing’, and the Daily Mirror, which: 
 
has pretensions as a mass sale newspaper.  What is it but treason for this timorous, 
whining publication to plead day after day for appeasing the Argentine dictators 
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because they do not believe the British people have the stomach for a fight, and 
are instead prepared to trade peace for honour112. 
 
  Harris highlighted that the newspaper used all the tricks first developed by the Daily 
Mirror in the 1950s113.  The Daily Mirror’s response under a Comment section headline 
of ‘The Harlot of Fleet St’, said that  
 
The Sun, a coarse and demented newspaper, yesterday accused the Daily Mirror, 
the Guardian and Mr Peter Snow of the BBC of being traitors to Britain114. 
 
and went on to discount the claim.  Although this might seem somewhat frivolous and 
almost amusing rivalry, underpinning it was a real debate about the role of journalism in 
reporting events, or taking sides in a national conflict.  Through this, and other headlines 
like the notorious “Gotcha’ headline after the sinking of the Belgrano, the Sun got a 
reputation for jingoism which was debated widely, lost them sales and irritated many 
Servicemen, some of whom threw copies overboard in disgust115. 
 
The more significant debate was that over the Panorama show on BBC that week116, 
which caused Mrs Thatcher to attack TV reporting as treating the British and 
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Argentineans as equals, almost on a neutral basis which would ‘give offence and cause 
great emotion among many, many people117.’   
 
This is especially relevant as we know from the opinion poll data that 65% of people felt 
that television had given them the best coverage of the conflict, whereas only 15% of 
people favoured newspapers118.  The resulting programme brought the resignation of 
presenter Robert Kee from the programme; his letter to The Times of 14 May 1982119 
made clear his objections to presenting the minority view against the war, without 
adequate presentation of the pro-lobby.  George Carey’s, Panorama editor, response in 
the same paper said that they had broadcast several parts of a longer interview with Mrs 
Thatcher from previous programmes and a piece with party chairman Cecil Parkinson 
who could have provided the balance.  Though there was a clear question of the role of 
the BBC, and particularly given its worldwide broadcasting role, in portraying the British 
perspective as the national broadcaster120 or standing for real objectivity, the question for 
this study is of the effect on the British people and their perceptions.  The BBC had 
commissioned Audience Selection to conduct a poll prior to the Panorama programme, 
though the research was carried out subsequently.  This found that 81% of people thought 
the BBC had covered the crisis in a ‘responsible manner’ and that it should ‘pursue its 
traditional policy of reflecting the full range of opinions’121.  That same poll showed that 
89% of the public used the BBC in their range of courses on the campaign, and 79% 
                                                 
117 Sun 7 May 1982 p. 4 and others 
118 http://ipsos-mori.com/polls/trends/falklands_panel.shtml accessed 29 April 2007. 
119 The Times 14 May 1982 p. 11 
120 Lord Greenhill’s suggestion (a previous BBC governor) in the same letters page that there should be the 
occasional reference to ‘our troops’ rather than British troops for example. 
121 Fiddick, P in The Arts Guardian 20 May 1982 p12 
187  
independent TV122.  This was supported by a Gallup Poll in the Daily Telegraph which 
found that 59% of the sample believed the criticisms of the BBC were unjust, 
independent of their own political beliefs123.  
 
Phillip Knightley, author of The First Casualty124, wrote an article in the Sunday Times 
on that Panorama programme, quoting Conservative MP Bernard Braine in a piece on 
American TV: Panorama was the pathway to anarchy125.  He analysed the main 
complaints against the programme: the reaction to the occupation was portrayed as 
hysterical; it was a mistake to send the Task Force; some Service chiefs advised against 
sending it; the government was spoiling for a fight; many Conservative MPs had private 
reservations; the military timing was appalling; bombing Port Stanley had cost the 
support of allies; and Britain was likely to give the Falkland Islands to Argentina in the 
end anyway.  As Carey said above, Knightley pointed to the balance provided by the 
Parkinson interview, but asked if it was the BBC’s role to support the country as being 
‘British”, or to be neutral or challenging?  He countered the Government’s criticism of 
not portraying the ‘truth’ with the fact that governments do lie, using the exaggerated 
claims of enemy kills during the Battle of Britain as an example.   
 
From the opinion poll evidence, the public perception was that the BBC seemed to have 
presented a fair case, supporting Knightley’s contention.  Williams, though, considered 
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that there is a difference between the people’s right to know, and what they want to know 
in wartime – that the people are prepared not to know if it safeguards their own troops’ 
lives126. 
 
A review of the local papers, such as the Oxford Mail127 and the London Evening 
Standard128 shows that although editorials sometimes mentioned the conflict, there were 
few letters from the public on the topic.  One exception was the Oxford Mail on 5 May129, 
where four of the fifteen letters concerned the campaign; two were against the campaign, 
one was for, and the other disassociated the author from a previous letter purporting to 
represent the National Union of Journalists.  More usually, despite a main story on the 
campaign, neither the editorial nor the letters mentioned the war at all.  Most of the letters 
revolved around local issues, suggesting that although the war predominated at national 
level, other issues had importance more locally.    
 
A review of the Yorkshire Post and the Bristol Evening Post for April 1982 shows an 
initial surge of interest but then rapidly waning.  The Yorkshire Post provided coverage 
on the front page, and generally 2 inside pages.  One of the early editorials130 begged Mrs 
Thatcher: ‘Please Mrs Thatcher, not another Suez’ – an interesting observation 
                                                 
126 Williams K in Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media Op cit pp. 154-168.  Morrison and Tumber’s 
research from 1998 after the Falklands War showed that 75% of those polled were in favour of reporting 
information, even if unfavourable to British troops, but 49% favoured publishing it after the war, and only 
26% during the war.  Carruthers Op cit p. 154.  A similar finding emerged after the Gulf War  - Carruthers 
Op cit p. 155 
127 The newspaper is a useful reference point as its geographical coverage area includes both the University 
with influential academia, but also the homes of several MPs and industrialists, who form part of the elite 
level in this debate. 
128 Not a typical local paper, but covering a substantial proportion of the population based in the capital. 
129 Oxford Mail 5 May 1982 p. 6 
130 Yorkshire Post 5 April 1982 p. 8 
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demonstrating that the impact of the Suez campaign was still a powerful influence on the 
public perception twenty-six years later.  Letters on the war only started to be published 
from 8 April, and were initially balanced – one for military action and one against.131  
Only on two further dates (10th and 23rd) in April were four letters published on the war, 
the remaining days having none or one letter.  Most of the early letters deplored the lack 
of foresight that led to the conflict; later letters were less critical.  The editorials revealed 
interesting perceptions: on 10th April, the editorial132 said that ‘Labour must stop playing 
party politics with the lives of our servicemen and the Falklanders’ – a theme also 
apparent in the Bristol press.  On 12th April, the editorial133 said that  
 
The latest opinion polls notwithstanding, the impression we get [unclear on what 
basis they made this judgment] is that the people of this country are not nearly as 
hardline as Parliament is over this affair…they are certainly backing the Armed 
Forces…but they will react very strongly if there is a real or apparent failure.   
 
Although there was no evidence produced to support this assertion, it did reflect the 
theme expressed elsewhere in this thesis that the public will generally support their 
Armed Forces, if not the political leadership.  And it reinforced the point made by 
Johnson and others in Vietnam that what matters to the public is success134.  Finally, the 
Yorkshire Post coverage reduced markedly from 15 April135 (only 13 days after the 
Argentine invasion).  Previous full front page coverage reduced to 1/3 or even ¼ on 22 
                                                 
131 Yorkshire Post 8 April 1982 p. 12 
132 Yorkshire Post 10 April 1982 p. 8 
133 Yorkshire Post 12 April 1982 p. 8 
134 Although it is worth noting that Knightley quotes an unreferenced Gallup poll of 1967 which he asserts 
said that half the American population at that time had no idea what the war in Vietnam was about.  See 
Knightley P, The First Casualty  (London: John Hopkins University Press 2002 (original edn 1975) p. 441 
135 Yorkshire Post 15 April 1982  
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April136, and the internal coverage was demoted from pages 6 and 7 in the first half of the 
month to ½ page 9 on 18th137, and small sections on pages 19 and 21 by 30 April138.  With 
few letters published, this seemed to show a reducing local interest in the campaign. 
 
The Bristol Evening Post is a useful measure of interest, not least because one of the local 
MPs (Bristol SE) was Tony Benn, one of the most dominant opponents of the war.  The 
paper’s coverage of the conflict was much less than the Yorkshire Post, with generally 
just front page coverage and little inside.  Only on two days (3 April139 and 20 April140) 
was the war given 4 or 5 columns on the front page – more usually it received 2 ½ 
columns.  The reduction in coverage after 8 April141 is striking, with local issues 
predominating.  Interestingly, on 6 April142, the coverage on the front page was given 
equal billing with an article on soldiers being quizzed over a murder of an 83 year-old 
lady in Bulford – suggesting that the paper was not swayed by any patriotic fervour that 
might have put the ladies’ murder on the inside pages.  The editorials reveal a degree of 
naivety and a lack of interest in the conflict.  On 5 April143, the editorial drew parallels 
with the Channel Islands occupation in the Second World War.  Following the recapture 
of South Georgia, the editorial on 26 April144 said that ‘Britain walks tall in the world 
today’ and that it was ‘like 1944 D-Day’ – surely a rather odd misuse of history.  Ahead 
                                                 
136 Yorkshire Post 22 April 1982 p. 1 
137 Yorkshire Post 18 April 1982 p. 9 
138 Yorkshire Post 30 April 1982 p. 19 and 21 
139 Bristol Evening Post 3 April 1982 p. 1 
140 Bristol Evening Post 20 April 1982 p. 1 
141 Bristol Evening Post 8 April 1982 p. 1 
142 Bristol Evening Post 6 April 1982 p. 1 
143 Bristol Evening Post 5 April 1982 p. 8 
144 Bristol Evening Post 26 April 1982 p. 4 
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of the main assault on the Falklands, the paper145 hoped: ‘May it be done quickly and 
cleanly, with no loss of British lives’ - perhaps hoping that Admiral Woodward’s initial 
assessment of a ‘walkover’ would be right.  When it became clear this would not be the 
case, the paper talked on 29 April146 of withdrawal of forces and joint administration.   
 
The letters pages were more active than any of the other regional press looked at.  The 7 
April edition147 had a special page of Falklands-related letters, ranging from the need for 
resolute action from Michael Colvin MP (a veteran of Suez), the Labour candidate for 
Westbury called for a negotiated settlement, fears over Gibraltar being next for invasion, 
disappointment at the US’ lack of support, disgust at the television coverage of the 
Argentine motorcycle Grand Prix, and a parallel with the 1914 Falklands battle.  More 
local comment came from a sailor’s mother on 8 April148, being against Mrs Thatcher, 
but the recurring themes over subsequent days revolved around an anti-nuclear weapon 
debate149 (failure of deterrence and the need for more conventional forces) and an anti-
Labour (and particularly anti-Benn150) thread for their lack of support for the Government 
and the Armed Forces.  But after 13 April, there were never more than two letters per day 
on the Falklands, and sometimes none.  Taken together with the reduction in coverage, 
this suggests that the public and press interest at local level was short-lived. 
 
                                                 
145 Bristol Evening Post 27 April 1982 p. 4 
146 Bristol Evening Post 29 April 1982 p. 8 
147 Bristol Evening Post 7 April 1982 p. 3 
148 Bristol Evening Post 8 April 1982 p. 32 
149 See particularly Bristol Evening Post 8 April 1982 p. 32, 15 April 1982 p. 30, and 21 April 1982 p. 30 
150 See particularly Bristol Evening Post 13 April 1982 p. 20, 23 April 1982 p. 32 and 26 April 1982 p. 20.  
Also 30 April 1982 p. 32 attacking Michael Foot. 
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Aside from opinion poll evidence and letters, another piece of evidence of public support 
for the military came from the donations for the South Atlantic Fund, set up to provide 
support for the families of those lost in the conflict.  The Guardian reported ‘sackfuls of 
mail arrived [at the Ministry of Defence] containing cash, cheques and postal orders from 
the public, businessmen and industrialist151.’  The fund received donations from such 
events as a friendly between Plymouth Argyle (reflecting the importance of the Plymouth 
naval base to the local community) and Everton football teams on 13 August 1982152.  By 
November 1982, the fund had disbursed £1.9m to families of the bereaved as interim 
payments, and £400 000 through Service and specialist charities such as St Dunstan’s for 
those seriously injured153.  The Fund was to go on to assist those suffering from 
psychiatric illnesses as a result of the war (twelve cases by July 1984), but this caused 
some debate in the Royal British Legion as to whether help was going as fast as 
required154. 
 
Despite the overarching trend to support for the war, there was evidence of tangible 
opposition.  The Daily Mail recorded that:  
 
More than half Britain’s million students would refuse to fight if they were called 
up because of the Falklands crisis, according to a poll of 363 students in London, 
Manchester and Belfast155.   
                                                 
151 Guardian 28 May 1982 p. 2 
152 Football programme dated 13 August 1982 from the match played in aid of the South Atlantic 
Dependants Fund.   
153 HC Deb 30 November 1982 vol 33 c111W Response by the Prime Minister to a question from Mr 
Churchill MP. 
154 HL Deb 19 July 1984 vol 454 cc1627-8 Question from Lord Molloy, President of the Royal British 
Legion, to Lord Trefgarne, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. 
155 Daily Mail 13 May 1982 p. 2.  A similar fear of conscription being reintroduced in the Gulf War 
amongst students and parents is mentioned in The students companion to sociology by Ballard, C; Gubbay, 
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There is no evidence from the newspapers of any serious proposal for conscription; 
indeed, the Daily Mail reported that the Royal Navy and Royal Marines received 
hundreds of volunteers at recruiting offices, some 59 at their Liverpool office in one day, 
the equivalent for a normal month156.  Even the Daily Express, which might have been 
expected to have favoured conscription, used its leader on 2 April 1982 to say that 
conscription was a good thing for community care, conservation and domestic peace, but 
not for military purposes157.  In a London Peace Rally organized by the Ad Hoc 
Committee for Peace in the Falklands, some 2000 people (according to The Times) to 
2500 people (according to a later version of the paper) marched and delivered a wreath to 
the offices of the Sun because its’ coverage was ‘a disgrace to peace hopes’158.  In truth, 
this was nothing like the scale of marches against the Poll Tax or later the march to 
oppose the second Gulf War.  Similarly, Arthur Scargill’s resolution at the Barnsley 
Labour Party (supported by the National Union of Mineworkers) calling for withdrawal 
of the task force received scant coverage, and was more noted for the opposition to it by 
the local Labour MP than anything else. 
 
The only explicit reference to consideration of Just War theory (as discussed in Chapter 
3) was on 30 April 1982 in Cardinal Hume’s comments on the war:  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
J; and Middleton, C (Wiley-Blackwell 1997) p. 34 though there is no evidence or footnote to explain this 
fear, which probably stemmed from parental experience of National Service. 
156 Daily Mail 29 April 1982 p2 
157 Daily Express 2 April 1982 p2 
158 The Times 17 May 1982 p4 
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Britain is morally justified in using an appropriate degree of force in reasserting 
its right over the Falkland Islands “as a last resort” Cardinal Hume said.’, which 
goes on to say he ‘reiterates the traditional Christian principles of the “Just 
War”159.  
 
One of the continuing themes in the broadsheets was the internal debate within the 
Church.  Archbishop Runcie and Cardinal Hume were criticized for their lack of clear 
direction.  In one such letter, Bishop Paul Burrough160 looked at Christians and War, 
arguing that the statements from previous Lambeth conferences still stood such that war 
was incompatible with the teachings of Christ161 (which Dr Mike Snape, Birmingham 
University, felt was representative of the wider views of the Church at that time162).  In 
another, the vicar of Emsworth stated that he did not wish to comply with the directive 
from the Archbishop of Canterbury who commended all to pray for the task force163.  Ted 
Harrison164, from the BBC’s Religious Unit, in The Times of 4 May, said that the BBC 
went ‘to great lengths’ to question the Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal Hume, but 
both refused.  Archbishop Runcie issued a statement to say that the ‘use of armed force 
can be justified’ but Harrison said that the ‘Church is undoubtedly divided on this issue’.  
Bishop John Robinson165 said that the battle with Argentina was not a Just War, but the 
Archbishops of Canterbury and Westminster said it was.  The Bishop of London, 
preaching at the RAF’s church, St Clement Danes, said that ‘British forces were now 
                                                 
159 The Times 30 April 1982 p1 
160 Rt Rev Paul Burrough from Empingham, Oakham, Leicestershire worked in Korea during the war there, 
and had a diocese in the then Rhodesia.  He was a member of the Lambeth Conferences of 1968 and 1978. 
161 The Times 27 April 1982 p. 13  
162 Email Lamonte/Snape 13 May 2009 
163 The Guardian 6 May 1982 p. 12 
164 Journalist BBC Radio News religious programme, Sunday 
165 Bishop Robinson, who died of cancer in 1983, was a liberal theologian, noted for his book Honest to 
God in 1963 which caused a considerable stir for a redefinition of God as Love, rather than a being ‘out 
there’ as a ‘cosmic supremo’.  His life and works were reviewed in books by Eric James (A life of Bishop 
John A.T. Robinson: Scholar, pastor, prophet) and Alastair Kee (The Roots of Christian Freedom: The 
Theology of John A.T. Robinson). 
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involved in a just cause’.  Harrison complained of the silence of the Church leadership166.  
Later, on 7 May, John Reardon of the United Reformed Church in a letter to the 
Guardian, suggested that the media have simply not been reporting the Church’s views, 
despite being told167.  Church opposition continued, contrary to the evidence of public 
support, as an article from Dr Kenneth G Greer, Moderator of the Free Church Federal 
Council entitled “Church leaders and the Falklands’ showed:  
 
On Easter Day, just after the Falklands crisis broke and the task force was being 
sent on its long and perilous journey, I was invited to comment on the BBC’s 
Sunday Programme.  I said that the use of military force to settle the Falklands 
issue would be an anachronistic folly.  Nothing that has happened since has 
caused me to alter that view168.  
 
Another small example was that of the Rev Merfyn Temple, Methodist minister from 
Abingdon, who set off from the UK to Chile just eating his own yoghurt and honey, 
aiming to reach the Falklands to publicise the need for rich nations to stop selling arms to 
Third World nations – but significantly he said it was the ‘apathy of the people of 
Abingdon’169 that angered him into starting his fast, suggesting he lacked even the 
support of his parishioners.  Even the post-war Service at St Paul’s caused controversy by 
church opposition to a nationalistic service of celebration170, against political pressure. 
 
Belgrano 
 
                                                 
166 The Times 4 May 1982 p. 8 
167 Guardian 7 May 1982 p. 14 
168 The Times 22 May 1982 p. 11 
169 Guardian 26 May 1982 p. 2 
170 Davie Op cit p. 87 
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There were noticeable cross-cutting changes at moments of great drama.  The sinking of 
the Belgrano and the closely following loss of HMS Sheffield had a profound effect at all 
levels.  The Times of 5 May recorded the Parliamentary reaction to the sinking of the 
Belgrano, where Mrs Thatcher said the ‘first duty was to protect and minimize danger to 
the task force171.’   
 
She was challenged by Michael Foot, Labour Party leader, Tam Dalyell and Jo Grimond 
on the grounds of whether this was use of minimum force, why couldn’t the ship be 
crippled rather than sunk, and was the force still under political control.  In the House of 
Lords, the Daily Telegraph recorded that Lord Jenkins of Putney accused the 
Government of ‘committing mass murder on the high seas172’ by sinking the Belgrano – 
but this was a lone protest.  After Mrs Thatcher, John Nott was challenged further by 
Dennis Healey, John Gilbert and David Steel on the precise position of the Belgrano but 
refused to give its position.  There was no evidence in the newspaper editorials of great 
concern over the sinking of the Belgrano, which caused the first significant casualties of 
the war, and certainly nothing in the polls or from letters to show great public concern at 
any level at the time.  Mrs Diana Gould, a geography teacher from Cirencester, achieved 
brief fame when she was given the chance to ask a question on Nationwide in 1983, and 
chose to ask it on the sinking of the Belgrano173.  The normally-poised Prime Minister 
Mrs Thatcher was evidently ruffled by the strong questioning.  Only later polls by Gallup 
                                                 
171 The Times 5 May 1982 p. 4 
172 Daily Telegraph 5 May 1982 p. 6 – Lord Jenkins of Putney was a former MP, Aldermaston marcher 
Chairman of CND, Chairman of Victory for Socialism and Trades Unionist – see obituary in the Observer 
28 January 2004. 
173 Text of questions to Mrs Thatcher on Nationwide in May 1983 taken from 
http://www.peacenews.info/issues/2486/2486082.html .  Sequence is also at  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3Ia3k3RqJc accessed 20 May 2009.  See Appendix 1. 
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from September 1984 demonstrate that 91% of those polled had read about the sinking of 
the Belgrano (showing a high degree of public awareness), but only 49% felt the 
Government had been right to order its sinking174.  What did cause great concern was the 
news of the loss of HMS Sheffield, perhaps best summarized in the editorial of The Times 
of 5 May: the ‘loss of HMS Sheffield is a sombre reminder of the price the nation may be 
expected to pay175.’   
 
The subsequent day, The Times’ editorial said: 
 
The flag-waving and the fanfare are no longer part of the fun… This shock came 
upon the House of Commons yesterday and the night before as the details of 
British casualties were announced.  It will percolate more widely to the public, 
though whether the same sense of shock is reflected in voting patterns at today’s 
local elections will only be evident when the results are declared176.’   
 
Interestingly, the editorial then went on to question the public’s preparedness for such 
news, based on their lack of awareness of defence issues: 
 
There is a sense in which the age of deterrence and the abolition of conscription 
have deprived the British people of the means to understand the facts of their own 
security177. 
 
If that were true then, then it would be so much truer by the end of the period.   
 
                                                 
174 King A ed, British Political Opinion 1937-2000 The Gallup Polls (London: Politico’s Publishing, 2001) 
p. 336 
175 The Times 5 May 1982 p. 11 
176 The Times 6 May 1982 p. 13 
177 Ibid 
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At the political level, concerns were expressed about how the ship could be lost, the 
apparent price of previous naval cuts, the use of aluminium in ships and a sense of shock 
at the losses.  At the elite level, most of the concerns seem to have been reflected in the 
first major British losses and the naval cuts – a theme continuing throughout the conflict. 
Interestingly, when interviewed later, Field Marshal Lord Bramall said that: ‘We 
estimated, and not over-estimated, we estimated the number of ships we would lose pretty 
accurately178.’   
 
Of the letters to The Times, though, only one related to the loss of shipping, in which 
Professor Bernard Crick179 from Birkbeck College suggested that the loss of the Belgrano 
and the Sheffield suggested that the conflict had now lost all proportionality180. The 
tabloids over successive days picked on individual servicemen lost from the ship and 
their families, whilst the polls show the only dip of the campaign in support for the 
Conservatives, and Government handling of the campaign, with an increased sense that 
the Government was too willing to send the task force.  The Daily Mail took reaction 
from a North London street market in an article by John Edwards181, where Lorraine 
Cooksley, a 20 year-old costumier was quoted as saying ‘It’s terrible.  I don’t know what 
to think.  I just didn’t think it would come to this.  I just wish it would all stop’ and 
stallholder Mrs Lilian Mears said ‘like everyone else I feel stunned…We fought for 
freedom in the past and we should go on fighting now.’   
                                                 
178 Interview Lord Bramall 24 July 2007 
179 Professor (later Sir) Bernard Crick, Department of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College, London 
was a well-known left wing academic and self-proclaimed polemicist.  He was the author of American 
Science of Politics (1958), Defence of Politics (1962), Reform of Parliament (1964) and George Orwell: A 
Life (1980).  David Blunkett was one of his students, and later to employ him on a number of reviews. 
180 Ibid 
181 Daily Mail 6 May 1982 
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Edwards toured the market to gauge reactions which ranged from ‘Bomb Buenos Aires’, 
‘Kill the bastards’ and ‘It’s dog eat dog now’ to ‘It’s disgusting, why has Britain 
suddenly decided that these tiny islands are so important that people have got to die for 
them?’.  There is no reason to suggest that these feelings represented more than a tiny 
sample, but they seem to fit proportionately to the opinion poll data of the day.  Linda 
Lee Potter (a right-wing journalist) similarly went out to gauge opinion and wrote  
 
The talk everywhere was of war.  And if the country people, railways porters, taxi 
drivers, teachers, lorry drivers and students are a reliable sample of the rest of 
Britain then the talk is of the will and the need to fight. 
 
That said, the proportion182 of people willing to support sinking Argentinean shipping 
prior to that point had been 58% at maximum; after the loss of British ships, by 25 May 
that support had increased to 79%. 
 
After the conflict, the comments of the editorials showed the definite respect for the 
military, but perhaps with some recognition of the close-run thing183 the operation had 
been:  
 
The Falklands victory is a great relief… The professional and human qualities 
displayed by the British armed forces are beyond praise and probably without 
equal184.’  
 
                                                 
182 Gallup polls Op cit 
183 Lord Bramall said ‘I always thought we would get away with it provided the carrier wasn’t hit’ and 
agreed that it was ‘a close run thing’.  Bramall interview Op cit. 
184 The Sunday Times 20 June 1982 p. 16 
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The Times reflected the outcome of the poll undertaken for the previous day’s Sunday 
paper:  
 
Other findings of the MORI poll, carried out for The Sunday Times, illustrate the 
national mood of both satisfaction and realism in the aftermath of victory185. 
 
What the Falklands campaign shows is that a place, largely unknown to the general 
public, can sometimes dominate the public consciousness.  Quite against the rational 
arguments of many at the elite level, the public backed the military effort to retake the 
Falklands in a very emotional response.  For the largely unpopular Government of the 
day, this success bred great popularity, and made the position of the Labour Party 
difficult, in balancing anti-war concepts with being in step with the popular mood to free 
the islands.  For the press, the campaign showed a split between the national press and the 
regionals; the latter losing some interest over the days of the campaign.  For the 
Guardian, the problem was balancing its anti-war stance with the desire not to lose 
readership by not supporting British troops.  This fine line could be overstepped, as the 
Sun found when its jingoism was perceived to be excessive for public tastes.  Similar 
problems faced the television broadcasters, when BBC1 was harangued for its Panorama 
programme, in an argument over its independence to portray the news against its Charter 
responsibility to the State.  But despite the parliamentary debate over the programme, poll 
evidence shows that the public still thought the BBC to be fair and impartial.  The 
campaign also brought to light the divisions and confusion in the Church – finding the 
right moment to provide moral guidance and leadership and trying to balance strong 
                                                 
185 The Times 21 June 1982 p. 4 
201  
views that Christianity is about peace not war, with using Just War theory to try and 
explain the circumstances under which force could be legitimized. 
 
Case Study 3.  The Gulf War – Operation GRANBY 
 
The Gulf War had a gradual build-up from the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 
1990 as US and coalition forces deployed initially to protect Saudi Arabia from invasion 
and subsequently built up for the relatively short conflict to retake Kuwait.  After the UN 
trade embargo against Iraq was imposed on 6 August 1990, Saudi Arabia requested US 
troops to prevent any possible invasion by Iraqi forces (Operation DESERT SHIELD).  A 
naval blockade of Iraq was put in place on 12 August.  The UN Security Council 
approved the use of force to make the trade sanctions work on 25 August 1990.  The UK 
announced its first phase of ground force deployment on 14 September 1990.  By 17 
October, the UK had 15 000 troops in the region186. The UN set the deadline for the 
withdrawal of Iraqi troops by 15 January 1991 on 29 November1990.  In the absence of 
such a withdrawal, Operation DESERT STORM (US)/GRANBY (UK) commenced on 
17 January 1991, at which point Allied forces had grown to 580 000, of which the UK 
contribution was some 43 000187. The operation was completed on 28 February 1991.  
Opinion polls were taken through the period and the most consistent picture is given by 
Gallup in their polls188. 
 
                                                 
186 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/861164.stm accessed 1 June 2009. 
187 Crocker III, H. W. Don't Tread on Me. (New York: Crown Forum 2006) pp. 386. 
188 King A ed, British Political Opinion 1937-2000 The Gallup Polls (London: Politico’s Publishing, 2001 
p. 345.  The opinion poll data is not broken down by class or age groups, which would have allowed further 
analysis. 
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The initial deployment of forces to protect Saudi Arabia was supported by 88% of those 
polled in August 1990189, with only 9% disapproving.  Between 29 August 1990 and 11 
December 1990 no less than fourteen polls were conducted, and so a good picture of 
changing views can be established.  When asked whether they preferred the military 
assault option or a continued blockade, most people surveyed favoured a blockade, but 
this reduced steadily from 67% at the beginning of August (i.e. just after the invasion of 
Kuwait) to 55% by mid-December (once the UN had made the ultimatum for withdrawal 
of Iraqi forces).  The reductions in those favouring a blockade did not automatically 
imply they favoured an assault instead; that option only received 25% to start with, 
increasing to 31%, but the number of don’t knows nearly doubled. But when asked if they 
were in favour of military action if the blockade failed, two-thirds were in favour 
initially, but gradually this reduced to 61%.  Thus it seems that the population was, by 
and large, in favour of blockade for as long as possible, but prepared to use force – but 
not by a great margin190. 
 
When people were asked what purposes those forces might be used for, roughly 
equivalent numbers advocated the defence of Saudi Arabia as returning independence to 
Kuwait.  Rather fewer (by 5-7%) were in favour of toppling Saddam’s regime and fewer 
still to protecting Israel.  But the highest percentage (69-87%), by consistently one or two 
percent over other alternatives, was in favour of defending the West’s oil supplies, which 
suggests that, despite political rhetoric, the public had a clear idea of what the forces 
                                                 
189 All figures here from Gallup polls Op cit 
190 Knightley highlights a poll quoted by the Daily Mirror (owned by the pro-Israel Robert Maxwell) on 22 
October which said that 86% of British people were in favour of a military attack – but no such poll seems 
to have been conducted.  Knightley Op cit pp. 489-90 
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should be doing.  When the pollsters went on to ask whether people would be in favour of 
using force against ships breaking the blockade, bombing military targets, bombing 
civilian targets, invading Kuwait, using chemical weapons or nuclear weapons the results 
were quite clear.  Up to the December poll, the highest percentage in favour of use of 
nuclear weapons if Iraq used them first was 26%.  In the first week of January (with the 
UN ultimatum close to expiry) this rose to 36%.  With a similar picture for chemical 
weapons in response to first use, other than for late August at 32% the figure again 
increased in January (ahead of the start of offensive operations).  Use of ground troops 
was never supported by less than 63%, and never opposed by more than 27%.  By 
January (just ahead of the start of the air war), those in favour had reached 74%, and 
those against 20%.  Bombing of military targets varied from 62% to 76% in favour, 
whilst bombing of civilian targets only ever reached 11% in favour.  The figure for those 
in favour of military action, even if it involved putting hostages at risk, started at 63%, 
but steadily reduced to 50% by January.  This demonstrates that people were broadly 
aware of the strategic issues, and placed greater weight on oil than the politicians, who 
were resolute that this was about the relief of Kuwait, were saying.  Military action was 
accepted, short of chemical or nuclear warfare, even if used by the other side first.  But 
the protection of civilians, as a moral issue, was still important191. 
 
Even in December 1990, with the UN deadline still a month away and forces patrolling 
heavily, 22% of people still thought a major shooting war in the Middle East unlikely, 
and only 25% thought it very likely – a major reduction from 39% in August.  This 
suggests that people still had faith in the UN process and Iraq’s willingness to accede.  
                                                 
191 Gallup polls Op cit 
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Indeed, even from August, people were expecting a long conflict – 72% expected it to go 
on for some time, compared with 65% by mid-December.  When asked in January if 
people expected a war to last a few months, 32% agreed, and 30% expected it to last 
longer than that.  Some 65% of people at that moment also said that the war aims should 
extend to toppling Saddam, as opposed to 26% who just wanted to free Kuwait.  All this 
suggests that people were prepared for a long campaign, and wanted to see Saddam 
replaced.  When asked in January whether they thought this conflict more important than 
the Falklands, 54% said yes, and 30% said about the same. 
 
Over the period from January to March when the war ended, popular support for the 
Government’s handling increased from 79% being somewhat or very satisfied to 80%, 
and rarely dipped much below.  But the level of those very satisfied was striking, rising 
from 47 to 55% and probably thus set the way for the Conservatives win at the next 
election.  Between 76-82% felt that the coalition were right to launch an assault on Iraq 
after the deadline for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces had ended, and never less than 78% 
were in favour of a ground assault if the air campaign did not achieve the aim by itself.  
All these indicators show strong support for military action once diplomatic efforts failed.  
Perhaps the short duration of the ground campaign prevented real analysis of views over 
that period, but the picture of general support is clear. 
 
Press coverage from soon after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on 2 August 1990 
shows a change in thinking from the Falklands War.  Professor Michael Howard192 was 
                                                 
192 Sir Michael Howard was Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regius Professor of Modern 
History at Oxford.  He served with the Coldstream Guards in the Second World War, awarded a Military 
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amongst a number in the ‘elite’ to advocate maintaining an effective blockade to either 
force Iraq out of Kuwait, or to allow elements within the Iraqi Government to topple 
Saddam193.  The Daily Telegraph was equally explicit  
 
It is important for the Government to emphasise that this crisis is no rerun of the 
Falklands Conflict.  It is a global issue, in which Britain’s role must be minor; 
whatever the outcome, that of the United States will be predominant194. 
 
Politically, there were both shadows of the Falklands, yet differences too.  In the Gulf 
debate in Parliament of 7 September 1990, Mrs Thatcher declined to rule out the use of 
force, and Mr Kinnock and Mr Heath reinforced the need to act under UN authority195.  
The Conservatives broadly supported the need for military options, and to follow the lead 
of the US.  The Labour Party, under Neil Kinnock, faced a number of challenges.  Mr 
Kinnock was known as a strong left-winger as a junior MP, an advocate of unilateral 
disarmament and a critic of Mrs Thatcher’s handling of the Falklands War, and many 
members of his party were strongly anti-war (and members of CND).  But the Labour 
Party had to be sensitive to public opinion and could ill-afford to criticise the Armed 
Forces.  The Prime Minister was pressed by the same people as nine years earlier: Tam 
Dalyell and Tony Benn.  Benn said  
 
I will use plain language: I fear that the United States has already decided that 
when it is ready it will create a pretext for war against Iraq… Britain is a minor 
player in this game: we have had a debate today as if everything hinged on 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cross during the battle of Salerno.  He is credited with the creation of the War Studies Department at 
Kings’ College London and wrote extensively on Clausewitz, the Franco-Prussian War and intelligence.  
See his memoirs Captain Professor Op cit. 
193 The Times 6 September 1990, p. 10 
194 Daily Telegraph 6 September 1990, p. 18 
195 Independent 7 September 1990, p. 4 
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whether the Prime Minister decided to go to war.  The Prime Minister is a minor 
player in this unfolding tragedy196. 
 
  Despite the differing views of a few senior parliamentarians, the paper described the 
outcome as more unified in its headline‘Commons puts the country before party197.’   
 
The significant difference between this emergency session and the previous one, for the 
Falklands conflict, was that the latter was held within twenty-four hours of the invasion, 
whereas this took some five weeks to be held, reflecting perhaps the difference between a 
war of perceived national sovereignty (Ceadal’s defencist war) and one of strategic 
interest, but not vital national interest (arguably more in the style of Ceadal’s crusading).  
This had been an issue for a number of MPs who had expressed a desire for a 
Parliamentary debate as far back as 13 August198.  On the following day, Tom King, 
Secretary of State for Defence, thanked the other parties for their support for Britain’s 
actions (in sending forces to defend Saudi Arabia), but the subsequent vote showed less 
unanimity: thirty-four Labour MPs and one independent voted against the Government 
because, as Tony Benn put it, Douglas Hurd (Foreign Secretary) had ‘made it plain that 
the outcome would be interpreted as a “licence for war”199.’   
 
Even by 10 January 1991, five days before the end of the UN deadline for withdrawal of 
Iraqi forces, Shadow Foreign Secretary Gerald Kaufman was still advocating delay:  
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We must not resign ourselves to war, but must work harder than ever for peace on 
the firm basis of the United Nations resolutions200.   
 
He said that he had previously raised fears that the all-party consensus was under threat, 
and that the five months and thirteen days since the trade embargo was applied was not 
long enough.  Mr Heath was equally strong, saying ‘We have got to be prepared, in order 
not to have this ghastly war, to let this man save face201.’   
 
The record rebellion of 55 Labour MPs on the Gulf debate as recorded on 17 January, 
with one third of the Labour Party rebelling or abstaining, highlighted the difficulty 
Labour faced: to both pay heed to local activists whilst reflecting that the electorate in 
general did not share the pacifist tendencies of many in the Party.  Mr Benn’s comment in 
the Gulf debate of 21 January 1991 that ‘A substantial minority do not support military 
action in the Gulf’ reflected a poll in The Sunday Times which had said that 20% of 
people opposed the war202.  His comments were echoed by John McAllion (Labour MP 
for Dundee East) who had serious doubts about the legitimacy of military action, whilst 
accepting that this was a minority view in the House of Commons, but thought this was 
the majority view in Scotland.  Marion Fyfe (Labour MP for Glasgow Maryhill) was 
equally angry, saying that she’d received one hundred letters, all but two supporting her 
anti-war stance.  Indeed, the Scottish MPs formed a group: Scottish Labour against War 
in the Gulf, but here, as in Lambeth, where the local Labour authority was rebuked by the 
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national Party for passing an anti-Gulf War motion which said that ‘patriotic and pro-war 
hysteria’ in Britain amounted to racism203, opposition seemed to be small and muted. 
 
Much as the Falklands War had proved a political and electoral success for the 
Conservatives, there were some commentators suspicious that this might be a motivating 
factor for the Conservatives in this campaign:  
 
I am not sure how the Conservatives would fare if the war went badly wrong, but 
it seems pretty clear that if it is fought to a successful conclusion without heavy 
losses the Government would reap such political benefit as there is204. 
 
One big difference was the personality of the new Prime Minister John Major.  Gordon 
Greig, Political Editor of the Daily Mail, joined the Prime Minister on his tour of the 
troops in the Gulf and assessed him thus:  
 
Mr Major is no orator.  He is not particularly inspiring.  In any case Maggie was 
an impossible act to follow.  But quietly and fluently, under a relentless Saudi sun, 
Britain’s new Prime Minister explained why they might have to fight, and die, in 
a desert war.  And, as he would insist, he did it his own way205. 
 
Much thought had been given to his image for the visit, discarding the grey suit for an 
open-necked tan shirt, and darker tan trousers.  Did it work?  Two soldiers were 
interviewed by the Daily Mail and said ‘He was alright, but we’d rather have Maggie.  I 
mean, she was a bit of magic.  This situation was made for her206.’   
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That said, the image presented to the public was avowedly not Mrs Thatcher, and a much 
calmer more reflective style that led the Daily Express to talk of ‘Tough-talker Major in 
war alert207’ – describing his trip to the troops. 
 
One article208 noted the differing experience of the War Cabinets of the Falklands209 and 
the Gulf: in the Falklands War, Whitelaw and Pym had both won Military Crosses in the 
Second World War, whilst Nott had also served in the Gurkhas210.  In the Gulf War, 
Prime Minister John Major had been too young for National Service, whereas Hurd, 
Wakeham and King had all been National Servicemen, the latter having served in Kenya 
against the Mau Mau.  In later conflicts, virtually none of the Cabinet had had military 
service, demonstrating the generational shift in experience and therefore in perceptions of 
the Armed Forces. 
 
The general tenor of the broadsheets thereafter was of a need for something to be done, 
and that this would imply the threat of, or actual use, of force.   
 
Assuming that a counter-attack on the Iraqi forces that invaded Kuwait is in 
prospect, sending extra tanks may well be the most valuable contribution we can 
make…Mention of tanks should remind everyone what a serious business this is.  
Getting rid of the invaders could prove a bloody business.  There is, however, 
little value in preaching against President Saddam, if we are not also prepared to 
act211.   
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The debate then started on what the war aims should be: whether to limit them to removal 
of forces from Kuwait, or to broaden them to attacking Iraq itself.  Efraim Karsh, of 
King’s College London, was amongst those advocating strikes against strategic Iraqi 
targets.212  The Daily Telegraph summed up the more resigned but forceful line of many:  
 
Between now and next Tuesday [deadline for Iraq to withdraw], the world will 
continue to cherish a slender hope that Saddam will act, even at the eleventh hour, 
to save his own people from the catastrophe that otherwise threatens them.  
However, the probability is that it will be necessary for the Americans and allied 
forces to attack Iraq as soon as proves militarily convenient after the deadline has 
passed213. 
 
A Sunday Times round-up of the newspapers on 13 January 1991, two days ahead of the 
UN deadline, gives a very consistent view of the press opinion214:  
 
The terrible consequences of not going to war now are the strongest reasons for 
taking up arms after the expiry of the UN deadline on Tuesday.  If Saddam is not 
stopped now, he will have to be stopped in the future and at much greater cost.215 
 
 The Observer shared this view:  
 
‘unless Hussein withdraws from Kuwait the allies have no choice, but to drive 
him out.  This century has already shown that there are times when right demands 
might, and this is one of them.   
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Only the Sunday Mirror was opposed to the war, much as it was in the Falklands, though 
the Mail on Sunday did say that war would be a ‘catastrophe for the world community’ 
but that did not mean we should ‘appease our way out of a war’.  Of all the broadsheets, 
the Guardian was the most outspoken in challenging the war and seeking time for 
sanctions to work.  One article by John Pilger216 in the Guardian accused the British 
press of a patriotic silence that would prevent the public from knowing why they had 
gone to war.  The Daily Mirror was more obsessed with internal power struggles with 
Robert Maxwell wishing to dismiss reporter John Diamond; to beat Rupert Murdoch’s 
Sun (which in part they did through Field Marshal Lord Bramall’s column); and, on the 
eve of the ground assault, a remarkable attempt by Maxwell to force the editor to promote 
vitamin pills for children, designed to improve IQ217.  For those (such as Chomsky) keen 
to advocate a kind of combined media effect in support of political/establishment 
objectives, this type of confused reality in at least one newspaper tends to suggest 
otherwise.  
 
An article by Sebastian Faulks218 in the Independent highlighted the lack of public 
debate:   
 
Almost everyone I meet these days says “I don’t think anyone understands how 
serious this war is going to be”.  I deduce from this that in fact pretty well 
everyone does understand; that we are all aware of the problems of blazing 
oilfields and of chemical warfare, of the family grief caused by thousands of 
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dead...And if we are all truly aware of these things, then why do we seem to have 
slipped into this dreadful situation without really having debated it?  The mood of 
the country seems to me very odd, in that there is no profound rational argument 
against war, only a sort of resignation that it is inevitable.  This shoulder 
shrugging is now - late in the day – being accompanied by some easy noises from 
Gerald Kaufman and Neil Kinnock219.  
 
Perhaps the answer to the former question lies in Phillip Knightley’s assertion that ‘We 
are a warrior race.  Waging war is as British as roast beef220.’   
 
A likely explanation for the lack of opposition is that, despite many personal reservations, 
politicians are reluctant to be seen not to support troops once deployed on operations, 
maintaining the Clausewitzian paradoxical trinity of nation, army and government221. 
 
In contrast, Peter Jenkins set out the opposing view in his article entitled ‘The case for 
going the “extra mile for peace”222’, writing that  
War in any circumstances has to be a moral question.  Down the ages it has 
centred mostly on degree or in the theological language of the Just War 
“proportionality”.  It is a subtle calculus which involves weighing not only good 
against evil, but one evil against another.’ 
 
This is typical of the more reflective style of journalism in the Independent, which 
appeals to the more ‘liberal’ audience.  He raised the question of a parallel with Munich 
appeasement, but said that could only be a valid comparison if Saddam ended up 
conquering the whole region. ‘The British, tutored by Margaret Thatcher, the mythology 
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of the Falklands War and the folk memories of Munich, have settled in their minds for 
war as the necessary response to territorial aggression223.’     
 
Actually, there is little evidence that anyone was concerned with the lessons of 1938; one 
might have expected to see reference to appeasement in other countries but this does not 
exist either.  However, it would appear that any post-Suez nervousness went after the 
experience of the Falklands to give a greater confidence in a military expedition.  John 
Keegan224, Defence Editor of the Daily Telegraph, also alluded to the opposition view, 
saying that the ‘voice of anti-war party gains strength’, referring to Mr Heath ‘who 
demanded that the Gulf crisis be settled by negotiation’, and to ‘The Arabists [who] find 
a wider measure of support among those who fear for the future of Christendom’s 
relations with Islam.’  He went on to say that ‘All these voices are entitled to be heard.  
That does not mean they have to be heeded225.’ 
 
As with the Falklands, the Church had all shades of opinions and was clearly 
uncomfortable with the idea of going to war.  Initially, little was forthcoming from the 
Church, prompting the Secretary-General of the General Synod of the CofE, Philip 
Mawer to write that the  
 
House of Bishops felt that no statement was desirable [but that] they did endorse a 
call by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York for a prayer for peace in the 
Gulf226,  
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which neatly covered over the cracks between the bishops.   The same issue of The Times 
included a letter from the President of the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, suggesting that 
colleagues should not look to Aquinas (source of much Just War theory), but to the New 
Testament and the 1978 Lambeth Resolution (of General Synod) that ‘the use of violence 
is ultimately contradictory to the Gospel227.’   
 
The debate over Just War thinking was also raised by Rev Professor Jack Mahoney 
(King’s College London). He noted the view that Just War theory could be seen as 
Constantian betrayal (i.e. the Church ‘sold out’ its principles to buy favour with the 
Christian Emperor Constantine) or was ‘realpolitik’, and in that context, how just would 
winning be in the Gulf228?  Professor Collinson from Trinity College Cambridge made 
the only press mention of what the Islamic Just War doctrine might be, but this did not 
seem to have been picked up elsewhere229.  A rejection of the war was signed by one 
hundred churchmen on 26 November, though subsequent letters to The Times  noted its 
‘shoddiness’ and ‘lack of rigour’, asking just how one can ever know when the last resort 
really is, and how one can know what is going to be proportionate in advance – key 
questions in Just War theory230.  The Pope said that war would be a ‘tragic adventure’231; 
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whilst the Archbishop of Canterbury232 said that war with Iraq ‘might be justifiable’233.  
He went on to say, in an interview on Newsnight that  
 
I think that there can be occasions when, for the sake of a greater peace in the 
future, it may be necessary to have as limited as possible military action234.   
 
Some two weeks later, the Archbishop spoke of his ‘profound sadness235’ about the Gulf 
War, whilst the Archbishop of York, Dr John Hapgood, said that the ‘decision to go to 
war was right’236  Dr Billy Graham, the American evangelist, was ‘disturbed237’ that not 
all the conditions for a Just War had been fulfilled in the Gulf Conflict – particularly that 
it had not been the last resort.  But this reflects the common difficulty in the Just War 
tradition of knowing when the last resort really is there, or when other means can still be 
tried.  Dissenting church voices led to the organization of Christian Coalition for Peace in 
the Gulf, drawn from Pax Christi, Clergy against Nuclear Arms, the Quakers, and the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation238.  The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Glasgow, Thomas 
Winning, said that ‘Given the present circumstances, war would be morally 
indefensible239.’   
 
O’Donovan noted that one of the changes in Just War thinking during the 1980s which 
might have affected US attitudes was the relationship of President Reagan to Catholic 
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bishops to satisfy his Catholic conscience240, though there is little written evidence of 
how this affected US/UK relationships in this conflict. 
 
According to an opinion poll conducted by Gallup for the Association for a Free Kuwait 
as reported in The Times, Britain was the country of the five largest European nations 
most in favour of the use of force: 86% of Britons polled backed the use of force if 
sanctions failed, compared with 75% in France, 66% in Spain, 63% in Germany and 59% 
in Italy241.  The same poll also showed that the British were most inclined to use force to 
free hostages kept by Saddam: 86% of Britons were in favour, compared with 82% in 
France, 72% in Italy, 70% in Germany and 63% in Spain.  Britons were also the largest 
group in favour of using force to protect oil supplies (78%).  Whilst one must have some 
suspicions because of who the poll was being conducted for (i.e. Association for a Free 
Kuwait), it does show some interesting differences in levels of support.  One might 
suggest that the successful outcome of the Falklands War gave the British more 
confidence in the use of force; Germany and Italy might still have been affected by their 
Second World War experience, with France perhaps still affected by their emotional 
experience in Algeria.   Nonetheless, the other nations were more in favour of using force 
in support of the hostages, whereas there was no increase in British support, perhaps 
reflecting more emotional identification with individuals in the rest of Europe.  The 
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hostage issue became a really difficult one242 in the British press when Tony Benn went 
to intercede on their behalf:  
 
Mr Benn said he had told President Saddam Hussein that keeping westerners 
hostage would not protect Iraq from war.  He said it served the US and British 
Governments’ purpose for Iraq to hold onto its hostages as they proved a pretext 
for war243. 
 
There were relatively few references to public opinion in the press.  One can only 
therefore get occasional snapshots, such as the comments from Lieutenant-Colonel 
Charles Rogers of the Staffordshire Regiment.   
 
There has been a tremendous response from the people of our area ever since we 
got ordered to the Gulf; masses of letters wishing us well and piles of parcels at 
Christmas.  The men are very aware of the support back home, and I think it 
breeds even greater determination not to let anyone down if it comes to battle244.   
 
Similarly,  
 
A deluge of unsolicited mail from former girlfriends, old schoolmates, former 
servicemen and strangers is helping to pass the hours between sorties and exercise 
the writing talents of the aircrews at the largest RAF detachment in the 
Gulf….Many get replies and, according to Wing Commander John Broadbent, 
none has so much hinted at criticism245.  
 
It is hardly likely that protestors would write to individuals or squadrons deployed; they 
would be more likely to write to newspapers and the Government.  An example would be 
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the letter from Nicholas Walter (presumably a member of the general public) to The 
Times on 18 January 1991, the day after the fighting started, in which he said:  
 
The only comfort in this terrible situation, when almost the whole national press 
supports the Gulf War, is that one-third of the population oppose military action 
and one-eighth oppose any British involvement at all.  This is a larger minority 
than opposed any previous war of this kind and it includes many of your readers.  
You owe it to them, and to yourself, to give better attention to their arguments and 
fuller coverage of their activities246.   
 
Equally, a MORI poll on 28 January 1991 showed defence to be the biggest issue for the 
public at 54% - the first time since MORI started polling that any single issue other than 
unemployment had broken 50%. 
 
Opposition to the build-up of forces was not confined to the politicians; a man set himself 
on fire at the Remembrance Day service as the Cenotaph in London in protest at the 
conflict247.  The Committee to Stop the War in the Gulf marched from the Embankment 
to Hyde Park on 20 January 1991, estimating their numbers at 10 000, although police 
estimates were closer to 5000.  The Times reported that this was a lower figure than the 
previous weekend’s march; similar marches in Glasgow drew 2000 on 20 January 
compared with 6000 the previous weekend.  Both figures are extremely low compared 
with the marches on, for example, the Poll Tax or even the CND marches of the early 
1960s or 1980s, suggesting this was a fairly marginal activity and decreased in 
importance once the UN deadline had been reached. 
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The letters pages were most notable for their absence of Gulf War-related 
correspondence.  Again, caution has to be used with this as it is a function of editorial 
choice, but nevertheless, there does not seem to have been a particular strong view in any 
direction, except on particular issues.  In the lead up to the conflict, on 25 September only 
three letters in The Times referred to the Gulf, one on UK control over its own forces (as 
opposed to release to US leadership), one on the press linkage between 7 Armoured 
Brigade in 1990/1 and the Desert Rats of 1943, and one on the likely morale of Iraqi 
troops248.  This was the general sort of correspondence leading up to Christmas 1990, 
with the exception of a debate in church circles, such as that from Brian Wicker in the 
Independent highlighting the signature of an anti-war statement by over one hundred 
theologians249.  By 23 December 1990, of seventeen letters to the Sunday Times, none 
referred to the conflict.  As the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal approached, one or two 
letters stated that war should be the last resort, but these were few and far between.  After 
the deadline passed on 15 January 1991, more letters appeared: in the Daily Telegraph on 
17 January, all the letters were on the conflict – one on the need to protect antiquities in 
Iraq, two on the links to Eighth Army in the Second World War, two on US forces, one 
on the need for low flying, one on the speech by the Archbishop of Canterbury that the 
author described as ‘depressing’ and one on troops doing crosswords250.  None of these 
suggested deep engagement by the British public in the campaign.  Only a few letters 
opposed the war: two in The Times on 19 January consider the US’ imperialist aims and 
the longer term aims for the war, whilst another sought legal views on what constitutes 
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proportionality in war in the Just War tradition251.  Two letters in the following day’s 
Independent opposed the bombing campaign as ‘bullying’252.  Indeed, the Independent 
seemed the home of much intellectual debate on the Gulf (whereas The Times broadly 
reflected the Establishment view, and the Guardian provided an opposing view to 
conflict), the 24 January issue containing letters from Trinity Cambridge opposing the 
war, Clare College Cambridge on the role of the Italians and one from a Government 
Minister on the effect (or lack of them) of sanctions253.  Press coverage seems to have 
caused considerable comment on 25 January 1991, with four letters to the Daily 
Telegraph critical of the BBC and CNN.  But by 4 February, across the range of 
broadsheets, only three in the Daily Telegraph concerned the Gulf, and even then, one 
related to the Second World War, one to a biblical plague of locusts, and one on the role 
of women in the operation254.  Thereafter, few if any letters concerned the Gulf war.  In 
sum, with minor debates over church views, and some disquiet in academic circles, there 
was very little debate in the letters columns, presumably reflecting less public concern or 
interest. 
 
A systematic review of the letters page of The Times from 3 August 1990 (the day after 
the invasion of Kuwait) up until 2 March 1991 (ceasefire was declared on 28 February) 
shows interesting trends.  The 384 letters looked at over the period were sent in the 
pattern below: 
 
                                                 
251 The Times 19 January 1991 p. 9 
252 Independent 20 January 1991 p. 18 
253 Independent 24 January 1991 p. 26 
254 Daily Telegraph 4 February 1991 p. 16 
221  
Daily letters
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
8/3
/19
90
8/1
0/1
99
0
8/1
7/1
99
0
8/2
4/1
99
0
8/3
1/1
99
0
9/7
/19
90
9/1
4/1
99
0
9/2
1/1
99
0
9/2
8/1
99
0
10
/5/
19
90
10
/12
/19
90
10
/19
/19
90
10
/26
/19
90
11
/2/
19
90
11
/9/
19
90
11
/16
/19
90
11
/23
/19
90
11
/30
/19
90
12
/7/
19
90
12
/14
/19
90
12
/21
/19
90
12
/28
/19
90
1/4
/19
91
1/1
1/1
99
1
1/1
8/1
99
1
1/2
5/1
99
1
2/1
/19
91
2/8
/19
91
2/1
5/1
99
1
2/2
2/1
99
1
3/1
/19
91
Dates
Nu
m
be
r o
f l
et
te
rs
 
 
It can readily be seen that, from about 27 August, and certainly from the second week in 
September, the letters started to dry up.  This may be due to lack of editorial interest, and 
this does not necessarily reflect the post-bag received by the newspaper; merely the 
letters published.  But it is not until the UN deadline was reached on 15 January, and the 
start of the coalition attack thereafter, that correspondence started to increase again.  The 
overall impression is, however, that the public were less engaged after the initial 
invasion, suggesting a lack of interest, despite the deployment of British troops during the 
period and daily media coverage. 
 
The next question is what the sources of the letters were.  These have been divided into 
groups of serving and ex-military; MPs (which includes prospective candidates and 
councillors); members of the House of Lords; ‘aristocrats’ (anyone with a knighthood, 
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not explicitly representing any cause or organisation); academics; organisations (from 
CND to the UN Association); religious leaders of any denomination; and members of the 
general public.  The latter group was the most extensive, and may have been unduly high 
since editors may not have printed their organisation or this may not be apparent from 
their letters.  The results are as below: 
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Noting the limitations on the general public, it is clear that this category far outweighs 
any other, suggesting that the debates in this broadsheet were widespread.  The next 
significant group is the organisations, which include charities as well as institutions.  To 
some extent, these can all be viewed as lobbying groups with a particular agenda.  The 
next most significant groups are the ex-military (which might be higher if some of the 
general public had military experience), and MPs.  There is a suspicion from the MPs 
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letters that the issues they raised could and perhaps should have been raised in 
Parliament, but perhaps were not adequately covered.  The ex-military often provide 
qualified commentary on events, such as the letter from a retired group captain on 1 
February 1991 which suggested that the degree of military success was being 
downplayed and that people’s expectations in the modern day were too high255.  Some of 
the most strident pieces were actually written by religious leaders, both for and against 
the conflict, but generally around questions of morality. 
 
The final element was the issues raised in the letters.  Grouping these is a difficult task, 
particularly if letters included two or more topics.  Some were slightly tangential to the 
issue and so caution must be paid to these results.  Again, it is not clear whether the 
editorial team picked on these letters because of the issues that they raised, or because 
they were representative of the postbag.  Nevertheless, it gives an impression of the 
issues the public were raising at this elite level of debate. The categories, in no particular 
order, were: the role of the Red Cross; the role of the UN; the British hostages in Iraq; the 
relationship of the conflict and defence spending; the efficacy of sanctions or not (as 
distinct from the UN’s political role, though arguably these overlap somewhat); parallels 
with other historical events, most usually the Second World War; the implications for 
Europe as a collective, and particularly for European defence; the wider aspects of an 
Arab state in the Middle East; the utility of intelligence; media issues; the relationship 
with Israel and Palestine; the relationship with Iran; the status of historic sites in Iraq; 
general anti-war issues; the need for a proper Parliamentary debate; religious issues, 
particularly around morality and Just War; and others. 
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The size of the ‘others’ group shows the range of issues raised in the letters.  
Nevertheless, the size of the religious issues group, mostly coming from religious leaders, 
clearly shows the strength of the debate in the church on the approach to war and how 
split church leaders were.  Doubts over the utility of the UN were a major part of the next 
group of issues, which also include several references to the dangers of appeasement – a 
clear reference to the events of 1938.  This was followed by extensive debate on the 
media.  Two strands emerge; the first about the extent of coverage for this conflict (the 
CNN factor), whether that be too much for some, and in particular, was too much 
information made available to the Iraqi enemy.  The second strand was support or not for 
the BBC, and in particular for Panorama’s work.  The figures show strong views on 
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Israel, most notably when Iraq fired missiles into Israel, but also on the need for a 
Palestinian state.  Many writers, mostly from the general public, alluded to parallels with 
previous conflicts, and particularly to formations and units in the Second World War.  
The anti-war letters, whilst there were several, were not pronounced as a group.  Hidden 
within the categories were several concerns over the war aims, which range from Just 
War concerns not to exceed the relief of Kuwait to several others who clearly felt that 
Saddam Hussein should be a target and removed. 
 
Learning from the Falklands media experience, the military were much more involved 
with the media campaign.  Brigadier Patrick Cordingley (Commanding 7 Armoured 
Brigade) was reported in several papers with a warning about potential conflict:  
 
He said the British public “must be prepared for a particularly unpleasant war” in 
which Iraq was likely to use chemical and biological weapons. “They should be 
told there will be a lot of casualties.  As a nation we have not addressed that 
yet”256.   
 
The changes in media contact were explained in the rules given to editors and reporters 
on reporting news from the Gulf on 7 January 1991, as reported in the press on the 
following day.  Changes from civil to military escorts for reporters, on the spot 
censorship rather than time-delaying centralized processes, and specific prohibitions on 
reporting special forces operations or troop numbers or casualties caused some concern, 
but were broadly accepted by Max Hastings of the Daily Telegraph:  
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Most of these rules seem absolutely sensible.  Newspapers and broadcasters are 
obviously anxious not to do anything that risks the safety or operational security 
of our forces, and the clearer the help we are given by the Ministry of Defence in 
achieving this, the better job we shall be able to do.257   
 
What perhaps was less expected was the TV coverage on a virtually twenty-four hour 
basis from CNN, which appears to have been much-watched in homes across the globe.  
ITN deployed a team of forty in Saudi Arabia and six in Baghdad, whilst the BBC had 
thirty in the same locations258.  Academics voiced warnings - ‘watching too much war 
can be bad for you’ said James Turner, psychologist at the University of Savannah, who 
termed it the ‘CNN complex’259.  This is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
One effect of the coverage was to affect television advertisers.  Concern was raised over a 
Territorial Army advertisement, which was broadcast despite opposition that this was 
promoting militarism at a time of conflict when in fact few Territorials were deployed260.  
But allegedly, ‘most advertisements featuring militaristic scenes have been taken off for 
fear of offending viewers during the war261.’ In the US, ‘many companies abandoned 
advertising entirely for fear that their commercials would be screened next to shots of 
carnage’.262   
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In the UK, despite audience figures for TV AM increasing by 2/3, advertisers deserted 
the station, particularly for products targeted at young women and children263. 
 
Concern was also expressed at the Iraqis’ effective use of the media in their pictures of 
the effects of bomb damage on civilian targets.  Geoffrey Best264, an expert on war and 
law, was among those concerned about the impact of such coverage to undermine the 
legal and moral case for the allies, though there is little evidence in polls or letters to 
demonstrate that it had any great affect on UK public opinion.  The Times did suggest that 
such pictures affected attitudes265, but were just as unable to get facts to quantify the 
effect in any real way.  Jeremy Bowen’s coverage of the Al-Amiriya bombing (which 
killed many civilians) seemed to contradict US reports that it had been a military bunker, 
but the effect it had on public opinion is not clear.  Three letters266 to The Times on 20 
February 1991 refer to this attack: one from a British-based Iraqi wrote in defence of the 
women and children killed; another asked if the bunker was a valid target; and a third 
from a retired air-marshal asked if the coalition were winning the propaganda war.  This 
followed a letter267 to The Times on 18 February from a lawyer, which suggested that the 
US were unlikely to have deliberately bombed a shelter, had they known what it was.  
There do not appear any long term effects on public opinion from this attack, unlike the 
effects of aerial bombardment in Kosovo. 
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As with the Falklands, the BBC was accused of bias.  This time, in perhaps a reflection of 
the controversy over the Panorama programme in the Falklands, the BBC was accused of 
censorship and being subject to political bias for electing not to transmit the third in a 
series of Panorama programmes on the so-called supergun project268. 
 
The lessons of the Falklands were also evident in the decision to have an information 
committee under John Wakeham269 to ensure all government departments were ‘singing 
from the same hymn sheet’270.  This was particularly important at the outbreak of the 
coalition action in January when ‘ministers were concerned about sinking public 
morale271.’  The opinion polls do not really offer clues as to why ministers thought public 
morale was sinking – the figures remained fairly consistent throughout, albeit that people 
preferred the option of a blockade to military assault.  The committee was later 
challenged by the New Statesman and the Guardian as acting as ‘news managers’.  Equal 
comment went to the Sun who had published a front-page Union Jack and invited readers 
to display it in their windows, an act which Tony Benn described as ‘the greatest wave of 
jingoism I have ever seen in my life272.’   
 
Though we do not know how many flags were displayed, that edition sold 3.8M copies.  
An NOP poll commissioned by the Independent and Newsnight suggested that news 
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coverage by the broadsheets was trusted by half of their readers, whereas the tabloids 
were believed by less than 33%273. 
 
In the aftermath of the war, opinions were still divided.  Professor G Lee Williams, of the 
Institute of Economic and Political Studies in Cambridge was amongst those believing 
that military defeat had only been created by technical superiority, and that disaffected 
Arabs would now line up behind Saddam Hussein to challenge the Christian West274.  In 
the same issue, Sir Gilbert Longden wrote that we had gone unwillingly to war, but that 
that it had been the only appropriate response275.  The concept of having a Gulf victory 
parade had been viewed by the Prime Minister, John Major, with misgivings, because of 
concerns that such celebrations might be too triumphalist and a glorification of war, 
precisely the concerns of the Bishop of Durham who described the idea as ‘obscene’, 
saying that ‘At the moment there is all this euphoria over a great victory and we should 
never have got into it276’.   
 
But the Prime Minister was persuaded by Defence Secretary Tom King for it to go ahead, 
and church leaders were concerned not to repeat the rift with the state after the Falklands 
service where the Archbishop of Canterbury combined the themes of thanksgiving with 
mourning and a plea for Christian reconciliation – to which Mrs Thatcher’s reaction was 
allegedly described as ‘spitting blood’.277  Badsey (and his publishers) conducted market 
research prior to publishing a book on the conflict, and was surprised to find that there 
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was little mass interest, and that it was perceived as America’s war278.  In the years after 
the war, a measure of protection was afforded to the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs by the 
No-Fly Zones over Iraq.  In retaliation for Iraqi attacks on Coalition air patrols, a number 
of Iraqi targets were hit but, with the exception of Operation DESERT FOX in 1998, 
much of this was done far from media glare, and Rupert Smith suggests that aircrews 
termed this ‘recreational bombing’ – which could certainly not be done under greater 
press scrutiny279. 
 
Case Study 4.  Bosnia 
 
MORI interviewed 1002 adults over the age of 18 on 16-18 April 1993, when Bosnian 
Serb forces were surrounding the town of Srebenica, for the Panorama programme of 19 
April 1993.  60% of people were dissatisfied with the Government’s handling of the 
situation in Bosnia (only 20% were satisfied), and 58% said that Britain was not doing 
enough.  The same percentage felt that the UN’s response was inadequate.  Some 64% 
were in favour of sending an international force, including British troops to help, but of 
those, 48% were opposed to sending the force if it meant staying there for several years 
and 55% were opposed if it meant taking large numbers of casualties280.  The first British 
soldier was killed on 12 October 1994, a year in which attacks in Markale Square in 
Sarajevo had attracted particular media attention281. 
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MORI conducted a poll of 1104 adults over the age of 18 on 21 July 1995, not long after 
British troops had been taken hostage in May that year.  The results282 were weighted to 
represent the profile of the population.  The results were used on London Weekend 
Television’s Dimbleby programme on 23 July 1995.  By then, 65% of those interviewed 
were dissatisfied with the Government’s handling of the war, and 67% were dissatisfied 
with the UN’s performance – both figures were significantly higher than the comparable 
MORI poll in 1993.  But now 47% felt that Britain was not doing enough, 5% lower than 
the 1993 poll, whereas 14% felt that Britain was too involved already.  Some 52% of 
people were in favour of Britain being involved in armed conflict, with 39% opposed.  
Support for deploying forced even if it would take years had declined to 39%, and if it 
meant taking casualties to 36%.  Some 59% of people supported air attacks on Serb 
positions to protect Bosnian Muslims but 31% were opposed.  And 50% of people felt it 
right to risk the lives of British soldiers to protect Bosnian Muslims, but 40% were 
opposed.   
 
Gallup carried out eight polls283 between February 1993 and January 1996 on Bosnia.  
Those indicating they were dissatisfied with the Government’s performance on this issue 
ranged from 43% initially to 39% at the end, but dissatisfaction had peaked in 1994 and 
1995, coincident with the deployment of British troops in numbers.  In contrast, British 
political opinion in 1994 was viewed by some US politicians as ‘wet’, for opposing 
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airstrikes yet the British chided the US for a failure to commit ground forces284.  Michael 
Foot was one of the great activists for action from 1991-2, relating to his personal love of 
Dubrovnik as a favourite holiday destination for many years285.  Looking at comparable 
time points with the MORI surveys, it is hard to equate the figures; one would have to 
join the ‘neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied’ group to the total to get similar levels of 
dissatisfaction.  But the size of the ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’ group at 16-23% and 
routinely around 19-20% indicates a high level of lack of interest.  When asked with 
which ethnic group the respondents had most sympathy in 1993, Gallup’s largest group 
was either none of them (21-25%) or don’t know (26-29%), with the rest well split.  This 
suggests either a lack of understanding of the situation or a lack of interest or both. 
 
In these Gallup polls, up to 1994, 67-74% routinely supported the use of British forces on 
convoy escort duties to dispense humanitarian aid – but that dropped to 62% in the first 
week of June 1995, and only recovered to former levels in 1996.  When asked if British 
forces suffered major casualties, whether the UK should pull forces out, limit them to 
fighting back if attacked or reinforce them, opinion was roughly equally divided between 
reinforcement or pulling out, with 14-17% advocating limiting them to fighting back if 
attacked.  By 1996, a clear margin (43% vice 35%) was in favour of pulling troops out in 
such a circumstance.  Hopes for success were clearly limited; when asked if people 
thought an international force could enforce a peace settlement, only 37-46% thought it 
would, while 34-43% thought it wouldn’t.  Nevertheless, a substantial majority still felt it 
would be worthwhile sending an international force anyway, and between 2/3 and ¾ of 
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people thought British forces should be part of that force.  Dandeker, not usually an 
advocate for conflict, felt that the Armed Forces could have used more robust tactics 
without endangering their impartial status286. 
 
With politicians fearing a larger conflict spreading into Europe, people were asked if they 
shared that fear.  In 1993, opinion was fairly evenly divided on whether it would or 
would not do so.  Between 1993 and 1995, less than 2/3 of people felt that Britain and 
European nations should intervene, whereas a third advocated leaving the Bosnians to 
sort it out themselves.  Evidence of a lack of interest or knowledge was also evident in 
the January 1996 question regarding numbers of actual British casualties in the conflict to 
date.  Some 17% thought it was a fair number or more, 54% thought very few, but 
significantly 29% simply didn’t know.  By mid-1996, when asked to look back on the 
success of British troops in theatre, 3% thought it completely successful, 27% mostly 
successful, 44% somewhat successful, 10% not at all successful and 17% didn’t know.   
 
Looking at the overall results in the round, there was clear widespread dissatisfaction 
with the Government’s handling of the situation throughout.  Equally strong is the feeling 
that a fair proportion of the group either did not know or were not interested in what was 
going on, many being quite content to let the Bosnians get on with it.  Rupert Smith 
highlights the lack of clarity in determining the status of an army when a force such as the 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) becomes the Bosnian Serb Army in 1991287; the former 
being recognised as a legal entity in support of the state, but the latter being closer to an 
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irregular force, and as such harder to identify with.  The case for intervention was not 
evident to all, and that despite the efforts of the media, such as Martin Bell: ‘I didn’t have 
a political intention [in Bosnia].  I wasn’t consciously trying to change the non-policy of 
my government but I did hope that just showing these pictures [of death and suffering] in 
my country would have an effect, that eventually people would say, “This is 
unconscionable what we’re not doing”’288. Whilst people were broadly in favour of use of 
British forces on humanitarian operations, there was no great appetite for taking 
casualties, and no great feeling that success would be quickly if ever achievable.  Even 
after the Dayton Peace Agreement had been signed and in process of delivery in 1995 and 
1996, people were still not entirely convinced that the British had been successful. 
 
Given the length of campaign, it is not practical in this research to undertake an analytical 
review of the letters columns as with other wars, but this would be worthy of further 
work. 
 
Case Study 5.  Kosovo 
 
In the spring of 1999, NATO allies led an air campaign lasting 78 days against Serbia to 
protect Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing.  Gallup polled in March, April and 
May 1999 as the conflict developed289.  Ipsos/MORI also polled on 26-27 March 1999 
and 1-2 April 1999 for the Mail on Sunday and again on 30 April-1 May 1999 ahead of 
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the local government elections290.  From an initial 58% in favour of the campaign in 
March according to Gallup, approval ratings increased to 67% by May, but the 
disapproval rate remained high (33% to 28%).  More interestingly, some 60% of people 
felt there had been insufficient public debate (including in Parliament) prior to NATO’s 
military actions.  Half-way through the conflict, less than half the people thought it had 
been managed competently, with 44% believing the management was incompetent, 
though support for Prime Minister Blair’s role was much higher at 66%.  And even in 
March 1999, 70% of people expected that ground troops would eventually be required to 
secure Serbian agreement to autonomy for Kosovo.  If ground troops were to be required, 
only 52% of people would have approved of their use, despite the fact that 73% felt there 
was a danger of the present war spreading into neighbouring countries. Some 41% felt 
that Kosovo peace and stability was not worth the sacrifice of any British soldier or 
airman. And even at that halfway point, only 57% of people believed the campaign would 
be successful in returning Kosovo refugees to their homeland. 
 
The MORI polls show a similar picture.  Only 55% of people in March thought Britain 
right to join the bombing campaign (compared with 58% with Gallup) and only 49% of 
people were satisfied with the way the Government had handled the crisis.  MORI tested 
how much people really knew about the war; only 54% of people could correctly identify 
the Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic and only 19% correctly identified which ethnic group 
the air raids were designed to protect.  Nevertheless, 87% of the 606 adults interviewed 
felt that Britain had a moral duty to help stop further killings and human rights abuses in 
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Kosovo (even if they didn’t really know which ones they were protecting).  At that stage 
(26-27 March 1999): 
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Table 6.1 MORI Polls March-May 1999 
% 26-27 March 1-2 April 30 April – 1 May 
Not worth loss of 
British life 
56 57 45 
Don’t know 34  34 
In favour of 
bombing campaign 
 76 70 
Satisfied with 
Government 
approach 
 60  
Said there had not 
been adequate 
public debate 
 51  
Not enough 
information on the 
consequences of 
NATO actions 
 66  
Thought NATO 
actions had made it 
more dangerous for 
ethnic Albanians 
 57 
Made no difference  23 
67 
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Despite the elite level debate over the seemingly outrageous ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, 
as in Bosnia, the British public was not entirely convinced, and in particular, felt there 
had been inadequate debate.  Whilst recognizing the need for ground troops, there was 
not the body of support for their use, and still less acceptance of the cause being worth 
the loss of British lives.  The figures are fairly consistent, yet do show some oddities in 
the desire to undertake an air campaign when the majority felt it was not having the 
desired effect or even making it worse.  This seems to support the view that many of the 
public simply did not understand the issues, but felt something had to be done – but not at 
the cost of British servicemen and women.  Alastair Campbell, Press Secretary to the 
Prime Minister, was later to claim that public opinion was much more robust than media 
opinion291, which does not seem to be supported by the figures. 
 
Politically, the Commons debate described in The Times of 26 March 1999292 shows a 
cautious Parliament.  As the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, made the case for the 
campaign, the Shadow Foreign Secretary Michael Howard said that the airstrikes ‘met the 
requirements of a Just War’, whilst questioning whether the UN Security Council 
resolutions gave legitimacy for action293.  Menzies Campbell for the Liberal Democrats 
was concerned over the potential for civilian casualties.  Tony Benn, as with previous 
campaigns, was opposed to it: ‘I think this is a war of aggression.  NATO is being set up 
to replace the UN.’  Former Defence Minister Alan Clark said: ‘What we are debating 
here is whether or not we are within our rights to be bombing a sovereign nation without 
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the authority of the UN or indeed the House of Commons in pursuit of the interests of one 
side in a civil war.’  In the event, Tony Benn failed to force a vote on the issue.  Prime 
Minister Blair was, however clear – saying in the 13 April debate that ‘This is military 
action for a moral purpose294.’  The opponents were still there – Benn, Dalyell, Mahon 
and Clark amongst them – but they were in a minority, and even the hard-left Campaign 
Group was split on the issue295.  Those MPs were amongst the eleven voting against the 
Government on 20 April, analysed by the paper to be splits along generational lines 
(Dalyell, Benn), anti-America (Galloway, Corbyn), anti-military (Mahon, Wise, Gerrard) 
and pro-Serbian (Wareing)296.  But then the Tories started to wonder if the strategy was 
right – Michael Howard talking of the need for a negotiated peace; Crispin Blunt saying 
the strategy had failed and calling for the replacement of the Chief of Defence Staff297.  
After the Chinese Embassy bombing (see below), Michael Howard accused NATO of 
incompetence, and why it had taken until that point, several weeks into the conflict to 
consider the legitimacy of a planned oil embargo298.  At that point, political unity had 
broken down.  Andrew Robathan, Conservative MP for Blaby, said that he had been 
warning about the air campaign since March, and that Clinton and Blair had no idea of 
military strategy299. 
 
Opposition to the war was reported in an article on 27 March 1999300.   
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Streams of letters and telephone calls are beginning to fuel the debate raging at 
newspaper offices across the country.  Supporters of the government’s stance are 
heavily outnumbered….People living in the north and the Midlands seem to be 
most vehemently opposed to the bombings.  The Manchester Evening News, the 
biggest evening paper in the North-West, conducted a two-day poll on the issue. 
Robert Ridley, assistant news editor, said “Our readers are wildly against the 
bombing campaign.  When we asked, first of all, if they thought it was right to 
bomb Kosovo, 79% said no.  We also asked if we should pursue a long-term 
campaign and 82% said no, we should not.”’  Elsewhere, Norwich is twinned with 
Novi Sad, which was hit on the first night, leaving local people ‘shocked’.  The 
Western Mail reported ‘strong feelings both for and against the campaign.’  The 
editor of the Birmingham Post reported qualified support from local people, 
whereas the Leicester Mercury reported receiving telephone calls from people, 
particularly elderly ones, “quite tearful about the war”301.   
 
Some academics were vociferous in opposition. ‘NATO activity is…worse than a crime, 
it’s a blunder!302’ Gelber returned to the fray on 13 April to say that the war in the 
Balkans was ‘misconceived in origin and bungled in execution303.’ Organisations such as 
the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom said that the ‘result of NATO 
bombing has been more barbarity and killings in Kosovo304.’ Mick Hume, editor of 
LM305 magazine, said  ‘The war against the Serbs is about projecting a self-image of the 
ethical new Britain bestriding the world.  It is a crusade306.’   
 
Right-wing author Frederick Forsyth307 was especially strident in his opposition, from his 
comment of 15 April  - ‘worst planned military adventure this country has been involved 
with since Suez308’ – to his later comment that politicians had not even been in the cadet 
                                                 
301 Ibid 
302 Professor Harry Gelber, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics in a letter, The 
Times 29 March 1999 p21 
303 The Times 13 April 1999 p19 
304 The Times 31 March 1999 p. 21 
305 Living Marxism 
306 The Times 15 April 1999 p. 22 
307 Known for his strident right wing views. 
308 The Times 15 April 1999 p. 23 
241  
forces let alone combat forces, and so didn’t know what they were doing309.  Though not 
on the scale of the Poll Tax riots or the anti-war demonstrations for the later Gulf War, 
2000 anti-bombing protestors met in Trafalgar Square, London, led by several Labour 
MPs including Tony Benn as part of the Committee for Peace in the Balkans310. 
 
From around 9 April 1999, attention in the press started to focus on the air campaign’s 
failures311.  Simon Jenkins wrote  
 
By targeting cities, factories and bridges, and hitting enough houses to kill 
civilians (including, of all obscenities, native Kosovans in Pristina) the bombs 
have increased support for the regime and made compromise less likely312.   
 
This theme was picked up by Professor Williamson, Edinburgh University, is his letter 
that day which said the ‘escalating NATO violence hardens Serb resolve and undermines 
the prospects for moderate political forces in Belgrade313.’  Somewhat defensively, an 
RAF source said: ‘a mistaken public perception has been created by films like Star Wars 
in which the enemy is vaporized314.’   
 
Michael Evans, Defence Correspondent for The Times, commented on 12 April 1999 that 
the deployment of a further 82 US aircraft showed that after three weeks of bombing, the 
                                                 
309 The Times 17 May 1999 p. 21 
310 The Times 12 April 1999 p. 4 
311 It is interesting to contrast this with the perception as expounded by Knightley in his book The First 
Casualty (London: John Hopkins University Press 2002) p. 462 that the coverage of the Vietnam war 
reduced from 1969 because of the switch from a ground campaign to an air campaign which seemed far 
more distant and thus less newsworthy. 
312 The Times 9 April 1999 p. 22 
313 Ibid p. 23 
314 The Times 14 April 1999 p. 2 
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Yugoslav defences were still intact315.  The following day saw the first major NATO 
error in bombing a passenger train at Grdelica, leaving nine dead and 16 injured316.  On 
14 April, NATO bombs hit a refugee convoy, killing 72, at Dakovica317.  The news 
postulated an ecological disaster after NATO bombed a petrochemical complex on the 
Danube, creating a cloud of toxic gas.318  The attack on a TV station on 23 April 
provoked a number of letters in response, notably one from a former Army officer 
suggesting it was ‘murder’319.  A stray bomb on 28 April hit houses 300m from a 
Yugoslav barracks killing 20 civilians.  The ultimate error was the bomb on the Chinese 
Embassy on 10 May 1999320.  The first thing to take from this is that NATO forces and 
the RAF were used synonymously here; if NATO got it wrong, then the RAF faced guilt 
by association.  Next, all these incidents seemed to shake the confidence of the public and 
particularly the elite figures in coalition capabilities, having been raised on the success of 
the first Gulf Campaign.  They started to question the strategy for the war, and then they 
questioned those in charge.  Perhaps that was why, with diminishing support for President 
Clinton at home, and no end in sight, the coalition adopted low-level flying from 6 May 
1999.  But even by 21 May 1999, a Ministry of Defence source was quoted as saying that 
Serb forces in Kosovo had only suffered ‘light casualties’321, adding to the impression of 
unease for the public.  The Editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships could not resist the 
                                                 
315 The Times 12 April 1999 p. 5 
316 The Times 13 April 1999 p. 1 
317 The Times 15 April 1999 p. 1 
318 The Times 19 April 1999 p. 1 
319 The Times 27 April 1999 p. 21 
320 The Times 11 May 1999 p. 13 
321 The Times 2l May 1999 p. 1 
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opportunity to observe that limitations of air power showed the error in creating distinct 
air Services322. 
 
The debate over means was highlighted in Simon Jenkins’ article of 28 April entitled 
‘The manner in which we conduct this war demeans British values323.’  He called for 
morality in method, arguing that 
One of the most sickening spectacles of the past fortnight has been liberal hawks 
deriding the conduct of the war ‘so far’, a war they wanted high off the ground, 
clean, technological and with no NATO dead.  I can only report that this war is 
leaving thousands of patriotic people baffled, concerned and even outraged   
 
The religious debate seen in other conflicts resumed in the Kosovo campaign.  Bishop 
Hugh Montefiore said that the actions of coalition forces negated two principles of a Just 
War: defensive action and the probability of success – and hence it was no longer a Just 
War324.  On 29 March, The Times summarized the churches’ divided views325: the 
Archbishop of Canterbury ‘highlighted the divisions among Christians about bombing 
Yugoslavia.’  Veteran pacifist Canon Paul Oestreicher, Coventry Cathedral, said it might 
have been right to fight the Serbs on the ground, but that air raids were wrong because 
they were likely to fail.  The Right Rev Richard Holloway, Bishop of Edinburgh and a 
critic of previous military actions said, ‘Reluctantly, with considerable anguish probably, 
I support the NATO line but with enormous anxieties326.’   
 
                                                 
322 The Times 21 May 1999 p. 27 
323 The Times 28 April 1999 p. 20 
324 The Times 27 March 1999 p. 23 
325 The Times 29 March 1999 p. 7 
326 Ibid 
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The Most Rev Patrick Kelly, Archbishop of Liverpool, said that the bombings were such 
a dilemma that we could ‘only pray for and be grateful to politicians and commanders 
making decisions.327’  The Right Rev Cormac Murphy O’Connor, Bishop of Arundel and 
Brighton, called for the ‘use of military force to be as limited as possible328’. But the 
Bishop of Bradford, Right Rev David Smith, wondered how the bombardment of 
Yugoslavia was going to bring about a solution329.  By 5 April, as public attitudes seemed 
to move in favour of military action, Archbishop Carey said that ‘Military action thus far 
is recognition that the civilised world cannot stand by and accept that evil should 
triumph.’330  And the Archbishop of York and the Bishops of Westminster and Oxford all 
supported action against ‘evil.’  However, at parish level, the concerns were shown more 
in the letters, e.g. Rev Hunt ‘NATO is bombing Serbia illegally331.’  After all the NATO 
bombing errors, some questioned legitimacy, discrimination and proportionality332.  By 
19 May, Canon Oestreicher was amongst a number calling for peace333.  And Rev David 
Platt, Didcot, even went so far as to say that Just War has ‘become a mere talisman, a 
shibboleth….all war is evil334.’  
 
 A commentator on Just War, Oliver O’Donovan, viewed it rather differently: he 
suggested that having tried to think of ourselves (the British) as good Europeans, we 
recognised difficulties in our neighbourhood that needed resolution, establishing a moral 
                                                 
327 Ibid 
328 Ibid 
329 Ibid 
330 The Times 5 April 1999 p. 6 
331 The Times 15 April 1999 p. 23 
332 See Rev Harrison, Rural Dean of Ashbourne letter The Times 15 May 1999 p. 23, and Rev Harvey, Sub 
Dean Westminster, Zaki Badawi Principal Muslim College Ealing and David Goldberg Senor Rabbi St 
John’s Wood Synagogue in The Times 17 May 1999 p. 21 
333 The Times 19 May 1999 p. 21 
334 The Times  21 May 1999 p. 27 
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case for intervention335.  However, he also challenged the use of air power to replace the 
use of troops on the ground in a Just War sense of not being prepared to take casualties as 
an immoral stance, on the basis that it does not give ‘proper weight to the claims of the 
non-combatant population that’s suffering336.’ 
 
Media coverage by the BBC came in for more criticism, especially John Simpson’s 
coverage from Belgrade, where it was felt he was giving biased views – despite the 
obvious constraints he was under.  Accused by the Government of ‘falling short of the 
standards expected of a leading journalist337’, again the mood of the general public and 
indeed media experts supported Simpson’s position.  What was more surprising was a 
letter from a Mr Maton to say that a picture published in the press of an injured woman 
lying in the road went too far, and she ought to have had some dignity.338   
 
Although letters started to reduce in early April, it was only on 21 April that the Kosovo 
campaign was no longer a headline in The Times.  By the following day, the daily war 
reports, previously around pages 4-7, were now confined to pages 17-20.  This seems to 
reflect a deliberate decision to downplay the war in favour of other news, and may reflect 
a decreasing interest in the public – though it is unclear what exactly was the cause and 
effect here. On 28 April, there was nothing about Kosovo on the front page of The Times 
at all. 
 
                                                 
335 O’Donovan interview 26 September 2007. 
336 O’Donovan interview Op cit 
337 The Times 16 April 1999 p. 23 
338 Ibid 
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For the first time, this campaign was debated on the internet.  Although there is no real 
way to analyse it in this work, this is an area for future study.  Chat sites were established 
and debates raged.  The Serbs used sites to publish comment on the Kosovo Liberation 
Army and vice-versa, both showing pictures to make their points.  US soldiers were also 
known to put their views on chat sites.  Hackers saturated the servers used by NATO and 
Serbia deluged the system with 2000 emails a day339.  The value of the internet was 
demonstrated by Robin Cook’s letter to the Serbs, translated into Serbo-Croat and placed 
on the web, which expressed regret for two former allies against the Nazis now being 
enemies340. 
 
In the same way as for the first Gulf War, a systematic approach was used to consider the 
letters published in The Times from 24 March 1999 (when airstrikes were ordered) to 10 
June 1999 when the Serbs surrendered.  The 183 letters considered were analysed 
according to date, source and issue.  Again, similar health warnings are required on the 
basis that this is a single broadsheet, and it does only represent what the editorial team 
chose to publish, rather than what might have been sent in.  It cannot therefore be a 
definite proof of public opinion, but it does serve as a measure of the debate during the 
78-day bombing campaign.  The distribution of the letters was as follows: 
                                                 
339 The Times 1 April 1999 p. 9 
340 The Times 5 April 1999 p. 5 
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It can be seen immediately that, with one or two notable exceptions, the flow of 
correspondence slowed considerably after 17 April – quite early in the campaign.  It is 
not clear whether this was as a result of boredom in the public or in the newspaper, but 
the flow from mid-way through the campaign through the second half was very sparse.  It 
is possible that many of the fundamental points were made early on, and did not bear 
repetition.  But the truth, tying this to the poll evidence, would seem to be that a lot of 
people were either opposed to the war or not bothered.  An example is a letter341 on 4 
May which highlighted an appeals trolley in Tesco’s; the one for Kosovo had two packets 
of pasta on it, the one for the Scottish Society for the Protection of Animals was full – a 
real indication of the place of Kosovo in the scale of importance for many people. 
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Turning to the authors of the letters, these have been categorized in the same way as for 
the Gulf War example i.e. military, both serving and retired, MPs, members of the House 
of Lords, ‘aristocracy’, organisations, academics, religious leaders and the general public.  
Where foreign dignitaries have written, they have been accorded equivalent status with 
British authors.  The results are shown below:  
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On this occasion, the general public produced a significant proportion of the letters, with 
ex-military playing a proportionately large part.  There does not appear to be any pattern 
to this, or any evidence of an editorial policy to put forward letters from particular 
segments. 
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The results were grouped into issues around NATO’s role; legitimacy of the operation; 
the role of OSCE (and, as in all these categories, letters appear for and against); historic 
parallels (both World Wars and several smaller operations); those actively pro-war, 
which includes those for whom ‘something had to be done’; religious issues 
(predominantly Just War and morality); those anti-war; humanitarian relief (not just for 
Kosovar Albanians but others caught up in the Balkans area); the role of the Russians, 
particularly in diplomacy; the need (or not) for ground forces; media issues (especially 
John Simpson); the link to Montenegro; the limitations of air power (which includes 
some more anti-war sentiment around the perceived failure of bombing and its 
inaccuracy); and others. 
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Whilst the list of ‘others’ is again large, it does not dwarf the other categories, suggesting 
a more focused debate.  The anti-war letters were very significant here, reflecting a more 
unpopular campaign (even if the causes merited action, this was about the means to 
conduct it), yet the pro-war letters reflected the need for action.  The timing of the letters 
is important; attitudes changed from around 2 April to harden in favour of the war.  This 
was possibly the result of more media coverage of the plight of the Kosovar Albanians 
and stories of atrocities becoming more evident.  Several mentions are made of 
comparisons with the Holocaust.  The letters on the limitations of air power link to the 
ground forces issue; many said that air power can never win a campaign alone, and that 
correspondingly ground forces would be required to win this war.  The need for ground 
forces became a particular issue from the end of the first week in April.  Bombings of 
civilian targets figured strongly in the anti-war and air power categories and dented the 
perception of a successful campaign.  Several letters discussed the plight of the refugees, 
whether in Kosovo or if brought to the UK (both for and against). 
 
Though the end of the conflict on 10 June 1999 was muted in terms of letter responses to 
the newspapers, perhaps reflecting apathy or quiet relief, some key messages were 
present on 7 June when it seemed that an end to hostilities was in sight.  Air Commodore 
(Retired) Mackie342, former Vice-President of CND, said that air power had led to a 
humanitarian tragedy343.  The Bishop of Barking said that a Just War had been conducted 
                                                 
342 Alastair Mackie served in the RAF from 1940-1968, gaining a DFC with 233 Squadron during the 
Second World War.  He was later a pilot on nuclear bombers before retiring and becoming CND Vice 
President for 15 years.  His memoirs are published as Some of the People All the Time (London: Book 
Guild Publishing, 2006) 
343 The Times 7 June 1999 p. 21 
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in an unjust way, and called for a re-examination of Just War theory344.  And a Denis 
Christian, presumably a member of the general public, said it had not been our finest 
hour, that there should be no victory parade, and that we should be very careful in issuing 
medals345.  Whether these be reasonable responses is largely irrelevant; this was a 
campaign with publicly evident errors, with a single strategy that did not work.  Public 
support might have been strong for the plight of the refugees, but the image of the Armed 
Forces was tainted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The five campaigns considered here show different slants on British opinion.  Borneo 
showed what was possible away from the eyes of the media.  The Falklands showed an 
unpopular Government facing much debate internally within the party and within 
Parliament over the reasons for the conflict, yet military success brought popularity and a 
unique bond between the political leadership and the military.  When much of the elite 
urged caution or outright opposition to war for a few islands with a tiny population so far 
from the UK, where ownership claims were uncomfortably confused, they were surprised 
by the depth of feeling from the populace which aligned strongly with the Government 
that action needed to be taken for people they’d never heard of, but were effectively 
British.  This was a true defencist campaign346 and, if there were any sense of humiliation 
from Suez, this campaign exorcised it for the British in a way that the Gulf War did for 
the US.  It showed the divisions in the church, and an inability to respond to what the 
                                                 
344 Ibid 
345 Ibid 
346 Though opponents would argue it was colonialist in nature – and arguably crusading in Ceadal’s terms. 
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public (and politicians) wanted and expected to hear.  It split the newspaper community, 
part-advocating a strong response and part-wanting diplomatic actions to be allowed to 
prevail.  It was a unique campaign, small in size, with military forces opposing each other 
with little or no civilian involvement.  
 
The first Gulf War was a campaign over a much longer period, with general political 
consensus, and a public who seemed much clearer that this was over oil than either 
politicians or elite debaters.  The populace seems to have been the strongest advocates for 
action within Europe, and the most prepared to take military action, perhaps a reflection 
of military success in the Falklands.  Military success led to political success, and the 
elite debates over the efficacy of sanctions seems to have passed most of the rest of the 
public by.  The Church seems to have tried to respond to their ill-prepared approach to 
the Falklands by producing a more positive, Just War-based, commentary, but that simply 
exposed the splits with those more pacifist in nature.  The role of the BBC was again 
brought into sharp relief; to what extent was it the mouthpiece of the British perspective, 
and to what extent should it portray truth in its reporting, however uncomfortable that 
might be.  In some senses this was the first media war, and the attempts to manage that 
media were made much harder by the pace and immediacy of information.  For the public 
though, the lack of correspondence in the press is striking, and seems to indicate quiet 
support, or resignation. 
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Bosnia marks the first of the more moralist interventions, or crusading in Ceadal’s terms. 
The public was quite clear that something needed to be done, and was prepared to support 
convoy escorting, but did not accept that this was worth taking losses over.   
 
Kosovo marked yet another stage in the debate.  Now in a very moralist intervention, 
where ethnic cleansing was the issue, the public seemed to accept that something needed 
to be done, but were very unconvinced that the case had been made, or debated 
adequately.  And there was not a consensus for taking losses.    
 
What is clear from the evidence is a differential picture of engagement at the political 
level, divergence of views at the ‘elite’ level, and a general lack of interest or depth of 
knowledge by the wider population.  There is also a strong sense of a return to previous 
conflicts, rather than the one at hand, which links strongly to earlier comments on 
Remembrance and the First World War in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 7.  THE MEDIA AND POPULAR CULTURE 
 
Much of this thesis has relied upon evidence from the media to evaluate public opinion to 
events.  But the media itself deserves some study.  There is a tendency to talk of mass 
communication and mass media.  But the reality is that the media is not of a single type 
or format, and the audience is not a mass either, but a series of groups by age, sex, 
religion, socio-economic groups and so on1.  Mass has been used in various texts as a 
deprecatory term2 – hence the mass-circulation newspapers are assumed to be trivial in 
content and mass art is viewed as not good enough for the elite.  What is curious is that 
newspapers and television are designed to communicate with the individual reader or 
viewer, rather than a group. But the potential power of the media was recognised by the 
Committee for Imperial Defence in the First World War as being of ‘incalculable 
significance for political stability’, and during the General Strike of 1926 as offering the 
Government ‘a most powerful weapon’, given suitable control and expertise3.  As 
sociologists like Gouldner4 pointed out, the media mediates in selecting and editing 
items, accentuating some and repressing others according to their own rule set.  The 
media stands between the public and the ‘elites’ of politicians, institutions, industry and 
other driving groups.  They will therefore have their own rules for operating in that space, 
                                                 
1 Wright-Mills distinguishes between a mass society and a community of publics, depending on the degree 
of autonomy, the ability to voice opinion, the rule sets that apply, and the ratio of givers of information to 
receivers.  Neither extreme describes the UK public (as Wright-Mills would recognise) but the way the 
media operates tends to treat the populace as a mass.  Wright-Mills Op cit p. 302. 
2 Badsey and Philo interviews Op cit 
3 Eldridge, J, Kitzinger, J, and Williams, K, The Mass Media & Power in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1997) p. 13.  ‘War not only creates a supply of news but a demand for it.  So deep-rooted 
is the fascination in war and all things appertaining to it that…a paper has only to put up on its placard “A 
great battle” for its sales to mount up.’  Cited by Lasswell 1927 and then by Carruthers, S, in The Media at 
War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2000) p. 3 
4 Gouldner, A, The Dialectics of Ideology and Technology  (London: Macmillan 1976) 
255  
which will determine what is reported and how it is presented, quite apart from any 
claims of objectivity5.  Even Kate Adie6 acknowledged that the characteristics of 
television news include being ‘highly selective, necessarily simplified, [and] suspected of 
some bias7.’  Nick Davies, formerly of the Guardian, talks of ‘masses of journalists who 
are….genuinely dedicated people, ..yet frequently they fail to tell the truth8.’   
 
Hiram Johnson’s 1917 statement of truth being the first casualty of war has been much-
used, but the reality is that war and peace are not distinct states, particularly during the 
four decades studied here, and as Carruthers points out, we do not move from truth in 
peace to lies or half truths in war neatly either9. 
 
The study of media and the effects on the public in the UK started with Himmelweit, 
Oppenheim and Vince in 1958 and their work on television and the behaviour of 
children10.  Much of the work over the next twenty years focused on the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, bringing together neo-
Marxist, structuralist and semiotic theories11.  Empirical studies were conducted by the 
Glasgow Media Group from the mid-1970s, and became the main source for those 
looking at how messages are received, as much as how they are transmitted12. 
                                                 
5 Tuchman suggests that journalistic objectivity is claimed by presenting ‘conflicting possibilities’.  
Tuchman, G, ‘Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen’s Notions of Objectivity’, 
American Journal of Sociology 77 (1972) p. 676.  See also Mermin Op cit p. 9 
6 BBC correspondent 
7 Adie, K, ‘The Media Portrayal of the Military’ in Badsey Op cit p. 51 
8 Davies, N, Flat Earth News (London: Chatto and Windus 2008) p. 13 
9 Carruthers, S, The media at war (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2000) p. 23 
10 Cited in Eldridge, J, Getting the Message, (London: Routledge, 1993) p. 35 
11 Davies, H, in Eldridge, J, Getting the Message, Op cit p. 36 
12 It is notable that that Curran and Seaton observe no historic correlation between public opinion and the 
political character of the press, quoting the power of the radical press in 1860 when the working class was 
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Media, the plural of medium, covers such things as television, radio, film, newspapers, 
advertising and more recently, the Internet.  We know that the media can have a dramatic 
effect on public opinion: the report on Ethiopia by Michael Buerk for the BBC in July 
1984 raised some £9M for the starving population13.  The situation had been developing 
for many months, and so it is clear that the effects of the BBC and ITV coverage were 
largely responsible for the surge in public donations to the Disasters Emergency 
Committee.  Not until the Buerk report of October 1984 did the situation become a crisis 
in the public’s mind.  Buerk’s first report in July was syndicated to 63 television stations 
around the world; his second report was carried by 425 broadcast stations worldwide, 
with a potential audience estimated at 470 million people.  That led to Band Aid releasing 
a hit single that Christmas.  The subsequent Live Aid concert in July 1985 was watched 
by an estimated 1.5 billion people14.   
 
But it was more than just a financial reward from the public; it galvanised governments 
into action.  Reports anticipating the famine had been coming in for some time:  
 
The entire aid world has been screaming from the rooftops for the last eighteen 
months that what has happened in Ethiopia was about to occur, yet it was only 
when we saw it in colour on the screens in our living rooms that the Government 
acted15.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
divided and defeated, and the election of 1918, where Labour gained 22% of the vote, yet no support from 
any national daily or Sunday newspaper.  In Curran, J, and Seaton, J, Power without Responsibility 
(Abingdon: Routledge 2003 6th Edn) p. 25 
13 Eldridge, J, Getting the Message, Op cit p. 106 
14 Ibid p. 121 
15 Russell Johnston MP, in Hansard 68(1984-5), 22 November 1984 
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Oxfam’s July 1984 report of the likely famine in Wollo and Tigre provinces of Ethiopia 
was ignored by the public and politicians alike.  So, too, were the reports from the 
Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and the International Disasters Institute 
dating back to 198216.   
 
The key questions here are why do some news reports have an effect and others do not?  
What is it about the way things are said or portrayed that makes them more or less 
effective?  How does the public discern the difference between fact and fiction?  And in 
the context of war, what effect does media coverage have?  In particular, do the media 
lead opinion, follow it, reflect it, or run counter to it?  This is avowedly not a sociological 
study, but an historical one, nevertheless, there are opportunities to utilise much of the 
research already carried out by other social and media institutions albeit in a slightly 
different way.  This chapter looks at a series of case studies to try and consider the 
relationship between public views and media coverage: the Mayaguez incident; the 
audience data for Trooping the Colour and the Festival of Remembrance; the fourth series 
of Blackadder; and Soldier Soldier.  It goes on to consider film, theatre and cartoons.  But 
before that, it is necessary to consider a few factors about the nature of the media, and 
how it works. 
 
In 1950, 344 000 television licences were sold.  Only ten years later, the number had 
increased to 10 470 000.  At that time, all of the licences were for black and white 
televisions; colour was introduced in 1967 and the first 20 000 colour licences were 
                                                 
16 Demonstrated by the inaction at the UN General Assembly until Visnews coverage in October 1984 
inspired them to address the issue as their main agenda item. 
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issued in 1968, still a low figure compared with the 15.1 million black and white 
licences17.  Colour only overtook black and white in 1977.  By 2000/1, the BBC issued 
23.4 million TV licences18, albeit Terra Media estimates there to have been nearly an 
additional million sets in use in UK19 whilst BARB estimated 24.1 million homes to have 
televisions in 200020.  The first commercial video cassette recorder (VCR) was produced 
by Philips in 197221.  After a battle over formats (Betamax v VHS) these became 
significant in the 1980s.  The Annan Report22 estimated there to be 40 000 machines in 
use at that time.  By the end of 1985, Crisell estimates there to have been 8.5m VCRs in 
use, and by 1989/90, 60% of all households had a machine23.  Gunter estimated that 70% 
had a machine in 1989, and 80% by 1993; with rises in teletext from 30% to 49% and 
home computers from 26% to 29% over the same period24.  It is simply not possible to 
evaluate how this changed people’s viewing habits or still less their attitudes25, but it is 
reasonable to suppose that people watched rather more television than the broad figures 
below suggest, simply by watching recordings.  Though relevant, VCRs will not be 
considered further in this work because of estimating difficulties.   
 
                                                 
17 http://www.terramedia.co.uk/reference/statistics/television/television_licences.htm accessed 9 January 
2009. 
18 HC 821 Session 2001-2002: 15 May 2002 ‘The BBC: Collecting the Television Licence Fee’ NAO 
Report 
19 http://www.terramedia.co.uk/reference/statistics/television/television_households.htm accessed 9 January 
2009. 
20 http://www.barb.co.uk/tvfacts.cfm?fullstory=true&includepage=ownership&flag=tvfacts accessed 6 
December 2008. 
21 Crisell, A, An Introductory History of British Broadcasting (Abingdon: Routledge 2007 2nd Edn)  p. 215 
22 Annan Committee, The Report of the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting 1977 Cmnd 6753 
23 Crisell Op cit p. 215 
24 Gunter, B, Sancho-Aldridge, J, and Winstone, P, Television: The Public’s View 1993 (London: John 
Libbey 1994) p. 11 
25 Although Gunter’s work quotes the power of having a remote control with the first VCRs!  See Gunter 
Op cit .p. 9 
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Radio licences were combined with television licences in 1946, but the importance of 
radio should not be underestimated.  The peak number of radio licences were issued in 
1950 (11.9 million26), but this declined steadily over the next few years as television took 
over.  The clear implication is that, throughout the period, the vast majority of homes had 
access to radio or television broadcasts. 
 
Newspapers consolidated considerably between the First and Second World Wars, but 
matched that by dramatic increases in circulation, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 http://www.terramedia.co.uk/reference/statistics/radio/radio_licences.htm accessed 9 January 2009. 
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Table 7.1 Newspaper circulation27 
 1910 1939 1951 1960 1970 1974 1997 
Daily 
Express 
900 000 4.2m n/a n/a n/a 3.2m 1.2m 
Daily Mail 900 000 1.5m n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Daily 
Telegraph 
230 000 640 000 n/a n/a 1.4m n/a 1.1m 
News of the 
World 
n/a n/a 8.4m n/a n/a n/a n/a 
People n/a n/a n/a 5.5m n/a n/a n/a 
Sunday 
Pictorial 
n/a n/a n/a 5.5m n/a n/a n/a 
Sunday 
Times28 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.5m 1.2m 1.4m 
 
Circulation increased into the 1960s, with the Daily Express reaching its peak around 
1960 and the Sunday papers performing similarly.  But the 1960s saw the start of the 
decline in circulation as television took over in importance.  Indeed, by 1959, the ITV 
advertising revenue already exceeded the combined revenues of all the Fleet Street 
                                                 
27 Also worthy of note are the ex-Servicemen from the Second World War who went on to take editorial or 
ownership roles in newspapers for the next 30-40 years eg Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Cudlipp (Daily 
Mirror), Colonel David Astor (Observer), Lieutenant Colonel Michael Berry (Daily Telegraph), Major 
Alastair Hetherington (Guardian), Major William Deedes (Daily Telegraph) Major Tiny Lear (News of the 
World), John Junor (Fleet Air Arm pilot) (Sunday Express)  Greenslade R Press Gang (London: Macmillan 
2003) p. 5 
28 Rubenstein, Prof William D,  Professor of Modern History University of Wales – Aberystwyth 
http://www.socialaffairsunit.org.uk/blog/archives/001137.php accessed 9 January 2009. 
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products combined29.  In 1992 it was estimated that 59% of adults read one or more 
national daily newspapers.30  From 1993 onwards, the Office of National Statistics shows 
that the most widely-read newspaper was the Sun (around 22-20%), followed by the rest 
of the tabloids31.  The broadsheets (Daily Telegraph, The Times, Guardian, Independent, 
Financial Times) cumulatively only gained 16% of daily readership in 1993/94, and 12% 
in 2000/01.  Of these, only the Daily Telegraph exceeded the lowest performing tabloid 
(Daily Star) routinely.  But the period from 1960 was not simply about a reduction in 
circulation figures, and fewer titles, but also to a transformation in production from 1986 
and the move from Fleet Street to Wapping.  The move itself was significant; the 
technological change to computer typesetting removed swathes of employees; and the 
implications for faster, easier communication from journalist to reader was transforming. 
 
From these figures, it is evident that, although cinema and radio are significant, 
particularly in the early years, it is newspapers and television that predominate in terms of 
people seeing those media32.  That does not translate directly into effective 
communication of messages however33.  Kate Adie noted that the top three stories of the 
BBC 6 and 9 o’clock news bulletins of 1995 were about the Balkans, yet the headlines 
were ‘in flat variance’ to those of the broadsheets, suggesting that television tends to 
                                                 
29 Sandbrook, D, White Heat (London, Little Brown 2006) p. 242 
30 http://www.editorsweblog.org/2007/12/uk_paper_readership_dips_5m_in.php accessed 9 January 2009 
31 Social Trends 32 Table 13.7 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D5191.csv 
accessed 9 January 2009. 
32 Lloyd suggests that the newspapers became the preserve of the elite.  Lloyd Op cit p. 28.  ‘television is 
now the supreme news medium, in the sense it is used and respected by almost everyone.  It is the only 
news medium presently capable of reaching across the whole of British society.’  Hargreaves, I, and 
Thomas, J, New News, Old News (London: Independent Television Commission and British Standards 
Commission 2002) 
33 Bourdieu suggests that ‘Television (much more than the newspapers) offers an increasingly depoliticized, 
aseptic, bland view of the world, and it is increasingly dragging down the newspapers in its slide to 
demagogy and subordination to commercial values’.  Bourdieu, P, Acts of Resistance (Cambridge: Polity 
Press 1998) p. 74  He goes on to discuss the coverage of the death of Princess Diana as a case in point. 
262  
favour, or focus on, war whereas the broadsheets do not.34 Actually, researchers at 
Cardiff showed that the coverage of newspapers and television was not that different: 
48% of broadcast stories in their research were in papers published earlier that day, and a 
further 42% of stories appear in newspapers the following day35.  Rupert Smith, working 
in London in 1993, focusing on the Balkans, recalls that he relied heavily on the media 
for his contextual information, but equally swiftly found that television can be so 
persuasive that it meant viewers could ignore other reports from other sources because 
the images were so powerful; he therefore took to listening to the radio, and not watching 
television until he had read all the other reports36.  Williamson also noted37, in a study of 
1973 television, that BBC1 and ITV had a particular flavour for retrospective military 
material.  The Glasgow University Media Group38 quoted a BBC survey from 1962 
which demonstrated that 58% of the population used television as their main source of 
news, with only 33% relying on newspapers39.  This is significant given the data above 
which shows that the early 1960s saw peaks in newspaper circulation, whilst television 
licences were still on the increase.  The same survey showed that 68% of those 
interviewed thought that the television news was the most trustworthy, whilst only 6% 
said that of the newspapers.  
 
                                                 
34 Adie, K, Op cit p. 52 [It also reflects a BBC decision in 1992 to expend resources on a permanent 
presence in the Balkans, and hence to use them for regular reports.]  Williamson suggested twenty years 
earlier that the priorities for the television news were those of the minority press, reinforcing Adie’s point.  
Williamson Op cit p. 41 
35 Davies Op cit p. 94 
36 Smith R Op cit p. 340 
37 Williamson Op cit  p. 100 
38 Also known as the Glasgow Media Group and the Glasgow Media Research Unit over time, here used 
interchangeably. 
39 Glasgow University Media Group, Bad News, (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul 1976) p. 1 
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In 1982, it was estimated that the two main evening news programmes had an audience of 
around 16 million people40.  Gunter’s study of 1993 showed that the news was the single 
top item of television output creating the most interest41.   A study by the Independent 
Television Commission on television viewing habits in 2002 showed that 79% of the 
population regarded the television news as their main source of world news42.  This was 
quite closely replicated by the student groups used by the Glasgow Media Group in their 
audience studies on Israeli/Palestinian conflicts in 2001 and 2002, where 82 and 85% of 
students cited the news as their main source of information43.  That said, the broadcaster 
George Alagiah said in a focus group that  
 
In depth it takes a long time, but we’re constantly being told that the attention 
span of our average viewer is about 20 seconds and if we don’t grab people – and 
we’ve looked at the figures – the number of people who shift channels around in 
my programme now at six o’clock, there’s a movement of about 3 million people 
in the first minute, coming in and out44.  
 
This starts to raise doubts about the level of the audience’s understanding – even when 
the apparent audience figures are high and when people respond in surveys that they 
derive their world view from the television news.  Furthermore, Wright-Mills argued that, 
even in 1956, the tendency was for people not to take things from first-hand experience, 
but to not believe them until they read about it in newspapers or heard it on the radio (and 
by modern extension, saw it on television)45. 
 
                                                 
40 Glasgow University Media Group Really Bad News (London: Writers and Readers 1982) p. 1 
41 Gunter Op cit p. 34 Table 3.3 
42 Hargreaves and Thomas Op cit 
43 Philo, G, and Berry, M, Bad News from Israel (London: Pluto Press 2004) p. 210 
44 Bad News from Israel Op cit p. 211 
45 Wright-Mills Op cit p. 311 
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Leaving aside dedicated programmes such as Panorama, This Week and Despatches, it is 
reasonable to suppose that most people draw on the television news programmes for most 
of their information on war and conflict46, and will make their personal assessments 
based on this information.  It is therefore worth considering who watches the news, 
before looking at the content of the news.  The 1975 work by the Glasgow Media Group 
quotes the Annual Review of BBC Audience Research Findings of 1973/447.  It showed 
that most families in UK in the early-1970s watched four or five hours television per day, 
and 60% watched at least one news broadcast.  From 1965 to 1974, figures for the main 
evening news were fairly constant at 17% of the population watching each of the main 
BBC1 and ITV broadcasts.  Both in 1962 and in 1970, those surveyed said that the 
television news was the more accurate and trustworthy, even amongst those who 
favoured newspapers as their main source of information.  But even then, only 62% of 
those interviewed in 1962 thought the BBC to be always impartial, and that had reduced 
to 47% by 197048.  What all this data tells us is that with greater affluence, more people 
bought televisions and relied on the television news for their information on the world.  
In general, the lower classes favoured ITV. As society changed, and people were more 
inclined to question societal norms, so the doubts over impartiality increased – and the 
questions over later programmes from both broadcasters reinforces this point. 
 
                                                 
46 The audience for current affairs programming reduced by 32% between 1994 and 2001.  Hargreaves and 
Thomas Op cit p. 6 
47 Glasgow Media Group Op cit pp. 2-4 
48 Ibid p. 5 
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The really difficult question is how the news is received, and what people make of it.  
Interestingly, a Finnish study in 1971 said that, even with help from an interviewer, 48% 
of people questioned immediately after the news could remember nothing of its content49. 
 
The next question is how the news is portrayed, and how impartial it really is.  
Impartiality in news presentation on television has been an on-going research topic for 
the Glasgow Media Group50.  Since 1975, they have looked at industrial disputes, the 
Falklands War, the Gulf War, Rwanda, Ethiopia and the Israel/Palestine dispute.  Using 
empirical methods, they have used a common methodology for each event.  They have 
recorded television news from all stations (and the availability of affordable and reliable 
VCRs really marked the start of this type of work), and then categorised it by topic area, 
length of time, style of presentation and so on.  They have looked at presenters and 
linguistics in each case.  To look at the audience reaction they have, uniquely, used a 
series of focus groups of varying age groups and socio-economic groups, and in 
particular employed a news game system of inviting individuals and groups to look at a 
series of stills from the news, in order to build a commentary around that issue.  This not 
only allows the researchers to look at the consistency of the story with the original text, 
but also whether common phrases have been recalled.  There a two potential difficulties 
in this approach.  The first is that the Glasgow Media Group was built mainly of 
                                                 
49 Cited in Eldridge, J, and Philo, G, Glasgow Media Group Reader Vol 1: News content, language and 
visuals (Abingdon: Routledge 1995) p. 41 
50 Also relevant is the propaganda model put forward by Herman and Chomsky, which says that the model 
‘suggests that the “societal purpose” of the media is to inculcate and defend the economic, social and 
political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state’.  Herman, E S, and 
Chomsky, N, Manufacturing Consent (London: Vintage 1994) p. 298.  It is not the purpose of this work to 
debate the Chomsky theory, but the evidence put forward in this thesis does suggest that the media will 
generally support a strong governmental line, where there are no internal divisions at elite level, partly 
reflecting availability of information, and in part reflecting what they perceive their 
readers/listeners/viewers want to see and hear. 
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sociologists, with generally a left-leaning political stance51.  The other issue is that of 
focus groups, where discussion can not only bring out memories from the subconscious 
of topics seen on television, but just as easily provide reinforcement of things that might 
not have been there – the modern expression being ‘groupthink’.  Arguably, the BBC is 
bound by its Charter, is state-funded, regulated by Parliament and is ultimately 
constrained to support the state in time of war52.  That said, it retains a considerable 
standing as an impartial and unbiased broadcaster, achieved by journalists ‘balancing a 
story’ – i.e. looking at all sides of the argument53. O’Neill is amongst many who argue 
that the ‘market-place’ drives broadcasters to ‘present news in a way which is congruent 
with the pre-existing values and beliefs of its audience’54.  In other words, you get what 
you want and expect to hear55. 
 
One of the questions in presenting news is ‘Who says so?’  At the political level, most 
broadcasters tend towards use of a minister or senior civil servant for information.  This 
has some problems in that the media are then reliant on the accuracy of what that 
individual says.  Governments will attempt to manipulate the news by only giving certain 
information at a particular time.  The Wakeham attempt to ensure that all Government 
                                                 
51 Certainly the early work on industrial relations shows a greater concern for particular interpretations of 
‘the facts’, and the letter sent by the Glasgow Group to the BBC and the IBA pointing formally to the 
existence of bias in television, signed by over 100 people, included the General Secretaries of twenty-two 
Trades Unions and seventy-three MPs including Tony Benn, Ian Mikardo, Michael Meacher and Joan 
Maynard, demonstrates a particular concern from the left-wing in politics. 
52 Lloyd (editor Financial Times) argues that the state always has ultimate power over the media, because 
of legal controls, but equally that politicians need the media to provide access to the people.  Lloyd, J, What 
the Media are doing to our Politics (London: Constable 2004) p. 13 
53 Adie, K, Op cit p. 68 
54 O’Neill, J, in Belsey, A, and Chadwick, R, (ed) Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media (Abingdon: 
Routledge 1992) p. 22 
55 This is not to say that you always get what you ask for.  Newspaper condemnation over Suez led to a fall 
in circulation and an angry response at the News Chronicle, and significantly at the Daily Mirror.  The 
Observer lost advertisers, but not readers.  As Cudlipp recognised, the populace want to support their 
troops in combat.  Greenslade, Press Gang Op cit p. 136 
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departments spoke ‘from the same hymn sheet’ during the Gulf War was an example of 
how this can be used56.  One of the changes over the four decades has been the increasing 
political commentary as opposed to simply news presentation57.  Hence the change from 
the style of the 1950s and early 1960s: ‘Have you anything to say to us Prime Minister?’ 
to the reported style of Harold Evans - ‘Always ask yourself, when you interview a 
politician – why is this bastard lying to me?58’ - which reflects the cultural change in 
diminishing respect for authority.  We know from the Glasgow Group’s work that the 
initial framework set for a topic is the frame of reference generally picked up and retained 
by the public, even if events subsequently move on, or if explanations change.  An 
example of this would be the explanations surrounding the shooting of three IRA 
personnel on Gibraltar.  Work by the Glasgow Group showed that the public were quite 
convinced of a number of elements: that the individuals were armed; that there was a 
bomb; and that a key witness was a prostitute.  All of these elements subsequently proved 
to be false, but they were part of the early broadcasts and were retained by the public as 
the key framework against which to judge the actions of British Servicemen59.   
 
Another example of selective release of information is the lobby correspondent scheme.  
The Parliamentary lobby correspondent system is self -policed by the lobby 
                                                 
56 It also reflects Chomsky’s assertion that ‘It is necessary to whip up the population in support of foreign 
adventures.  Usually the population is pacifist, just like they [the US public] were during the First World 
War.  The public sees no reason to get involved in foreign adventures, killing and torture.  So you have to 
whip them up.  And to whip them up you have to frighten them.’  Chomsky N Media Control (New York: 
Seven Stories 2002 2nd Edn) p30.  This plays to the demonization of enemy leaders to support war eg 
Hussein, Galtieri, Milosevic etc. 
57 Lloyd Op cit p16 states that there were no political columnists in the 1950s, but Hugo Young listed at 
least 221 in the early 2000s. 
58 Ibid p17 
59 Eldridge, J, Kitzinger, J, and Williams, K, The Mass Media & Power in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1997) p. 161 
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correspondents but allows advanced access to white papers and off the record 
conversations with parliamentarians provided they are not quoted.  This provides a useful 
outlet for parliamentarians, and offers exclusive information to the media, but it does 
allow for claims that it prevents proper journalistic analysis and challenge in a balanced 
way.  Arguably, the process of embedding journalists with designated units in the Gulf 
War, as described in the MOD rules mentioned in the Campaigns chapter had a similar 
effect.  The access to the military allowed unprecedented coverage of what was 
happening in that particular segment of the battlefield, but the press were confined to 
whatever they were fed by their minders.  A significant change between 1960-2000 is the 
reduction in the number of journalists with military experience, which inevitably has an 
effect on the level of understanding between military and media, and the way news is 
subsequently portrayed60.   
 
In an industrial example of dustmen’s strikes, the Glasgow Group determined that the 
source of ‘facts’ tended to be management, whereas the labour side provided detail on 
‘events’ such as picket lines or demonstrations.  The parallel with the Armed Forces is 
the tendency in both television and newspapers to rely on senior officers for an 
interpretation of the strategy, and on soldiers for their ‘feelings’ on what was going on – 
the coverage of the Gulf conflict for No 15 Squadron in Dhahran being a good example, 
where Wing Commander John Broadbent was used to describe the operation, but junior 
officers and other ranks provided personal feelings on their deployment61.  In the 
                                                 
60 Taylor, P, ‘Myths: Military ,Media and IRA’ in Badsey Op cit p. 182a 
61 The Times 4 February 1991 for example. 
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Falklands, the UK side was presented by civil servant Ian MacDonald, with comments 
from deployed commanders such as Julian Thompson and Sandy Woodward. 
 
The next part of the question is ‘What is said’.  Part of the Glasgow Group’s criticism of 
the television news is that it fails to give the context to allow the public a greater 
understanding of the issues.  They use the example of Israel and Palestine to illustrate this 
point62.  There is not space here to rehearse the historical background to the dispute, but 
the coverage of the intifada in September 2000 to the Egyptian peace talks in October 
2000 included some 91 news broadcasts63.  The effectiveness of that coverage, and the 
understanding it brought, might have been greater had there been greater reference to the 
war of 1948, the forced displacement of Palestinians, the war of 1967 and the borders it 
produced, and the subsequent policies on settlement expansion and Israeli insistence on 
road control in and around Palestinian settlements.  The demonstration of this lies in the 
responses of students to the news as measured in 200164.  82% relied on the television 
news as their main source of information.  66% did not know who occupied the occupied 
territories.  Only 20% recognised the settlers to be Israelis.  Only 8% correctly identified 
that the Palestinians had suffered a lot more casualties than the Israelis. The only 
conclusion from this group is that the television news either did not provide sufficient 
                                                 
62 Philo G and Berry M, Bad News from Israel (London: Pluto Press 2004) Chapter 1 pp.1-88.  In More 
Bad News by the Glasgow Media Group in 1980 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980), the team 
alleges that the news is partial because the only explanation provided in the 1975 wages dispute is that 
wage increases are responsible for inflation.  Other explanations such as material cost increases, lack of 
capital investment and increasing profits are ignored in favour of the Government (and majority) view.  
Their contention is that this is mutually reinforcing in the public mind; that as they believe it so 
broadcasters continue with that message.  This may or may not be the case; arguably wage increases must 
be contributory to price inflation.  Nevertheless, the Israeli example makes a similar if less emotive and 
controversial point. 
63 Bad News from Israel  Op cit p. 100 
64 Bad News from Israel Op cit pp. 261-5 
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information for the public to recognise the true causes and effects of the conflict, or that 
the level of interest or recollection was not strong enough for this to have made a 
significant impression.  A good summary was made by a female participant from a low 
income group in Glasgow.  She said that the Israel/Palestinian problem could be solved if 
the Palestinians would just stop throwing stones.  When she was told that the Palestinians 
had lost their homes, she said that if you knew that, you’d throw bricks yourself65.   
 
Philo suggests that, in the possible context of Conservatives and Labour agreeing that the 
public sector needs to be reduced in size and that taxation should not be increased, the 
media would reflect and reinforce that consensus66.  The parallel is that the media will 
seek to exploit divisions at the political and elite levels67.  Dixon argues that the fact that 
politicians recognise this likely outcome causes them to adopt a bi-partisan approach68.  
There are numerous examples in the context of coverage or war and conflict where this 
can be demonstrated: the political opposition to the Falklands and Gulf Wars by people 
such as Tony Benn69; the divisions over war aims in the Gulf War – whether to seek 
regime change in 1991; and different explanations for the shooting of IRA terrorists in 
Gibraltar.  Wilton and Clifford make a similar point from the Bosnia campaign, where the 
proximity of major military and other headquarters allowed journalists to telephone or 
visit each location quickly and to seek discrepancies or divisions which then became a 
story70.  In a reverse way, Bloody Sunday was made twenty years after the event; 
                                                 
65 Bad News from Israel Op cit p. 259 
66 Philo G ed.  Message Received (Harlow: Longman 1999) p. xi 
67 Badsey used the example of the war in Iraq in 2003 to demonstrate the point.  Badsey interview Op cit. 
68 Dixon P Op cit p. 99 
69 Adie suggests that the political elites will, by and large, have the strongest voices in any media debate; 
only rarely are they unlikely to determine the character of media coverage. Adie, K,  Op cit p. 66 
70 Clifford and Wilton Op cit pp. 16-17 
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programme-maker Peter Taylor was able to demonstrate that this was ‘an undisciplined 
cock-up, not a conspiracy’ using interviews with the Company Sergeant-Major and the 
then commanding officer, Derek Wilford, which dispelled myths of conspiracy in favour 
of truth71. 
 
If there is one thing that the period has produced, it is a panoply of dramas regarding war, 
from films to television dramas to comedy.  From The Great War72 documentary, to the 
thirty-two different series73 between 1959 and 1974 on the adventures of secret agents of 
various types (a reflection of the Cold War), to comedies such as Blackadder, ‘Allo ‘Allo, 
and Get Some In!, war and conflict has been explored in a whole range of ways.  
Examples of these types form part of the case studies, so it is worth considering the effect 
that fiction has on people’s attitudes.  Kitzinger draws attention to this in her work on 
audience reception74.  She reports on a sexually abused 16 year-old girl’s reaction to the 
character of Beth Jordache who was abused in Brookside:  
 
Before that everything I saw seemed to say that if you were abused you’d be 
strange, different, keep yourself in a wee corner.  Watching Beth has really helped 
me75.   
 
Watching fiction clearly has an impact; Kitzinger also relates that many children when 
asked had seen the film Pulp Fiction, and could relate to the killers Vince and Jules.  But 
                                                 
71 Taylor, P, Op cit p. 36 
72 The biggest documentary made for television by that time and used to launch BBC2.  Criticised by the 
Imperial War Museum for not making clear which scenes were reconstructed as opposed to original 
material but nevertheless a powerful series.  Bond, B, Op cit pp. 68-9 
73 Sandbrook, D, White Heat, (London, Little Brown 2006) p. 377 
74 Kitzinger, J, ‘A sociology of media power: key issues in audience reception research’, in Philo G, 
Message received Op cit p. 1 
75 Ibid 
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that did not mean they immediately went out to rob or kill indiscriminately – though 
Philo points out the cases of a sixteen year-old boy who was convicted for a murder in 
1997 using a machete where he had documented a ‘rule-set’ taken from television 
programmes, and a random murder by two boys in 1994 that had been created by their 
obsession with the exploits of the SAS and in particular, Bravo Two-Zero.  But these are 
exceptions: by and large the public are quite clearly discerning.  But they can reproduce 
with considerable accuracy elements of the dialogue, and certain images evidently leave a 
lasting impression.  Memory recall does not equate to understanding however.  The 
description of a false rape accusation in the film Disclosure certainly related to how 
vulnerable people felt in their own lives76, demonstrating the power of fiction to influence 
real life attitudes.  But the other point to make from Kitzinger’s work is that a single 
message can be received in very different ways by a diverse audience.  The final book in 
Pat Barker’s trilogy, The Ghost Road (1995) contains a last scene with a Lieutenant 
Hallet repeatedly crying out ‘shotvarfet’, a cry taken up by the other soldiers, and 
assumed by the psychologist Rivers to be ‘It’s not worth it’ – but Bond suggests that this 
is 1990s ‘whingeing’ transposed to 191877. 
 
Adie’s examination of the BBC news of 199578 shows that, despite the presence of 
British troops in Bosnia, the media preferred action to inaction.  With apparent quiet in 
Bosnia, five stories appeared in the top three items on particular evenings: a British 
soldier involved in a fatal car accident in Cyprus; two Scots Guards gaoled for murder in 
Belfast; disciplining of members of The Parachute Regiment for assault; the enforced 
                                                 
76 Ibid p. 6 
77 Bond B Op cit pp76-7 
78 Adie K, Op cit p54 
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retirement of ACM Sir Sandy Wilson; and the case of Private Lee Clegg (The Parachute 
Regiment) resurfaced.  The common theme of all these stories is the exposure of those in 
whom the media [and by implication society at large] place a higher responsibility and 
trust, who are perceived to have failed to meet the required standards.  Few professions 
outside politics and the law attract such attention, even in some cases for many years after 
leaving the Services (the often-termed ‘former soldier’ in news reports).  The other side 
of the coin is the apparent respect by the public for members of the Armed Forces:  
 
Ask British television viewers what they remember of British troops in Bosnia 
and they will recall not the military manoeuvres, or the negotiations, or the 
statistics, but the faces and the voices under their blue berets!79   
 
This says a lot, albeit from a reporter’s perspective, about the public engagement with 
junior soldiers, rather than leaders.  The comments here also reflect the difference 
between ‘peace’ and ‘war’: ‘when the nation moves from peace to war, the focus changes 
from the banal to the dramatic’80. 
 
The final part of this section concerns how news is presented.  The Glasgow Media 
Group’s work on industrial relations in 1975 had many examples to show that all is not 
quite as it seems.  For example, an ITN broadcast from 1 May 1975 which said  
 
On a day when nearly 8000 car workers were made idle by a dispute in the 
Midlands, the president of the motor manufacturers’ society, Sir Raymond 
Brooks, has said no major British firm is making a profit81.   
 
                                                 
79 Adie, K, Op cit p. 59 
80 Pickup, Lt Cdr D J, ‘The Media and the Minder: The Royal Navy’s Perspective’ in Badsey Op cit p. 147 
81 ITN 1750 1 May 1975 cited in Bad News, Op cit p. 25 
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The linkage here is clearly made between disputes and lack of profits – which may or 
may not be true, but is an implied linkage.  Similarly, the news tends to broadcast images 
from the factory gates during disputes and, if there are going to be any interviews, they 
are done in the heat of the moment rather than in the calm, more measured environment 
of the studio, where the management and politicians are usually interviewed.  So there are 
questions here about imagery, frameworks within which the issue is set for public 
consumption, the choice of language, and subtle messages on who is interviewed and 
how that is conducted.  The relevance of the industrial examples is that by extrapolation, 
coverage of war and conflict is equally partial, no matter what the intent of the 
broadcasters.  In the length of time available to cover the issues, some will be deemed 
more newsworthy than others, access to film material will be limited by resources, and 
there will be choices made about what the public wants to hear and see. As an example, 
Martin Bell (BBC) was asked by a London newsroom editor ‘Is there blood?  We don’t 
want to see any blood, at least not before the nine pm watershed82.’ To that extent, the 
message coming from the television news is different from the newspapers with a slightly 
less tight timeline for production, and more space for analysis.  
 
We know that pictures are very effective and well-remembered – Eddie Adams’ image of 
a Vietcong suspect being shot in the head by General Loan, chief of South Vietnamese 
police, and that of a girl running burning from a napalm attack are some of the best 
known images of the Vietnam War83.  Equally, Sontag’s syndrome of the 1970s, later 
                                                 
82 Cited in Stewart, I, ‘Reporting Conflicts: Who calls the Shots?’ in Badsey Op cit p. 70 
83 McLaughlin, G, The War Correspondent (London: Pluto 2002) p. 32.  The debate between Hallin and 
Culbert over whether public opinion really led to the US exit from Vietnam and the power of the media 
uses the 1968 Loan shooting as a key factor.  Robinson reflects that the image of the shooting at least gave 
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dubbed ‘compassion fatigue’ of reducing public sympathy through prolonged exposure to 
such images is also a factor84.  That said, a Harris poll from 1967 said that, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that the war was terminated for lack of public support caused by the 
media coverage, 64% of people in the US said that the coverage had made them more 
supportive of the war effort, and only 26% said it had intensified their opposition85.  This 
is supported by analysis by Hallin and Lichty looking at coverage of combat in Vietnam 
which showed a very small proportion actually included US casualties.86  Nevertheless, 
Knightley quotes Robin Day as having questioned at RUSI whether a democracy with 
televisions at home would ever be able to fight a war again, no matter how just87.   War 
imagery certainly affected photographers such as George Rodgers, photographer for Life 
magazine:  
 
I lived with the horrors of war for a very long time.  It’s one of those sorts of 
things that does eventually fade with the seasons because the memory’s like an 
herbaceous border.  But I couldn’t look at the Belsen pictures for a good 45 years.  
They lay in a box and did nothing.  I think, at last, they no longer have the power 
to affect me88.  
                                                                                                                                                 
people who were already concerned about the Vietnam War some evidence to support a policy change.  
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The Falklands coverage was tightly controlled for ‘operational’ reasons.  Not least was 
the need for reporters to use scant military communications systems to get stories back to 
the UK.  Pictures of casualties from the land fighting were not broadcast until the fighting 
was over.  The BBC ‘complained of being told not to use a picture of a body bag and to 
remove the phrase: “horribly burned”89.’  Michael Nicholson was allegedly told by 
Captain Middleton of HMS Hermes that the ITN crew were ‘an embarrassment to him90.’  
Brian Hanrahan’s report of the Argentine bombing at Bluff Cove was delayed while the 
sentence was removed: ‘Other survivors came off unhurt but badly shaken after hearing 
the cries of the men trapped below91.’   These and many other examples led to the 
criticism of the MOD for its close control of the media92, and reveal an attempt to 
maintain public morale by manipulation of the media.  Media coordination under Ian 
MacDonald at the MOD was based on official formal briefings, with no off-the-record 
debate, and a very formalised distance between the media and the MOD.  The BBC’s 
reaction to the adverse criticism in the House of Commons after the Panorama 
programme described in Chapter 6 and the subsequent mauling received by the Director-
General at the House of Commons Select Committee was to be even more sensitive to 
topics to be covered.  For both ITN and BBC were already applying their own censorship 
of what they perceived the public might not or should not hear and see93.  But the BBC 
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then specifically ruled out (with some subsequent exceptions) interviews with the 
bereaved, and positive interviews with Argentine diplomats94.  Coverage was also 
affected by inter-Service rivalries, each one keen to ensure their own activities were at 
least proportionately broadcast95.  The Royal Navy, in particular, felt that they had come 
off ‘worst’, in that they perceived that the public should have focused on the need for 
surface ships for such operations (post the Nott Review of 1981) yet the media had led 
them to focus on Argentinean bombs and the loss of HMS Sheffield and HMS Antelope 
(amongst others)96. 
 
The Glasgow Media Group looked at the coverage97 of two specific incidents – the 
sinking of the Belgrano and the bombing of Port Stanley airfield.  In the former case, 
they found a reluctance to report any suggestion that the vessel was well outside the 
Exclusion Zone, and still less any proposition that it was heading in another direction.  
Instead, they found most references to survivors, rather than a debate about casualties.  In 
contrast, the subsequent sinking of HMS Sheffield was marked by stories of casualties, 
rather than survivors – demonstrating the different focus for ‘us’ and ‘them’.  In general, 
this story was portrayed in a pro-Government manner, which thus fixed the story in the 
public mind.  Interestingly, the overly jingoistic approach of the Sun led to a fall in 
circulation98.  In a Gallup poll in September 198499, 91% of those interviewed said they 
had read or heard something of the sinking of the Belgrano.  Of those, 49% believed it 
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had been right to sink the ship, with 31% being against.  This suggests that the media had 
been effective in getting coverage of the event across, but the justification for the case in 
the intervening two years to the time of the poll had been undermined through subsequent 
analysis or rejection of the initial media message.  Tellingly, 65% felt that Mrs Thatcher 
had not told the whole truth about the Belgrano affair.   In the latter case, the efforts of 
the Vulcan bomber aircraft to close the runway using dumb bombs, followed up by Sea 
Harrier attacks were depicted by the Government as successful.  This was the flavour of 
all subsequent reporting, even when it became apparent that the islands were indeed 
being resupplied from the mainland and that reinforcements were being flown in; 
Argentine film of a Hercules transport using the runway and of a crashed Harrier was 
dismissed as fake.  The airfield simply was not closed.  The Glasgow Media Group’s 
analysis concludes that the opinion poll evidence of vast majority support for the 
Government’s actions was swayed by the framing of the questions which did not allow 
for viable alternatives.  They suggest that the media coverage was limited by MoD 
control, yet set its own editorial rules according to what it saw as the public’s needs for 
information.  It is not evident, from the analysis of the opinion poll data in Chapter 6 that 
the framing of questions was consistently swayed, and so it is hard to justify a conclusion 
that the public did not necessarily support the Government’s actions and might not have 
done had they known all the facts.  But it is certainly true to say that the media coverage 
was filtered in time and content.  What is less clear, given a lack of contemporary 
audience research, is what the public actually made of what they were told. 
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The Gulf War was covered by 1500 journalists in the region, and many more at home. 
Keeble suggests that all the Fleet Street newspapers supported the military response 
together with 95% of columnists100.  At one end of the scale were the semi-humorous 
pictures from 7th Armoured Brigade of two soldiers in vests, underpants and gas masks 
under a caption ‘On patrol in the Gulf’ which initiated a request from the Prime Minister 
through the Defence Secretary for information to the Brigade Commander101.  On the 
other end of the scale, the first night of bombing, including reports from Baghdad, was 
watched by the largest television audience in history102.   
 
Media coverage included numerous sequences from aircraft camera pods, showing the 
precision of guided weapons, with the intended effect of demonstrating a highly 
technological conflict, with high precision (implying low casualty rates), despite the fact 
that only 7-8% of weapons used in the conflict were guided munitions.  In contrast to 
Vietnam, the fact that 489 napalm bombs were used on the trenches in the Gulf War did 
not receive much coverage103.  The extensive coverage of guided weapons had an 
unexpected effect in that it made the attack on a Baghdad air raid shelter at Al-Amiriya 
on 13 February 1991 (thought to be a military target) more surprising.  The heavy loss of 
civilian lives104 did not fit with the framework of imagery of precision bombing.  Perhaps 
this explains in part why the coverage was cut by ITN and carefully framed by Peter 
Sissons talking to Jeremy Bowen for the BBC at the site to suggest that it could have 
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been a military facility105.  The shots at the end of the conflict of the bombed convoy to 
Basra (the so-called ‘highway of death’) again did not fit the image of a technological 
war of few casualties, and had to be framed as a military necessity to prevent further use 
of the troops on offensive operations.  Veteran reporter John Pilger was amongst those 
critical of the lack of reporting of casualties of the war as not being newsworthy106.  
 
The big difference between the Falklands coverage and that of the Gulf War was that in 
the former only British journalists were allowed with the Task Force, and under heavy 
censorship and limited access to satellite links, their reports were delayed and neutered.  
In contrast, the Gulf War will be remembered more for the omni-present CNN, especially 
in Baghdad, and the constant feed of information.  Though many journalists were 
embedded, others were free to roam, giving a rather different picture of the war, less 
managed by Governments.  The speed of response led to errors; for example, allegations 
of the use of chemical weapons by a NBC reporter in Israel took time to be corrected, 
leaving an impression of the use of Scuds with chemical in-fills.   Because access to the 
front line was limited, reports had to be made from further back in Saudi Arabia and 
elsewhere.  Reports were therefore framed as ‘I have been informed that’; in fact, the 
information had been passed by London offices to reporters in theatre and was played 
back to give added authenticity107.   
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At the political and elite level, Philo108 suggests that there were attempts by US, UK and 
French politicians to shape opinion on the decision to go to war, the conduct of the war, 
the attitudes to casualties and expectations for success.  For example, the French last 
minute peace initiative is viewed as a cynical attempt by the French government to show 
that they had done all they could and were therefore now justified in going to war.  Sean 
McKnight also points out the over-estimation of Iraqi forces by the Sunday Times Insight 
team and Professor Paul Rogers at Bradford University when he wrote in the Guardian 
and Newsweek on the conduct of the air war109.  And the evidence of the massive 
coverage of precision bombing shows tight media control and an attempt to demonstrate 
both technological prowess and concern for casualties.   
 
Did it work for the public?  Certainly support for the Government was high and remained 
high.  But the media turned at the end of the war, showing shots of the ‘Highway of 
Death’ and the plight of the Kurds, which led to the concept of Safe Havens under 
Operation Provide Comfort, although no protection was provided to the Shias in the 
south, perhaps due to the lack of television coverage)110.  All this shows the difficulty for 
politicians in managing the press, and the ability of the public and elites to question what 
they see, forcing reaction by politicians as the Kurdish example shows.  McKnight argues 
that there was a greater role for academia to play in producing accurate data for public 
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(and political) assessment, but that most US and UK sources were grossly in error111.  
Rupert Smith recalls looking at all the BBC and ITV news coverage from the deployment 
of his force during the Gulf War to the ceasefire, and in particular ‘how the word pictures 
were appealing to memories of the pictures of the trenches of the First World War or the 
bombing of the Second’112.  It is not quite clear how these images relate to the First 
World War; on the face it these would appear totally dissimilar conflicts, but the fact that 
these images evoke thoughts of the First World War in particular is significant and 
supports the theme expressed elsewhere in this thesis. 
 
The power of the media to influence public opinion and galvanise a campaign is put 
succinctly by Andrew Marr:  
 
When a civil conflict is relayed in all its horror to tens of millions of voters every 
night by television, the pressure to do something, to separate the sides and succour 
the suffering, is intense.  But mostly this requires not air attacks but a full-scale 
ground force, which will be drawn into the war, and must be followed by years of 
aid and rebuilding.  Will the same voters be happy to keep paying, and keep 
accepting the casualties that follow?113 
 
And the answer that emerges from the opinion polls on Bosnia and Kosovo114 as 
highlighted in Chapter 6 is that on the whole for such small wars of an interventionist and 
moralist nature with national survival not at stake, then no, the public would not. 
 
Case Study 1.  The Mayaguez – ‘We got them all out, thank God.  It went perfectly115.’ 
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The Mayaguez was an American vessel seized off the coast of Cambodia on 12 May 
1975, at the end of the Vietnam War.  We know a great deal about broadcast news 
coverage of the incident because it occurred during part of the period covered by the 
Glasgow Media Group in looking at industrial relations.  The basic synopsis can be 
drawn from Christopher Wain’s coverage for the BBC 2200 hrs news on 15 May 1975: 
 
The Mayaguez incident had started on Monday when the …ship was seized by a 
Cambodian gunboat while steaming through the Gulf of Thailand en route to 
Settapao.  It was an act of piracy said President Ford.  He ordered a task force 
from the Seventh Fleet to go in and get the prisoners out.  It all took time.  On 
Tuesday, two battalions of US marines, 1,100 men, arrived at U Tapao airbase in 
southern Thailand.  Meanwhile the aircraft carrier Coral Sea … was moving to a 
point mid-way between U Tapao and the island of Koh Tang, where the 
Mayaguez was lying.  By Wednesday the battle plan was ready.  A US Navy 
Corsair fighter bomber sank three Cambodian gunboats and immobilised four 
others.  And as darkness fell, the aircraft direction destroyer, Holt, moved into the 
area.  Her task was to guide the marine assault helicopters into Koh Tang.  
According to some reports the first wave of 135 marines flew into the attack 
direct from Thailand, but that’s not likely.  The aircraft almost certainly stopped 
to refuel on board the Coral Sea before the dawn attack.  They went in at 
midnight our time last night.  They were flying in on CH53-D heavy assault 
helicopters, each one carrying 37 marines and 3 crew.  One helicopter apparently 
landed on the Mayaguez.  The marines hurriedly searched the ship but found she 
was empty, the others stormed ashore and it was here that they started taking 
casualties.  According to the reports from Washington, three helicopters were lost.  
One was shot down, the others crashed into the sea just offshore.  The marines 
were pinned down by gunfire from the waiting Cambodians, but those ordered to 
search for the missing sailors couldn’t find a sign of them.  …At 10 in the 
morning … a Thai fishing boat came out from the Cambodian mainland flying a 
white flag and according to the reports from Washington all 39 of the missing 
crewmembers were on board the ship.  They were transferred to the destroyer 
Wilson and President Ford announced that the operation was over and was a 
success116. 
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In fact, subsequent analysis showed that intelligence had failed, and that the marines 
attacking Koh Tang faced not a small bunch of captors, but an elite unit of Khmer Rouge 
troops.  The 39 crewmembers were actually released before the start of the US bombing 
of the mainland.  The use of a Thai base for the US operation created a severe diplomatic 
row between Bangkok and Washington.  The final figures, according to Johnson and 
Tierney, showed 41 marines dead, many injured, several helicopters lost and the marines 
position on Koh Tang nearly overrun117.  Three marines who were left behind by accident 
were captured and subsequently executed.  The reason for the additional deaths quoted by 
Johnson stemmed from his research in the Gerald Ford Presidential Library, which 
showed that another 23 servicemen were killed in a helicopter crash as part of the rescue 
mission118.  This news was kept from the press for a week, and when finally released, the 
Pentagon said these men were not part of the operation.  The only significance here is that 
if the public had linked the additional 23 deaths to the first group, they might have been 
less inclined to view this as a success for the country and the President. 
 
The seizure was the top news item for all news programmes on 12 May 1975, pushing out 
a report on the disaster at the chemicals plant at Flixborough.  On 13 May 1975, both 
BBC and ITV showed coverage, again as the first main news item, of the vessel anchored 
at Koh Tang.  ITN was the first to break the news of the deployment of US marines to U 
Tapao to undertake the rescue mission.  All the news stations covered the destruction of 
Cambodian gunboats around the Mayaguez on 14 May 1975 as their main item, with later 
news editions covering the protests from the Thai government over the US action.  
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Coverage that evening in the BBC1 and ITN main news slots swamped any other item by 
their duration (5:27 for BBC1 2100 hrs and 7:43 for ITN 2200 hrs).  The news on 15 May 
1975, with the exception of the BBC1 news at 1745 hrs, all had the recovery of the 
Mayaguez as the lead item, with over 8 and 9 minutes coverage by the BBC1 and ITN 
2100 and 2200 hrs editions respectively.  The following day, the news item only reached 
around the seventh highest item in each news programme, falling behind cost of living 
increases and the Armed Forces pay rise.  The final day of coverage of the issue was 17 
May 1975 when the vessel arrived in Singapore amidst considerable Thai protests and 
demonstrations.  Apart from the 2320 hrs late BBC2 news, the Mayaguez again was the 
main headline for each broadcast.  For much of the week, only library pictures of the 
Mayaguez were available (and then only black and white images).  In fact, that black-
and-white image was used 25 times during the week119.  The only ‘current’ pictures were 
of the vessel in Singapore120; the marines at U Tapao; and the most relevant – the marines 
landing at Koh Tang121. 
 
The UK public’s view of the incident is hard to gauge.  The opinion polls taken by Gallup 
on the conduct of the Vietnam War in May 1975 show the biggest rise in % of people 
who sought the beginning of US troop withdrawals through the conflict – from 41% in 
March 1975 to 47% in May 1975122.  It also showed a 5% increase (to 42%) in the 
numbers of people who thought that the British support for US policy in Vietnam was 
wrong.  It is not possible to link these changes in views to the Mayaguez incident 
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definitively, both because of a lack of clarity over the precise dates but also because 
specific questions were not asked about this incident. 
 
The Times commenced its coverage on 13 May 1975 with a front page article (though not 
the main item) entitled ‘US warships sail for seas of Cambodia after “act of piracy”’123.  
At that early stage, even The Times incorrectly named the vessel as the Mayaquez.  The 
paper reported that  
 
there was an immediate and outraged reaction amongst conservatives in Congress.  
Senator James Buckley of New York said that the President should order 
immediate and punitive air and naval attacks in Cambodia124.  
 
But the newspaper went on to question the legality of attacks under the War Powers Act.  
On the following day, the paper reported the first gunfire damage to an aircraft which had 
been watching the vessel.  In its front page report, the paper said that ‘The Mayaguez is a 
powerful merchantman, seized on the high seas, and can be rescued at once with a 
minimum of force125.’ It is not clear from where they gained this impression. 
 
The story became the lead item on 15 May 1975, under the banner ‘US Marines seize 
captured ship off Cambodia after gunboats are sunk126.’  As the paper went on to report 
the President’s order to land on Koh Tang, it was suggested that US bases on Thailand 
might be being used for the attack, in which case ‘Thailand has no longer any strategic 
importance whatever to the Americans, and Thai threats to expel them carry very little 
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weight127.’ This report seems not to have fully captured the international significance and 
to have misread the situation.  For the first time the editorial commented on the incident, 
giving qualified support to the US policy:  
 
That United States forces should have again been involved in Indo-China is of 
course a matter of regret.  But this time it would be difficult to blame the 
administration for what occurred128. 
 
It went on to say that the incident represents a series of unfortunate circumstances, 
including the apparent (at that stage) use of Thai bases.  From 16 May 1975, the flavour 
of reporting moved to casualties – the main headline being ’14 US Marines feared dead 
after battle on island129.’  The article reported 14 men missing, 3 helicopters lost and 
several hit.  It recognised the intelligence error that the crew were not still on the island of 
Koh Tang, and that, just as the marines were landing, a transcript of a broadcast from 
Phnom Penh was received in the White House to say that the crew were being released 
immediately and unconditionally, but that this was too late to stop the air strike on a 
Cambodian air base.  The tone from the US was still belligerent:  
 
“I think other nations are going to leave us alone”, he [Senator Barry Goldwater] 
said, “Had he [the President] not done what he did, every little half-assed nation 
in this world would be taking shots at us130.’   
 
The editorial that day stuck to a supportive line, describing it as ‘A well-handled affair’, 
‘good for American morale’, ‘He [the President] seems to have managed well’ and ‘What 
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ever the explanation [of the Cambodian action] the reaction of the United States appears 
on present evidence to have been both right and effectively executed.’131  This seems to 
be more positive than the emerging picture of intelligence failure and rising casualties 
seemed to imply.   
 
Despite all the media coverage over several days, the only letter published on the incident 
was from a Mr Christopher Wood (no apparent authority), who is unconvinced by the US 
explanations of the incident, but views it as an example of the superpowers’ 
unwillingness to abide by international territorial waters.  The UK coverage in this 
particular paper seems surprisingly uncritical overall, despite the emerging evidence.   
 
Coverage in other newspapers varied.  The Daily Mail carried the story as its main front 
page article on 13 May 1975132, and again on 15 May 1975133, with a slightly smaller 
front page article on 14 May 1975134.  Further analysis was provided inside the paper, 
with comments on 15 May 1975135 that the American action was justified against an act 
of piracy, and that the ‘successful’ action represented a ‘much-needed shot in the arm’ on 
16 May 1975136.  That day’s coverage included a double-page spread entitled ‘Moment of 
triumph – how Ford took the news that a gamble had paid off’.  But despite the extensive 
coverage, no letters were published from the public on the incident.  The Daily Mirror 
had somewhat less front page coverage on 13 May 1975137, and indeed nothing on 14 
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May 1975138 – suggesting that this was not a significant issue for Mirror readers; 
coverage being more extensive on the economy and Europe.  But the story returned to 
front page on 15 May 1975139, and again on 16 May 1975140 under the headline 
‘Whoopee in the White House’ with the article going on to describe the action as a 
‘display of strength’.  But again, there are no letters that week or subsequently on the 
incident. 
 
 The lack of a great public response, at least demonstrated by the single letter in just one 
paper, suggests that the public were either not particularly interested in the event, as it did 
not involve UK forces or national interests, or it may suggest that the public were 
essentially supportive of the line as framed in the news coverage of an appropriate 
response to an act of piracy, well-led and well-executed.  Subsequent evidence did not 
affect public attitudes sufficiently to provoke a response.  That is not to say that foreign 
wars do not capture public attention on all occasions; the anti-Vietnam campaign drew 
large numbers of supporters for their march on 27 October 1968, bringing together a 
spread of left-wing groups141. 
 
From a US perspective, the public viewed the incident rather differently.  In a poll, 79% 
of the respondents viewed the President’s handling of the incident positively142.  Indeed, 
Ford used the Mayaguez incident in his re-election campaign in 1976, when he could 
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easily have been apologising for what might appear a blunder. In a Harris poll taken on 
23-25 May 1975, 76% of Americans agreed that ‘after losing Vietnam and Cambodia, the 
United States had no choice but to take decisive action, even risking a bigger war, to get 
back the ship and crew143.’   
 
There are some interesting lessons to be drawn from this perception. First, it was apparent 
that the US public were far more interested in success, than the possibility of taking 
casualties (which in fact did occur).  From this, Johnson and Tierney draw their 
conclusion that the public are not inherently casualty-averse, but they are very failure-
averse.  This reflects the findings of Feaver and Gelpi, which supported their presumption 
that ‘success trumps casualties’144.  And so the job of the Government is to manage 
expectations carefully and to portray the incident as a success.  This explains why the Tet 
offensive, which arguably was well fought by American and South Vietnamese forces to 
turn around the North Vietnamese at great costs to the latter, was seen as a failure by the 
US public.  Previous positive speeches by President Lyndon Johnson and General 
Westmorland claiming success was close at hand were instantly disproved as the 
Vietcong and North Vietnamese attacked.  Thereafter, no matter what they said, they 
would not be believed.  Interestingly, Gaddis noted that Johnson had previously said in 
1964 that ‘I don’t think the people…know much about Vietnam and I think they care a 
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regularly in the newspapers until the later stages of the war.  Yet despite the size of the casualty list, there 
does not appear to have been an adverse public reaction, more a ‘stoic endurance’.  Bond, B, Op cit p. 24 
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hell of a lot less145’.  But four years later, Johnson decided against seeking re-election and 
Westmorland was replaced146.  In contrast, Dixon points to the negative effects of Jewish 
terrorism on British forces in Palestine after the Second World War to suggest that public 
revulsion147 at the atrocities and casualties contributed to a strong ‘bring the boys home’ 
movement148, which is particularly significant in an age before the spread of television.  
He goes on to say that for a government to admit the effect on public opinion of 
casualties is to show weakness to an adversary (in this context insurgents) which they 
might choose to exploit tactically149. 
 
Second, it shows that despite factual reporting which showed that more marines were lost 
than their were captives; that the intelligence, planning and preparation were all poor; and 
that the execution was fatally flawed with little consideration of the possible political 
consequences; the public disregarded all the facts for the more emotional reaction to the 
event that this was a demonstration of strong resolve.  A Harris poll of US opinion 
reported the support for the President as being 60% negative, which ‘indicated his jump 
in popularity at the time of ….the Mayaguez…from the Cambodians, had been 
fleeting’150.  A small incident, costly in lost manpower and equipment, created a very 
short term political gain for the President, longer-term political difficulties with the Thai 
Government, yet had little longer term effect with the US populace. 
                                                 
145 Gaddis, John Lewis, The Cold War (London: Penguin 2007 orig 2005) p. 168 
146 Though some would argue the Cronkite report of 27 February 1968 was crucial in swaying elite opinion.  
Carruthers Op cit p. 117 
147 Dixon, P, Op cit p. 104.  Mentions riots and anti-Semitic demonstrations in London, Manchester, 
Newcastle, Gateshead, Holyhead and Eccles.  The extent to which this was due to the casualties themselves 
or more to a feeling of anti-Semitism (which had long been present as an undercurrent in society) is not 
clear.  See also The Times 4 August 1947 
148 Dixon Op cit p. 99 
149 Ibid p. 101 
150 The Times 19 August 1975 p.4 
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The next few case studies look at particular television programmes over the period, 
including a comedy (Blackadder), a fictional drama (Soldier, Soldier), the Festival of 
Remembrance and Trooping the Colour.  To set these in context, it is worth recalling that 
Coronation Street has been running since 9 December 1960 and is one of the longest 
running programmes on television.  Although audience research was limited before 1989, 
Granada estimated the viewing figures in the early years to be around 25 million 
people151; over half as many again as watched the news on BBC and ITV combined.  In 
1991, the first year of reliable figures from British Audience Research Bureau (BARB), 
the average audience was 17.23 million people152, still larger than the total audience for 
the news.  The point here is that people’s interests generally do not lie in current affairs or 
programmes on defence issues, but on contemporary drama, and the viewing figures in 
case studies need to be seen in that context.   
 
Despite the limited data, we do have lists of top programmes from each year from 1960153 
onwards, though there has to be some scepticism over the accuracy of the figures as these 
precede BARB and set-top boxes provided in each home to automatically record choices, 
and so it is in response to audience questionnaires and so is less likely to be as valid when 
extrapolated.  Nevertheless, the 1960s are conspicuous by the absence of any much-
viewed defence-related programmes with only a few exceptions: The Army Game was 
11th in 1960 and 1961 for ITV; the Festival of Remembrance made its only appearance in 
1962 at 23rd for the BBC with an audience of 14.6 million people; and Dad’s Army 
                                                 
151 Telephone call Lamonte/Nugent Granada TV 25 June 2008 
152 BARB audience research data, 1991 from BARB website www.barb.co.uk accessed 9 November 2008 
153 BBC audience research data accessed 9 November 2008 
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started appearing in 1969 at 31st top for the BBC; by 1972 it had reached 8th highest 
viewing for the BBC.   
 
Case Study 3.  Blackadder Goes Forth.  Blackadder Goes Forth was screened in 1989, 
the fourth series of a very successful BBC comedy tracing the fictional lineage of the 
Blackadder family up to the First World War.  The final sequence of the series shows 
Blackadder going over the top in the trenches to a sound of machine-gun fire and then a 
sequence of falling poppies.  The sequence was voted the ninth most memorable moment 
of all time in a 1999 poll conducted by the Observer and Channel 4154.  Jones155 is 
amongst those who believe that the use of the Blackadder series in secondary schools is 
one of the reasons for the continuing negative image of the First World War as lions led 
by donkeys and as futile slaughter156.  Coverage of the 1989 series in the Radio Times is 
extremely limited; there are no letters in the week after the final episode or 
subsequently157.  Despite the obvious link to Remembrance Day, the Daily Mail made no 
comment on the last episode of the series, and there were no letters published158.  The 
Sunday Times, previewing the end of the series, said it ‘will be sorely missed by millions, 
but the entire venture will undoubtedly be remembered as one of the finest comedies of 
                                                 
154 Observer/Channel 4 poll 1999 
155 Jones, M, ‘War and national identity since 1914’ in Carnevali, F.  Strange, J-M, ed.  20th Century 
Britain: Economic, Cultural and Social Change, 2nd Edn.  (Harlow: Pearson Education  2007) 
pp. 90-91 
156 This image was not confined to the First World War.  The Daily Mirror referred to Second World War 
officers as ‘brass buttoned boneheads, socially prejudiced, arrogant and fussy’ – according to Curran, J, & 
Seaton, J,  Power without Responsibility  (Abingdon: Routledge 2003 6th Edn) p. 59.  See also Bond, B, Op 
cit pp. 86-7; Sheffield, G, in Stewart, I, and Caruthers, S L, War, Culture and the Media (London: Flicks 
Books 1996); and Badsey, S, (Leeds conference 1994) 
157 Radio Times  British Library 534 [1989] 
158 Daily Mail 3-6 November 1989 
294  
this decade159.’ This reflects in part both the affection of many and the high proportion of 
middle class viewers who also read this Sunday newspaper – often opinion-formers in 
society as well. 
 
The figures below160 show the audience figures for the first showing of the programme in 
1989/90.  After an initial peak close to 13million people, the audience figures steadily 
declined over the series, with the exception of the last two episodes; the penultimate 
episode received 10.5million viewers and the final episode, arguably the most 
memorable, received 10.2million viewers.  When it was re-shown in 1992 on BBC2, the 
audience figures were around 6million, with the peak audience for the penultimate 
episode.  Again repeated in 1995, this time on BBC1, the peak audience was for the last 
episode at 6.59 million people. Shown again in 1998 on BBC2, audiences averaged 4 
million people, with no discernable peaks for particular episodes. 
 
                                                 
159 Sunday Times 29 October 1989 p. C15 
160 BBC audience research data accessed 9 November 2008 
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Looking at the breakdown of the audience by age group for the 1992 series (information 
is not available for the 1989 series but the expectation is that it would be broadly similar), 
and using the fourth episode as a mid-series representative sample, the age breakdown is 
shown below.  The predominant age groups are 25-34 and 35-44, with 39% of the 
audience between them.  Arguably, this reflects the generation that had grown up with the 
Blackadder series, and is similar in age group to the actors taking part.  It does not reflect 
in any sense the period that the series covered, although interestingly the over-65 age 
group does have 11% of the viewers.  This may mean that the oldest viewers took a 
greater interest in this programme because of the period it covered, or simply that that 
group watches proportionately more television than younger groups. 
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Taking the audience by socio-economic groups, and noting the risks in being too specific 
when using BARB data on how people relate to particular groups, the figures are shown 
below.  53% of the audience falls into the ABC1 bracket – broadly the upper and 
professional classes.  The size of the C2 or broadly lower middle-class group is 
significant at 26%.  But the real point here is that the majority (albeit not by much) of the 
audience is in the opinion-forming or opinion-creating group.  The fact that we know that 
the programme is still used in secondary schools as part of First World War debate 
demonstrates that this programme, intentionally or unintentionally, created a particular 
view of the First World War, and the sheer size of the audience shows that this was a 
major influence on public perceptions of war.  The sayings from Blackadder that have 
crept into modern use, such as Baldrick’s ‘cunning plan’ or notorious methods for 
making coffee, or General Melchett’s ‘Baaah’, give instant images of the ordinary soldier 
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and the bungling generals divorced from the real life at the front.  Without objective 
measures of audience responses, it is hard to judge precisely how people translated the 
fictional comedy of the Blackadder series into reality, but the number of repeats and the 
use in schools suggests this was a powerful image which will have coloured people’s 
attitudes to the First World War, and thus to Remembrance, and potentially to wars and 
how they are conducted today. 
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Case Study 4.  Soldier Soldier.  Soldier Soldier was a drama series based on the lives of a 
group of soldiers in the fictional ‘A’ Company, 1st Battalion The King’s Fusiliers.  
Produced by Central Television for the ITV network, it ran for seven series of 82 
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episodes from 10 September 1991 to 8 December 1997161.  It made stars of Robson Green 
and Jerome Flynn; when they left the series in 1995, audience figures declined rapidly 
until it was withdrawn in 1997.  Set in the aftermath of the Cold War, and at a time when 
the British Army was going considerable reorganisation, the series was viewed162 as an 
accurate portrayal of Army life, including the forced amalgamation of the fictional King’s 
Fusiliers with the equally fictitious King’s Own Fusiliers, reflecting the amalgamation of 
a number of regiments in the real British Army.  The perception is that the series put the 
Army in a positive light, in a period when relatively small numbers were engaged in 
Bosnia, which was one of the topics covered in the series as a posting for the Company, 
along with Northern Ireland, Germany, and ceremonial duties at Buckingham Palace.  
Braun suggests that the success of Soldier, Soldier in holding the key 9 o’clock slot on 
ITV is proof of the Army’s appeal to a broad viewing public163.  A review of the TV 
Times for the 1994 series164 showed no public letters, despite several feature articles on 
cast members, including the ‘marriage’ of Lesley Vickerage, the departure of John Bowe 
and filming of Robson Green at the Tower of London.  The absence of letters does not 
necessarily reflect any lack of interest given the high audience figures.  The Daily Mail 
coverage of the last of the series in December 1994 makes no additional mention of the 
programme, and no comments are published in the letters pages165. 
 
                                                 
161 http://www.tv.com/soldier-soldier/show/5919/summary.html accessed 9 January 2009 
162 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soldier_Soldier accessed 9 January 2009 [Wikipedia must be viewed with 
some caution as it is only an amalgam of interested parties’ thoughts, nevertheless, personal recollection 
suggests this particular source is valid.] 
163 Braun, E, ‘ Stereotypes and Other Types: The Portrayal of the Army in British Television Drama’ in 
Badsey, S (ed) The Media and International Security (London: Frank Cass 2003) p. 77 
164 British Library TV Times pp. 616-619 [1994] 
165 Daily Mail 13-16 December 1994 
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The graph below shows the audience figures from 1991 (when figures became available 
through BARB)166 to the last series in 1997.  Although the 1992 series looks unusually 
low, the figures show the great success of Robson Green and Jerome Flynn in leading the 
series up until 1995.  Figures thereafter show a decline, although episodes still attract 
around 10 million viewers until the series was cancelled in 1997 (notably higher than the 
viewers for the Festival of Remembrance).  Although the programme depicted a 
deployment to Bosnia on peacekeeping duties, and another to Northern Ireland, there is 
nothing in the audience figures to show that this created less or more viewers.   
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166 BBC audience research data accessed 9 November 2008 
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Splitting the audience this time by both age and sex for representative weeks in 1992 and 
1997 (5 October and 9 December respectively) shows a number of useful elements.  Both 
audiences are dominated by females, showing a close association with the lead actors.  
The higher proportion of females in 1992 suggests a strong link to Robson Green and 
Jerome Flynn.  But the consistency in the division by sex shows a good degree of loyalty 
to the programme over the years.  The division by age groups shows a predominance of 
the 25-44 age groups – i.e. the key opinion-formers.  The younger element are less well-
represented, which might indicate less interest amongst them and less of a draw to the 
Army as a recruiting exercise.  A significant proportion can be seen to fall in the over-65 
age group.  Again, this might show a greater interest in defence-related programmes for 
an age group with memories of the Second World War or National Service, or simply a 
more homebound group watching more television than others. 
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Dividing the audience by socio-economic group shows a marked spread, entirely 
consistent over the five years chosen.  Although the professional C1 group is quite high, 
this might be being skewed by a high proportion of the over-65 age group.  But 
undoubtedly pre-dominant are the C2 and DE groups – less affluent, and less able to 
influence opinion.  In theory, these would be the groups from which the Army would 
draw many basic recruits, but the low representation in these age groups suggests this is 
not likely to have been a particular factor.  Instead, this undemanding if effective drama 
seems to have focused on the lower middle and working class families, with a particular 
effect on women.  It will therefore have conditioned public opinion though the sheer size 
of the audience, but not greatly at the political and elite levels. 
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Case Study 5.  Festival of Remembrance.  The Festival of Remembrance is shown 
annually from the Royal Albert Hall on the Saturday evening preceding Remembrance 
Sunday.  The Festival follows a very structured format and, with few exceptions, is 
always held in the presence of HM The Queen and members of the Royal Family.  It is 
designed to remember the sacrifices of Servicemen and women in all wars, and members 
of the civilian emergency and support services.  The Act of Remembrance forms the final 
key stage of the festival, with the release of poppies during the two minutes’ silence.  The 
audience figures from 1990-1997 are shown below167 (figures for previous years are 
unavailable).  The figures show a general decline in audience figures over the period.  
The peak in 1991 would seem to coincide with a post-Gulf War slight surge in support, 
but this is relatively small.  A further small increase against the general trend in 1994 
might be aligned with events in Bosnia or celebrations of the 50th anniversary of D Day, 
but the more surprising figure is that for 1995, which is remarkably low, given the 50th 
anniversaries of VE and VJ day, and the additional emphasis placed on Remembrance 
that year by the Royal British Legion.  Although not shown here, the figure for 2000 was 
0.5 million less than 1995, and 1 million less than 1997.  This suggests that, despite the 
resurgence of interest in Armistice Day in the late 1990s, and the steady support for 
Remembrance services as we saw earlier, this particular programme had decreasing 
support.  This may be due to a format which some saw as dated, or it may be that other 
forms of Remembrance (such as two minutes silence on Armistice Day) overtook this 
particular event.  Or it might be that the draw of the Royal Family was less important to 
people.  It is worth noting that the audience figures are 20-25% less than those for 
Blackadder. 
                                                 
167 BBC audience research data accessed 9 November 2008 
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Breaking down the audience by age groups, and in this case comparing the viewing 
figures for 1993 to 2001 as representative years, there is undoubtedly evidence of an 
ageing population, particularly in the over-65 age group.  But the distribution is actually 
remarkably similar, showing that the increase in the over-65s is actually made up of 
reductions across all younger groups ie this is not demonstrating a progressive increase in 
the audience.  Were this to be the case, one would have expected a much larger increase 
in the 55-64 age group.  Significantly with these time slices, those entering the over-65s 
group between 1993 and 2001 can only have been aged 3-11 at the start of the Second 
World War, and 9-17 by the end, and so it is unlikely any of them saw active service in 
the Second World War.  It is highly likely, however, that many would have undertaken 
National Service, and potentially been involved in Korea, Suez, Aden or Malaya.  It may 
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be, although it would be difficult to prove, that one reason for the increase in the over-65s 
watching the Festival was actual military service, albeit not during the Second World 
War.   
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Breaking the audience down by socio-economic groups brings the differences into sharp 
relief.  The largest group by far in both years is the DE group, reflecting the large 
numbers of relatively less well-off pensioners, though there is apparently greater 
affluence amongst the over-65s in 2001 than 1993.  The next largest group is the middle 
class C1 group, where presumably a proportion of the over-65s sit.  The lowest group is 
the most affluent and influential AB group.  Arguably then, the Festival of Remembrance 
is not terribly influential as a programme by engaging the opinion-formers in society. 
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Case Study 6.  Trooping the Colour.  Trooping the Colour is the ceremony of parading 
one of the colours of the Foot Guards in front of the Sovereign and representatives of the 
other Guards Regiments, which takes place on Horse Guards Parade each summer.  
Though the numbers of Guards on parade has declined over the years due to the size of 
the British Army and operational commitments, it is regarded as one of the Army’s most 
prestigious parades in the calendar, which is completed by a Royal Air Force flypast 
while the Royal Family appear on the balcony of Buckingham Palace in front of crowds 
in The Mall.  It is traditionally shown on BBC1 live on the Saturday morning, and 
repeated in the evening on BBC2.  For the purpose of this work, the audience figures 
used have been from the BBC1 live presentation, noting that this may be artificially low 
as many people are at work for the morning show, but simply adding the two audiences 
together risks duplication as some watch both editions. 
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The audience figures below168 show a continual decline over the period 1990 to 1999, 
with a peak after the Gulf War in 1991, and another in 1996.  The reasons for the latter 
are unclear – it may be a function of the weather that morning that meant people wanted 
to watch television, or it might be a reaction to the Options for Change programme of the 
1990s, where public outcry reduced planned amalgamations of Scottish regiments.  But 
the audience is less than half that of the Festival of Remembrance, and around a quarter 
of that for Blackadder.  The evening showings on BBC2 mirror the profile of the live 
showings, sometimes exceeding the live show (e.g. 1999 2.81 million in the evening vice 
2.03 million for the live show) and sometimes less (e.g. 1993 3.39 million in the evening 
but 3.81 million by day).  It is significant that the modern day Armed Forces gather rather 
less attention (in the day or the evening) than the service of Remembrance, suggesting 
that the public’s mind is towards the sacrifice of previous wars (even if they were too 
young to remember or simply were not alive), rather than today’s forces. It also supports 
the view that people’s view of conflict is coloured more by the past than today. 
 
                                                 
168 BBC audience research data accessed 9 November 2008 
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Trooping the Colour BBC1 audience figures
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Comparing the age profile for the audiences for 1992 and 2001 as representative years 
(2000 figures are very similar but 2001 is used to give greatest spread between years) 
shows the pattern below.  The pattern is remarkably similar.  Differences in the under-44 
groups are extremely small and show no particular pattern with other years; these are not 
viewed as being significant.  The similarity in the figures for 45-54 and 55 to 64 is 
extraordinary.  The figures for over-65s for the two years are 48% and 45% respectively.  
What is very clear is that this is watched by people over 45, and nearly 2/3 of viewers are 
aged over 55.  The fact that this is the same for both years – and intervening years appear 
to be the same – shows that this is always a programme for the oldest in British society, 
and does not appear to have altered over time (i.e. it is one of the things one does as one 
gets older).  From an influence perspective, this suggests that younger opinion-formers 
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and influencers are not interested in this programme, which reflects on their view of the 
modern armed forces. 
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Again, a breakdown of the audience figures by socio-economic groups places the greatest 
percentage in the DE bracket, reflecting the less well off retired viewers.  An increase in 
the proportion of C1s between the two years says more about the affluence of the over-65 
grouping.  That aside, there is a relatively even split between the C1 and C2 groups, with 
ABs trailing by a small amount.  In broad terms, political and elite groups dominate the 
AB and part of the C1 brackets; the evidence suggests they are partly influenced to watch 
this sort of programme, but the actual total number of people involved means that this is a 
very small proportion of the whole group in society. 
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Popular Culture 
 
Although this thesis will not cover films in any detail due to space constraints, the 
importance of the cinema as a medium was considerable, especially in the early days of 
television.  The peak of cinema visits was in 1946, when people visited 34.19 times per 
year per head of population (i.e. on average once every 10.6 days).  By 1984 the figure 
had reduced to 1.06 times per head of population per year (or once every 344 days)169.  It 
is therefore reasonable to expect that films in the 1960s had some impact on the British 
public (though it is worth noting in passing that the anti-war films of the 1960s – Oh! 
                                                 
169 http://www.terramedia.co.uk/reference/statistics/cinema/cinema_visits.htm accessed 9 January 2009. 
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What a Lovely War! (1969)170 and King and Country (1964) were not commercial 
successes171, whereas Lawrence of Arabia (1962) and Zulu (1964) both were172), but that 
films after 1970 (when audience attendance proportionate to the population was a third of 
the 1960 figure) might have considerably less effect.   
 
The atmosphere can be seen in the films of the period – the success of Le Carre’s The Spy 
who Came in from the Cold (1963) and The Looking-Glass War (1965) highlight the 
tensions of the Cold War and the slightly seedy nature of the world of spies.  Mainstream 
political opinion during the 1950s and 60s was very anti-communist, particularly on the 
Left, with expulsions from the Labour Party and Trades Unions.  After the very patriotic 
films such as The Dambusters and The Cruel Sea of the 1950s173, the 1960s demanded 
more realism and showed the unglamorous side of war – The Long and the Short and the 
Tall (1960) and The Valiant (1962) depicted British troops torturing enemy prisoners in 
wartime.  The anti-war films of the 1960s also started to challenge authority in a way not 
seen before.  Films such as The Hill, a 1965 film174 set in a British Army prison in North 
Africa during the Second World War shows not only servicemen, usually seen as heroes, 
as convicted of a range of offences, but an over-zealous prison guard, leading a prisoner 
to die climbing the artificial hill in the centre of the camp. Similarly, the 1968 film of a 
                                                 
170 Which drew heavily from Leon Wolff’s In Flanders Field and Alan Clark’s The Donkeys which were 
both critical of the war as futile slaughter and particularly critical of Haig’s leadership.  Bond, B, Op cit p. 
60 
171 Weight, R, Patriots (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2002) p. 345 
172 Jones, M, ‘War and National Identity since 1914’ in Carnevali F and Strange J-M (ed) 20th Century 
Britain (Harlow: Pearson 2007) 
173 See Ramsden, J, ‘Refocusing the People’s War’ in Journal of Contemporary History1998 Vol 33(1) pp. 
35-63. 
174 http://festival-cannes.com/en/archives/ficheFilm/id/2886/year/1965.html accessed 24 December 2009 
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television play, Bofors Gun, dealt with a British corporal falling foul of a suicide plot by 
a sociopathic Irish private175, surfacing a range of tensions between the two countries. 
 
Most historical films and plays did not seriously challenge national support for the 
military, but the 1965 pseudo-documentary The War Game by Peter Watkins, depicting 
the effects of a nuclear strike, struck a political nerve.  The Daily Sketch ran the headline 
‘Brilliant – But It Must Stay Banned176.’  Chips with Everything in 1962177 about RAF 
conscripts undergoing basic training challenged the class system when an aristocrat forms 
a friendship with a working class boy; the aristocrat is later accepted as a future officer.  
Oh! What a Lovely War! became the best known play and subsequent film from 1963, 
painting a satirical anti-war message.  By the end of the decade, the National Theatre put 
on plays such as Dingo, and ‘H’, or Monologues in front of Burning Cities, portraying 
British soldiers as selfish, violent bullies178’  It is worth noting that the theatre was 
censored by the Lord Chamberlain up until 1968, with the passing of the Theatres Act.179  
Later plays made similar challenges; Privates on Parade was about British entertainers to 
the troops in Malaysia, including a ‘camp old queen, female impersonator’, and a 
stereotypical Army commanding officer, challenging notions of imperial living180.  The 
Romans in Britain (1980) was commissioned in 1979 by Sir Peter Hall and written by 
                                                 
175 http://www.channel4.com/film/reveiws/film.jsp?id=101378&section=review accessed 24 December 
2009. 
176 Daily Sketch, 9 February 1966 
177 http://www.arnoldwesker.com/synopses/chips_with_everything.htm accessed 24 December 2009. 
178 Sandbrook, Op cit p. 257 
179 The Theatres Act still allowed prosecution for strong language and obscenity by the Attorney General.  
The passing of the Act was followed a day later by the opening of Hair the musical, which offended many 
for its anti war message during the Vietnam war and desecration of the US flag on stage.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/27/newsid_3107000/3107815.stm accessed 24 
December 2009. 
180 http://www.curtainup.com/privatesonparade.html accessed 24 December 2009 
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Howard Brenton.  It was written as a challenge to the dramatist’s perception of the ease 
with which politicians and the public had accepted British troops deploying in Northern 
Ireland, but will probably be rather better remembered for the simulated male rape scene 
which led to a prosecution led by Mary Whitehouse181.  Plays allowed often a left-wing 
series of writers to express their anti-war feelings, sometimes covered in a wider story, 
other times more explicitly.  The silence of the audience on the opening night of Romans 
in Britain shows that the public were not always ready to receive the message, but it does 
demonstrate a progressive increase in challenging the establishment and the historical 
record. 
 
Gorer, in his work on changes in sexual behaviour from 1950 to 1969, thought the 
acquittal of the publishers of Lady Chatterley’s Lover in 1960 to have been a turning 
point, where tabooed issues, previously only meriting titillation, could start to be 
discussed openly and seriously182.  Certainly the Daily Telegraph had two pages devoted 
the Bishop of Woolwich’s testimony, where he agreed that this was a book that Christians 
should read183, although there were no letters published on the trial on 29 or 31 October 
1960. Equally the Daily Mirror had at least two pages per day184 covering the trial, but 
there were no letters on the trial or its outcome.  The Times covered each day’s events in 
court without making comment185, and there are no letters during or after the trial to 
                                                 
181 http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2005/oct/28/theatre accessed 24 December 2009 
182 Gorer Op cit p. 3.  Perhaps this could be used as the start point for the much over-used term ‘The 
Permissive Society’.  See for example Algate, A Censorship and the Permissive Society, British Cinema 
and Theatre 1955-1965 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995) 
183 Daily Telegraph 28 October 1960 pp. 24-25 
184 Daily Mirror 28 and 29 October 1960 pp. 6-7, 23 and 12 and 23 respectively 
185 The Times 28 October 1960 p. 6, 29 October 1960 p. 10, 1 November 1960 p. 6, 2 November 1960 p. 8 
and 3 November 1960 p. 5 and 12 
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reflect any public views.  The Daily Mail made no mention of it at all, nor were there any 
letters on the trial186.   
 
Cartoons 
 
Newspaper cartoons offer a different perspective on public opinion.  Unfettered by 
journalistic analysis, and governed only by editorial choice, they have a unique role in 
displaying an opinion on events, often by poking fun at individuals where the written 
word might not allow.  Proof that cartoons can have a disproportionate effect on opinions 
can be demonstrated by the effect of Zec’s187 cartoon in the Daily Mirror of 5 March 
1942, ‘The price of petrol has been increased by one penny – Official’188 which depicted 
a torpedoed sailor on a raft.  The intent was simple – to highlight the heroism of the 
Battle of the Atlantic and to provide a message – don’t waste petrol, but Churchill felt 
that it could affect the morale of merchant seamen, and it implied that lives were being 
put at risk to increase the profits of oil bosses.  The episode ended in a farce in a debate in 
the House of Commons on 26 March 1942, where Churchill and Morrison were forced to 
realise that they had overreacted.   
 
This section reflects a comparison of the cartoons from the Guardian (as a left-wing 
broadsheet) and the Daily Express (as a populist right-wing tabloid), drawn from the 
British Cartoon Archive at the University of Kent.  Though this merits a thesis in its own 
                                                 
186 Daily Mail 28-31 October 1960. 
187 Philip Zec tried to get into the RAF but was turned down.  He became a leading cartoonist of the Second 
World War, producing 1529 cartoons, often lampooning Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler et al. 
188 Zec, D Don’t Lose it Again (London: The Political Cartoon Society 2005) pp. 74-81 
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right, this small collection, measured from a keyword search against ‘war’189, gives a 
comparable grouping (297 versus 357 respectively) and demonstrates some trends.  The 
public reaction to cartoons was never on the same scale as that of Zec’s cartoons; war-
related cartoons simply did not create the same comment as those related to the Trades 
Unions or racism190.  This can be shown from Cummings’ biography191, which shows that 
his cartoon suggesting Britain’s immigration policy would lead to race riots of 3 March 
1965 for the Daily Express was unsuccessfully referred to the Press Council as an insult 
to coloured peoples.  Indeed, Cummings felt that he was having an impact on the issue 
because of the ‘angry letters’192.  Similarly, the NUJ members on the Scottish Daily 
Express objected so strongly to a Cummings cartoon on 17 October 1971 planned for the 
following day entitled ‘Father O’Brezhnev Missionary to Ulster’ that they stopped the 
presses and over 350 000 copies were lost193.  Equally, Martin Rowson’s cartoon for the 
Guardian on 13 July 1998 of Peter Mandelson’s platitudes, including ‘The Pope is 
Catholic…the Blairs shit in the woods’ led to a complaint by a reader to his MP and to 
the Press Complaints Commission194.  ‘Emmwood’195, political cartoonist on the Daily 
Mail, thought that Gerald Scarfe’s unusual style had cost the paper 50000 readers – a case 
of the cartoonist not being in tune with the style of the paper196. 
 
                                                 
189 http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/search/cartoon_item/anytext%3Dwar?year_from=1960&year_to=2000 
accessed 24 December 2009.  All cartoon references are drawn from this collection 
190 Interview Dr Nick Hiley, Director British Cartoon Archive 2 June 2010 
191 http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/artists/arthur-stuart-michaelcummings/biography accessed 2 June 2010 
192 Ibid 
193 Ibid 
194 http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/artists/martinrowson/biography accessed 2 June 2010. 
195 John Musgrave-Wood (1915-1999) 
196 http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/artists/geraldscarfe/biography accessed 2 June 2010. 
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One reason for the limited number of disputes between cartoonists and editors was the 
small pool of cartoonists in use over the period.  This meant that most had served long 
apprenticeships before getting to the top of their professions and were more in line with 
editorial policy197.  A second reason would be that, in the period, most cartoonists 
produced ‘roughs’ – typically 4-6 draft outline cartoons reflecting the issues of the day, 
from which editors picked the work to refine into a finished cartoon, thus removing much 
of the opportunity for friction.  Cummings described this process in his biography198.  It 
can be illustrated in David Austin’s notebooks for July 1995199 for the Guardian, which 
carried a list of the headlines for the day, a number of roughs, and the final selected 
cartoon.  On 26 July 1995, Austin listed the headlines as including ‘Bosnia – closing in 
on Bosnian Serbs?  US will bomb? Clinton’s interests served by Milosevic deal’ as well 
as ‘Grade’s pay’ (Grade being the highest paid UK boss and Britain’s ‘chief 
pornographer’), and ‘Women-only shortlists’ being ‘not well done’200.  The nine roughs 
included a Labour canvasser at a doorstep asking for the ‘man of the house’, and  a 
Bosnian asking ‘Has some idiot discovered oil?’ above a slogan saying ‘US to bomb’, but 
the selected final cartoon201 had a US serviceman pointing to a board titled ‘USAF 
Operation Restore Bill’, with a subtitle of ‘Newt’s Rabid Reaction Force’, an arrow 
marking ‘Hillary’s Column’, two circled areas for ‘GOP enclaves’ and ‘Greater 
Arkansas’ and in the bottom right-hand corner, ‘Bosnia’. 
 
                                                 
197 Hiley interview Op cit 
198 Cummings biography Op cit 
199 Austin archives, British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent, July 1995 
200 Ibid 26 July 1995 
201 Not yet digitised in the archives 
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Only a few cartoonists, such as Steve Bell, became really important for the newspaper (in 
this case the Guardian) and the readers (for example the ‘Maggie’s Farm’ series) which 
allowed him to submit what he liked202.  Sometimes, like Cummings’ cartoon of 6 August 
1973 which compared the heat for Richard Nixon of Watergate with a recent fatal fire in 
which 30 people died, questions were raised over how far satire could be used (although a 
complaint to the Press Council was rejected)203. Raymond Jackson (Jak) regarded himself 
as an impartial observer, because he ‘went for everyone’204. 
 
In many cases during the period, the First World War was used as an image to portray 
conflicts other than war, as a model for pointless attrition, or an image of waste, and the 
suffering for any soldier.  This can be seen in Steve Bell’s verse covering a copied 
painting of a soldier in a trench205; Martin Rowson’s cartoon for the Guardian showing 
Tory politicians mired in a trench206;  
[PC2290] [not in the digital version of this thesis, see source: http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/record/PC2290 ] 
and Cummings cartoons for the Daily Express, showing Thatcher and police in one 
trench, with Scargill in the other, alluding to a four year battle207, and similarly another 
by the same cartoonist showing Scargill in a Kitchener pose with a hammer and sickle in 
his hat ‘Your Scargill needs you – to commit suicide for him208’. 
 
                                                 
202 http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/artists/stevebell/biography accessed 2 June 2010. 
203 Cummings biography Op cit 
204 http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/artists/raymondjackson/biography accessed 2 June 2010. 
205 PC4917 11 November 1998 Guardian 
206 PC2290 10 June 1997 Guardian 
207 44259 30 November 1984 Daily Express 
208 39409 16 September 1984 Sunday Express 
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One can see a trend in cartoon change over the period 1960-2000 in the way HM The 
Queen was depicted.  In the 1960s, she was generally depicted behind a statue, in 
silhouette or from behind (e.g. Emmwood for the Daily Mail on 28 February 1961)209.  
Fawkes was the first to depict her face on 12 September 1969210 (Fawkes recalled later 
that even these cartoons brought complaints from readers)211, coincident with the 1969 
documentary on life with the Royal Family and a move to make the Christmas message 
more informal.  With that, the more respectful image declined, to be replaced with more 
and more critical depictions, such as the large ears of the Prince of Wales212 and Prince 
Philip as ‘Lethal Bonehead’213. 
 
The Guardian grouping214 showed a much larger preoccupation with war up to 1971 (166 
of the 297 cartoons are from the period to the end of 1971).  Only 32 dated from after 
1979, but this may be due to the way these were catalogued.  The early themes were 
drawn from the Second World War, and comparisons with the Soviet threat215.  
Throughout the period of the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson was depicted as a 
cowboy216. In comparison, Nixon, his successor was depicted first as a soldier with a 
gun217, then was generally seen in a suit218, before looking ever more haggard and 
                                                 
209 http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/group/cartoonists-and-royal-family-1953-2003 accessed 2 June 2010. 
210 Ibid Daily Mail  Fawkes 12 September 1969 
211 Ibid 
212 Franklin Sun 20 October 1987 
213 Ibid Steve Bell 20 December 1996 Guardian 
214http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/search/cartoon_item/anytext=war?year_from=1960&year_to=2000&publicati
on=The%20Guardian accessed 24 December 2009 
215 Note the use of the Nazi swastika in LSE8591 6 January 1960, and the comparison of Prussia, Hitler and 
Khrushchev in LSE8777 12 September 1961. 
216 For example 06699 dated 10 February 1965. 
217 For example 17755 5 May 1970 
218 Such as the cartoons from 1971 on the US involvement in Laos and Cambodia 
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arguably crushed in his later years in office219.  The Arab/Israeli peace post-1967 war was 
depicted with a strong anti-Arab flavour –e.g. the Wooden Horse from Nasser220.   
[15232] [not in the digital version of this thesis, see source: http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/record/15232 ] 
The general flavour of the cartoons was not pro-military – which one can see in the 
depiction of F-111 as a white elephant221;  
[08467] [not in the digital version of this thesis, see source: http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/record/08467 ] 
the ghoulish generals post-Mai Lai222; and the sympathetic approach to the IRA both in 
the depiction of IRA snipers223 and Heath being bogged down in a tank in Northern 
Ireland224.  Gibbard’s cartoons made several allusions to the Star Wars programme, 
poking fun at whether it would work and at Reagan in particular.225  Martin Rowson 
focused on the conflict in Northern Ireland, especially the darker side of the IRA and 
Ulster politicians226, whilst Steve Bell showed his criticism of the ineffectiveness of the 
UN in Rwanda227.  His later work for Remembrance in 1997 showed a Union Flag, with 
the words of Binyon’s poem on it, with the last line modified to read ‘We will remember 
Tony Blair and bomb Iraq’228.  Much of the 1999 coverage surrounds Kosovo, with the 
sceptical line of the cartoonist exemplified by a picture of a NATO soldier saying ‘Stop 
or we’ll shoot somebody or other229’. 
 
                                                 
219 For example 22479 10 May 1972. 
220 15232 12 April 1969 
221 08467 14 February 1966 
222 20068 dated 2 April 1971 
223 21026 dated 4 September 1971 
224 21202 dated 26 October 1971 
225 See 36815 19 November 1985; 44425 the Cold War village of 5 March 1987 and 43402 2 December 
1987. 
226 PC0158 
227 PC0921 
228 Guardian 11 November 1998 
229 Guardian 22 March 1999 
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The Daily Express grouping230 was hard to track against the Guardian on a day-by-day 
basis.  There were similarities in the 1960 cartoon of schoolchildren asked what to do 
during a 4-minute warning231, but the style was rather less serious – for example ‘Test 
Ban Man’ in 1963 was hailed as a positive step for the evolution of man by monkeys232.  
Lancaster’s small cartoon took an ironic look at Vietnam ‘When is an incident not an 
incident’ after a bombing raid by 150 US jets233.   
[06764] [not in the digital version of this thesis, see source: http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/record/06764 ]  
In the 1967 Arab/Israeli War, the cartoons were solidly pro-Israel, both during and after 
the conflict, including Carl Giles and Michael Cummings work234 - Giles and Cummings 
alternated, with Giles favouring the more homely family cartoons, and Cummings 
making more vicious political attacks.  Carl Giles used many of his wartime experiences 
as the ‘Official’ War Cartoonist for Second Army in 1945 to continue to make references 
to the Second World War with his ‘Giles family’ cartoons – that of 16 September 1969 is 
an example, presumably timed to coincide with the Battle of Britain commemoration235.  
In a similar way to the Guardian, most of the war-referenced cartoons date from before 
1971 (185 of the 357), and indeed only one was referenced to war after 1989, but this was 
probably due to cataloguing preferences.  In the 1970s, Cummings set Lt Calley’s 
Vietnam indictment into the context of the genocide and refugees in Pakistan236.  During 
                                                 
230http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/search/cartoon_item/anytext=war?year_from=1960&year_to=2000&publicati
on=Daily%20Express%20 accessed 24 December 2009 
231 GA1632 dated 23 June 1960. 
232 04078 7 August 1963 
233 06764 dated 13 February 1965 
234 See GA2462 1 June 1967, 11355 6 June 1967, 11371 8 June 1967 and 16181 1 September 1969 as 
examples. 
235 16277 16 September 1969 
236 20537 14 June 1971 
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the Northern Ireland campaign, the Daily Express took a very pro-British and pro-Army 
stance.  Examples here are on internment237 and provocation of British troops238:   
[21199] [not in the digital version of this thesis, see source: http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/record/21199 ] 
A similarly pro-British stance was taken during the Falklands War, from the cartoons 
regarding corned beef239, to the nature of the Argentine fleet240, and to ‘Traitorama’241 – 
referring to the Panorama programme which so upset the Conservative Government.   
 
It might be easiest to characterise the Express cartoons as having been very pro-
Conservative and pro-British, and generally, though not exclusively, less politically 
satirist and more up-front funny than the Guardian.  The latter seems to have had more 
questions to ask over the nuclear debate, the Arab/Israeli peace settlement and Star Wars, 
whereas the former was far more engaged with supporting the British position in 
Northern Ireland and the Falklands.  In both cases, the cartoons do offer a radical 
depiction of events, in a funny but challenging way, which send messages beyond that of 
the simple columnist.  The cartoon archive for the period demonstrates: the trend in 
growing irreverence to authority from the mid-1960s; a clear relationship of individual 
cartoonists to the editorial policy of their newspapers; a reaction from readers; strong use 
of the First World War as a metaphor for attrition and pointless waste; and a reduction in 
interest in war topics from the 1970s onwards.  Public reaction to war cartoons, as 
measured by letters to cartoonists or editors, was negligible.  Cartoonists such as 
Cummings reported far more concern over issues such as immigration and other topics. 
                                                 
237 21183 25 October 1971 
238 21199 27 October 1971 
239 GA4382 8 April 1982 
240 48688 14 April 1982 
241 43817 12 May 1982 
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Conclusion 
 
The media can be seen to have the potential to affect the population in a way rarely seen 
in previous years, as demonstrated by the reaction to the mid-1980s crisis in Africa.  
Indeed, the period of this thesis might really be termed the growth of a new age in media, 
where older forms of the media such as the radio and cinema were replaced by television 
and at the end of the period, the Internet242.  Though newspapers declined in quantity and 
circulation, they retained an importance in conveying information in a quite different way 
from television, where immediacy was not quite so vital, and more time could be spent on 
analysis.  But this did not mean that the public’s perception of the veracity of their 
coverage was any better than the television; in fact, quite the reverse is true.  But, other 
than opinion poll evidence, the letters pages of the broadsheets provide one of the few 
sources of any public reaction to events, which makes them of value in this work. 
 
Aside from some dedicated documentary programmes, most people used television news 
as their main source on world events.  Despite government objections to some coverage 
during the Falklands and Gulf campaigns, the vast majority of people still believed that 
television news reporting was impartial and unbiased.  In reality, groups like the Glasgow 
Media Group demonstrated consistently that the news is, by its very nature, partial 
                                                 
242 Robinson reflects a number of pieces of research between 1997 and 2002 that show that the effect of the 
internet at that time was to act as additional communication, rather than a revolutionary aid to mobilization 
of action.  Robinson, P, in Reporting War Op cit p103 
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because of the nature of the work of the editorial team.  Public understanding was set by 
the frame of reference used by the broadcasters and the chances were that the initial 
message would be retained, even if subsequent events proved that not to be the case.  But 
retention of the news was not that good, as a Finnish study proved, and the news did seem 
to be an opportunity for people to channel-hop or do other things.   
 
Not only were choices made about what topics are shown, but the way they were put over 
(who was interviewed, what images were used) was also important.  Limitations of time 
mean that the context could rarely be put over and so the chances of the public being able 
to understand the real detail of the stories were small.  In general, television broadcasters 
tended to follow the government line, particularly in wartime, unless they detect division 
or disagreement at political or organisational level, in which case they were likely to 
exploit that division as news. 
 
From the public’s side, the evidence is that people could construct quite reasonable 
representations of stories some time after the event, especially from a few images.  And 
from the evidence of the Falklands and Gulf Wars, people were likely to watch much 
more coverage in war than in peace.  But they are just as likely to find resonance with 
fictional stories and characters as the news – indeed children could often reproduce 
fictional stories from films verbatim243.  Here the predilection of people to watch fiction 
rather than fact coloured their judgement of events, particularly in war.     
 
                                                 
243 Glasgow University Media Group Message Received Op cit p. 1 
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The five case studies were chosen deliberately not to be exhaustive, but to illustrate a 
number of specific points.  The Mayaguez incident demonstrates that no matter how 
much coverage given to an incident by the media, it may not find resonance with the 
public.  This is probably due to the fact the British forces were not involved.  But it also 
showed that the media was inclined to take a particular line (in this case a positive one on 
intervention) when the evidence as it emerged actually suggested this had not been a 
well-planned and executed operation.   
 
Blackadder Goes Forth demonstrated the power of comedy to affect viewers.  Shown 
four times over the period, it attracted many more viewers than some of the serious and 
factual programmes about war.  It showed a capacity for the British public to find humour 
in a war that had millions of casualties for all sides; something unthinkable in France for 
example244.  Yet the attraction to opinion-formers and makers from 25-44 is evident.  
And the fact it continued to be used in secondary schools as part of the teaching on the 
First World War shows the power of fictional comedy to blur fact and fiction.  Soldier, 
Soldier was equally fictional, but equally powerful.  Again appealing to the 25-44 age 
group, but definitely skewed towards the lower socio-economic groups, this again 
received more viewers than most factual documentaries on the contemporary British 
Army. 
 
The final two programmes, covering the Festival of Remembrance and the Trooping the 
Colour ceremony, demonstrate both changes in society and television viewing.  Both 
were factual and bridged the gap between the modern Armed Forces and historical 
                                                 
244 Interview with Professor Martin Alexander, specialist in French history, 22 August 2007. 
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service.  Both were much more important in viewing terms in the early-1960s, when the 
top programmes of the day were usually the Royal Variety Show and The Queen’s 
Christmas message – quite clearly reflecting strong establishment values.  Both reduced 
markedly – to a point where neither really competed with the fictional alternatives on 
other channels.  And the viewers still watching were clearly older and less influential in 
society. 
 
The evidence here, and from those watching television films, is that the public tended to 
trust the television news, but preferred to watch fiction or comedy.  Although it would be 
quite wrong to regard the British public as a single mass group, it is fair to say that their 
knowledge of defence issues, and indeed interest in them, was limited, and may just as 
easily have been affected by historical or fictional perspectives as any coverage of 
contemporary service. 
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CHAPTER 8.  CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that British attitudes to war and the Armed Forces   
underwent considerable change in the period 1960-2000. There is no single measure that 
captures the change, nor can any basket of measures really encompass the gamut of views 
represented by British opinion; there are simply too many groups with different 
perceptions based on their position in society and their emotional reaction to events and 
the way they are presented.  There are no simple models to cover British opinion with 
certainty; the best that can be achieved is to take insights from campaigns and attitudinal 
work to draw some conclusions. 
 
The very nature of ‘Britishness’ changed over the period, and indeed has constantly 
changed over time.  A number of factors have affected the relationships within the 
country.  Some of the mainstays of society have altered dramatically.  Religion is no 
longer a unifying force; secularization has increased dramatically since the Second World 
War.  The economic ties which traditionally kept the United Kingdom together have 
loosened, notably since the advent of North Sea oil and the decline of the manufacturing 
sector.  This has meant for the Scots in particular, a resurgence of national identity and a 
feeling of potential development on a European rather than British basis.  Class, which 
some argue started to dissolve as a defining element in society in the First World War, 
only to re-emerge afterwards in the Twenties and Thirties, has changed in nature from the 
1960s, and has partially been replaced by material wealth as a divider – the haves and 
have-nots.  Finally, the steady emigration of white British has been replaced and 
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supplanted by an increasing immigration of people from Ireland, the former colonies, and 
latterly Eastern Europe which has brought its own effects on religion, by increasing the 
size of the Roman Catholic church and that of the evangelical churches, and on class and 
wealth distribution.   
 
As society changed, so did the norms and mores that define it, and have led people to take 
particular positions on issues, such as defence.  It is very easy to overstate importance of 
the liberalising decade of the 1960s, but there is no doubt that the effects of austerity in 
the 1950s when unleashed with the advent of colour in clothes, greater personal wealth 
and access to goods in the 1960s created a more materialistic and questioning society.  
The demise of National Service in part reflected society’s disillusionment with large 
standing armies, an increasing rejection of authority, a diminution of the concept of 
Empire and hence a greater challenge to British intervention.  Liberalisation in areas like 
homosexuality may have been ahead of main societal thinking, but reflected a trend away 
from conservatism in attitudes from which public support for war was traditionally found.  
Anti-war demonstrations in 1968 and the importance of CND in the early 1960s and 
again in the early 1980s illustrated a greater willingness, particularly in the young, to 
challenge authority and to seek peaceful solutions to world issues. 
 
Any analysis of British attitudes has to attempt at some division of society.  Whilst there 
a number of models, the most convenient here is that of the political level, the elite level 
and the populace.  This model is itself very fluid, and is issue-dependent.  The political 
level has been fairly constant throughout the period, being Whitehall-based and reflecting 
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the instruments of Government.  In this particular work, the most striking change in the 
period was the significant reduction in the numbers of parliamentarians with direct 
military experience, including National Service; the 1991 Major government being the 
last to have ex-military representation.  The elite level is the most fluid.  It varies in size 
and composition depending on the issue.  For the purposes of this work, it broadly 
comprises defence industries, relevant academia, broadsheet elements of the media, 
retired military personnel and interested members of the public.  The remainder 
comprises the general population, but this disguises the many constituent parts that will 
respond to issues in different ways.  There are regional differences which get accentuated 
by national views (Scotland/Wales/Northern Ireland) and by linkages with local 
regiments (losses from local regiments are likely to be felt more in those communities).  
Religion may also play a part (e.g. the National Army Museum of Scotland deliberately 
excludes the involvement of the Scottish Regiments in Northern Ireland on 
religious/political grounds).   Economics will play a major role – high poverty levels and 
unemployment will focus attention on those issues to the exclusion of defence.  So 
although the broad model is of three parts, actually the linkages are far more complex 
than this.   
 
The role of the Church in society is one that demonstrates both a great change over the 
period and has a direct relationship to the Armed Forces through the act of 
Remembrance.  The dramatic decline in active church membership at a national level, 
though not clearly reflected in the case studies presented, shows the increasing 
secularization of society.  Attitudes towards Remembrance have not changed in the same 
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way, however.  It is very clear that the public attachment to the Festival of Remembrance 
on television declined rapidly from its peak in 1962.  Yet the support for local 
Remembrance services, whilst declining in some areas, remained remarkably consistent 
where services were more civic in nature and less bound to churches.  Given that the 
numbers of ex-Servicemen declined dramatically through death, such that relatively few 
survived with Second World War or National Service experience by the end of the 
period, the implication is that they were supplanted by an increase in younger members.  
The move from personal experience to perception is very evident, in that First World War 
teaching as history and through poetry became an essential part of the core curriculum 
(however much one might question the validity of some of the material used) for the post 
1960s generation.  The implication, therefore, is that thinking on the First World War 
drove public attitudes towards modern conflicts. Such conflicts were acknowledged in 
Remembrance services but do not seem to have been emphasised and had little impact on 
attendance (e.g. post-Falklands and Bosnia).  It is striking how the agendas within local 
churches were driven by individuals.  In the 1960s and 1970s, many of the clergy had 
seen military service and had a strong and vocal position in society, reflected by the 
media coverage and the tenor of their sermons.  Two things seem to have brought a 
degree of disarray to the clergy: the anti-nuclear debate, encapsulated in the book Church 
and the Bomb; and the approach the church took as British troops engaged in conflict.  
The rise of CND, with the active involvement of many clergy, and the Church’s 
developing attitude towards nuclear weapons gave many in the Church cause for concern, 
not only over the morality of nuclear weapons but also the wider question of the 
justification for any war (the Just War debate).  This had two effects. Younger clergy, 
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especially those without military experience became extremely uncomfortable with the 
act of Remembrance, as evidenced by anti-war elements in some services or even by 
ignoring the event altogether. Moreover, it meant that the clergy’s attitude to British 
forces on operations was muted (and chastised by some clergy) during the Falklands, 
forcing a much stronger and more positive messages by senior clergy in the Gulf War, 
which in turn drew condemnation from within the church, demonstrating clear disunity. 
The other change over the period was from a decline in the significance of the Armistice 
Day celebration in the 1970s, and its re-emergence in the mid-1990s to become at least as 
important as Remembrance Day and possibly more so. This reinforced the secular 
message and that in many minds that the First World War was especially important in a 
time of increasing values and morals (even if actual behaviours did not always match the 
political intent). 
 
This work has shown that, despite the changes in societal attitudes over the four decades, 
the political level has been consistent in promoting a strong attitude towards defence and 
a willingness to employ force in support of national objectives.  Objections came from a 
small but vociferous group whose members were consistent from the Falklands to 
Kosovo and who were mostly opposed to the use of force in any event.  Greater 
questioning of Governments came over the conduct of conflicts (the loss of the Belgrano, 
the destruction of Al-Amiriya), but the political level was rarely critical of the military 
itself, although it was critical of the conduct of the government in times of conflict. In a 
sense, this reluctance to criticise the military once engaged on operations was counter-
productive, as the military was allowed to undertake virtually any operation with 
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impunity given a strong-willed government of the day (e.g. Conservative government 
with the Gibraltar shooting and the sinking of the Belgrano)1.  There is little evidence that 
the political level was been overly affected by consideration of the views of the populace, 
except to the extent of perceptions of what they might think, particularly in relation to 
casualties (Bosnia/Kosovo being good examples).  The elite level showed the greatest 
tendency to debate and challenge.  Arguably the elite level increasingly challenged the 
political level over the period, and influenced and supported the moral interventionism of 
the decade since 2000.  Again, there is evidence that the elite level anticipated that the 
population would take a certain view, when it is not evident that they did so (e.g. 
Mayaguez).  On occasion, the elite level, or elements of it, completely misread public 
intent, such during the Falklands conflict, where large elements of the elite level 
perceived that a major military operation for the sake of 1,800 islanders on islands where 
the UK had already considered transfer of sovereignty did not make sense, yet the 
populace were strongly in favour.  At other times, the elite could be in step with public 
opinion, such as the reaction to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo where all sides felt action was 
required, though the elite appears to have led the public in the sense of deployment of 
ground troops. 
 
Reading public opinion is very difficult.  The most obvious method is through opinion 
polls, but their very nature means that their objectivity must always be questioned. And 
the results show that in the same poll, people can give entirely contradictory views on the 
                                                 
1 Although there was a curious reaction to the use of the Armed Forces to backfill the fire services during 
their strike of 14 November 1977, both a ‘Dunkirk’ spirit to the use of mothballed ‘Green Goddess’ fire 
engines, and yet a wave of sympathy for the firefighters and uncertainty of this use of the Services.  See 
Turner Op cit p. 201 
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same topic (e.g. as many opposed to military action yet in a separate question were in 
favour of an invasion (from the Falklands)).  So a mosaic must be built of public opinion.  
The newspaper letters columns give a ready indication of the strength of opinion on 
issues, but looking at this in a systematic way through the lens of a single paper or across 
several papers on one issue tends to highlight more about the editorial policy of the letters 
editor than reveal much about public opinion2. However, it is sufficient to demonstrate 
for example that overseas conflicts,  such as the Mayaguez  incident, despite extensive 
mass media coverage, are unlikely to excite public opinion The source of the letters 
shows that the political level uses the broadsheets to put forward views that might better 
be expressed in Parliament. The Church used the same broadsheets to conduct debates.  
The general public used the broadsheets to debate a range of issues, often reflecting on 
historical parallels to contemporary events, but few used the tabloids for comment at all.  
The reality of broadsheet circulation was that such debates are largely confined to the 
elite level, and did not reach the wider population. 
 
One clear change in the culture has been the greater scrutiny of the conduct of British 
forces at home and abroad.  In the early-1960s in Borneo, British forces could operate 
away from the media gaze, with little fear of public scrutiny.  Several events over the 
period have changed that freedom. One example was the reaction to the publication of 
stories of a massacre by British troops operating in Malaya in 1949, when soldiers 
confessed to having machine-gunned villagers.  When reported in the People in 1970, 
                                                 
2 See Evans H, Good Times, Bad Times (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson 1983) p. 206 for a description 
by the former editor of The Times, of the (arbitrary) process by which letters from the 200 letters or so 
received every day were selected for publication. 
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sales fell due to people’s dislike of the report3.  Individual accountability changed with 
greater censure of individuals in peacetime incidents such as involvement with civilian 
accidents/incidents in Cyprus, falsification of travel and entertainment claims and so on.  
This reflects both greater media interest in individual cases, and a growing moral 
requirement for individual servicemen to have the same exemplary standards as other 
public figures in politics and the church, and this continues after their service.  The 
collective responsibility has also increased with greater media access, and has been 
demonstrated in the sinking of the Belgrano, the shooting of IRA members in Gibraltar, 
Bloody Sunday, discomfort over the ‘Highway of Death’ in Iraq, and latterly in the 
debate over civilian casualties during bombing campaigns.  There is not great evidence 
from any one source to demonstrate increasing public disquiet, but the confluence of 
attitudes to casualties, post-conflict polls on issues such as the Belgrano, the number of 
plays at theatres in the late-1960s and early-1970s which roundly criticised British 
servicemen as bullies, and the level of media attention to these incidents suggests that the 
three levels of political, elite and populace share concerns which will impact on the 
conduct of future conflicts and what the British expect from their service personnel.  
 
Evolution in attitudes towards homosexuality offers more evidence of change in both 
society and the Armed Forces in the period under discussion. From the review of 
prostitution and homosexuality by Sir John Wolfenden in 1957 to the ultimate change in 
Service policy in 2000, few topics have engendered stronger opinions within the Armed 
Forces or in the media, though wider public perceptions is harder to gauge.  It is clear that 
the Wolfenden Committee were very taken by the experience of National Servicemen in 
                                                 
3.  Greenslade Press Gang Op cit p. 228 
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recommending a minimum legal age for homosexual acts of 21.  Similarly, evidence from 
the Brigade of Guards, the Windsor drummer boys, the Second Sea Lord’s list, and the 
return of HMS Eagle in 1968 suggests that homosexuality was a major issue in the 
Armed Forces, however little acknowledged publicly.  It does appear that, though the law 
was changed in 1967 to decriminalise homosexual activity for adults, society at large was 
less ready to embrace the change. Politicians had viewed liberalisation as a potential 
vote-loser. The Armed Forces actually intensified their efforts to track and remove 
suspected homosexuals.  A greater public tolerance really only became apparent in the 
1990s, when Lustig-Prean et al appealed against their dismissal from the Services, and 
when the Court of Appeal judge wondered how long the MOD could sustain their 
position against evident societal change.  Armed Forces law only changed after the 
European Court of Human Rights upheld the appeal of Lustig-Prean et al, and seemingly 
this then became a non-event for the Armed Forces, with little internal or external 
reaction.   
 
However this does beg the question, if the Armed Forces in the 1960s were faced  with 
real problems of blackmail, importuning of minors and other difficulties, why were no 
such difficulties prevalent after 2000?  Is it possible that the same concerns over 
protecting young people may re-surface in the future?  There was another dramatic 
change over the period related to homosexuality. In the 1960s, gay activists were strongly 
anti-military because of a perceived inconsistency between pacifist feminine tendencies 
in gays and strongly masculine warlike-requirements of the military, to the point of 
joining with other activist groups in anti-war, anti-nuclear and anti-establishment 
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protests). Yet forty years on, the gay lobby was working for assimilation into the forces 
on grounds of equality. 
 
The role of the media has been the subject of much academic debate, often around the 
myth of media coverage undermining US public support for the war in Vietnam, the 
alleged CNN effect in Iraq and elsewhere (which can be summarised as instant coverage 
requires instant response), and the partiality and inadequate coverage on television news 
which fails to provide the requisite information for the populace to make informed 
judgments.  Conventional wisdom says that the media will generally follows the 
government line – and the evidence considered here tends to support that view, even 
when it is simply not supported by emerging facts such as the Gibraltar shootings4.  One 
of the key questions is whether the press leads, follows or reflects opinion.  The evidence 
presented here is that it can do all of those.  In Kosovo, there was a concerted view from 
the elite and media that something needed to be done in response to apparent ethnic 
cleansing.  In the Mayaguez example, the news was presented continually with no public 
reaction or apparent interest.  But the greatest tendency is to exploit divisions within the 
political and elite levels – particularly reflecting the lack of response from the Church to 
the Falklands and the Gulf Wars, and the divisions in the Church between those senior 
figures keen to follow the national line and those below often totally opposed to all wars.   
 
                                                 
4 For the argument, in the context of the alleged CNN effect, that the elite and policy makers are not overly 
affected by public opinion poll evidence, but more by ‘perceived public opinion’, which is in part framed 
by the media, see Robinson, P, The CNN effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention (London: 
Routledge 2002) p. 3.  Robinson also argues that the media can be very influential where government 
policy is uncertain, citing Kosovo, Bosnia and Iraq as examples (p. 117). 
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Of all media, television has the greatest power to influence. The vast majority said they 
used it as their main source of news (which reflects its immediacy, even if newspapers 
can give greater context and more considered opinion) and the sheer numbers of viewers 
demonstrate its power against newspapers or any other single source.  Selecting a few 
television programmes can illustrate the scale of change both over time and between 
genres.  The results are necessarily limited by the availability of data, so the figures from 
before and after 1991 are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, the figures for a comedy 
series (Blackadder) and a fictional Army drama (Soldier Soldier) show the numbers of 
people who watch dramas about the military and war, rather than those who watch it on 
the news (significantly fewer).  Both show the proportion of opinion-formers who 
watched such programmes – particularly the age group for Blackadder.  Films, whether 
seen originally in the cinema or watched on television, show the power to mythologise 
conflict and to produce both patriotic and anti-war messages.  By contrast, the figures for 
Festival of Remembrance and Trooping the Colour show the decline in viewing of such 
programmes over 1960-2000 period. The latter programmes were mainly watched by the 
oldest age groups from lower socio-economic groups.  But the implication is that fiction 
in war is more powerful than fact in the public mind. 
 
The types of conflict in which UK forces have participated have changed since 1960.  
Post-colonial policing actions moved to a defence of UK sovereign territory in the 
Falklands, representing Ceadal’s defencist operation.  Support to the civil authorities in 
Northern Ireland would ultimately last 38 years, and despite not being called a war, 
involved a substantial part of the UK Armed Forces and led to the use of armed troops 
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out of uniform not only in UK but in Gibraltar.  The public just do not seem to have 
understood why the two sides were fighting – not helped by the determination by 
successive Governments since the 1920s not to discuss Northern Ireland in Parliament 
but to allow the populace to run their own affairs.  The public’s response to events was 
carefully managed by politicians and media framing the IRA’s activities as terrorism.  
The fact that the largest proportion of civilian casualties was caused by security forces 
actions is largely ignored or overlooked.  The campaign also promoted media and public  
questioning of the actions of the security force (including the RUC), beginning with 
reactions to the riot of 5 October 1968 that left Gerry Fitt holding his head covered in 
blood.  Growing reports of ill-treatment of detainees by troops were reported by the BBC 
and led to the Compton inquiry.  The Armed Forces were under the microscope in a way 
not seen before.  The campaign also saw a new form of censorship of the media – a ban 
on publicizing proscribed organisations – so-called starving them of the oxygen of 
publicity.  The public’s reaction to all this was mixed.  In general, it seems they just did 
not care.  At one extreme was the small group who wanted the troops to pull out in 1987, 
but programmes like Busman’s Holiday persuaded others that the troops should stay.  For 
many, it was a problem they simply wished would go away.  For all the hype around the 
shootings of IRA members in Gibraltar, the majority view appeared to be that they 
deserved what they got.  In part, that was due to careful framing of the debate using 
Government misinformation, but also it reflected the on-going love affair between the 
public and the SAS that started with the Iranian Embassy siege and continued both in fact 
and in fictional series on television.  To some extent, Special Forces could apparently do 
little wrong.  The bomb attacks on the mainland caused considerable shock and anger, but 
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then an overwhelming desire to get on with business as usual – something Wesselly 
reminds us is very normal and was also witnessed during the Blitz.  But some events 
sparked much greater indignation – the Warrington bombing and the attack on a mounted 
troop in London, reflecting popular concerns over any attacks against children or animals. 
This is open to manipulation.  In 1995 a five-year old child injured in a Serb mortar attack 
on Sarajevo in 1993 died in Great Ormond Street Hospital.  In fact, she had failed to 
make the list for UN evacuation and doctors used the media (particularly a BBC report 
from August 1993) to ensure she was evacuated5.  In 1991 a 15 year-old girl alleged that 
Iraqis had thrown Kuwaiti babies from their incubators; she was later revealed as the 
daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the USA; the story had been created by the agency 
providing support to the Kuwait government. 
 
1991 saw a large-scale multi-national operation in Kuwait, where issues of national 
survival were not present for the UK, but issues of national interests most certainly were.  
Again, this has the feel of a defencist operation, though the location might tend towards 
Ceadal’s crusading category.  The Gulf War saw a rebellion of 55 Labour MPs – 
something not seen nine years previously in a more consensual Parliament.  For the wider 
public, Faulks summarized their view as one of resigned support, though the polls 
suggested the highest support in Europe.  The clergy were just as divided as in the 
Falklands – the strongly opposing letter by 100 theologians forced support from senior 
church leaders after considerable criticism of a lack of a line during the Falklands 
campaign.  The confidence borne of a low-casualty short war (and perhaps an illusory 
feel of the effectiveness of precision bombing) was clearly a factor in dispatching troops 
                                                 
5 Holland, P, in Tell me lies Op cit p. 185 
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to Bosnia and then Kosovo, where the motivation was far more idealistic to protect 
particular groups from attack by others.  Though some would claim that Bosnia/Kosovo 
had significance as European wars and therefore are part of UK national interests, it is 
less evident that the broad population saw it that way. Both conflicts are firmly in the 
crusading category, with high moral overtones.  The lack of public support for the Bosnia 
operation suggests that people are not keen to employ troops on such operations without a 
clear understanding of the costs and benefits involved, and in this campaign the polls 
demonstrate a clear lack of understanding by the public.  Kosovo showed even more 
starkly that the public felt there had been insufficient public debate, and less than half felt 
it was being managed competently (despite solid support for Tony Blair).  Regional 
opposition to the bombing campaign was marked, reinforced by NATO errors in bombing 
the Chinese Embassy and a civilian train6, which gave the lie to claims of great accuracy 
in weaponry.  But the letters columns also demonstrate a waning interest in the campaign 
over time – it simply was not of interest to the uninvolved populace. 
 
Views on previous wars help to shape public perceptions of contemporary conflicts. The 
impact of the World Wars was particularly significant in this period.  Although interest in 
the Second World War have regularly occurred is high and receives impetus on 
anniversaries, the First World War has had a disproportionate effect on public attitudes to 
modern warfare7.  This can be seen by the great emphasis on First War studies in schools, 
through study of poetry and, with easier access to the Continent and greater affluence, 
                                                 
6 BBC1 and Channel 4 News 12 April 1999 
7 For the fortieth anniversary of Hitler’s rise to power, which spawned some twenty books in the US, Frank 
Finlay’s performance in ‘The Death of Adolf Hitler’ and Alec Guinness’ ‘Hitler: The Last Ten Days’, see 
Harris, R, Selling Hitler (London: Arrow,  1986) p. 52. 
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school trips to the battlefields.  The whole flavour of the act of Remembrance and the 
resurgence in support for Armistice Day, long after most of those who fought in the war 
were long-since dead, has been around the First World War rather than more recent 
conflicts. If people’s perceptions are coloured by the myths of the First World War 
(generally around the trench warfare of the Somme and Passchendaele, the bravery of 
individual soldiers and the ineptitude of the generals) then it is likely their view of 
modern military events will be influenced. A similar point applies to the Second World 
War.  The evidence shows that the major part of the population has, particularly from the 
1970s, preferred to watch Second World War fictional films or dramas rather than 
contemporary television news coverage or any sort of formal programmes on defence.  It 
is simply not possible to quantify the effects that this has had, but we know from parallel 
work that young people can recite virtually word for word the script of popular films such 
as Pulp Fiction and relate strongly to fictional characters from soap operas.  So it can be 
demonstrated that the dominant exposure to war for most of the population has been 
through films and fiction, and some historical studies.  The contention must be, therefore, 
that people’s attitudes to today’s conflicts are affected by misperceptions of the past. 
 
What this thesis has demonstrated is not only the lack of foresight as to the changing 
relationship between British society and the Armed Forces but also any attempt to shape 
military doctrine to prepare the Armed Forces for the rise of both liberal Britain and 
Britain’s new role in the world.  For all the changes over the four decades considered, 
nothing can take away the on-going theme of a close relationship between the public and 
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the individual soldier, preferably framed as a hero (especially if to do with Special 
Forces) and that has been a constant throughout. 
341 
APPENDIX 1.  THE CONCEPT OF A MASS GROUPING. 
 
There are those, such as Glasgow Media Group, who would reject the proposition of a 
‘mass’ group, suggesting that this is too broad and fails to reflect society.  They would 
argue that the growth in higher in education, with some 50% of those in the relevant age 
bracket are now in higher education, compared with some 5% or below in the 1960s, 
implies that there is a much higher proportion of educated people now than in the past, 
who are likely to have views on national issues1. However, their economic status (since 
many low paid public sector jobs are filled by graduates) are likely to mean that their 
concerns are rather different, and to relate to pay and housing, than necessarily defence.  
They would suggest looking at specific interest groups for particular issues, whether 
unions, or ship workers (relevant to naval shipbuilding) for example, and look at their 
impact on power and the elite level.  Space precludes any further consideration of this 
theme.  
 
                                                 
1 Interview Greg Philo Glasgow Media Group.  14 February 2008 
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APPENDIX 2.  2001 CENSUS RESULTS – RELIGION IN BRITAIN (SOURCE: ONS) [not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
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APPENDIX 3.  TEXT OF NATIONWIDE MAY 19831 [not available in the digital version of 
this thesis] 
 
                                                 
1 BBC Archives 
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